The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME II

 

SECTION III:

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD AS REVEALED IN THE SCRIPTURES

 

LECTURE XIII:

THE NATURE OF GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT AS REVEALED.

 

Section 6: The law expresses God's preference of obedience to disobedience, all things considered. -- Two opposite views on this subject possible. -- The first, Inadmissible by the language of the law; opposed to the dictates of common sense; self-contradictory and absurd; mistakes an Involuntary state for a preference; converts sin Into holiness and holiness into sin. -- The second view supported by the language of the law; by God's sincerity &c., &c.; by his own solemn assurances In the Scriptures. -- No texts teach the contrary.

 

 

I proceed now to consider the law of this government in -- Sect. 6. -- As an expression of God's preference of obedience to disobedience, all things considered.

 

We have consulted the dictates of reason on this subject, and now propose to consider it in the light of Revelation.

 

Before I proceed to show what the Scriptures teach on the subject, I remark that there are two different, and only two different views, in respect to which we need direct our inquiries:

 

One is, that God expresses in his law simply a preference of obedience to disobedience in themselves considered, or when each is considered in its true nature and tendency; while he also expresses in his revelation, a preference of disobedience to obedience, all things considered, or, of the former to the latter in every instance in which the former takes place, as being the necessary means of the greatest good.

 

The other is, that God in the circumstances, or under that perfect system of moral government under which he addresses his law to men, expresses a preference of obedience to disobedience, all things considered, i.e., considered in every respect and in every instance of moral action.

 

I propose to consider these different views of the divine law in the order in which I have now stated them.

 

I. Concerning the former, I remark --

 

1. That the language of the divine law not only does not admit of the meaning now expressed, but forbids it. There is not a word in the language, which expresses or implies, or in the remotest manner intimates that God prefers disobedience to his law to obedience, or sin to holiness, all things considered. Much less is there any thing in the language which shuts it down to this meaning. On the contrary, the language of this law in its form or manner of use, is the direct, unqualified, and decisive form which lawgivers have ever employed, and subjects have ever understood to express an absolute preference, all things considered, of obedience to disobedience to law. Such language, therefore, requires this meaning, de usu loquendi, the only umpire of propriety, and admits of no other. It is absolutely incredible that the lawgiver should use this language in any other meaning, and not intend to deceive his subjects, especially if he employs it to mean that he prefers disobedience to his law all things considered, to obedience in its stead. If therefore, there be any reason for this interpretation of the divine law, it must be found elsewhere than in the language of the law. And further, it is worthy of remark, that none who thus interpret the divine law pretend to derive their interpretation from the language of the law; but simply and solely from certain peculiar and false notions of Scriptural language as employed on another subject -- the decretive will of God. The argument is this -- that without the interpretation of the law now opposed, its just meaning would be inconsistent with the meaning of the Scriptural language respecting the decretive will of God. Be it so. If just interpretation gives inconsistency or contradiction in the language of the Scriptures, we must admit the inconsistency or contradiction. But we shall see there is no pretense for this alleged inconsistency; and if this be so, then there is not even a pretense that the law of God expresses his preference of obedience to disobedience all things considered, and in all instances in which obedience takes place.

 

2. The interpretation of the divine law now opposed, does violence to the plain and incontrovertible dictates of common sense, and ascribes a peculiarity to the moral government of God which is incredible. It will not be pretended that the law of any other moral government was ever understood to express such a preference of obedience as that now supposed. And to show how revolting to the common sentiments of men such a law would be, we have only to suppose its import fully and precisely developed. Suppose then a parent or civil legislator should, in the absolute and unqualified form of a law, require any given act of duty, and should at the same time unequivocally declare that in every instance in which the law should be violated, its violation would be the necessary mean, of the greatest good, and as such be preferred by him to an act of obedience in its stead. Now I do not ask merely whether such a law thus explained by the lawgiver, would not be regarded as something unheard of; but whether it would not be considered as furnishing decisive proof of either insanity or falsehood, and be pronounced by the unhesitating decisions of common sense and sound reason to be worthy either of contempt or execration? When we reflect that God in revealing himself to men as their moral governor, does in fact assume that men are prepared to understand the nature of this relation, and leaves them to the obvious dictates of reason and common sense as the medium of understanding the language of his law, can we suppose that he intended that his law should be understood in a meaning which all the world would regard as absurd and revolting in the law of a human legislator? Is such a peculiarity in the government of God credible? Who made this discovery? Not the people, but theologians; and how were they led to give the law such an interpretation? Simply to maintain its consistency with other errors about decrees.

 

3. This scheme is self-contradictory and absurd. It is here necessary to advert to the different phraseology used by the advocates of this scheme. Some of their language I regard as unobjectionable, only when used as synonymous with that which I regard as -- entirely false. Thus they often say that God purposes sin, or the existence of sin, all things considered. This is undoubtedly true. But then it is by no means synonymous with the position that God purposes sin rather than holiness, all things considered. God doubtless purposes the existence of sin rather than its prevention (and this is the true meaning of the elliptical statement under consideration), it being considered that the prevention of sin by God required the nonexistence of the best system. This however does not imply a preference of sin to holiness for any consideration whatever, when the existence of one is compared with the existence of the other under the best system. The doctrine to which I object is that which represents God as preferring sin to holiness, all things considered, under the present system of government, and the thing considered in sin as the ground of the preference, is its relation as the necessary means of the greatest good.

 

But that I may not misrepresent this doctrine, I would still more minutely exhibit it in the language of its advocates.

 

It is said then that holiness and sin, or obedience and disobedience, are what they are in their true nature and appropriate tendencies, and that they are nothing more: that whatever good sin may be made the occasion of under the government of God, decides nothing in respect to its true nature and tendencies, i.e., nothing in regard to the thing itself: that although its existence may be NECESSARY, as the occasion by which God can produce greater good than would be the result of universal holiness in creatures, yet its true nature and tendency are only to evil, while the true nature and tendency of holiness are only to good; that therefore the estimate expressed by the Moral Governor simply respects holiness and sin as they are in their own nature and tendencies, i.e., in themselves abstractly from the good which he may bring out of the evil, and that therefore the law of God is a proper expression of his preference as a lawgiver for holiness to sin, although the existence of sin is preferable to holiness in reference to the good of which it is the necessary means.

 

Upon this I remark, that it contains a palpable inconsistency; in other words, that it comprises two positions, both of which cannot be true. Thus it asserts that sin is what it is in its own nature and appropriate tendency, and that it is properly nothing more; and that it is, thus viewed, wholly evil: and yet it also asserts that in the circumstances in which it exists, it is the necessary means of the greatest good. Now I ask, what is the import of this last position but this, that God being what he is and man being what he is, the moral government of God being what it is and holiness and sin being what they are -- in short, the nature, relations, and reality of things being what they are, sin in the circumstances in which it exists, is the necessary means of the greatest good? But if this be the meaning of this position, then its meaning is that sin in its true nature and tendency is the necessary means of the greatest good. I assert on high authority, that of President Edwards, "That tendency is truly esteemed to belong to the nature of any thing, or to be inherent in it; that is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence, whether that tendency be good or bad." If then sin in the circumstances in which it exists will produce and is the necessary means of producing the greatest good, according to the real nature and relations of things, or "in its proper situation," &c., then it is the true nature and tendency of sin to produce the greatest good. But this palpably contradicts the position in the same scheme, that the true nature and tendency of sin is only to evil. Both cannot be true.

 

Notwithstanding the plain contradiction and inconsistency of this scheme, we can be at no loss which of the contradictory positions essentially belongs to the scheme itself. It is unquestionably that which affirms the necessity of sin to the greatest good; for the moment this position is separated from the scheme, its real or its professed object fails. That object is to give an intelligible and satisfactory explanation of the existence of sin, and of the purpose of God in regard to its existence. The explanation is, that it is the necessary means of the greatest good. But if this be denied and rejected from the scheme, it fails utterly to give satisfaction on the question why sin exists, or to show in what respect it is an object of the divine purpose. The scheme itself, by such a denial would be denied and abandoned.

 

If I be asked whether God may not bring greater good out of the existence of sin and the system with which it is connected, than WOULD HAVE BEEN the result of the obedience which would have been actually rendered under any different system, I reply that there is no doubt of it. But this does not prove that he will or can bring more good out of sin, than would have resulted from the obedience which SHOULD AND MIGHT have been rendered in this system. Of course it does not show that sin in this system is necessary to the greatest good.

 

It may be said that God is able and will in fact bring greater good out of the existence of sin, than COULD have resulted from the universal obedience of his accountable creatures, and that thus sin may be desirable, not as having in itself any tendency to good, but as the necessary means of the greatest good. It may be urged as decisive in favor of the distinction between a thing as thus good in itself, and good as the necessary means of good, that as the means of good it has no inherent property in itself, but is entirely dependent on the will and agency of God, and that on the supposition that God brings greater good out of it, than could have resulted from universal obedience, then it is good not in itself, but only as the necessary means of good. I answer that this supposition is inconsistent with itself. For while it asserts that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, it also asserts that it has no inherent property which fits it to be such a means. But if sin has no inherent property in its own nature that fits it to be the means of good rather than any thing else, then it cannot be the necessary means of good, rather than something else; and therefore to say that it has no such inherent property, and to say that it is the necessary means of good, is to assert a plain contradiction.

 

Again: sin either has inherent in its nature that property which fits it to be the necessary means of the greatest good through divine agency, or it has not. If it has not, then something else through the divine agency might answer the proposed end as well. If it has such an inherent property, then it is in its own nature fitted to be the means of the greatest good in a respect in which nothing else is, and is therefore in its own nature or tendency better than any thing else as the means of good.

 

Again: if there be nothing in the nature of sin which fits it to be the means of the greatest good, and if it be true that the supposed result, viz., the greatest good, is not to be ascribed at all to the nature of sin but solely to divine agency, then for aught that appears, divine agency might use any thing else as the means of that good as well as sin. Of course sin is not the necessary means of that good, for the same divine agency might have produced the same result without the existence of sin as well as with it. A case referred to in illustration of the opinion which I am opposing, will demonstrate the error of that opinion. I mean the crucifixion of the Saviour by wicked hands. It is assumed that in order to the good which results from the atonement of Christ, it was necessary that he should be put to death by a murderous act. Whether it be so or not must depend on the question, whether there was any thing in that sinful deed as such, which was necessary to the fact of an atonement. If there was, then the act may be said to be necessary to the good resulting from this work of divine mercy. But if there was not, then his death, allowing that to be necessary, would, though accomplished in any other manner -- for example, by the direct agency of God, or in the way in which the Saviour suffered in the garden -- have possessed the same atoning efficacy. And to make the error of the above theory still more apparent, let it be supposed that there was that in the act of the murderers of our Lord which was in the nature of things indispensable to the redemption of a fallen world, and that benevolence required that this redemption should be accomplished, and would not the moral quality of the act be at once changed? It would indeed be malice toward an innocent man -- it would be in direct violation of a divine command; but the moment that such malice becomes in its true nature and tendency, and according to the true nature and tendency of things, indispensable to the greatest good, it becomes a matter of duty, and ought to be a subject of precept, according to the only principle that benevolence itself can be decided to be a proper subject of precept.

 

But it may be said still further, that it may be necessary, in order that sin may be the necessary means of good, that it should be a violation of a divine command, since otherwise it could furnish no occasion for the display of the divine mercy in its remission. I answer, that sin is what it is, independently of the law which forbids it. It is not made sin by being forbidden. That the law is given by a perfect being, may be proof that the act forbidden is sin; but the mere fact of violating a good law does not, strictly speaking, constitute the sin of the act. The act is in its nature sin or it is not, and no law can alter its nature. If it is not in its nature sin, then it would furnish no occasion for the display of mercy, since there can be no display of mercy in forgiving sin which is not sin. If it be in its nature sin, then it cannot be in its nature the necessary means of the greatest good; for to suppose this, is as we have shown, to suppose that concerning it which wholly changes its moral quality.

 

4. That which this scheme denominates a preference in the divine mind of holiness to sin, is not and cannot in the case supposed, be a preference, but can be only an involuntary state of mind. I need not say that we properly decide what is possible and what is impossible in respect to volitions, preferences, &c., in the divine mind by the known laws of our own mental operations. I affirm then, that it is absolutely impossible according to these laws, that I should really and truly prefer one object of choice to another viewed in themselves, and at the same time prefer the latter to the former as the necessary means of the greater good. In every act of choice we take into consideration the entire amount of good inherent in and connected with each object, and form our choice or preference in view of the whole. In other words, we never prefer or choose an object because in one respect we esteem it better than another, while yet in another respect we esteem the other as so much better than that, as to possess on the whole a superior value. Let us take an example. Rich fruit and a bitter medicine which is necessary to life are proffered. Now I may desire, i.e., be involuntarily inclined to choose the fruit as better in one respect, or if you please, better in itself than the bitter medicine. It may be true that I should choose the fruit IF my life were not in danger. But is not this all that can possibly be true respecting my state of mind toward the fruit? Can there be a real preference or choice of it in such a case? There is according to the supposition, an actual preference of the medicine as the means of the greatest good. Is there also an actual preference of the fruit? If so, which will be taken? Both cannot be. Which will be when each is actually preferred to the other? But the point is too plain for controversy. Precisely however like the supposed preference for the fruit, which is not preference and can with no propriety or truth be called a preference, is the preference of holiness to sin which is imputed to the Divine Being, and which he is supposed to express in his law, which is no preference. It is merely an involuntary desire or inclination which in all cases precedes choice or preference, and is as truly diverse from an act of the will as any one mental act or state is from any other. All therefore that can be said with truth on this scheme is, that God has an involuntary desire that men should be holy when holiness and sin are considered in themselves; but instead of preferring holiness to sin on this account, he prefers sill as the necessary means of the greatest good, to holiness. The scheme therefore which represents God as preferring sin to holiness as the necessary means of the greatest good, does ascribe that to God which necessarily implies that he neither has nor can have in any sense whatever, a preference of holiness to sin; that his law, interpreted as it must be, is an absolute falsehood, and himself the unqualified approver of sin.

 

6. This scheme converts the act of man which the Scriptures pronounce to be sin, into duty or moral excellence.

 

This it does in two respects. (1.) As it asserts it to be the most useful; for, as we have already shown, if sin be the necessary means of the greatest good, then it is such in its nature and tendency, and of course is in its nature and tendency the most useful. But we hold that there is not a plainer truth in morals, than that virtue or moral excellence is founded in its tendency to good. As we have before had occasion to say, it is not the law which makes an action right in a moral sense, but only proves it to be so. The action is right or wrong independently of the law which prescribes it, and is morally right simply and only as it is as a voluntary act which in its nature and relations tends to produce the greatest good. Such according to this scheme is sin. Sin therefore is morally right as the best act of man.

 

It is so (2.), if we appeal to the known will of the Lawgiver, for according to this scheme God has expressed no will but one, and that is a preference of sin to holiness. Even if we admit the opposite and inconsistent preferences, which this scheme ascribes to the Supreme Lawgiver, still we know at least in respect to all the sin that has been and all that shall be committed, that he prefers it to obedience in its stead. So also as we are told that all men who come into the world will commit some sin, it follows that some sin in every man even before its commission, is known to be preferred by God to perfect holiness. Indeed if we reflect how long the world has stood, and how much sin there has been in it, how few and solitary are the exceptions furnished by individuals to the universal sinfulness of our race, and that all the sin which has existed has, as the necessary means of the greatest good, been preferred by God to holiness in its stead, the probability is not slight but preponderating with respect to an individual, that he will better please God by disobedience to his law than by obedience. Rather I may say it is matter of absolute certainty. For if God has in one instance preferred sin to holiness -- and surely if he has in all instances in which sin has existed -- then his law is no expression of an opposite preference, and cannot furnish a particle of evidence that he has any other preference than that of sin to holiness. If his law furnishes no such evidence, none is furnished. We are left simply to the known and declared expression of his preference of sin to holiness as the rule of duty.

 

Many other consequences might be legitimately derived from the scheme now opposed, which are equally revolting and absurd. It might be shown that repentance on the part of a sinner is not only not a duty, but in view of the divine will as the standard of right, is impossible. It might be shown that benevolent action also is not right action, &c., &c.

 

II. I shall attempt to show the truth of the second view of this subject as before stated, viz., that God in the circumstances or under the system of moral government, under which he addresses his law to men, expresses a preference of obedience to disobedience in every respect and in every instance of moral action.

 

This I argue --

 

1. From the language of the law.

 

I have already remarked that the language of the law is the direct and unqualified language used by men in all legal enactments to express an unqualified preference. I now say that it must be understood to express such a preference. In proof of this I allege the principle that the language used in this instance must be interpreted as it is interpreted when used in similar cases and in a similar form. If not, then how can it convey any meaning to the mind? I admit there may be cases in which reasons may exist for limiting the ordinary import of language; but no reason can be assigned for such limitation here. If it be said that otherwise the Bible is contradictory, and this is all that can be said, I answer, first, that this according to principles before advanced, is an insufficient reason; and secondly, that the Bible is not made contradictory by this interpretation.

 

2. This being the true interpretation of the language of the law, it follows that if the meaning now given is not the real meaning, there is no sincerity in God's commands.

 

This is sufficiently obvious from a single illustration. If I invite a friend to my house, or command a child to perform a certain act, and should connect with such an invitation or command the declaration that all things considered I preferred the invitation should not be accepted, or the act should not be performed, should I be counted sincere? How then can God be so accounted? Surely it makes no difference whether the fact is uttered in connection with the command or is capable of being, known from other sources of evidence. It is the fact and not the method in which it is learned, that makes God sincere or false -- that binds man to take him at his word, or releases him from the obligation.

 

Several other considerations might be urged; such as the metal perfection of God; the nature of the thing required of man; his hatred of sin; the character of the law as holy, just, and good; the essential nature of law as involving an honest and sincere preference of holiness to sin; the design of law as fitted to make men believe the lawgiver sincere, &c. It is sufficient to refer to the frequent and strong assurances which are made by God himself. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn and live." "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not!" "If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace!" "Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to the knowledge of the truth." "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together." Last of all we have God's own vindication from the charge that is urged by this theory: "What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? wherefore when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes.

 

Again: I urge that no valid objections can be derived from opposing texts. If there are texts which, when properly interpreted, teach the contrary, then we are forced to admit that there are contradictions in the Bible. The declarations ought to be very explicit and precise, to lead us to doubt that the law expresses God's preference of holiness to sin. Neither are true.

 

Acts, iv. 28, and ii. 23, are often referred to. But in these texts nothing more is declared than that God purposed the wicked act by which Christ was crucified. This I cheerfully admit. But the question is, in what respect did he purpose it?

 

Did he purpose it as the necessary means of the greatest good? Is this distinctly asserted? Is it implied? It is not to the point to say that great good followed the act. The question still returns, whether all this good might not have been secured without the act. Who knows that it could not? And if no one, who shall say that it could not?

 

(Gen. i. 20.) Here nothing more is said than that God meant or purposed the wicked act of selling Joseph into Egypt to be the occasion of good, as he doubtless does design in respect to all sin. But it is not asserted that sin, or this sin was preferred as the necessary means of the greatest good.

 

(Ps. lxxvi. 10.) The meaning of this passage is exhausted by saying that God will cause sin (wrath) to praise him and prevent all that he cannot render subservient to this end. But how does it follow from this that the wrath -- the sin -- is the necessary means of the greatest good?

 

(Exodus, ix. 16, and Rom. ix. 17.) These passages declare only that God purposed Pharaoh's existence and his acts. But they do not declare that these acts of sin were the necessary means of the greatest good, or of any good.

 

(Matt. xiii. 14; Mark, iv. 12; Luke. viii. 10.) Christ did not choose to change the system of influences that he had purposed, nor to add to it influences which would secure the conversion. This was for wise reasons; but among these reasons it is not said that their continuance in sin was preferred as the necessary means of the greatest good.

 

END OF SECTION III.

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