The GOSPEL TRUTH

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME II

 

APPENDIX -- No. V:

THOUGHTS ON THE EVIDENCE FOR DIVINE REVELATION, AND ESPECIALLY THE ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES.
 
1. Miracles defined. -- Misconceptions removed -- 2. Miracles are credible. -- A strong presumption against miracles as contrary to experience. -- 3. Are capable of proof. -- 4. Under the circumstances; and, 5. Are therefore credible. -- To complete the argument, the historical narrative must be shown to be true and Its authors Inspired.

It is urged that events like the recorded miracles have been wrought. -- Also by Dr. Chalmers, that miracles may be wrought by other beings than God. -- This opinion controverted: 1. As inconsistent with the proper meaning of the word; 2. As subverting the object of miracles; 3. As destitute of proof; and, 4. As opposed by reason and the Scriptures.

 

 

IT is essential to the argument for a divine revelation, that the facts related, the miracles, should be shown to be credible, since if miracles, as the opposers of revelation maintain, are incredible, not only no argument from the miracles alleged can be derived, but the whole argument for a revelation is weakened, if not subverted, by the narration of such events.

 

On the question whether the scriptural miracles are incredible, I propose to show --

 

1. What a miracle is; and,

2. That a scriptural miracle is no more incredible than a common event.

 

1. What is a miracle? Different answers have been given to this question. As a general answer, comprising others which have been given, I should say: A miracle is an event which can be accounted for only by ascribing it to a direct divine agency; or which cannot be accounted for by ascribing it to any law of nature, or to the agency or action of any created agent or cause.

 

By nature, in this connection, I mean created beings or things. By a law of nature, I mean that established course or order of things or events which depends solely on the constitution, properties, or nature of any created thing, and which admits of no deviation by any created power. By a deviation from a law of nature, I mean any departure from or alteration of such a law, whether it includes or involves a suspension, or counteraction, or violation of the law. A miracle then essentially differs from every other event, as it involves a deviation from some law of nature as now explained.

 

How we are to determine whether an event is a miracle or not, or whether it actually involves a deviation from a law of nature, we shall inquire elsewhere. What I now affirm is, that no event can be a miracle which does not involve, and that every event is a miracle which does involve, a deviation from any law of nature.

 

It may be well to remark still further, that by laws of nature I do not mean merely that order of created things by which certain changes are produced in certain circumstances, but also that order or course of things by which certain changes are not produced, or by which they continue as they are, or produce no changes whatever. Thus it is as truly a law of nature that a dead man should remain dead, as that a living man should die when wounded in the heart; that a man born blind, or without eyes, should not be made to see by a word or by the application of clay and spittle, is a law of nature; that five loaves and two small fishes should not be augmented into a quantity of food sufficient to feed five thousand men, is a law of nature; that men cast into a fiery furnace seven times heated should be burned, is a law of nature. Now though each of these laws of nature may in some respect differ from every other, yet all of them are the result of the nature of things, and are established and determined by it; and the opposite event in each instance would involve a deviation from the law of nature which pertains to that particular instance.

 

Some definitions of a miracle given by able writers on the subject demand a brief consideration. Thus we are told by Mr. Horne, in his Introduction to the Study of the Scriptures, "that it is essential to a miracle that it be accompanied with a previous notice or declaration that it is performed according to the purpose and by the power of God, for the proof or evidence of some doctrine, or in attestation of the authority or divine mission of some particular person." The same thing is included in this writer's definition of a miracle. I deem this an error which consists in confounding what is or may be always an attendant of a miracle, or may be requisite to complete the proof of a miracle with an element essential to a miracle. That the accompaniment of the previous notice or declaration specified, is no part or essential element of a miracle, is obvious from the consideration, that the same event without such an accompaniment would be and must be regarded as a miracle. The event actually involving a deviation from a law of nature, would ipso facto be a miracle, whether any proof of its being a miracle were furnished or not.

 

Again: Dr. Brown, in his Essay on Cause and Effect, denies that a miracle involves a violation of the laws of nature.

 

This denial he rests on the strange and mistaken assumption that the word nature, includes all existence both created and uncreated. From this assumption it follows indeed that there can be no such thing as a miracle considered as involving a violation of, or a deviation from a law of nature; for plainly in this import of the word nature, every event must have a cause in nature, i.e., a natural cause. It is impossible that any event should not have an adequate cause. If God himself be included under the term nature, then no event can be above nature, or be supernatural. I need not say that nothing can justify Dr. Brown in giving that comprehensive meaning to the word nature which includes all existence, even God himself. No certainly must have known that the word not only in all correct usage, but especially in the common definition of a miracle, is used to exclude the Creator, and to denote simply the range of created existence. God and nature are obviously distinguished, because God is supposed to do what nature cannot. These remarks expose the futility of what this writer designed to show, that a violation of the laws of nature is a violation of the great principle, that every event must have an adequate cause. For how is this principle violated by maintaining that an event is not produced by any secondary cause, and is therefore produced by God's agency? All Dr. Brown's reasoning to show, that if a miracle be a violation of the laws of nature its reality could never be proved by testimony, because this supposes that the great principle of cause and effect is dispensed with, is owing to a strange mistake respecting the import of the phrase "laws of nature."

 

But this false reasoning is not the worst consequence of his mistake. According to his definition, the reality of a miracle can never be evinced to the human mind. His definition of a miracle is, that it is an event whose peculiar antecedent is the will of God. How then, if this is its only peculiarity, is an event ever to be shown to be a miracle, i.e., to be an event whose antecedent is the will of God? Why may not the will of God be the antecedent of one event as well as of another? Surely there must be some criterion of distinguishing an event which has this antecedent from one which has it not, or we are not entitled to refer one to the will of God any more than another. What then is this criterion? What, unless the event by some peculiarity authorizes the conclusion that it cannot be produced by any created agent or cause? If we cannot decide this in view of the nature and circumstances of the event, then plainly we cannot decide that it is not brought to pass by some created agent or cause, and of course cannot trace it to the will of God. If we can decide this, then the event, and the only one which can be truly traced to the will of God as its antecedent, is an event which cannot be brought to pass by any created cause, and which is above nature. This is its grand peculiarity; that without which, there can be no warrant for ascribing it to the will and power, of God. In other words, a miraculous event is one which is a violation of, or a deviation from the laws of nature. Call it by what name or define it as we will, this peculiarity must be assumed respecting it, or the inference of a divine interposition in the production of the event can never be authorized. I only add, that all correct usage sanctions this application of the phrase laws of nature, that the peculiar views started on this point by Dr. Brown resulted from his peculiar notions of a cause, and any controversy on the topic must be a mere logomachy, as the phrase was never before used in the sense which he has given it.

 

2. Miracles are credible.

 

There is a strong presumption against a miracle, simply considered. The principle applied to all secondary causes on which this presumption rests is, that the same causes in the same circumstances produce the same effects. On this principle Mr. Hume maintains that miracles are incredible and incapable of proof from testimony. Nor can I hesitate to say, that in my opinion his argument on the subject, or the principle on which it rests, has not been successfully refuted, at least not in every instance. On this particular topic his most prominent antagonist, Dr. Campbell, has failed. I do not here speak of the entire treatise of Dr. Campbell, but only of that part of it in which he maintains the abstract principle, that testimony to facts which are contrary to all experience is entitled to credit.

 

Nor when I speak of the presumption against miracles simply considered, do I mean that a case may not be supposed, in which we should reasonably hesitate to say that there is not a miracle, but that no case can be easily supposed in which a violation of the laws of nature is implied, and in which I can be reasonably required to believe in this violation, MERELY On verbal or written assertions. A case in which I might be perplexed can very easily be imagined, but after all it appears to me, that I should either reasonably feel that I did not know all the facts in the case, and on this ground should still withhold my faith, or I should presume that there were circumstances, which removed what would otherwise render the narration incredible.

 

The mental assurance of laws of nature and of their uniformity in the future as well as in the past, is evinced by an experience so uniform and so extensive, as to be scarcely inferior to that given by our senses of the reality of external things. And so it must be, or it is absurd to talk of a miracle; for what is a miracle if not an event contrary to all experience except of itself, and incredible therefore just in a degree proportioned to our assurance of the future uniformity of nature's laws?

 

Miracles ARE contrary to experience, and must be thus viewed so long as the question of their reality is agitated. That a dead man should be raised to life by a word, or that the fire of a furnace should not consume human flesh, circumstances being the same, is contrary to experience. The experiment has been fairly made, and no philosopher could hesitate so to pronounce.

 

The story of the King of Siam, by Mr. Locke, is a good illustration of the difference between an event aside from experience, and one contrary to experience. This is aside from experience, not contrary to it. But let all the causes of freezing exist, and exist in the same circumstances, and no freezing ever have occurred since the world began; and then the declaration that freezing would be produced by these causes would be the declaration of a miracle; and if the circumstances were alleged to be the same as in all former cases, the declaration would not be entitled to credit. See Campbell, sect. 2; Dwight, vol. ii. p. 460. I cannot subscribe to what these writers say.

 

3. Miracles in their own nature, equally capable of proof as are common events, i.e., the testimony of our senses, other things being equal, is to be as much relied on in one case as the other, the opportunity of judging, the state of the mind, the presumption against their existence, &c., being removed.

 

4. The circumstances of the miracles of Christ remove all presumption against, not to say create a presumption in favor of, their reality. THERE WAS AN OBJECT WORTHY OF GOD'S MIRACULOUS INTERPOSITION. Hence --

 

5. The credible nature of these miracles cannot be doubted; and therefore they may as easily be proved to have taken place by testimony as any ordinary events.

 

Most if not all the other direct arguments must depend on the truth of the historical narrative contained in the Bible. By this I intend the truth or correctness of the account of sensible facts given by the writers of the book, and also of the instructions of Jesus and his apostles. If this be so, then every other argument must conduct us to this conclusion, i.e., the truth of the narrative; for unless we can establish its truth in these matters, how can we come to any conclusion founded upon it? But if on the other hand we can prove the truth of the narrative in these two respects, our conclusion is incontrovertible. If for example I can in any way prove that Jesus wrought miracles, in attestation of his mission from God, I prove the validity of his claim, and that what he taught was from God; and if in addition to this, I prove that those who have given us a record of what he taught were inspired, I prove that what they wrote as his instructions was what he taught, and was from him. All this it is obvious depends on the truth of the historical narrative.

 

To evince the truth of the historical narrative, the arguments which are relied on are various; and though they all bear indirectly on the ultimate conclusion that Christianity is from God, yet it is important if we would estimate their weight, to see the form and bearing of each. Some of these arguments which support the general conclusion that this religion is from God, only as they evince the truth of the historical narration, are the following: The argument founded on the credibility of the writers as witnesses. The argument founded on the reception of the history by Christians at the time it was published. The argument from the coincidence of facts related in other Writings -- as contained in Paley's Horæ Paulinæ. Now to these and every other argument of the kind, some things are, necessary in common, and some things which are necessary to one particular argument are not necessary to all.

 

On the other hand, some things are necessary to each of these arguments which are not necessary to others. Thus, to make out the argument from the credibility of the writers we must prove that it was written by its professed authors; for unless we can identify the authors we can derive no argument simply from their credibility. It is true indeed that their credibility may be proved without proving by the second and third arguments before mentioned, that its professed were its real authors; but these arguments prove the truth of the record or the reality of the facts independently of the testimony of the authors, and it is quite logical to infer from such a source the credibility of the historian. Still the credibility of the historian thus proved, cannot be relied on to prove the reality of the facts or truth of the record. Thus to use it in an argument would be reasoning in a circle: it would be deriving his credibility from the truth of the record. It is true there may be what may be called particular exceptions to these general remarks. For example, we may suppose the credibility of a writer to be proved in the manner now supposed with respect to a very large portion of the facts which he records, and yet not with respect to all of them; and in this case we might reasonably rely on his credibility in regard to those facts which are not proved in any other way.

 

It ought here to be remarked, that while there are many ways of proving the truth of the Gospel history, considered as a narrative of facts, that no one of these arguments terminating at this point proves that the system of religion contained in the Bible is from God; for though we had the very autographs themselves and could ascertain with exactest precision their import; though we were fully convinced of the intelligence, honesty, opportunities for information -- in a word, of the credibility of the writers as mere human historians; and though we might from the nature of the facts recorded concerning Jesus, infer that what he taught was from God, still their record of what he taught might be very imperfect; and though according to the circumstances of the case we should place a greater or less reliance on their account of his instructions, yet we should only have that ground for an unqualified reliance. that the record contains exactly what he taught, and that the Bible contains a religion from God which the case seems to demand. It is only when we take another step in the argument and show that these historians were the subjects of a divine inspiration which led them into all truth, that the mind rests in the unhesitating conclusion that Christianity is from God.

 

The evangelical history being true, miracles were wrought in attestation of the fact that the system of religion taught by Christ and his apostles is a revelation from God. But God only can work miracles, and he only in attestation of truth. It follows therefore that the system of religion taught by Christ and his apostles is a revelation from God.

 

This argument, so absolutely conclusive as it would seem to every unperverted mind, is opposed on the ground that events similar to the miracles recorded in the Scriptures have taken place in other instances. To show that this claim is wholly groundless, and that God only can work miracles in the true import of the word as used in this controversy, is the object of my subsequent remarks.

 

Instead of occupying time with an examination of the accounts of pretended Pagan and Popish miracles, such as those of Pythagoras, of Aristeas, of Vespasian, of the Abbé de Paris, and of others, I refer to Horne's Introduction and other works in which these accounts are examined and sufficiently refuted: `Paley's Evidences and Douglas' Criterion.

 

It is claimed that the magicians of Egypt wrought miracles. If So, the proof must be found in the Mosaic account of their works. But this very explicitly informs us, that what these magicians did under the pretense of working miracles, was done by their enchantments, i.e., by jugglery or legerdemain. The facts in the case are obviously these: The magicians of Egypt attempted to resist the authority of Moses' divine mission by performing through the arts of jugglery what would be regarded wonders as great as those performed by Moses. The method adopted by Divine Wisdom to render void these attempts, was not to lay open the real causes of these seeming wonders by unfolding the arts and tricks of the magicians, but in a more direct and impressive manner, to perform works which should be seen at once to be both beyond their power, and beyond all human and created power. While such was the method adopted to convince Pharaoh and the Egyptians of Moses' divine mission, the writer of the narrative appears even solicitous to impress on the reader's mind the fact that the seeming wonders of the magicians were done by their enchantments.

 

There is another claim made by the advocates of Revelation and professedly on its authority, which, as it involves a principle as well as facts, has an important bearing on the argument from miracles, and demands a thorough examination.

 

The claim is, that created superhuman agents can, and actually have performed miracles. Thus Dr. Chalmers says: "It is presumptuous to affirm that nothing short of Omnipotence can suspend the laws of visible nature," -- " that we cannot tell what be the orders of power and intelligence between us and God; and it is a monstrous presumption to affirm that no archangel, no secondary or intermediate being whatever, can perform a miracle." He asserts on the authority of the Bible, that there are such beings, and that they have performed what are to all intents and purposes, miracles."

To the clearing away of the supposed difficulties of this subject, it is important to remark that the word miracle (_____ ________, _______), as used in the Scriptures, is in itself wholly ambiguous. By this however I do not mean that it is so in the least degree in its actual application, in view of all that bears on the question of its meaning in each instance of its use. The fact is far otherwise. Indeed in every case of the actual use of an ambiguous word, there is either an improper and forbidden use of it, or else the connection and manner of use show which of the different possible meanings of the word is the real one. What then is the real meaning of the word miracle, in any instance of its actual use, must be determined by the connection in which it stands.

 

In the most generic sense of which the word is capable, it denotes a wonder, that is, an event which is unusual and extra, ordinary in one respect, viz., that it cannot be accounted for by any known secondary cause. The word also has two specific meanings in different applications. When applied to the works of creatures it still retains its generic import, and denotes, as the nature of the case and often other considerations decisively show, wonders, i.e., events which cannot be accounted for by any known secondary causes, but which nevertheless are of such a nature as not to require, and therefore in any way cannot be ascribed to power above that of creatures. (Vide Matt. xxiv. 24.)

 

Again: when the word is applied to the works of God, it still as before retains its generic import, and denotes, as the nature of the case and often other considerations decisively show, wonders, i.e., events which cannot be accounted for by any known secondary causes, and which require us to ascribe them to power above that of creatures, even to that of God.

 

With these different meanings of the miracles in view, to affirm that miracles in the generic sense of the scriptural term ______, or in the former of its two specific meanings, cannot be ascribed to created agents, would indeed be presumptuous. The Scriptures evidently sanction this use of the term. On the other hand, to use the word in the specific meaning which it has, when applied to those works of God which are alleged in attestation of a revelation, and to affirm that created agents can work miracles, is to say the least not less presumptuous. There are in my view, on the part of Dr. Chalmers and others who use similar phraseology on this subject, two errors. The first is, that they do not distinguish between the two meanings of the word miracle in its different applications, and treat of the subject as if the word had but one meaning. The second error is, that they use the word in that meaning which it has when applied in the controversy respecting a divine revelation (for it is undeniable that they would be understood to use it in this import), without having accurately ascertained what this meaning is.

 

The doctrine then -- and Dr. Chalmers fully asserts it, and professedly on the authority of the Bible itself -- the doctrine that any created agent can perform a miracle, in that sense of the word which is its true sense when applied in the argument for a revelation from God, I deny for the following reasons, viz.:

 

1. It is inconsistent with the true meaning of the word miracle in its present application.

 

2. It subverts the peculiar characteristic of a miracle as a proof of divine interposition.

 

3. It is destitute of all proof.

 

4. It is opposed by decisive proof from both reason and the Scriptures.

 

Before I proceed in the discussion, let it be remarked that the inquiry respects miracles only in that specific import of the word which it has, when used to denote a work wrought in attestation of a revelation from God.

 

1. The doctrine that any created agent can perform a miracle, is inconsistent with the common and only just conception of such a work.

 

I need hardly say that the ablest advocates of a divine revelation, as well as their opponents, have considered a miracle as an event above the power of any created agent. Is this idea then essential to the true idea of a miracle? If not, then there is no word which usage has sanctioned to denote that class or kind of events which are above the power of created agents. Is this credible after all the discussions which have been had respecting the reality of such events? Will it then be said that there are no works, or that it is presumptuous to affirm that there are any, which some of the creatures of God cannot perform as well as God himself? I think not. But if we are authorized to affirm that there are works which God only, and not creatures can perform, then I ask what are they? The only answer from those who agree with Dr. Chalmers must be, we cannot tell -- the works, if such there be, which God only can perform, cannot be distinguished by us from works which some of his creatures can perform. Therefore if water be turned into wine, if mountains be removed, if the dead be raised to life, we cannot decide from the nature of the event whether God or a creature has done it. Is this the common conception or judgment of those who believe in miracles, or even of those who believe in God? Or do they, under the name of miracles, conceive of certain works which God only can perform, and which the human mind can and is bound to distinguish from those which creatures can perform as exclusively the works of God? If the human mind is competent to make no such distinction, then instead of talking of God's works,let us speak of those which may or which may not be the works of God.

 

Again: I ask in what does a miracle, according to the principle of Dr. Chalmers, differ from an ordinary event, or one brought to pass by the agency of second causes? Not in this, that the former is above the power of any created agent and the latter not; for it may be true according to Dr. Chalmers that a miracle is not above the power of some created agent. Is the difference then, that a miracle is an event which appears to us to be above the power of any created agent, while an ordinary event does not? But I ask, how does this appear to us? Plainly not from any thing we know or have good reason to believe, either from the nature of the event or the manner of its production; for it is an event which may be brought to pass, by a created agent. It does not therefore appear to us at all to be above the power of a created agent. We have no means of deciding whether it is so or not. Is it then said that a miracle is an event which lies without the limits and range of what Dr. Chalmers calls "visible nature," or of which we know of no adequate created cause, and of which therefore God by direct agency may be the cause? But according to the principle of Dr. Chalmers, it is equally true that God may not be the cause and that a created agent may be. If then it is essential to his definition of a miracle that God may be its cause, it is equally essential that God may not be its cause, and that a creature may be. A miracle therefore would be an event concerning whose author or cause we can decide nothing, except that either God or some creature of God is its cause; i.e., which may be or may not be an ordinary event. What other difference can be supposed on the principle of Dr. Chalmers, I am unable to conceive; and to the question, what is the difference between a miracle and an ordinary event (by which is meant an event brought to pass by the agency of second causes), the only answer is -- no difference; at least no one is authorized to conceive or to affirm that there is a difference. Palpably as this conclusion follows from the principle of Dr. Chalmers, it is believed, that no one will adopt it.

 

I recur then to the idea of a miracle as an event which is. above the power of any created agent. If this idea be conceded to be involved in the true definition of a miracle, then the very supposition that a created being should perform a miracle, carries in it this palpable inconsistency or absurdity, that a created being can perform what none but the uncreated Being can perform; that a created being has power to do what he has not power to do.

 

It is plain then that Dr. Chalmers denies in one essential respect the commonly received definition of a miracle. This he must do, or give up his position that some created superhuman agents may have power to perform miracles. With the idea of a miracle as exclusively the work of Omnipotence, if we admit that Gabriel possesses or even may possess the power to remove mountains, then if mountains are removed, we cannot regard the event as a miracle. The very supposition of a miracle performed by a creature is absurd and self-contradictory, unless we abandon the commonly received definition of a miracle.

 

2. The doctrine that any created agent whatever can perform a miracle, subverts the peculiar characteristic of a miracle as a proof of divine interposition. Dr. Chalmers not only maintains as we have seen, that created agents may for aught we can say, perform miracles, but he asserts on the authority of the Bible, that such agents have performed what are "to all intents and purposes miracles." Having taken this ground, he is fully aware of the peculiar pertinency of the question which he puts-" How comes a miracle, and in what circumstances, to be the token of a revelation from God?" This question he treats under three suppositions; the first is, that the so called miracle, i.e., an event which may be brought to pass either by God or a superhuman creature, is wrought in support of either known falsehood or known immorality. In this case he justly claims that the event must be ascribed to a created superhuman wicked agent. The reasons for this are obvious. It is a work beyond the power of any human agent, and must be ascribed to a superhuman agent; it is done for a malignant or selfish purpose, and must therefore be ascribed to a wicked superhuman agent. But the problem to be solved is, why not ascribe it to God? I say this is the problem to be solved, and that Dr. Chalmers in his solution of it, has assigned at most only a part of the reason as the whole. The reason which he assigns as the whole reason is, that the work is done for a malignant or selfish purpose. I admit that this is a reason and a decisive one. God is good and cannot be charged with countenancing falsehood or immorality. But this is not the whole reason for not ascribing it to God. There is yet another, viz., the work done is one which according to the supposition may be done by a created being; so that entirely aside from the falsehood or immorality of the affair, there is this decisive reason for not ascribing the work, the so called miracle, to God. There is nothing in its nature to justify us in ascribing it to God, but on the contrary, that which decisively forbids it. There is not indeed in the work, considered aside from the selfish purpose, that which would oblige us to ascribe it to a created superhuman spirit, but there is that which would decisively forbid us to ascribe it to God; there being no possible reason for doing so, except that he might have done it, while it is also true that it might have been accomplished by another agent, which is plainly no reason for ascribing it to God. Thus the possibility that a work (whether it be called a miracle or not doe's not alter it) may be performed by a created agent, divests it wholly and absolutely of all decisive evidence or proof that God has done it. The nature of the work, though called a miracle, furnishes no more reason for concluding that God has done it, than that some other agent has. Dr. Chalmers obviously deceives himself by calling the work a miracle, leading himself into the common conception of a miracle; for it is plain that his mind adopts the erroneous, groundless assumption, that there is some reason furnished by the nature of the work which would justify us in ascribing it to God, and even requires us to do so, were it not for the opposing considerations that it is done for a false or selfish purpose: whereas the nature of the work furnishes not the shadow of a reason for ascribing it to God, but decisive reason for not doing it, since, although it may be performed by God, it may be performed by some other being.

 

Again: Dr. Chalmers' second supposition is, that the so-called miracle is clearly wrought for a benevolent purpose, and the very revelation declares that it is wrought by the power of God. He claims that in such a case, we should and ought to accept of the supposed revelation as coming from God. I answer, that I have no occasion to deny, that in the case put, it would be reasonable to accept of the professed revelation as from God: that when every thing supposable in the case bespeaks goodness, and honesty, and truth, and when the bearer of such a message declares that it is from God, and that certain works too which might be performed by some other being, are in fact performed by God's power, it might be highly reasonable to accredit all that such a messenger declares. But the question is, what have these so-called miracles to do with our belief? Why do we believe in the fact that these works called miracles, are done by God, and not by some other agent who has power to do them as well as he? Dr. Chalmers assigns two reasons for so doing: one is the manifest benignity and truth of the message, and the other, the declaration of the bearer of such a message. These reasons it is admitted are quite sufficient. But after all, what is the force or influence of the so-called miracle? Just nothing at all. That the message is benignant is seen in its own nature: that the messenger is true, and honest, and entitled to credit, arises from the known nature of his message, and any other considerations that may be supposed to exist in the case; while the fact that the so-called miracle is the work of God, is proved solely by the nature of the message and the testimony of the messenger, and not at all therefore by the nature of the work itself. So far as this is concerned, some other agent might have, done it as well as God; and the messenger might with the same propriety have declared that the death of a living man was produced by the direct agency of God, as declare that the restored life of a dead man was so produced. In either case he might indeed be entitled to credit, for the reasons assigned by Dr. Chalmers. In neither case could the nature of the event amount to a particle of proof of God's agency, since in either it might be brought to pass by other than His. Dr. Chalmers says, "that the accordancy between the characteristics of the professed Revelation and our previous notions of the divine character, leaves to the miracles all that force and authority which properly belong to them." But what previous force or authority must belong to a work to convince me that God has done it, when I am authorized to believe that another being may have done it? Why talk of restoring to miracles their previous force and authority as evidence, when they have and can have none? Is it not plain that Dr. Chalmers reasons all the time on the secret assumption, that there is something in what he calls miracles which proves decisively that they are the works of God? And is it not equally plain, when he maintains that these, are not exclusively the works of God, that their characteristic as evidence of God's interposition is wholly destroyed?

 

We come to Dr. Chalmers' third supposition, that of a professed revelation, supported by what he calls miracles, which confines itself to a bare announcement of facts relative to the existence of things wholly beyond our observation or knowledge. He maintains that the miracles would in this case sustain the claim of the professed revelation on two grounds; first, the absence of every thing which indicates the agency of a wicked spirit; and, secondly, that God would not lend himself, either by permission to others or by direct agency, to the deception of his creatures. So far as the first of these reasons is concerned, if it be admitted to be a sufficient reason for not ascribing the so-called miracles to a wicked spirit, it is not a reason in the lowest degree for ascribing them to God, since the I may be the works of a good though a created spirit, commissioned by God to bear the message. Again: if the absence of every thing which indicates the agency of a wicked spirit is a reason for ascribing the miracles to God, this reason does not result from the nature of the works, but solely from other and distinct considerations, viz., that they are either the works of God or of a wicked spirit, and that they are not the works of the latter, because if they were, there would be indications of his malignant agency. But here the question is, whether the evil spirit might not be sufficiently wise for his own purposes, to avoid furnishing even the least indication of malignity, and whether there is not somewhat of an unreasonable assumption in this argument. But waiving this altogether, and admitting that in the case supposed, there is good reason for believing that the works are God's, still the reason is not furnished by the nature of the works. Any other evinced to be the results of his direct agency, would be as good evidence of God's interposition as these so-called miracles. Proof furnished of God's direct agency from testimony, or the circumstances of an event, is surely a very different kind of evidence from that furnished by a work which God only can perform. But, says Dr. Chalmers, God would not permit wicked spirits to deceive his creatures, i.e., to furnish legitimate proof that falsehood is truth, by working miracles. Certainly not. But this is not the question nor any part of it; but whether God would not permit them to do those works which they have power to do; and if he would not, why? Dr. Chalmers says this would or might be fitted to deceive his creatures; and this is the reason that God would not permit them to do the works. I answer, that it would not in the least degree be fitted to deceive them; in other words (and this is what is meant), it would furnish no legitimate proof, nor the shadow of it, that falsehood is truth; that works which are not God's works are God's works. Do we not know or believe, according to Dr. Chalmers, that these superhuman beings have power to perform these works? Why then if they actually do them, should we be deceived, and conclude that God has done them? This is the only way in which we can be deceived by them; and why conclude from their nature that God does the works, when for aught we know there are a thousand other beings who might do them? Such deception truly would be wholly gratuitous on our part, for there is absolutely nothing in the nature of the works which can authorize, I but that which absolutely forbids such a conclusion.

 

Take as an illustration, the miracles by Moses on the authority of which he claimed of Pharaoh that he, should let the people go. What would Pharaoh have said to this demand, on the principle of Dr. Chalmers? The reply would have been, "Your pretended works of God may have been performed by some other agent. They can therefore neither require nor authorize, but must forbid me to conclude that they are performed by God. Such works can furnish no evidence that God has sent you." Moses, according to Dr. Chalmers, could not deny this. He could only say in reply, that "they are not the works of a created agent, but are God's works." To this Pharaoh might rejoin by asking, "Where is the proof that they are the works of God?" Moses answers, "You must take my word for it." "That, says Pharaoh, "I am not bound to do. I might as well take your word that any other work or event is God's, and not only so, I might as well take your word, that God has sent you, as take your word that this is God's work. Besides, you appealed to the works, as the proof of God's agency to establish your claim to a divine mission, and now you ask me to take your simple word for it." "True," says Moses, "but is it not plain that God would not deceive you by permitting a creature to do these works?" "Deceive me!" rejoins Pharaoh; deceive me in what, or by what means?" "Why," answers Moses, "deceive you in leading you by these very unusual works, to conclude that they are God's unless they really are his works?" "I am in no danger of that," says Pharaoh; "so long as I have common sense I shall never be deceived by such works into the belief that they are God's, knowing as I do that they may be done as well by angels or devils as by God himself." And truly, why should he be deceived in a case in which there is nothing to deceive him? Plainly he should not, though all the waters of Egypt were turned into blood.

 

Dr. Chalmers however, is very explicit on this point. He says: "Though neither a good nor a bad morality stood associated with the message, still on the strength of natural religion would we defer to the authority of the miracles alone;" i.e., to the authority of works which, in his view, devils have power to perform, and for the non-performance of which by devils no reason can be given. Is it not plain that Dr. Chalmers in this view of the subject, all the while assumes in his own mind the common definition of a miracle, as that which Omnipotence only can perform, and that in this lies what he calls "its proper force and authority?" and yet in affirming the possibility that miracles should be performed by other beings than God, does he not forbid us to ascribe them to God, and deprive them of every particle of force or authority as evidence of God's interposition?

 

3. There is no proof that any created being can perform a miracle, or any thing which shall have the semblance of one.

 

On this point there can be no hesitation, provided we adopt the common definition of a miracle. For then the very supposition that a created agent should perform a miracle involves, as we have seen, a palpable absurdity. But the question now is, whether created beings can perform works which we shall reasonably regard, or which by the laws of evidence we shall be bound to regard as miracles; that is, as works wrought by God in attestation of a revelation. It is obviously assumed by Dr. Chalmers and others, that such works have been and may be done by such beings. This class of works is conceived to be beyond the powers of any created agents, with which we are acquainted, or beyond the powers of "visible nature."

 

According to the view now under consideration, the true test of a miraculous work is, that it is one which in its own nature is beyond the power of any created agent with which we are acquainted; and which therefore, while it may be for aught we can say to the contrary, the work of a creature, may also be the work of God. Such a work it is claimed, being declared by a witness of a certain character and in certain circumstances to be God's work, ought to be believed by us to be so, and to be regarded as a proof of a divine revelation. According to this view, the real test or proof that an event is a miracle is, that it is in its own nature beyond the power of any created agent with which we are acquainted; for the supposed testimony that it is wrought by God, does not determine it to be a miracle, but only a miracle wrought by God and not by a creature: or if it be said that the fact testified, viz., that it is wrought by God, is essential to its being a miracle, and as such a proof of divine revelation, then the nature of the fact as it falls under the cognizance of our senses, is no more proof of a revelation, than any ordinary event concerning which the same fact should be testified in the same manner. The raising of a dead man to life, viewed as an event within the power of created agents, and yet testified by the supposed witness to be done by the power of God, furnishes no more proof of a revelation than would the death of a living man testified by the witness to have been effected by the power of God; and neither adds a particle of proof to the fact of a revelation, beyond that of the naked testimony of the witness. The witness is no more entitled to credit when he asserts that the supposed work, which according to the supposition may be performed by a created agent, is performed by divine agency, than when he asserts the fact of a revelation. The work itself therefore, in its own nature, adds nothing to the proof of such a fact, and in this respect is wholly useless. This may be illustrated by an example-that of a king, sending his signet by a messenger. If we suppose that there were a hundred or a thousand other such signets, any one of which the messenger might have obtained, it is plain that the showing of the signet with the assertion that it is the king's, would still leave the simple testimony of the witness as our only reliance; and no proof from the signet, or from his possession of it, would be added to his mere testimony to the fact of his mission by the king. One who should believe in his mission would reasonably say -- I believe it not because the messenger has the signet, for others have the same, but simply and solely in view of the character of the witness and the circumstances of his mission.

 

Whether then created agents can perform works which we shall reasonably regard as miracles, or having the semblance of miracles to our mind, that is, works which shall reasonably appear to us, or be regarded by us as proofs of a revelation, is a question which depends entirely on another, viz.: whether we can draw the line of demarkation between those works which God, and which creatures can perform. Just so far as we can draw this line, and no farther, are we competent to decide the question whether an event is a miracle or not. Of every work in respect to which we are authorized, in view of its nature, to say God only can perform it, we can assert that it is a miracle, i.e., a proof of a divine revelation, but of no other. That any created agent has power to perform a work which we are authorized to say God only can perform, cannot be admitted. Of course no created agent, even if we suppose his powers to transcend those of any finite creature with which we are acquainted, or those "of visible nature," can do any work which can be esteemed miraculous. If cases can be supposed in which we cannot decide whether God only can do the works, then of course we cannot decide that they are miracles, and may be in doubt whether they are or not; i.e., we can make no decision, and of course must remain uninfluenced by them. Before then we can decide that any work apparently done by a creature is a miracle, we must decide that it is a work which God only, and not a creature can perform. So that if we decide that a creature has actually done it, then we know that it is not a work which God only can perform, and therefore that it is not a miracle. Or if we decide that it is a work which God only can perform, then we cannot admit that a creature has done it. It is utterly impossible therefore, that any mind should find the least proof that any creature can perform a miracle.

 

But that created agents can work miracles is claimed on the basis of matter of fact. The cases alleged are such as the following:

 

The raising of Samuel from the dead by the Witch of Endor, (1 Sam. xxviii.) The design of the narrative seems to be to assert a miracle. Samuel, according to the account, was raised from the dead; while the manner of the event was such as clearly to show that the woman had actually no concern with it. "She cried with a loud voice," that is, she betrayed disappointment and consternation. "She saw gods ascending out of the earth;" that is, in her panic she saw what was wonderful and strange, she knew not what. When inquired of by Saul "what form he was of," her answer was, "An old man cometh up and he is covered with a mantle;" while, "Saul perceived that it was Samuel." It is also manifest from the narrative, that the sorceress had not even prepared her enchantments. Thus from the obvious disappointment and consternation of the woman, and from the appearance of Samuel as having no connection with her enchantments, it was apparent to Saul that her pretensions were groundless, and that those who claimed the power over familiar spirits were impostors.

 

Had it been said in this narrative that the woman did not expect to see Samuel come forth, all the difficulty would vanish. But I ask, had not the writer of this narrative as much reason for supposing that his readers would so understand the matter, as had he expressly asserted the fact? I think so, not only in view of what he has said respecting the manner in which the woman regarded the appearance of Samuel, but for other reasons. That God raised Samuel from the dead we conclusively infer from the nature of the event, and also from the fact that in proof of it, Samuel actually uttered a prophecy and addressed it to Saul. The law against witches was quite sufficient to show that God did not work miracles by their instrumentality, and that he did not authorize them or others to believe that he would; as he must have done had be in this instance, or in any other, have raised a dead man to life in connection with their enchantments. On this supposition, why was not Saul even authorized to make the application to this woman which he did make, and to entertain the expectation from her which be so evidently did entertain? Such must have been the views of every unbiased Jewish reader of this narrative. Of course it is as certain that the woman did not expect to raise Samuel from the dead, as had the historian asserted the fact. Hence I conclude that the miracle of raising Samuel was wrought for the double purpose of convincing Saul that she was an impostor; by the way in which it was done, and the manner in which the woman regarded it; and also to reprove Saul for his wickedness, and to denounce on him the judgment of death by the mouth of the risen prophet.

 

Another class of facts claims consideration, viz., demoniacal possessions. These facts as given in the literal interpretation of the scriptural narrative may be admitted. Still there is nothing in them miraculous even in appearance. They must have been regarded by those who witnessed them either in view of their nature, or of their frequent occurrence, or of both, as ordinary events in distinction from miracles. In this manner it is obvious on the face of the narrative they were regarded. Whether we can or cannot assign the reasons why the people of that age regarded them as ordinary events, the natural results of adequate power of created agents, the fact that they were so regarded cannot be denied by any one who admits their reality on the authority of the history. If he admits the reality of the facts, he must admit also that they were not miracles in the view of those who witnessed them. We, indeed, may be obliged to regard them as a peculiarity of another age. But whatever the phenomena were, we cannot avoid the conclusion that their cause was known, and known as an adequate second cause. In these events therefore, there could have been no semblance of a miracle to those who witnessed them. They were Jews who asked, "Can a devil open the eyes of the blind?"

 

Should it here be said that whatever may be supposed in respect to the people of another age, if the same phenomena were to occur in our time they would be justly regarded as miracles -- such as that recorded, Mark, v. 4 -- I reply, that if the same phenomena were to occur now, either their nature or frequent occurrence, or something else equally decisive, would reveal their nature as the effects of adequate second causes, and of course prevent the possibility of mistaking them for miracles. To suppose that they should occur in such circumstances as to require us according to the laws of faith to believe them to be miracles, is to suppose that God should lay us under obligation to believe that to be true which is actually false. Besides, we never could be required by the laws of faith to believe them to be miracles, so long as we knew or had good reason to believe, that they might be the effects of created power. Such events in such a case could not furnish the least evidence that they are performed by divine power, or that God has any more concern in bringing them to pass, than the commonest events. If we suppose such an event to occur, we might or we might not be able to assign the reason for its occurrence; but surely we could not reasonably suppose, that God designed by it to convince us that he had done what he had not done, and what we should not have the least reason to imagine he had done. If we suppose such a design on his part, it must be our own fault if we are deceived by it. But it may be supposed, that we have no reason to believe that the imaginary extraordinary event can be brought to pass by a created agent, and that all the evidence in the case goes to prove that it is accomplished by the power of God, and that nevertheless God may permit or commission a created agent to perform the work in attestation of a divine mission -- and on this supposition it may be asked, whether the event would not be good evidence to our minds of the fact of a divine mission, and in this respect be entitled to the same influence, and answer the same purpose as a divine work? I answer, yes; because all the evidence in the case would be to one point, viz., that it is a divine work. The mere supposed possibility that it is a creature's work would be no evidence either way, and the conclusion that it is God's work, would be as truly authorized and required with such a possibility as without it. Why then resort to the present supposition, and especially that of a possible fact, which if real would imply that God should lead us and oblige us to regard that as evidence which is not so in the truth of things, and which to our minds proves that to be true which is not true viz., that the event is the effect of divine power, when it is not?

 

I am aware that another than the literal interpretation of the scriptural language on the present subject, has been adopted by some advocates of revelation, of no less reputation than Sykes, Lardner, Farmer, and others. This class of writers admit the incredibility of the narrative when literally interpreted, and attempt to relieve the subject of difficulty by rejecting the literal interpretation. The question here respects the origin of certain phenomena, and not the reality of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles, of which these phenomena were the occasion. I cannot however concede to the opinion that the language of the Scriptures on this subject is not to be literally interpreted. I see in the first place no real reason assigned for it, except the supposed incredibility of the facts as given by a literal interpretation. But why are they to be pronounced incredible? Solely on the ground that they are aside from, not contrary to all experience, except that given in the scriptural narrative. Be it so. But this no more establishes their incredibility, than the want of experience by the inhabitants of the torrid zone, establishes the incredibility of the fact that water freezes in a more northern climate; or than the want of experience by the greater part of the human race establishes the incredibility that stones should fall from the atmosphere. Indeed why is it at all incredible, that the facts in question should actually have existed as the scriptural history relates, even from the beginning of the world, considered as the peculiarity of another age, being in their nature well understood by the people who witnessed them, and designed to render the triumph of the Redeemer over the grand adversary of God and man more complete and signal, and to cease, when that object should be accomplished? Besides, no man is authorized to say, from the nature of the phenomena, that there were no created agents adequate to their production, known to those who witnessed them. Of course the facts in question in respect to incredibility stand on entirely other grounds than the facts of miracles. In the second place, the language of the scriptural writers cannot in my view, according to any authorized principles of interpretation, be understood in any other than its literal import. On this point I can here only remark, that whether the facts be credible or incredible, the language of the narrative could not be more absolutely unequivocal than it is, that the facts actually occurred. How is it possible that this plain narrative of plain men should tell us of the spirits that held converse with the Saviour; that supplicated his forbearance and a respite from torment; that professed their knowledge of him as the Holy One of God; that were commanded by him to be silent, and that when ejected from those whom they possessed, were permitted by their own request, and in execution of their own will, to enter a herd of swine, and to make new manifestations of their power and malignity? How are these things possible, if the writers of the narrative did not mean to be understood as recording the reality of these spirits, and of the facts Connected with their agency? And why should the plain meaning of the language be rejected solely on the ground of the supposed incredibility of facts, which are in no degree incredible? That the writers intended to be understood as giving us a literal account of the facts, cannot, I think, be reasonably doubted. The only alternative therefore, is either to receive it as true, and to admit their authority as historians, or to regard their narrative as proof of their credulity, and of that of the age in which they wrote; which, if this be all that can be said, is nothing less than infidelity. I say if this be all that can be said, for there is one thing more at least of what may be true on this subject, viz., that while this is literal language, and expressed the actual belief of the age or the people, and also of the writers, it is still only the language of appearance. Whether this be so or not, I am not prepared to decide with confidence. I would however admit that in some instances things or events are in words ascribed to the devil, as in Matt. xiii. 39, which if ascribed in literal language to that principle of evil which is inseparable from a principle of good in the very nature of things, would better harmonize with just and necessary conceptions of God, and of his providential government.

 

4. There is decisive proof both from the Scriptures and from reason, that no created being can perform a miracle.

 

This proof from the Scriptures, it is true, can have no influence except with those who attempt to defend the scriptural miracles. With them the question is, what are the events to which the scriptural writers appeal as proofs of a revelation; or rather what is the nature of this proof from miracles? On this point I shall only ask what is it, except that in their view and that of other men, miracles are works which God only can perform? John, iii. 2; Acts, x. 38, 40; John, v. 36, and x. 21, 25; Matt. xii. 24, 28; Ex. iv. 11; Ps. xciv. 9, and cxIvi. 8; John, ix. 32, 33.

 

The proof from reason that no created agent can perform a miracle, if by a miracle we mean a work or an event which God only can perform, is still more decisive, consisting in the self-evident proposition, that no creature can do that which God only can do. The same thing is true, if we define a miracle to be an event which involves a deviation from, or a violation of, a law of nature; for it is no deviation from a law of nature for a creature to bring to pass an event which he has power to bring to pass.

 

But it is claimed by some that a miracle, considered as an event brought to pass only by the power of God, cannot be evinced to the human mind by legitimate evidence, not even to that of an eye-witness; and this on the ground that we are ignorant of the powers of nature or of created agents, and that therefore whatever the event may be in its nature and its circumstances, we are not competent to decide that God brings it to pass.

 

Before replying to this argument directly, I would remark that I shall assume what it admits, that a miracle as defined, is possible. I shall also assume that whatever presumption there is against a miracle from experience, it is completely removed by the object for which the miracle is wrought. This is fairly assumed, for the question now is, not whether a miracle can be reasonably admitted on the ground of testimony as opposed to experience, but it is simply whether the event, supposing it to be brought to pass by the power of God, can be satisfactorily proved to be, since as it is claimed, for aught that can be shown, it may be accomplished by created power. It, is not whether God can work a miracle or bring to pass an event by his own direct and immediate agency, but it is whether he can bring it to pass in such a way or manner as to prove to our minds, according to the laws of rational belief, that he has brought it to pass by his direct and exclusive power. It is claimed that he cannot, and this on the ground that the event, be it what it may, and produced in what manner it may, may for any evidence to the contrary, be brought to pass by the power of some created agent.

 

To this reasoning I propose to reply, by stating and illustrating what I deem sufficient grounds for inferring the reality of a miracle, and by showing that these are sufficient for the inference.

 

I remark then, in the first place, that the creative power of God may be an incommunicable attribute. By creative power must be understood at least power to create substance -- this visible universe from absolute and universal nothing. The true and essential conception of creative power is, that it is necessarily eternal, underived, and self-existent. As such its existence could neither be produced nor be prevented. The mind cannot conceive as it must, power to be eternal, underived, self-existent, without conceiving it to be necessarily underived, and in its own nature incapable of being produced or communicated. For whatever is necessarily conceived by the mind as existing by a necessity of its own nature, is necessarily conceived as incapable in its own nature of being produced, created, or communicated. Space, for example, cannot be conceived to be capable of being produced or created.

 

Creative power is possible or capable of existence, without being created or produced. So is self-existence. Space and duration are possible without being created or produced, and so is the equality of two and two with four. Whatever is capable of existing and actually exists without being created or produced, exists by necessity and cannot be created or produced. It is eternal and self-existent.

 

Some things however are necessarily conceived by the mind as existing by a necessity of their own nature, directly, and others indirectly. Thus space and duration are necessarily conceived by the mind as existing by a necessity of nature directly; by which I mean, that the mere conception, or as logicians say, the simple apprehension of space by the mind, necessarily involves or gives the conviction of its necessary existence in re. In other words, the object of thought has necessarily in the view of the mind a corresponding reality. The self-existence of God is necessarily conceived by the mind to be necessary in its own nature indirectly; by which I mean, that while the bare conception or simple apprehension of a self-existent God, does not necessarily involve or give the conviction of the necessary existence of such a being in re -- in other words, while the object of thought has not necessarily in the view of the mind a corresponding reality, yet when the fact of a self existent God is given or proved to the mind, then the mind necessarily conceives it to be necessary in its own nature, and thus incapable in its own nature of being produced or created.

 

Without claiming then that the mind on the condition of the bare conception of creative power necessarily gives as it does give on the bare conception of space, directly the conviction of the necessary existence of the corresponding reality, still it is manifest that it necessarily gives this conviction indirectly, that is, when the fact of such power, as in the present case, is admitted by the mind. This necessary existence of actually existing creative power is not the necessity of existence which is given by the mere certainty of existence, that is, the necessity that a thing is while it, is; but it is a necessity of existence given in the nature of such power, as that which could neither be caused to be, nor prevented from being, any more than space or duration.

 

Power could not create in the first instance without being in its own nature necessarily uncreated; in other words, creative power which creates in the first instance, is necessarily conceived by the mind to be necessarily incapable in its very nature of being created or produced, just as the actual self-existence of a being is necessarily conceived to be necessarily incapable of being produced or created, and therefore incommunicable. Nor does this necessity that the power which creates in the first instance is itself incapable of being produced or created, result from the mere circumstance that the instance in which the necessity is given to knowledge, is the first of creation; for though given clearly in this instance, it is given as the necessary nature of power which creates from absolute and universal nothing. This conception of creative power thus formed becomes as a necessary conception the true and essential idea of creative power in all cases. It is a conception which involves the knowledge of the nature of creative power as being necessarily incapable of being produced or communicated, and what the mind thus knows in respect to creative power, it cannot cease to know while it knows what it really is. The mind then in its true conception of creative power must conceive it to be necessarily underivable and incommunicable.

I now proceed to say, that no power except that which is adequate to create, or creative power-power which is adequate to give to substances their existence and their natures -- can be adequate to destroy, or change, or counteract them. The being who has power adequate to transform the nature of substances, and thus destroy, suspend, or counteract their action as causes, and thus to suspend those laws which result from their nature, has power which is adequate to create substances with their nature. Power that is adequate to raise a dead man to life, is and must be power to give existence to a living man from nothing. Indeed the one power must be identical with the other, since the giving of life to a dead man is as truly and essentially an act of creation as would be the act of giving him life from absolutely nothing. If then creative power is incommunicable, the act of giving life to a dead man must be the act of God, and not the act of any creature of God. This view of the subject I confess myself inclined to adopt.

 

If it be said that it is too metaphysical to be satisfactory, I ask, why is not also the opposite assumption, viz., that God can impart creative power? The proposition that God cannot impart creative power, is plainly no more metaphysical than the proposition that he can. And if my opponent has a right to rest on the assertion that he can, I have as good a right to rest on the assertion that he cannot. But I have not rested the proposition that he cannot impart creative power on mere assertion. Whether the reasons given be sufficient or not, I can only say they seem so to my own mind.

 

Without however resting the question on the position now taken, let us examine it on the ground that God can impart creative power to creatures.

 

I remark in the second place, it is reasonable to believe that God would not impart creative power to a creature if this be possible. The supposition that he should do this, involves so many things which are inconsistent with a sound theism, that it can hardly require a refutation. If any should insist on the possibility of his giving existence to such a creature, it maybe replied that the supposition of such an existence is wholly gratuitous and unauthorized. From the mere light of nature, we have no evidence of the existence of any superhuman beings intermediate between God and man. Should an event be known to occur which is beyond the power of man and of every known created agent, it would be unreasonable to ascribe it to any being but God, since he is known to possess, and is the only being who is known to possess, power adequate to its production. Again: the supposition that a creature possesses creative power, involves the supposition that he possesses infinite, attributes. A being who has power and knowledge which qualify to create from nothing, must have power and knowledge which are infinite, that is, attributes limited only by what involves a contradiction. To suppose such a creature is unphilosophical. When the mind is brought to the conclusion of an omniscient and omnipotent Creator, it is brought also to this, either that this Creator is an eternal, self-existent being, or that there is some other. We must conclude that there is an eternal, self-existent being who is the Creator of all created things, or that there is a created creator, or that there are many created creators. If the eternal, self-existent Being is not the Creator of all created things, then there may be as many created creators, with one exception, as there are things created; and to admit this is to violate the axiom of sound philosophy, that we are to admit no more causes than are necessary to account for an effect. Besides, there is a strong presumption against the supposition that an eternal, self-existent Being should give existence to creatures or to a creature, if this be possible, having the same infinite attributes with himself, especially if we reflect that each of these creatures would be able to create other beings ad libitum of the same infinite attributes.

 

Assuming then as proved, the existence of one and only one eternal self-existing Creator, who alone possesses creative power, the existence and the nature of all created things must depend on him to the exclusion of every other being. No created being can either destroy, change, or counteract the nature of created things, which is exclusively the effect of creative power. To suppose the contrary is to deny the exclusive power of God to create, since the being who can destroy, change, or counteract the nature of created things, must have power to create.

 

Again: from the nature of created things in given circumstances necessarily result what are called laws of nature modes of operating or acting, by which physical agents in certain circumstances necessarily produce certain effects; and while the nature of created things, from which these laws necessarily result in certain circumstances, remains the same, and is neither destroyed, changed, nor counteracted, these laws must remain the same.

 

As no created being has power to destroy, or to change, or counteract that nature of things from which the laws of nature necessarily result, and since no deviation from these laws can be effected, without destroying or changing or counteracting that nature of things on which these laws necessarily depend, and from which they necessarily result, it follows that no created being has power to cause a deviation from any of the laws of nature.

 

Further: man is competent to decide to a certain extent what are laws of nature, and what are deviations from these laws. To deny this, is to deny the authority of our senses in matters of universal experience and observation, and on which the senses can solely decide. And here it is obvious at once that if we are not to rely on this authority, then not only the Christian must abandon all his reasoning for miracles, which is founded on the experience of his witnesses, but the infidel must abandon all his reasoning against miracles, which is founded on the experience of the rest of the world. The infidel, when it will subserve his purpose in argument, as strenuously maintains as others, on the authority of experience and observation, that certain causes in certain circumstances must produce certain effects. For example, that a man placed in a furnace seven times heated must be burned: that water cannot be turned into wine, or a dead man be raised to life, by a mere word. These and a thousand similar facts which are laws of nature, are settled by experience and observation, nor can the unperverted mind deny or doubt them. Let it now be supposed that we see a man placed in a furnace seven times heated, and not burned. I say see him, I mean that we ascertain (so far as the senses when perfectly employed on the question of fact can ascertain any thing, which is solely a matter for the senses to decide upon), that such are the circumstances of the case. Now the question is, are we to rely on these mental decisions or judgments? What are they, and on what grounds do they rest? The first is, that such is the nature of fire and of human flesh, as God has made them, that in certain circumstances, viz., when brought into contact in a furnace seven times heated, and when there is no cause either natural or supernatural to prevent the effect-the fire must burn human flesh. To say that we are not to rely on this judgment or decision respecting the nature of the thin," under consideration, is either to deny, contrary to all experience and observation, that fire has always produced this effect in the given circumstances; or to deny the self-evident proposition, that the same physical cause in the same circumstances must produce the same effect; or to deny both. As no one will deny either, it must be received as a fact unquestionable and incontrovertible, that from the very nature of the things, as God has made them, fire must burn human flesh in the circumstances now supposed.

 

Another decision or judgment in the case, so far as the senses perfectly employed on the subject can decide, is, that the man is placed in the circumstances supposed. I speak not now of any judgment or influence derived from the fact that the man is not burned. This may or may not modify or change the final conclusion in respect to the facts in the case. How this is, we may see presently. The fact that the man is not burned may be a ground of inferring some other cause or circumstance in the case than any which is cognizable by the senses. The judgment I now speak of concerns the causes and circumstances, as these are cognizable simply, by the senses, and aside from the fact that the man is not burned. I suppose the case to be one in which the mind, so far as the senses when perfectly employed on the subject can enable it to judge or decide respecting the case, necessarily judges or decides that the man is placed in the circumstances supposed. I claim that aside from any inference from the fact that the man is not burned, the true and only judgment of the mind would and ought to be, that the man is placed in the furnace seven times heated, and that there is no cause either natural or super-natural to prevent the burning of his flesh; and that this decision or judgment, were it not for the single fact that he is not burned, would be entitled to unqualified confidence.

 

But the supposition is, that the man in these circumstances is not burned. How then is this fact to affect our conclusion? We are plainly not to conclude that our senses do not give us all the facts and circumstances of the case which are cognizable by the senses. The senses are according to the supposition perfectly employed on the question of fact, and their decision is to be relied on as in other like cases. When thus employed they have never deceived us. In this respect they are to be absolutely relied on. We are therefore bound to believe that the facts and circumstances supposed, are the only facts and circumstances of the case, unless we have reason from some other source for inferring some other cause or circumstance which is not cognizable by the senses. Such reason we have in the fact -- a fact given by the senses that the man is not burned. This obliges us to conclude that the effect of burning is prevented by some cause which is not cognizable by the senses when perfectly employed. This must be either some natural cause, that is, some created agent not cognizable by the senses, or it must be God.

 

Is it then a created agent which is not cognizable by the senses? I answer, first, that we have no evidence from the light of nature, that there is any such created agent intermediate between God and man. As God is the only being who is known to possess power to prevent the effect in the ease supposed, the only rational conclusion is, that its prevention is to be ascribed to his power. If on the authority of our senses we could decide that a watch had disappeared from the room in which we are, and that no individual had been in and passed out of it except A. B., we should be bound to believe that A. B. had taken the watch. The reasoning would be this: The watch must have been taken away by some visible agent; A. B. is the only visible agent by whom it could be taken away; he therefore has taken it. So in the case under consideration. The effect must be prevented by some invisible agent, or some one not cognizable by the senses. God is the only known agent who is not cognizable by the senses, and who could prevent the effect; he therefore has prevented it. It is here to be remembered that for reasons already assigned, there is no more presumption against the man's not being burned than against his being burned; in other words, that the prevention of his being burned by divine agency in the case, is as credible as the fact of his being burned in another case by natural causes would be. If we suppose a case in which the presumption from experience against a divine interposition is not removed in the manner already explained, it might be one of difficulty. We might be compelled to oppose what seems to be given by the senses perfectly employed, to the testimony of all past experience, and we might and probably should inquire again, whether what seems to be given by the senses perfectly employed in the case, is really the result of such an employment or use of these means of knowledge; or if it proved to be such, we might begin to distrust the authority of the senses, which is one of the most difficult of all tasks that can be imposed on the mind; or we might suspect that in drawing universal conclusions from universal experience and observation we had gone too far, and begin to think that what has been, at least as determined by experience, is no proof of what will be; in short, we might. be in the supposable quandary of being bound to judge on a question, when the evidence on both sides, is exactly balanced, a case which may be imagined, though it can never occur; since if we really suppose such a case, we cannot be bound to form a judgment. The case to be decided on, is one in which it is as credible that the burning of the body is prevented by the agency of God, as that the watch is removed by the agency of A. B. The mere possibility of another invisible agent ought no more to diminish the confidence of our conclusion in the one case than in the other.

 

Again: the mind cannot reasonably admit the existence of a created agent as the author of the supposed event; but there is good and sufficient reason for disbelieving and denying it. Whenever the senses perfectly employed on the subject have decided on the facts or circumstances in which physical phenomena occur, they have in all cases decided correctly. The mind has often from an imperfect use of the senses, judged rashly and incorrectly. But no erroneous judgment or decision can be traced to a perfect use of the senses. The mind has thus decided, that the facts and circumstances which exist and which are cognizable by the senses, are all the facts and circumstances of the case, to the entire exclusion of any and every cause or agent not cognizable by the senses. This it has done in numberless instances and never found itself mistaken. No cause or agent not cognizable by sense, has ever interposed and by the result evinced the reality of its existence. It is true the mind has other proofs of the existence of God. But it has no proof of the existence of any created agent not cognizable by the senses. And here it naturally inquires, why if there are such created agents have they never evinced their existence until now? Why have they never prevented human flesh when in contact with fire from being burned? Why have they never turned water into wine, or raised the dead to life? Why should they do such things now, when they have never done them before? By this process of thought the mind, in connection with uniform experience and observation, comes to the conclusion, not only that the senses give all the facts and circumstances of the case which are cognizable by the senses, but that these are all, to the entire exclusion of any and every created cause or agent. The senses are in fact, and are obviously designed to be, the medium of deciding on the existence of physical phenomena and their causes. With this authority they do decide in certain cases, that the causes and circumstances which they discover, are all the created causes concerned in those cases. The mind is thus brought to the conclusion before the event and irrespective of it, what the created causes are and what they are not. For example, when it has decided in this way that a man is thrown into a furnace seven times heated, or that a man is dead, it also decides that there is no created agent which can interpose and prevent the burning of the body, or raise the dead to life. Indeed if the mind did not rely on this judgment or decision as one fully warranted when thus based on the authority of the senses, that is, if it admitted the possible existence of created agents not cognizable by the senses, with power thus to interfere with the operation of causes which are cognizable by the senses, and should allow this fact to modify or control its judgment, then it could not decide that any of those things cognizable by the senses are causes of the phenomena connected with them; for all these phenomena might be the effects of the power of agents not cognizable by the senses. A man might be actually burned in a furnace, or killed by being pierced through the heart, or by poison, or sustained in life by food, &c., &c., and yet neither the fire, nor the dagger, nor the poison, nor the food, be the cause of the effect connected with it. These things are sufficient to show, that the mind is under the same necessity of regarding the authority of the senses, when they decide that certain sensible causes and circumstances, which they discover by the senses, are all the created causes or agents concerned, which it is under of regarding these things as causes at all.

 

Once more: there is another consideration still more decisive on this point. The mind cannot suppose that there are created agents not cognizable by the senses, with power to interfere with the operation of causes which are cognizable by the senses, without supposing created power which is adequate to destroy, or change, or suspend, or counteract the nature of created things, which is exclusively the province of creative power. But to suppose this is to deny the exclusive power of God to create, since it must be admitted that a being who can destroy, or change, or suspend, or counteract the nature of created causes must have power to create. Hence all sound and consistent theism admits, that power thus to interfere with the nature of created things or causes must be creative power, and must belong exclusively to God. Since therefore no created being has power to change, or suspend, or counteract that nature of things from which the laws of nature result, and since there can be no deviation from these laws without either changing, or suspending, or counteracting that nature of things on which these laws depend, it follows that no created being has power to cause a deviation from the laws of nature. Man then being fully competent to decide in certain cases what are laws of nature, and also what are deviations from these laws, and that God only can cause such deviations, is competent to decide that certain supposable events, viz., those which involve a deviation from any law of nature, are and can be brought to pass only by the power of God, and are, according to our definition, miracles.

 

We have now finished the preliminary discussion respecting miracles, which prepares us briefly to present the argument from this source for a divine revelation. We have shown that --

 

Miracles wrought for the purposes and ends of the scriptural miracles are credible events; that not only is every aspect of incredibility removed from these events by their object, but a very high degree of presumption -- even proof -- furnished of their reality.

 

It follows that: The testimony of the sacred historians to the reality of miracles -- thus placed beyond all question -- confirms their reality as decisive proofs of a revelation from God.

 

END OF VOLUME II.

Return to MORAL GOVERNMENT Table of Contents