Introduction. -- Discussion Involves the consideration of the Mosaic Economy. -- Mistaken or defective views. -- As preliminary, we ask, What is a Theocracy?

 

 

I PROPOSE to unfold my views of the nature of God's moral government, as presented in the Scriptures, by considering the law by which this government is administered.

 

In the proposed discussion of this subject, I shall confine my inquiries to three forms in which God has given law to man, viz., the law which he gave to our first parents in Eden; that which be gave to Israel by Moses; and that which he gave to the world by Christ and his apostles.

 

In pursuing the investigation of this comprehensive subject, it would seem to be the most natural method, to direct our attention in the first place to the law of Eden. This has been the common method with theological writers; and has, if I mistake not, occasioned serious difficulties and many errors in the interpretation of important parts of the sacred writings.

 

There have been, I think, two common assumptions in respect to the law of Eden which are groundless. The one is, that this law, which, in the sum of its requirement, was both a rule of action and of judgment, as first given to our first parents in Eden, has continued to be such to their descendants, without modification or change. It is indeed, quite undeniable that this law of God, requiring absolute moral perfection of man, is, ever has been, and ever will be, obligatory on all men as a rule of action. But it is obviously impossible, that under that economy of mercy which was instituted and revealed on the first apostasy, it should also be a rule of judgment. This would secure the final condemnation of all, and render redemption nugatory. God will judge the world according to the Gospel. I say no more on this topic at present, as I shall have occasion to resume it in another connection.

 

The other assumption to which I refer is, that the law of Eden is given to us by Moses in the very words in which it was given to our first parents by their Creator; and that hence the real question concerning its import is simply how they understood the language of this law.

 

Without however, provoking a controversy respecting the origin of language, and without attempting to show how Adam did or could understand the law from the words of the law, I advert to a fact which wholly supersedes the necessity of such inquiries, viz., that the language of the law given in Eden is the language of Moses, the Jewish historian; and this, whether he compiled the narrative from prior records or not. As the narrator of this transaction, Moses must have used the language of his own age and country. Of course his language must have conveyed those ideas, or that meaning, to his countrymen, which their usage gave it, and this meaning must have. been the same which was originally conveyed by the Creator to our first parents. Whether, therefore, the terms of this law, as it is recorded by Moses, be the ipsissima verba which God addressed to them or not; or whether any language, properly so called, was the medium of communicating to them what these words now express, as employed by Moses according to Jewish usage; this is wholly immaterial to our purpose. If we can determine the import of this language, in the time of Moses, we can determine the true import of what we call the law given to Adam.

 

These remarks, with a little acquaintance with the controversies respecting the import of the law of Eden, will be sufficient to show that if we would obtain just views of this law, our inquiries must be directed first to the import of the Mosaic law. At the same time, many other of the great questions in Scriptural theology, and among them that of our justification before God, depend on correct and adequate views of the law given to Israel. Before then, proceeding to the topics proposed respecting the law of God's moral government, I shall attempt, as preparatory to the discussion of them, to present to some extent, what I consider just views of the Mosaic law.

 

Here a wide field of inquiry opens before us. I propose only to give you some general views which may serve to guide your own future investigations.

 

It has been extensively maintained that the government which God administered over Israel was a theocracy; in other words, that God, as the governor of this people, simply assumed toward them the two great relations of national king and tutelary deity; and that accordingly, the laws which he gave them by Moses were simply national laws, and were enforced simply by temporal sanctions, involving to a great extent, supernatural interpositions in their execution. On this ground the learned Warburton has founded an argument for the divine legation of Moses, of this nature, viz., that Moses is the only human legislator who ever attempted to enforce his laws by temporal sanctions involving supernatural interpositions; and for this reason, that none but the true God could control the laws of nature, and execute such promises and threatenings as those by which the Mosaic code was enforced. In this argument Warburton rested much on the premise, that no future state of reward and punishment was taught in what he calls "the Mosaic religion," or "Mosaic dispensation," by which he must be understood to mean at least, that the Mosaic code was in no respect enforced by such sanctions. He denies that Noses, or the people of Israel, disbelieved a future state. He admits that the Mosaic dispensation, as a typical system, taught the doctrine of a future state, and that many passages in the Old Testament, in their typical sense, teach the same doctrine. What he seems to mean and maintain is simply, that the Mosaic dispensation, as such, does not, in literal language, or in the primary meaning of its language, teach the doctrine of future rewards and punishments; nor of course, make any use of this doctrine in enforcing obedience to its laws. What is true in this respect we may see hereafter. I only remark now, that the argument of Warburton for the divine legation of Moses must be admitted to be conclusive, whether we suppose the doctrine of a future state to be revealed and known or not; for if the laws given to Israel were enforced by constant supernatural interposition of God, the divine mission of their lawgiver was established.

 

Various opinions have been entertained in respect to the nature and design of the Mosaic dispensation. Some have maintained, that the laws of Moses respected only the external conduct or overt doings of men, because, like civil laws in modern times, they were enforced only by temporal sanctions, and in their administration made external conduct the criterion of obedience or disobedience, as if because such conduct under civil law is the proof, it is therefore the whole constituting element of loyalty or disloyalty. Others seem to deny or overlook the peculiar character or nature of this government as a theocracy, and to contemplate it only as a religious system which exhibits God solely as the moral governor of men. Others speak of it as requiring obedience, in the most unqualified manner, to all its precepts, under the penalty of death, and allowing no merely to any sinner, however penitent. Others still have considered the Mosaic law as a system by which Church and State were united -- a union of which I am not so fortunate as to have seen any satisfactory explanation by those who maintain it.

 

Indeed, I must confess myself by no means satisfied with any view or explanation of the Mosaic law which I have seen. Even Jahn, one of the latest and best writers on the subject, appears to me to have overlooked entirely that material characteristic of the system, to which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews has given the most prominence -- its characteristic as a representative system. The grand error of commentators -- of all who have attempted to unfold the nature of the system -- has been, as it seems to vie, one of the following: either that they have regarded it as so exclusively a religious or moral polity -- what I have termed God's moral government over men as moral beings, as to overlook, and virtually deny, its primary, essential, and in one sense, its only character, that of a merely national institution; or, that they have regarded it -- I do not say as exclusively a civil institution, for such I think, in one use of language, it is and is properly said to be, but that as such, it neither furnished nor was designed to furnish, any important instruction respecting God's higher system of moral government over men as moral and immortal beings; or, that they have regarded it as so combining the two systems -- so uniting Church and State -- under one system, that it is impossible, even for practical purposes, to trace a clear distinction between them. On this subject there is an ambiguity of language which also deserves notice. In speaking as modern writers do of this system, as a national or civil institution of government, their language naturally leads the reader to understand that it does not in its nature include a representative system. But to speak of a national system of government, in that age of the world, when every such system was a theocracy, was to speak of a national system which, in its essential nature, was a representative system. To omit therefore, this idea or conception of a theocracy, by using the language described, is to give an essentially imperfect and false view of the thing in one of its most important relations.

 

Jahn, in his able treatise on this subject, appears to me to have misled himself by this unauthorized use of language; and in some instance, to have fallen into the second, and in others into the third, of the errors above specified. Certainly, I cannot discover that he ever exhibits a theocracy, or the Jewish theocracy, as a representative system. Without this view of this theocracy, or with either of the views of it above specified, it is not strange, I think, that very imperfect and erroneous views should be formed of the reasons, the nature, the design of this amazing economy.

 

The proposition on this important part of the subject, which, with requisite explanations, I shall attempt to establish, is, that the Mosaic law or system of government was a theocracy, and as such, designed to exhibit God's moral government over men as moral beings under an economy of grace.

 

I propose to show --

 

I. What a theocracy is;

II. That the Mosaic law was a theocracy; and,

III. That it was designed to exhibit God's moral government over men as moral beings under an economy of grace. I inquire, then --

 

 

I. What is a theocracy?

 

That we may the better understand the nature of this kind of government, it is necessary to recur to the actual state of the world, and to the prevailing views of civil government, especially in Egypt, when Israel was called out of that country, to be organized as a distinct and peculiar nation under the superintendence and government of the true God.

 

The following facts demand particular consideration:

 

1. The notion of tutelary deities -- which has been supposed to be originally Egyptian -- was universal throughout the Gentile world.

This notion was, that the earth was divided by its Creator among a number of subordinate deities, each of which was employed in the protection and care of his own country and people, and wholly unconcerned for every other.

 

2. On this universal belief of an idolatrous world, in Egypt and all other nations, was founded all civil government.

 

These ancient legislators adopted into their civil code, not only laws which were strictly municipal, or designed to regulate Civil Conduct, but laws requiring and regulating, so far as such laws can control, the worship and service of their national gods, always claiming that they imposed their laws by the authority and sanctions of some divinity. And so, it may be said, the people believed.

 

3. All these were civil laws, or laws of the civil magistrate, having divine authority, whether they respected the worship of their national divinity or other conduct.

 

They were enforced by temporal sanctions, and the belief was as absolute as it was universal among the nations, that as they obeyed or disobeyed these laws of kings and rulers, they should receive both as individuals, good or evil from the hands of the civil magistrate, and also as nations, blessing or cursing from their tutelary deities, in the present world. Thus temporal good and evil, as dispensed in these modes, became exclusively and directly the sanctions of civil government in Egypt and in other nations -- sanctions of sure execution, in the popular belief, except arrested, in case of disobedience, by such rites of sacrifice and lustration as were ordained for propitiating their offended deities.

 

4. Every such national institution involved another characteristic or relation: it was regarded as a representative system.

 

By this I mean that the theocracy, or national system which, as such, respected the conduct and condition of men, as beings of earth and time, implied another and a higher system of government over them as moral and immortal beings, so that the latter was represented by and inferred from the former. The theocracy, as I understand it, was in every respect a merely national system, though of that peculiar kind in which God, or the divinity of the nation, was both national king and tutelary deity, and which also implied and represented a higher system of government in relation to a future state of existence.

 

The popular belief in this other and higher system, and its intimate connection with the theocratic government, seems to me, as a general fact or truth, to be placed beyond all reasonable doubt by Bishop Warburton in his Divine Legation of Moses, and also by other writers. I say as a general fact or truth, for I by no means commit myself to the defense of all the details of Warburton on the subject. Assuming their, as I think I may now safely assume, that the national government of Egypt, during the bondage of Israel in that country, was a theocracy and, as such, a merely civil or national institution as we have described it, we may now see that it would naturally, and did in fact in the view of the nation, become a representative system, implying another and a higher system of government over men, as moral and immortal beings; so that the latter was inferred from, and represented by the former. Let us look at the nature and circumstances of the case.

 

This form of civil government -- for as a theocracy it was simply such -- though wholly of human origin in fact, was founded, in its earlier forms at least, wholly in the pretense of divine revelation and divine authority. The ancient kings and legislators pretended, and secured the admission of the pretense, that they were commissioned by some god, by whose authority and direction they imposed their laws on the nations. The design of this claim to a divine mission and to divine authority, was of course, to establish their control, and to perpetuate their power and their institutions. The more effectually to accomplish this, they availed themselves of the false religious systems of their people, especially the doctrine of tutelary deities, who, it was believed, exercised a particular providence over the affairs of men, and would bless with prosperity or curse with calamity, the nation over which they presided, as they should obey or disobey the laws of the civil ruler. Hence these rulers artfully employed these quasi religious opinions of the people, and especially encouraged their mysteries or rites of worship, that they might increase their veneration for these tutelary gods. This was done that so they might establish and render effective, the popular belief of the superintendence of these gods over the affairs of men in this world, by giving full force to the divine but temporal sanctions of civil government and its laws. Accordingly, the belief, as we have before said, was as absolute as it was universal among the nations, that as they obeyed or disobeyed the laws of kings and rulers, they obeyed or disobeyed their gods, and should receive at their hands as tutelary deities, both as nations and individuals, good or evil, blessing or cursing, in the present world. Thus temporal good and evil, as dispensed by the providence of the national gods, and by their authority through the hands of the civil magistrate, were the sanctions, the only proper legal sanctions, of a theocracy or national government in Egypt and in other nations.

 

But this is not all. Equally universal was the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments. Nor did the ingenuity prompted by the love of power fail to employ this belief for the purpose of enforcing submission to the authority, and obedience to the laws of civil government. This belief, however, was not inculcated or adopted, under the assumption that eternal sanctions were a part of the theocracy or national government; for this was not a government directly instituted and administered by the gods, without the intervention of men as civil rulers. It was administered in its ordinary course by men, who, according to the popular belief, were directed by divine inspiration; and so far as sanctioned by the providence of the gods, it was sanctioned only by means of. temporal good and evil.

 

But then this belief of a future state of rewards and punishments involved the belief of a great and momentous fact inseparable from it -- the belief of another and higher system of government than a national theocracy -- a government which, in its origin, authority and administration, would be regarded as directly and exclusively in the hands of the national divinity, whether of one supreme god or of many gods. This would be naturally regarded as a moral, as distinguished from a civil, government, and as determining the allotments of men in a future state of existence, when they had passed beyond the reach and control of earthly rulers, and all that could be called civil government. It would necessarily be regarded as a government, with its law as a rule of action and of judgment, and with its final issues in happiness and misery, as suited to an untried state of existence, and as exclusively in the hands of the national divinity. It would also involve other and higher relations on the part of men while living and acting in this world, than those of the subjects of a merely civil and temporal institution, for it would hold them responsible in respect to the higher rewards and punishments of an eternal retribution. As instituted and administered by the national divinity, it would naturally and surely be regarded as having a strong resemblance, in certain great principles and modes of administration, to that which the same being had established and administered over them as their tutelary deity. The administration of some of the laws of a theocracy would necessarily be confined to the civil magistracy. This part of the theocracy, consisting of these laws, some of them perhaps, admitting of satisfaction for their violation by offerings and sacrifices, and others not, would not naturally, being thus exclusively in the hands of men with the errors and imperfections of its administration, be supposed to bear an exact or even a striking resemblance to the higher system. It would be far more natural and reasonable to infer a resemblance between that part of the theocracy whose administration, in respect to sanctions, was reserved in the hands of the tutelary god or gods, according to the promises and the threatenings which were to be executed by an extraordinary providence. This, I cannot but think, would be the most natural view of the subject, though we may not be warranted by the records of antiquity to say that it was actually taken. But that the theocracy, or lower system -- so far as its administration was viewed as in the hands of the tutelary divinity, and as involving an extraordinary providence, whether it respected individuals or the nation generally -- would be considered as resembling, and so representing, the higher system in its general nature and great principles, cannot, I think, be reasonably doubted. It is true indeed, that from the essential differences in the nature of the two systems as pertaining to different states of existence, would obviously, in the view of all, naturally arise differences in their administration. But how could it be supposed, that the same Divine Being who reigned supreme in both systems,should prescribe a rule of action requiring less or more in either, than the spirit of loyalty due to a divine being? The natural conclusion would be, that this rule of action, though sustained in the one system by temporal, and in the other by eternal sanctions, would be the same in both, and especially if it were absolutely perfect in the lower, would not be less than absolutely perfect in the higher system. Further, if the lower system assumed, and proceeded on the assumption, that this perfect rule of action was universally transgressed, this would be unavoidably implied in respect to the rule of the higher system. If this perfect rule of action was modified as a rule of judgment under the theocracy, by an economy of grace and forgiveness in respect to penitent transgressors, through propitiatory sacrifices, how could it be supposed that less benignity would characterize the government of the same being, under the higher system, in forgiving transgression through some adequate propitiation. Under both systems, the perfection of the law as a rule of action could scarcely fail so far to convict the human conscience of sin, as to render welcome the doctrine of forgiveness by sacrifice, and to secure the belief of it, especially as sedulously inculcated by kings, hierophants, &c., in the mysteries and rites of national worship. It is true, that the mode of determining who is obedient and who disobedient to the rule of judgment, would widely differ under the two systems. In one it would be only through the medium of external action; in the other, by the direct inspection of the heart by an omniscient judge. In neither would the claim for the true principle and spirit of loyalty to the reigning divinity be dispensed with as a matter of obligation. In each system, as a system of law and grace, the rule of duty, as prescribing the whole duty of the subject, would differ from the rule of judgment as prescribing the condition of acceptance and favor. While the rule of duty in each system must be the same, and the rule of judgment in each the same, yet, in the lower or national system, external action, though not full compliance with the rule of judgment as being merely external action, must be the evidence or proof, and therefore the criterion of such compliance. But in the higher system, not external action but the direct inspection of the heart, would determine the question of compliance with the rule of judgment. Hence they who were judged obedient to the national system according to the rule of judgment under it as a system of grace, would, if actually obedient to this rule, be rewarded under the higher system; or if judged disobedient to the national system, according to the rule and mode of judgment under it, would, if actually disobedient to this rule, be punished under the higher system. Thus, a higher influence than any furnished by the theocracy, or merely national government, with its temporal sanctions, and its mode of adjudication, was employed, not as a part of the national government as such, but still as tending to secure obedience to the national government. It was the influence of the authority of Him who was their national god, but not as their national king, reigning over them as beings of earth and time, but as their moral governor, reigning over them as moral and immortal beings. The two relations of national king and moral governor were combined in one being. The authority was one and the same in both. It was divine. It was as if God should become the national king of this State, and thus impart his authority to our particular form of government and each particular law of this government. This would not confound, but present in perfect distinctness, the two great relations of national ruler and moral governor. his assumption of the former would not in the slightest degree obscure the latter, especially if we suppose him to give us a national system of government, resembling in its more prominent and substantial characteristics his moral system. We should still distinguish the one from the other as clearly as the Saviour did, when he said, "Fear not them which kill the body," &c.; or, again, "Render to Ceasar the things," &c.; or as the apostle, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man," &c. In like manner, if we suppose ourselves in the condition of the heathen nations, without the knowledge of God by revelation, and yet believing in a supreme divinity as a national god and tutelary deity, and at the same time believing in a future state in which this being would dispense future rewards and punishments, it would be natural -- it would be reasonable to believe -- it would be nearly incredible that we should not believe, in a higher system of government than the theocracy, while the latter should represent, and satisfactorily illustrate, the nature and great principles of the former. So in the case of a heathen theocracy, the resemblance being rationally assumed, so far as the nature of the two systems would admit, the lower system, in its essential nature and substantial principles, being constantly acted upon and familiarly known -- being regarded as a revelation from the supreme divinity and having his high sanction; how can it be doubted that a theocracy, though as such a mere national system would be, and was regarded by its subjects, in all supposable and substantial respects, as implying, proving, and representing a higher system of moral government, whose judgments and retributions were to follow when the soul left the body; in a word, that a theocracy, though simply a national system administered over men as beings of earth and time, was a representative system also, exhibiting a moral system as administered over men as moral and immortal beings?

 

A theocracy then, may be said to be the civil government of a nation or people in which the supreme divinity, whether one god or many gods, assumes the two relations of national king and national god or tutelary deity, and administers by his extraordinary providence, their entire civil polity under a system of grace; thus exhibiting, by inference and representation, his higher system of moral government over them as moral and immortal beings.