Topics to be discussed. -- Remarks on the terms decrees, predestination, &c. -- I. Nature of the divine purposes. -- II. Their extent; they include every event. -- III. The certainty of their accomplishment. IV. The mode of their accomplishment: 1. As they respect events in the material world; Question argued at length in respect to the efficiency of second causes; 2. As they respect the sets of moral agents. -- These determined by the constitution of man and his circumstances. -- Objections considered.

 

 

According to the views given of this subject in the preceding discussion, the providential government of God consists in that system of influence or control by which he secures the accomplishment of his providential purposes.

 

The topics which next claim consideration are the universality of his providential government, and the mode of its administration. And here it is obvious that every question on these topics must depend on the universality of his providential purposes, and the mode of their execution; since it is undeniable that God's providential government must be co-extensive with his providential purposes, and the mode of its administration must be identical with the mode in which he executes these purposes. This then brings us to the consideration of what has been commonly called the doctrine of God's decrees.

 

Here again, as I have often done before, I take occasion to notice the language or phraseology commonly.employed on this subject. And I must say that in my own view, the principal terms employed have occasioned much of the controversy respecting it, and that the use of them, if not unjustifiable, ought on the ground of expediency, at least in many cases, to be relinquished. The words to which I allude are decree, predestination, and the like. These words are of heathen origin and of heathen import. They were used originally by those who believed in fate and destiny, and who applied them, not merely to denote the certainty of events, but to denote also the still further notion or idea of the most absolute natural necessity. If then these terms are to be understood according to their original meaning and use, they surely convey a meaning, or express ideas which are false. With such a meaning they ought not to be adopted, at least in many cases, by the translators or the expounders of the Word of God. I do not intend by this to censure our translators in the instances in which they may have employed some of the terms now referred to; for in my own view, the context in those instances in which the objectionable idea ought to be excluded, does exclude it, as in Rom. viii. 29, the event spoken of is moral conformity to Christ, a conception inconsistent with the heathen notion of destiny.

 

Nor do I intend to censure those theologians for an unjustifiable use of these terms, who have been careful to define them and to exclude, by their definitions, the objectionable import. I only say that the use of these terms to convey the idea of absolute natural necessity, is a use unjustifiable and ought to be exploded.

 

Conceding the unquestionable right of any speaker or writer to use terms as he pleases if he defines them, and also the propriety of using terms which in themselves are ambiguous, provided the context limits and defines their meaning, still even in such cases there is room for considerations of expediency. For if after all (and the fact is notoriously common in controversial discussions), the terms will not be understood in the sense in which they are used, it becomes a serious question whether if other terms can be used that will convey to others our real meaning instead of that which we do not intend to convey, we ought not to reject the former and to adopt the latter. Or rather there is no question, for as the object of the use of language is to convey to others the real ideas of our own minds, we are bound, if we can, to use such language as shall accomplish this end. On this principle, I would either exclude the terms decree, predestination, and kindred terms, from discussions of the truth under consideration, or explain them so that they cannot, be misunderstood. I should not indeed expect in this way to prevent all controversy, but I am confident that men of evangelical sentiments may be brought by it to agree in words, as they do actually agree in things. There is not one of these men who will not admit that under all providential events, however evil, and whether they be viewed as natural or moral evils-we are bound to exercise cheerful resignation to the will and government of God. But yet in the view of many of these persons, to speak of God's decreeing or predestinating moral evil, is to utter a sentiment deserving the severest reprobation. And why? Plainly because they attach very different ideas to these terms, from those which the former phraseology conveys. And yet that phraseology conveys the whole truth, while their ready admission of the truth thus expressed is decisive that the parties agree in things and dispute only about words, a sort of controversy that should be left to philologists and grammarians, rather than agitate the Church of God. For these reasons I adopt, instead of the phrase, the decrees of God, the phrase, the providential purposes of God, and now proceed to consider --

 

I. Their nature;

II. Their extent;

III. Their certainty; and,

IV. The mode of their accomplishment.

 

I. Their nature.

 

To this part of the subject our attention has already been directed. The providential purposes of God as they are distinguished from his purpose as a moral governor, are those purposes of God which respect the CERTAINTY OF EVENTS, or purposes that events SHALL BE, or SHALL TAKE PLACE.

 

That God has formed such purposes in regard to many events, and even in regard to all events which directly depend on his own agency, no Theist will deny. Whatever God does, he always designed or purposed to do; is a position too plainly true to need argument for its support.

 

II. Concerning their extent --

I maintain that the providential purposes of God apply to all actual events. The meaning is, that God has from eternity purposed that every event which takes place shall take place. The proof may be thus, stated. God as an omniscient and immutable being forms no new purposes respecting actual events. His purposes therefore are eternal. God also as an omniscient being must foreknow all events. He must therefore purpose either that they shall take place, or purpose that they shall not take place, or be indifferent whether they take place or not. A heathen philosopher would say, "Magna Di curant, parva negligunt." -- (Cic. de Nat. Deorum, 66.) But that God is indifferent to any actual event, however trivial it may appear to us, cannot be justly affirmed, unless it can be shown to have no connection whatever with any other important event. On the contrary, that he is not indifferent to any event, however trivial in our view, is satisfactorily inferred from manifold such events, and those of the highest moment. The cackling of a goose saved Rome. The showing of a fig in the Roman senate caused the destruction of Carthage. Who will pretend that the apostle unjustly appreciated the reality or importance of such connections in his exclamation, "Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth!" so, true in the case to which be applies it, and so applicable to cases innumerable? Who shall tell us the effects on this material system of the annihilation of its least particle, or even of its occupying another place than it does at any moment of its existence? Indeed the connection of which we speak, is so often and so decisively manifested to us, as to warrant the conclusion that the ultimate design or end of God, in the creation and government of this world, may depend on events which in themselves would appear to possess no importance. Hence the inference is authorized, that God can no more be indifferent to one event than to another -- to the floating of an atom than to the ruin of a world. Besides, to suppose God to be indifferent to any actual event, is to suppose him either directly or indirectly to give existence to that event without a reason, which is plainly impossible.

 

God then must purpose that every actual event shall take place or that it shall not. But to suppose that he has purposed that an event shall not take place, and does not prevent it, is to deny his power to prevent it. But since nothing can exist except in dependence on God, it were as absurd to say that he could not prevent its existence, as to say he could not abstain from acting. It follows therefore that no event takes place which God has not purposed shall take place; in other words, that God has purposed the existence of all actual events.

 

It is common to present an argument on this subject founded in the assumption that God cannot foreknow that an event will take place, unless he has purposed that it shall take place. The question is not, whether God can as a matter of fact foresee any event which he has not purposed, but whether, in the nature of things, it is conceivable that he could foresee such an event, supposing it to take place. If by this assumption it be meant that it is inconceivable that God should foreknow that an event will take place which he has not purposed shall take place, or which is contrary to his purpose, allowing the possibility of such an event, I cannot admit it. For since events which are contrary to my purpose are possible, and since I may know that they will take place, so if we suppose any event contrary to God's purpose to be possible, he may also foreknow that event. I may foreknow that my friend who is sick with a fatal disease will die, and it is plain that my knowledge of the fact no more depends on a purpose that it shall be, than my knowledge of any present event which is contrary to my pleasure. It is true however that if it were in my power to prevent such an event, then it would be impossible that the event Should take place contrary to my purpose. On this account it is impossible that any event should take place contrary to God's purpose, and therefore we cannot suppose him to foreknow an event which is not in some respect the object of his purpose. Having the power to prevent it he would prevent it, if for some reason or another he did not purpose that it should take place. But then the impossibility that God should foreknow an event which he has not purposed, results not from the fact that he could not foreknow such an event allowing it to be possible, but from the fact that it is impossible that he should foreknow that an event will be which is contrary to his purpose, when we take into consideration his power to prevent it. But this is the same argument with the preceding; i.e., such is the knowledge and such the power of God, that he will suffer no event to take place which is in every respect contrary to his purpose.

III. The certainty of their accomplishment.

 

As every actual event fulfills a purpose of God, so no event whose actual existence he has purposed will fail to take place. This is conclusively argued thus. If an event be not within the power of God he cannot purpose that it shall take place. No being can purpose that an event shall take place, the existence of which he knows to be impossible. But such impossibility, so far as it exists, is perfectly known to omniscience. No event therefore whose actual existence God cannot secure can be the object of his providential purpose. Of course every event whose existence God purposes, he can bring to pass, and therefore will bring to pass.

 

IV. The modo of their accomplishment.

 

It is the philosophical doctrine of some theologians, that all events are brought to pass by the direct efficiency of God; in other words, that neither matter nor mind possesses efficiency in itself or is in its own nature an efficient cause, but that all material phenomena and mental acts are results of divine efficiency, as directly and truly as the existence of any created thing. To this philosophical doctrine, in its full extent at least, I cannot subscribe. My views of it and of the subject now before us, will be given by considering the mode in which God accomplishes his providential purposes

 

1. As these respect events in the material world; and,

 

2. As they respect the acts of created moral agents.

 

1. As the purposes of God respect events in the material world.

 

Laying aside miraculous events as not properly belonging to the present inquiry, the topic of discussion is --

 

Whether second causes in the material world are efficient causes, or whether the phenomena connected with them are to be ascribed to the direct agency of God? This a question which, if I mistake not, it is difficult for us to decide with any high degree of confidence, and the decision of which is of no great doctrinal or practical importance; still, as a topic frequently investigated, it may be well to devote to it some consideration.

 

In support of the doctrine of direct divine efficiency, in opposition to that of the efficiency of material causes, the following things may be alleged: -- First, that the efficiency of such causes is impossible. This has been often asserted as an axiom, a self-evident proposition, the truth of which no sound mind can doubt, and which no argument is necessary to support. All efficiency, it is said, must exclusively pertain to the Great First Cause. It is enough to say, in reply to this assumption, that it is wholly gratuitous. Others who hold the truth of this position rest it on a different basis. On the ground that matter is incapable of intelligence, and that most if not all effects in the material world are marked with design and bespeak intelligence in their cause, they infer that matter cannot be the efficient cause of these effects. The correctness of this conclusion, admitting that matter is incapable of intelligence, depends on the assumption that an efficiency cannot pertain to second causes, which without possessing intelligence shall produce effects which bespeak intelligence. To pronounce this impossible to an omnipotent Creator, seems to be an assertion entitled to no very high degree of confidence.

 

In opposition to the doctrine of the efficiency of material causes, it may be still further said that it greatly impairs, if it does not wholly destroy the argument from this part of the creation for the divine existence; for he who can believe that a flower comes into being through an efficiency inherent in matter, can believe that a world or a universe might come into existence in the same way; that there is no greater absurdity so far as the thing itself is concerned, in supposing the eternal uncaused existence of that substance which we call matter, than in supposing the eternity of that which we call spirit; and that since, if matter actually possesses such efficiency, it is in its own nature capable of it, it will follow that no good reason can be assigned, why the present material system is not the result of such efficiency. For it may be said, if this doctrine be true, then it is proved either that intelligence in the cause is not necessary, to the manifestation of contrivance in the effect, or if it be necessary, then matter being proved to be the efficient cause of effects that manifest contrivance, is proved to possess intelligence; so that since matter by its own inherent efficiency produces such effects, preserving the regularity of the material universe and giving existence to all its phenomena, it might by its own inherent energy have disposed itself into its present form, and be the independent cause of all the changes and results which occur.

 

To all this it may be replied, that although we ascribe real efficiency to matter, it will not follow that matter possesses intelligence, nor that there is not an intelligent being from whom the efficiency ascribed to matter is itself derived. There way be an efficiency in the particles of matter which shall die, pose them in given circumstances into the form of a crystal or a rose, and still this efficiency may be derived from an intelligent Creator. The desire manifested by a watch in the division of time, may be traced to the efficiency of the mainspring, and yet we cannot avoid on the one hand, the conviction that intelligence has been employed in the production of the machinery and its results, nor on the other, that such intelligence does not pertain to the materials of which it is constructed, but is exclusively the attribute of its contriver. The supposed efficiency of matter then, is not inconsistent with the existence of an intelligent being as its author by direct agency, and thus indirectly of all its results. But this is not all; the legitimate evidence on the subject conducts us unavoidably to the conclusion that there is such a being. As we have before shown, from the manifestation of contrivance the mind unavoidably infers the existence of an intelligent being, i.e., of a contriver. The fact or principle on which this inference rests is this, that in all cases in which we know the cause of adaptation, we know it to be either directly or indirectly an intelligent cause. Although therefore there are instances of adaptation which our knowledge does not enable us to trace directly to an intelligent cause, yet we are obliged as sound philosophers to conclude that there is no such instance, which is not to be ascribed either directly or indirectly to an intelligent agent. We do not therefore destroy or weaken the argument from the design or contrivance manifested in material phenomena in support of the existence of an intelligent Creator; for though we ascribe an efficiency to second causes, still that efficiency implies the existence of such a Creator.

 

It may however be further said, that all the power or efficiency of which we have any decisive evidence pertains to spirit, and that therefore as the phenomena of the material world are effects which Are beyond the power of any finite spirits which we know, we are led to the simple but sublime doctrine, that they are produced by the direct and ceaseless agency of the Infinite Spirit.

 

The reply which may, be made to this reasoning, which I think must be admitted to be plausible, brings me to the arguments on the other side of the question.

 

It may here be said that although all the efficiency or power which we know, pertains to spirit, yet according to analogy we Should be led to believe from this very fact that power or efficiency pertains to other causes. Finding in our own consciousness that certain changes are produced by our own powers or efficiency, and thus that God has created finite agents, the possibility of the fact can no longer be doubted that he can create such agents; and witnessing changes without us connected with what we term causes, precisely as they would did efficiency pertain to them, it may be said that the dictate of philosophy is, that efficiency does actually pertain to these causes. Whether this be the dictate of philosophy or not, what we have already said on the subject in our previous discussions, will satisfy us that such is the actual process of the human mind, and such are its actual conclusions almost without exception.

 

It is further said, that if efficiency does not pertain to these causes, the creation of the material world is useless. In this I see no force. For it may be replied that all the ends to be answered by giving efficiency to second causes would, so far as we can discover, be accomplished by the regular direct agency of God through the medium of these causes.

 

It is further said, that the efficiency of second causes is obviously the dictate of common sense, as evinced by the universality of human belief. To this it may be replied, that the universality of human belief may be accounted for, without supposing it to be founded in evidence, by tracing it to the acknowledged propensity of the human mind to exclude God from all its thoughts; and it may be said as a strong confirmation of this, that men of piety are wont to see God in every thing. It may however be doubted whether men of piety derive their views and impressions respecting the presence of God from their belief of his direct agency, for God is as truly presented to the view of the mind which contemplates his power manifested by the efficiency of second causes, as by direct agency through the medium of those causes. He is still brought before the mind as the author of all. Nor can it be doubted that the human mind finds it peculiarly difficult not to believe that there is in the nature of material causes, something which is the ground or reason of their appropriate effects-something for example in the nature of fire, which constitutes it an efficient cause of certain effects, which there is not in water, and vice versa. Indeed no philosopher can decide that God could create such a thing as fire is, and not impart to it such a nature and such an efficiency.

 

It may be still further alleged, that to deny all efficiency to second causes is to deny the reality of material things. For it may be said, what are they, if they have not a nature or properties -- and what is nature and what are properties, if not a real esse, a real existence? For example, who will say that if you suppose the peculiar property of the loadstone to be taken from it, it would not become a different thing from what it is; and that if you were to go on abstracting one property after another, till all its properties or all its efficiency were taken away or annihilated, that any thing would be left? And so of every thing else. If there be then no efficiency in these things, there are no real existences without us; and what then are the senses which our Creator has given us, with their inseparable inferences, if you please so to term them, but organs of deception and error? To suppose that our Creator has so constituted the mind, as to lead us into error and mistake in regard to the reality of things, is hardly to be admitted.

 

On the whole, the specific question before us is perhaps one on which, if confident conclusions are authorized only by demonstrative evidence, we ought not to come to any confident conclusion. I would however say that my own mind inclined, to the belief of the efficiency of second causes. The possibility of the fact cannot be denied. The fact evinced by our own consciousness of the existence of created agents of one sort, not unnaturally leads us to infer, on the principle of analogy, the existence of created agents of another sort. The universality of human belief in some degree corroborates the doctrine, while the apparent necessity either of admitting it or of denying the reality of material things, and thus implicating our Maker in the charge of deceiving his creatures, goes still more strongly to confirm my belief.

 

Be this however as it may, the preceding remarks show that the intelligent Creator of the material universe is its providential governor. If he is the author of all material phenomena by direct agency, and as truly so as he is of any created existence, then surely all these events take place as the expression of his will and as the accomplishment of his providential purposes. Nor is this conclusion weakened at all by the supposition that he has imparted efficiency to second causes. For still that efficiency is the result of his power, and we may be confident that an omniscient and omnipotent God will no more create such causes of such a nature, or arrange them in such a manner that they shall fail to fulfill his designs, than were his direct agency employed in producing their results. Still therefore, all events in the material universe are the expressions of his will and proofs of his dominion throughout this portion of his works.

 

It was proposed to consider the mode in which God accomplishes his providential purposes --

 

II. As they respect the acts of created moral agents.

 

If what we have already said on other occasions be true, men are free moral agents; and if what has now been said be true, the providential purposes of God extend to all the actions of men; in other words, God has purposed that every human action which takes place shall take place. The present inquiry is, how does God secure the certainty of the actions of free agents? The more common doctrine of Orthodox divines is, that he does this by motives. In this however, if we would state the whole truth with metaphysical accuracy, we must include the nature or constitution of man; and our meaning must be, that the constitution of man and his circumstances axe such as to be the occasion of the certainty of all his actions. Perhaps however this answer to the inquiry may be considered as differing from that which ascribes the certainty of human action to motives, at least in one respect; viz., as it may include a divine influence, which secures in some cases a result which would not be secured simply by the essential constitution of man, and by what we commonly term motives. On this account I prefer it, and for the sake of giving precision and comprehensiveness to the statement of my views on this topic, I choose to say that God secures the accomplishment of those of his providential purposes which respect human action, through the constitution of man and the circumstances in which he acts.

 

When however I make this statement, I do not question the propriety or truth of that popular phraseology which is often used, and which in words ascribes the certainty of human action in particular instances to some single cause; as for example, to the nature of man, or to temptation, or to divine grace. For as I shall have occasion to show elsewhere, the real meaning of such popular phraseology as authorized by usage comprises all that I mean in the statement which I have made. I would here only observe, that when the actions of man are traced to the nature of man, the meaning cannot be that his nature is the cause considered apart from his circumstances or from the objects of choice; nor when human action is traced to motives or temptations can it be meant to exclude the nature of man; nor when divine grace is spoken of as the cause, can the object be to exclude the nature of man and the motives to holiness. So that the popular statement, when taken in its true meaning, whatever be its form, comprises all that is included in the more precise and comprehensive statement now made.

 

To the inquiry, how does God accomplish his providential purposes which respect human action, I answer --

 

Through the constitution of man and the circumstances in which he acts. In support of this position I observe --

 

1. That considered simply as an hypothesis it adequately accounts for the certainty of human action.

 

Who can doubt that physical propensities may be so strong toward a given action or course of action, and the motives or temptations so powerful, that such action will be certain? But if this may be so in one case it may be in all; and unless it can be shown that such is not the ground or reason of the certainty of human action in all cases, then it cannot be asserted that such is not the sufficient ground or reason.

 

2. Such substantially must be the ground or reason of the certainty of voluntary action in God.

 

None will deny that the voluntary acts of the Divine Being are certain, nor that the divine nature is a ground of such certainty. But is it not equally undeniable, that there is in the nature of things a ground or reason why a being of such a nature as God, chooses and acts in every instance as he does choose and act? If so, then the real ground or reason of the certainty of his acts is substantially the same with what we affirm to be the ground or reason of the certainty of human action. The question is, whether it is not so in fact? I answer, there is no absurdity in the supposition that such is the fact, for if such is the ground of the certainty of divine action, it may be of human action. God can in this respect make beings in his own image.

 

But further, we have no warrant to assert that such is the ground of the certainty of divine action, unless we first assume that such is the ground of the certainty of human action; for we can in this respect reason concerning God only from what we know of ourselves. We know nothing of the nature of voluntary action except from ourselves: so that our decision, whatever it be in regard to the ground of the certainty of such action in God, must rest on the previous decision that the same thing, i.e., the same thing in its nature as a cause, is the ground of the certainty of such action in us. I say then, that from the universal concession of those divines with whom we dispute on this point, viz., that the nature of God and the nature of things are such as to be the ground of the certainty of his acts, it follows that the true dictate of reason is, that the nature of man and the circumstances in which he acts are the ground of the certainty of his acts. I further say, that they do and must admit this to be the fact before they come to their conclusion respecting God, and that this conclusion shows that whether they are aware of the fact or not, and that however inconsistent they may be with themselves, they do admit our present doctrine in regard to the certainty of human action, since it is the only possible basis of their conclusion respecting the certainty of divine action.

 

3. It is the dictate of common sense, and what all the world believe.

 

In any inquiry into the reason of any human action, who ever in the exercise of common sense thinks of tracing it to any thing except the constitutional propensities, the objects of choice and other circumstances in which man acts? I speak here of the ultimate cause, ground, or reason of human action.

 

It is common indeed to trace specific action to the governing purpose, yet if we pursue the inquiry, whence is this governing purpose, we are carried back to the constitution and circumstances of the being. Nor do I appeal here to what must be conceded to be a matter of fact in regard to mankind generally, but to the very philosophers and divines who adopt a different theory. They too, when they would speak to the conviction of their fellowmen, are obliged to trace and do in fact always trace, human action to the cause now assigned. Look into their popular sermons and discourses for example, and see to what cause they trace human sinfulness. It is to the nature of man, or it is to the influence of the world, or to temptation, or to the strength of passion and appetite, and so on, all of which causes are resolvable into the cause which we assign.

 

4 The same thing is evinced by the consciousness of every human being.

 

Every one who acts voluntarily or as a free agent, knows why he acts as he does. But whatever be the reason why one acts in a given manner is the reason of the certainty of such action. Now, that this is a matter of human consciousness supersedes any further argument. Nor can we from the nature of the case make any other appeal except to every one's own consciousness. In making this appeal however, strange as it might seem if facts did not confirm it, we are not always sure of a true answer even from honest men. Their philosophy blinds them to the operations of their own minds. Still there is a way to settle the question of consciousness in cases in which a mere appeal to consciousness results in a false answer. I ask then, what is an act of choice? Consciousness must answer that it is a preference of one kind of good to another. I then ask why is there a given choice or preference? Consciousness must answer that such is my known or conscious capacity of good from the object chosen, such are my propensities toward it, such are the views which I take of the adaptation of the object to my happiness, that I choose it. Now I say that there is not a human being that is not in every act of choice conscious of all this. To be more particular, take a sinful choice as an example. What is it, and why is it? Is there a human being who knows what duty is who cannot tell from his own consciousness what the act is which is sin, and also the why and the wherefore of the act? Does he not know that the act is a preference of worldly good, and does he not know why he prefers this good? Does he not as a matter of consciousness, trace this act of choice to his estimate of the comparative value of the object as an act of his own, and to other inseparable preliminary acts of his own? And does he not trace this act and those connected with it, to his susceptibilities to that good, to the adaptation of the object to his happiness, and to the circumstances, perceptions, and so on, which resulted in this estimate? Does he not know that these things being as they were, be chose as he did? I say if man is conscious of any thing he is conscious of this, and that he is conscious of the reason why he acts as he does in every case. But as we have said, the reason why he acts as he does is the reason of the certainty of his act; i.e., with this antecedent this consequent would certainly follow. It is then out of place here to resort to philosophical arguments drawn from any other source than human consciousness and which contradict its decision. They are false, for consciousness is the highest evidence. Nor do I admit that there are any such arguments whose fallacy cannot be exposed. This is the next topic of inquiry.

 

To the view which has now been given the following objections deserve notice:

 

Obj. 1. It may be said that it is inconsistent with one fact, viz., divine influence in the production of holiness. I answer, that when human action is secured by a divine influence, the circumstances of the agent are changed, so that this case is properly included in the theory or doctrine now advanced. True it is, if this be an influence that secures holy action independently of and abstractly from the nature of man as a moral agent, and of motives, then indeed it will follow that God secures one kind of human action in a manner not recognized in the present theory. For there would be no truth or propriety in saying that all human action is secured through the nature and circumstances of man, including in these circumstances the motives to action, provided there is in fact one kind of action which is secured, without having any relation or connection with either man's nature or motives. But if this influence of God does not dispense with the nature of man as a moral agent, nor with the influence or relation of motives to moral action, but is an influence which is actually coincident with both an influence which results in or secures this event, viz., that such a being as man is, yields to the motives to a given action which are presented to him, when without such influence he would not yield, and when with it he is not obliged to yield by physical necessity -- then it is true in this case that the certainty of holy action is justly traced to the nature of man and to the circumstances in which he acts. For then this divine influence is as really one of the circumstances in which he acts, as are the motives in view of which he acts.

 

Obj. 2 It is said that independent action in creatures is a physical impossibility. This is argued first, from the nature of creatures as necessarily dependent for their actions on their Creator; and secondly, from the nature of their actions, Considered as effects which must have a cause.

 

In reply to the first of these positions I remark, first, that it assumes what cannot be proved; viz., that God cannot create an agent, i.e., a being with powers to act. This argument, as presented by those who adopt it, wholly overlooks the distinction between the dependence on God for the power to act and dependence for action itself. Now let it once be admitted that man is an agent, and it is admitted that he has the power of acting. And although he is dependent on his Creator for the power to act, yet when it is conceded that he has received this power, it is the very, perfection of absurdity to say that he is necessarily dependent for action; it is to say we have a power to act and yet cannot act, i.e., have power to act and have not power to act.

 

Again: the admission that man acts is inconsistent with the principle now under consideration. For what is action but power acting on the exercise or exertion of power? For example, what is an act of volition but an act of the power to will? If this be so, then it is plainly impossible that God or any being should be the author (in the sense of absolute efficiency) of any volition except his own. If it be admitted that there is an influence of one being upon another which causes or occasions the certainty of action in the latter, still the thing caused or occasioned is action, and is therefore in its own nature an event whose existence as truly and properly depends on the agent or actor as on him who occasions it, and of which, strictly and properly speaking, the agent is the author or efficient cause. To suppose him to be the agent, and a moral agent, is to admit that he has adequate power to act not only as he does, but to act otherwise. Of course, to suppose that the event -- viz., action -- is necessarily dependent in the sense of natural necessity on an influence or efficiency ab extra, is to deny the power of acting to one who confessedly acts, and has the power to act as he does and otherwise; i.e., it is to admit and deny at the same time, that he has the power of acting. So that if we admit that man acts in the exercise of a power to act, it follows that instead of its being physically impossible that there should be independent action, i.e., instead of its being thus impossible that there should be action except it be produced by divine efficiency as its physical cause, it is impossible that there should be any such action thus produced in such an agent. For the very nature of action implies that it exists independently of any physical efficiency from without the agent who acts. Or thus:

 

To suppose action to be produced by an efficiency ab extra, as its physical cause, destroys the essential nature of the action by ascribing it not to the power of acting as its efficient cause; for we have no conception of action, except that it is power acting. So that instead of its being impossible that there should be action independent of efficiency, ab extra, as its physical cause, it is impossible that there should be action which is not thus independent.

 

The proposition that man from his nature is necessarily dependent on God for his actions, is then not only inconsistent with the fact that man acts at all in any sense of the term, but the only argument used to support the doctrine rests on what may be confidently affirmed to be a false assumption, viz., that God cannot create an agent. And here I would add, that so far as I know, all who have maintained the doctrine of divine efficiency in the production of human volitions, have rested it on this gratuitous and false assumption.

 

In reply to the second principle on which the present objection rests, and which assumes that actions are effects, I remark First, that this language is objectionable, because it is liable to convey a meaning in which it cannot be applied to human action. The word effect as used in the present argument, in order that the least plausibility may pertain to the argument, must be used to convey a false meaning. The meaning must be that human actions are physical effects, i.e., events which exist by natural necessity, and of course the existence of all power adequate to their production except divine power, and of all power adequate to any other event, is denied by the terms of the proposition. Thus there is a petitio principii in the very outset of the argument. There is also an assumption, which if what we have been saying be true, is inconsistent with the essential nature of an action, while yet the reality of action is conceded. It is an assumption also equally inconsistent with the power of acting in man, since to suppose that actions are physical effects of divine efficiency, and of course that they take place by a natural necessity, is to deny the powers of moral agency to man, and thus to assert that a being acts who has no power to act, i.e., that a being who has power to act has no power to act.

 

It is to no purpose to say here that man has power to act when acted upon by divine efficiency or power. For still it is saying that he has not natural or physical power to act, that not being power to act, which cannot act without power or efficiency ab extra to aid it. Besides, when this power or efficiency is exerted, a given action not only will but must by a natural necessity follow; none other can take place. But the freedom of human action is destroyed by the natural necessity of human action, and confessedly so by those whose scheme is now opposed.

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