Third leading proposition continued viz.: God governs with rightful authority. -- God is benevolent, because the present system may be the best possible. -- Objection from the existence of moral evil. -- There may be an impossibility, in the nature of things, that it should be prevented. Assuming that a moral system may be the best, 1. It may be impossible to prevent all sin under a moral system--2. If this is not true, it may be impossible under the best moral system.

 

 

IN the last lecture, I commenced the argument in support of the benevolence of God by proposing to show,

 

That the present system may be not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator.

 

In that lecture I considered the objection to the divine benevolence, derived from the existence of natural evil. I now propose to consider that which is derived from the existence and prevalence of moral evil.

 

This is justly esteemed the principal objection. It is demanded, if natural evil is a necessary and useful consequence of moral evil, why did not God prevent moral evil? Why did he not adopt, as he might have done, a moral system, which should result in the perfect and endless holiness and happiness of his moral creation; at least one which should have prevented the present extensive prevalence of moral evil? Or, if this was impossible, then it may be demanded again, why adopt a moral system at all; or, if he could not adopt a moral system, nor any other which should be better than none, then why adopt any system of creation?

 

This I think, is the objection derived from the existence and prevalence of moral evil in its full force. And it is obvious that it derives all its plausibility from the single assumption, that God, either by adopting a different system from the present, or none at all, could have done better than he has done. It is equally obvious, that fully and fairly to meet this objection, it is sufficient to show that the present system, notwithstanding the existence and prevalence of moral evil, may be not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator. For if it may be true, then there is no evidence or proof to the contrary, and none is authorized to assert it. Of course the objection is groundless, and must be abandoned.

 

That the present system may be better than none, I shall for the present take for granted, and this for two reasons; one is, that in view of the excess of happiness over misery in the world, the possibility that the present system is better than none can scarcely be supposed to need proof; the other is, that I shall hereafter have occasion to prove that it is better than none. Indeed, I have adverted to this part of the objection rather as what might be said, than as what has been or is likely to be strongly urged. It is important however to show in this part of the discussion, that the present system, notwithstanding the existence of moral evil, may be the best possible system to the Creator.

 

By the word system, or the phrase moral system, must be meant all that which results in moral action, or in any way determines it to be what it is, including the nature of the moral beings themselves, and all the influences under which they act as such beings. The system must thus be distinguished from its results in moral action, as a cause from its effect, and thus be viewed as not including either sin or holiness as any part of the system under which they exist.

 

Some who maintain that the present system not only may be, but is the best possible to the Creator, attempt to show, that the reason that God does not prevent moral evil under it, is not that there is any impossibility in the nature of this moral system, or of any moral system, that he should prevent it; but that the moral evil which exists, is the necessary means of the greatest good. When it is said, that there is no impossibility that God should prevent all sin under the present system, the meaning must be, either that he can prevent it by some changes which would not impair its essential nature, or by direct interpositions of his power on the mind, thus leaving the nature of the system wholly unchanged in every other respect.

 

In opposition to this theory, it is now maintained that there may be an impossibility, in the nature of things, that God should prevent all sin under any moral system whatever, and the present degree of moral evil under the best moral system; and that therefore moral evil in its present degree may exist, not because it is the necessary means of the greatest good, but because, in respect to divine prevention, it is incidental to a moral system, which is not only better than no system, but the best possible to the Creator.

 

The former of these theories has, in my own view, been so fully abandoned, even by its professed advocates in recent controversy, that I shall not here attempt a full exposure of its intrinsic absurdities and obvious inconsistencies with acknowledged truths. I propose to notice it only as it may come in my way, in defending the theory which I adopt.

 

If it can be shown, that there may be an impossibility in the nature of things, that God should prevent all moral evil under a moral system, and the present degree of moral evil under the best moral system, then it will follow, that the moral evil under the present system may exist; because, in respect to divine prevention, it is incidental to one which is not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator, and is therefore no evidence against his perfect benevolence.

 

Before I proceed directly to sustain this theory, I deem it important to remark, that no prejudice against it ought to be entertained by the disciples, and especially by the advocates of Christianity. It has often been said, that the existence of moral evil under the government of a perfect God, is a profound, unsolvable mystery, and that it has hitherto baffled the research of the most powerful minds in every age. Hence we are often met with the reproving interrogatory, why not let it alone? I answer, first, because the enemies of truth will not let it alone; and for the defenders of truth to shun the inquiry, is to abandon it without a defense, and to concede, in the field of argument, a complete triumph to Universalism, to Deism, and to Atheism. When the universalist reasons thus: God is infinitely good, and therefore disposed to make all his creatures holy and happy forever; he is omnipotent, and can secure this result, and therefore most certainly will secure it; and when, on the basis of this conclusion, he forces the doctrine of endless punishment, by false interpretation from the sacred page--when the infidel, from the same premises, comes to the same conclusion respecting the holiness and happiness of God's moral creation, and either because he has more sense or candor than the former, admits that this doctrine of future punishment is plainly taught in the Scriptures, and, for this very reason, denies that a benevolent God is the author of the book; and when the atheist, on the supposition of a benevolent and an omnipotent God, infers that there could be no evil, and because there is evil, denies the existence of such a being, it is in vain, and worse than in vain, to cry out "mystery," in refutation of the argument. Such men as Voltaire and Hume, and multitudes of far inferior discernment, know that this is not reasoning. Their reply is, we knew that you could not answer; and they despise you for holding opinions which you are confessedly unable to defend. But further; the inquiry concerning the origin of moral evil is not to be avoided, for the Bible has not shunned it. Indeed, it would seem incredible that it should. Who can believe that Christianity has been given to the world, exposed to an objection which is incapable of all refutation, and which undermines not only its divine origin, but theism itself? It has not. Its divine author has formally stated and fully solved the great problem, whence cometh moral evil? He has solved it for the instruction not merely of philosophers, but of the people, and on substantially the same principle on which it is now proposed to solve it by reason. This he has done with unsurpassed perspicuity and force, in "the parable of the tares of the field." In this parable we are taught the following truths:

 

1st. That the kingdom--the reign of heaven--the moral government of God under a gracious economy--is perfectly fitted to its great design of reforming and saving all men.

 

2d. That the fact that there are wicked men, or that there is moral evil, rather than its opposite, under this best system, is in direct contravention of this great design of its divine author.

 

3d. That the reason that moral evil exists, is that there is an impossibility, in the nature of, the case, that God should prevent it, under the system, which exempts him from all responsibility in respect to its existence; and

 

4th. That the interpositions requisite to remove the evil, would do more hurt than good, by diminishing the amount of holiness under the system.

 

Here then we have the same solution of the problem whence cometh moral evil, which is now proposed with only this difference, that what the Saviour teaches as a fact, a doctrine, is now for a particular purpose in argument, proposed merely as a theory or possible truth. Why should such a theory be encountered with prejudice on the part of the friends and advocates of Christianity?

I now proceed to show on the principles of reason, that --

 

There may be an impossibility in the nature of things, that

God should prevent all sin or moral evil under the best system.

 

Assuming what will probably not be denied, that a moral system may be the best system, I propose to show:

 

1. That there may be an impossibility that God should prevent all sin under a moral system; and

2. That if it be possible, that he should prevent all sin under any moral system, there may be an impossibility that he should prevent all sin under the best moral system.

 

1. There may be, an impossibility in the nature of things, that God should prevent all sin under any moral system whatever.

 

That such an impossibility may exist, is evident from the nature of a moral system, for it necessarily includes the existence of moral beings; and sin or moral evil cannot be prevented in moral beings, by any power or influence which destroys their moral agency. To suppose this, is to suppose sin to be prevented in moral beings who are not moral beings. But moral agency implies free agency--the power of choice the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action. Moral agency and of course moral beings can no more exist without this power, than matter can exist without solidity and extension, or a triangle without sides and angles. Let it then be kept in mind that I now speak of preventing sin in moral beings, free moral agents, who can sin under every possible influence from God to prevent their sinning. But if such beings do what in this respect they can do under every possible influence from God to prevent their sinning, they certainly will sin when it is impossible that God should prevent their sinning. And why may it not be so? Who knows or who can prove, that such cases will not occur under any possible moral system? No man knows nor can prove it. Therefore let no man assert it. There may be an impossibility that God should prevent all sin or moral evil under any moral system. The assumption that God can prevent all moral evil in a moral system, is wholly groundless and unauthorized, and the objection to his benevolence, derived from the existence of moral evil, which rests entirely on this assumption, is also groundless, and ought to be abandoned.

 

I do not say that there is an impossibility that God should prevent all sin under a moral system; nor even that it may not be true that there is not such an impossibility; but I affirm. simply, that there may be. This is sufficient for my present purpose, that of answering the objection to the divine benevolence, derived from the existence of moral evil. For on this supposition, moral evil under the present system, in respect to divine prevention, may be incidental to a system which may be not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator; and is therefore no proof against his benevolence.

 

Here this grand objection to the benevolence of God might be left as fully refuted. But many things may be said to strengthen the objection and to weaken the force of the reply to it, which has now been made.

 

These things may be comprised in alleging that the supposed theory is inconsistent with the omnipotence of God, and in supposed proofs, that God can prevent all sin in a moral system.

 

In the first place, it is often alleged that to suppose that there may be any impossibility that God should prevent all sin in a moral system, is highly dishonorable to God, inasmuch as it virtually denies his power as an omnipotent Being. The plausibility of this gratuitous assumption is such to most minds, through want of reflection, that it has perplexed the argument for God's benevolence more than every other consideration. In reply to this, I claim in the first place that they who assert that any impossibility that God should prevent all moral evil under a moral system, is inconsistent with his omnipotence, should either prove the assertion or retract it. What right has any one in reasoning to assert what he neither knows nor can prove to be true? Who does not know that there is a kind of impossibility in many cases, which God has no power to remove or overcome. It is impossible that God should cause a thing to be and not to be at the same time, that he should make two and two to be five, or a part equal to the whole. There is an impossibility to God in each of these cases which involves a contradiction. Reminding the objector of what every tyro in reasoning knows that this kind of impossibility limits the power of God in such a sense as fully to justify us in denying his power in such cases, let him address himself to an argument showing that the same kind of impossibility does not exist in the case now under consideration. When he shall do this, we shall begin to suspect that his present objection to our theory is something more than either designed or undesigned sophistry. I reply again to this assertion with a denial of its truth. The impossibility now supposed of God's preventing all sin under a moral system, if it be real, is not inconsistent with his omnipotence. It is not that kind of impossibility which is given by a direct conflict between the power of the creature and the power of God, because the power of the creature to sin is superior to God's power. Such a direct conflict between the power of moral beings to sin and God's power, is as inconceivable as that the forces which produce the motion of the planets should be interfered with by the power of motives or arguments. The direct prevention of sin, or which is the same thing, the direct production of holiness in moral agents by dint of Omnipotence, is an absurdity, inasmuch as it implies that God is the efficient, proximate natural cause of their moral acts, and that they act morally without acting as moral agents, i.e., without being the proximate, efficient causes of their own acts. What then is the impossibility of God's preventing all sin in moral beings, which it is now supposed may exist? I answer: It is an impossibility, the supposition of which involves a contradiction in the nature of the case. It is the impossibility of God's preventing moral beings from sinning by any thing which he can do, when beings who can sin in despite of God, do in this respect what they can do. To suppose that in such cases they should be prevented from sinning, is to suppose them to sin and to be prevented from sinning at the same time, which is a contradiction and an impossibility. And would such an impossibility if it exists, dishonorably limit the power of God? Would it imply the want of any degree of that power which constitutes omnipotence? Must we then, if we could duly honor God, assert that he has power to accomplish contradictions, or to accomplish that, which for aught that can be shown to the contrary, may involve a contradiction and an impossibility in the nature of things--assert that to be true of God which for aught that can be known or proved to the contrary, may be false? Is God honored by the confident assertions of mere ignorance, and on such a basis is either his goodness or his omnipotence to be denied? Plainly if the supposed impossibility of God's preventing aft moral evil under a moral system actually exists, it no more dishonorably limits his power than the impossibility that the act should be prevented and not prevented at the same time, or than two and two should be five, or a part equal to the whole.

 

It is also to be said, that the doctrine that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, denies the power of God in the same sense as that in which the theory now maintained can be said to deny it. According to this doctrine God cannot--he has not power to secure the greatest good, without sin as the means of this end. It limits the Holy One of Israel by the impossibility of securing good, which results from the nature of Bin; for it assigns this impossibility as the very reason for the existence of sin. Thus on both schemes, an impossibility in the nature of things is involved. In the one case it is maintained that there may be an impossibility of God's preventing all moral evil under a moral system, resulting from the nature of moral agency as involving power to sin under every possible influence to prevent it; in the other, that there is an impossibility that God should produce the greatest good without sin, resulting from the nature of sin as the necessary means of the greatest good.

 

If either theory is true, God may be properly said to be limited by an impossibility in the nature of things. And which is the most dishonorable to him, the supposition that he cannot produce the greatest good without sin as the means of it; or that he cannot prevent that, the prevention of which may involve a contradiction--i.e., he cannot prevent beings from sinning who can sin in despite of his power to prevent them? The former is utterly absurd and inconceivable. For how can it be impossible that God should produce the greatest good by the best kind of moral action. Or how can it be true that he cannot produce the greatest good without that kind of moral action, which is fitted to destroy all good and to produce all evil? How can that which is confessedly wholly an evil, only an evil--an evil without qualification, be the necessary means of the greatest good? How can the worst kind of action conceivable, be the best kind of action? If not, then how can it be impossible that God should produce the greatest good without sin as the means of it? Plainly the supposition of such an impossibility is the most palpable of all impossibilities. There can be no such. If then, one of the supposed impossibilities must exist, shall we suppose it to be that which may or that which cannot exist.

 

Further; there is no conceivable theory by which the benevolence and omnipotence of God--in other words, by which the existence of a perfect God can be vindicated, without supposing an impossibility in some respect that he should prevent moral evil, which is consistent with his benevolence and his omnipotence, and which is the reason of his not preventing it. The most plausible argument ever devised in defence of Atheism is probably that of Epicurus. This argument, when applied to moral evil, is substantially the following: "God either would prevent all moral evil, and could not; or he could prevent it, and would not; or be neither would nor could prevent it; or he both would and could prevent it. If he would and could not, then he is not omnipotent; if he would not and could, then he is not good; if he neither would nor could, then he is neither good nor omnipotent; if he both would and could, then moral evil would not exist. But moral evil does exist. Therefore there is no God who is both good and omnipotent." Now where lies the fallacy of this boasted argument? an argument which in some form has been often repeated in triumph even to the present day. There are two assumptions in this argument, one of which is fully authorized; the other is wholly unauthorized. The former is that moral evil is not the necessary means of the greatest good, but is wholly an evil; for if it be the necessary means of the greatest good, it would not be, as is claimed in this argument, inconsistent with the divine goodness. This assumption is fully authorized; for how can the worst kind of moral action conceivable, be the best kind of moral action? The other, is the assumption that if God cannot prevent all moral evil under any and every created system, then he is not omnipotent; for if there may be an impossibility that God should prevent all moral evil under a moral system, or under the best system, which impossibility is consistent with his omnipotence, then the fact that he cannot prevent it, is no proof that he is not omnipotent; while if there can be no such impossibility, then God as both good and omnipotent would prevent all moral evil. But he does not, and it follows therefore from the present assumption, that if God is good he is not omnipotent. Indeed the existing moral evil being wholly an evil, must be supposed to exist, either because if God is good, he is not omnipotent; or because if he is omnipotent, he is not good, or because he is neither omnipotent nor good; or because there is an impossibility of his preventing the evil, which impossibility is consistent with his goodness and his omnipotence. Thus we are driven by unanswerable reasoning either into blank Atheism, or into the admission of some impossibility of God's preventing all moral evil, which impossibility is consistent with his goodness and his omnipotence. Such an impossibility may result as we claim, from any moral system, or at least from the best system. The assumption then that there can be no such impossibility, or that if God cannot prevent all moral evil under any, even under the best system, then he is not omnipotent, is unauthorized; and constitutes the fallacy of the foregoing argument for Atheism,

 

It is here worthy of remark, that the advocates of the doctrine, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, while they advance in so doing that which is palpably absurd, also maintain the groundless assumption of the atheistic argument. To vindicate the goodness of God, they maintain the palpable absurdity--, that what is wholly an evil is the necessary means of the greatest good; and to vindicate his omnipotence, that there is no impossibility of his preventing all moral evil under any moral system whatever. They thus give their sanction to a principle which by just reasoning sustains downright Atheism. For if sin is, and who does not know it is, wholly an evil, and if there is no sense in which God cannot prevent it under the present system consistently with his omnipotence, then in view of the existing sin it follows either that God is not good or not omnipotent, or that he is neither good nor omnipotent.

 

But it is claimed, that there is the most decisive proof that God can prevent all sin, under any moral system whatever.

 

1. It is said, that as an omnipotent Being, he must have power to direct and control the conduct of his creatures as he pleases, or according to his will. By the will of God must here be meant, either his will as a lawgiver, in which he prefers, all things considered, that right moral action should (not shall) take place in all cases, rather than wrong; or, his providential will--his decree--in which he purposes that the event willed shall take place. If the former will be meant, then it is not admitted that God has power to control the conduct of his creatures, in all cases, according to that will. It is undeniable, that he does not in all cases; while it is equally so, that as benevolent and omnipotent, he would thus, control it, were there no impossibility of his so doing, consistent with his benevolence and omnipotence. Such an impossibility is of course not inconsistent with these attributes. If by the will of God, he meant his providential will--his decree--then I deny that he has such a will to prevent the sin which actually takes place. Foreseeing the certainty of the sin, he could not will nor purpose actually to prevent it; but, on the contrary, must, rather than prevent it by destroying moral agency, or for some other reason, have purposed its actual existence. God therefore, whatever may be his will as a lawgiver, has no will or purpose that any sin shall not take place, which does take place. He has power actually to direct and control, as he wills actually to direct and control, the conduct of his creatures, and of course, power to bring to pass whatsoever he wills shall come to pass.

 

2. It is often said, that it is incredible, that God should not be able to prevent all sin in moral beings by the influence of motives. I answer, that if there may be such an impossibility, then such an impossibility is not incredible. Indeed, why is it incredible that God should not be able, by motives, to prevent beings from sinning, who possess power to sin under all possible motives which he can employ to prevent them.

 

3. It may be said, that God can create moral beings of such a nature as shall certainly prevent their sinning. If by "such a nature," be meant what some mean, viz., a holy nature as a constitutional property of the beings, I deny that such a nature can be literally created by God. To suppose holiness to exist in a creature of God, prior to all voluntary exercise or act on the part of the creature, is to suppose holiness to exist before it exists, which is absurd. In short, whatever nature God may be supposed to create in moral beings, they must have power to act morally wrong, under every preventing influence from God. And who can prove that such beings will not act morally wrong, and that it may not be impossible that God should prevent it?

 

4. The appeal is often made to facts. It is said, that God does and can prevent some moral beings from sinning; and if he can prevent some, he can prevent all. This is a palpable non sequitur. All moral beings have the power to avoid sinning, as well as power to sin. That some, who have the power to avoid sinning, should be prevented from sinning, is indeed altogether credible. But why is it not also, that it should be impossible for God to prevent some from sinning, who have power to sin under every possible preventing influence. To deny such impossibility, is "talking quite at random, and in the dark." Besides, there are no known instances of the prevention of sin in moral beings, except under a system in which others have not been prevented. And how do the facts alleged, prove that God could have prevented all sin, either under the present moral system or under any other? Nor could the sin of any who have sinned, have been prevented by God without some changes and interpositions for the purpose. Those requisite to prevent one sin, and especially to prevent all the sin which has taken place, supposing the system in other respects to be the same, might, in despite of future preventing interpositions, have resulted in more sin than could have been prevented. To assert therefore that God might have prevented all sin in a moral system, or in any moral system, is to make mere arbitrary assertions, no man knowing enough of possibilities in the case, to adduce the shadow of proof of the truth of what he asserts.

 

5. But the objector may appeal (and I readily consent that he should) to the facts of revelation. He may speak of angels, who have never sinned and never will, and of the redeemed in heaven, who never will. But revelation brings to our knowledge neither angels nor men confirmed in holiness, except those who are confirmed under a moral system in which sin takes place. And who can show that any changes requisite to prevent the sin which has taken place, supposing that inch changes might have been made, would not have resulted ultimately in a vast increase of sin? It may be said, that our first parents were for a time holy, and that, had their circumstances been continued exactly the same, they would have continued holy; for the same antecedents would have been followed with the same consequent. I answer, that it is impossible, in the nature of things, that the antecedents should continue exactly the same. When they had lived one day or hour in obedience to the divine will, some things were necessarily true of them which were not when they had thus lived but half a day, or half an hour. One change in the antecedents might lead to another. In the progress of their being, how many thoughts and feelings--what diversified associations and excitement of constitutional propensities would arise, which never occurred during the short period of their continued obedience! And if none but the omniscient Being could foresee these things, then who but he can pronounce on the result?

 

6. If the objector should still insist, that a God of infinite wisdom and power might have devised and adopted a moral system which would have excluded all moral evil, then I ask, what moral system? Can he specify it? Can he delineate minutely its essential, constituent elements?--the exact nature and degree of influence it must possess, that it may be effectual to prevent all moral evil? Could any thing be more presumptuous and audacious than such an attempt? And if he does not know what moral system, or that any moral system would be effectual to the prevention of all moral evil under it, how does be know that God could devise such a system? I am not saying that he could not; but I affirm, that no one can prove that he could. The fact that moral beings can sin under any and every preventing influence from God, forever precludes the possibility of proving a priori, that they will not, and that there may not be an impossibility that God should prevent all moral evil under a moral system. It may be, that, had the nature of man, or his circumstances, or both, been different in any respect from what they are, or had any other influence in kind or degree been resorted to than has been, the system in other respects being the same, then the consequence, in despite of any and all further preventing interpositions, would have been an immeasurably greater amount of moral evil than has resulted, or will result front the present system. Had the powers of man been greater than they are; had he commenced existence with the more perfect faculties of manhood; had his susceptibilities, propensities, circumstances, been in any manner different, the results in moral evil, for aught we know or can prove to the contrary, would have been vastly worse than those of the present system as it is. Under the imagined change for the better, still man might leave sinned. To sin in circumstances more favorable to virtue, might imply greater strength in the sinful principle or purpose, formed in resistance of the greater obligations and motives to virtue--even a desperation which would render vain all efforts to reclaim; which would prevent a rendering useless, an economy of grace, and thus result in universal and hopeless sin and woe.

 

7. Should the objector still insist, that some changes might have been adopted by an all-wise and omnipotent Creator, which would have prevented the present prevalence of moral evil, I ask, what changes? Does he say, greater force of intellect, and consequently more just and adequate views of the nature and relations of the great objects of moral choice would have secured the end? I reply, that men do not sin through any such deficiency in this faculty of the soul, as to show, that to augment its strength, would change the result in practice. Besides, any finite strength of intellect is consistent with power to sin, and cannot therefore be alleged as proof that the subject of it will not sin.

 

8. Is it then said, that greater strength of intellect, and a diminished strength of the propensities to natural good, would secure the result; I reply, that however vigorous the intellectual perceptions, and however weak the propensities to natural good, so long as the latter are real, and such as are essential to moral agency, they must be capable of an excitement which shall render possible the choice of their gratification, since otherwise moral agency could not exist. It is impossible therefore to prove a priori, that such a moral agent will not sin.

 

9. Is it then said by the objector, that if sin were to be followed with the immediate execution of its curse on the transgressor, this would certainly diminish the degree of moral evil in the world? I answer, that the consequences might be immeasurably worse. Indeed, when we reflect that mankind actually possess sufficient intellectual capacity to perceive the difference between right and wrong moral action, and the infinite preponderance of motive to the former compared with the pleasures of sin, and think of the universal sinfulness of our race, the presumption rests on no slight basis, that to make this world a place of immediate retribution, would be to change it, with all its bright prospects from a state of trial, into a world of desperation in sin and suffering. In such a system, one sin would cut off all hope of the divine favor; and who could decide that all would not sin once? Thus the amount of moral evil might far surpass what now exists, and this world, instead of being a place of probation, cheered with intimations of mercy and forgiveness, might become the theater of retributive vengeance to all.

 

10. Should the objector propose any other emendation of the system, it would be equally nugatory. No one is competent to devise or suggest a change, which he, or any other man, can pronounce to be an improvement, without the most palpable presumption. To show how utterly groundless are all objections to the present system, derived from the existence of moral evil, we need only remark, that the present state of man is, or at least may be, one of moral discipline, in reference to the formation of his moral character for immortality; that it is, or at least may be, peculiarly fitted to give stability to moral principle, and thus to secure ultimately immutable moral perfection in man; and that every thing which pertains to it, as a system from God, may be indispensably necessary to secure the greatest amount of holiness and happiness to the universe which God can secure. Who then shall say, or be respected for saying, that any change in the system which he can devise or suggest, would improve it? Who would take the responsibility of effecting, if he could, the least alteration in the system which the supreme Creator has adopted?

 

11. After all, the objector may say, if man cannot devise a system of greater perfection than the present, this is no proof that the Creator, a being of infinite perfection, cannot. I reply, that this is a mere evasion of the point at issue. My object has not been to prove that the Creator could not have devised and adopted a better system than the present; though I may hereafter show that we have good reason to believe that he could not; but to show that it cannot be proved that God could have adopted a better system than the present--that it may be true, so far as existing evil is concerned, that he could not, and that the assertion that he could, is presumptuous in the extreme. Hence the objection to God's benevolence derived from the existence of moral evil and therefore from natural evil, and which is designed to show that the present system is not the best possible to the Creator, being founded wholly in the ignorance of the objector, is to be laid entirely aside as nugatory and vain. The conclusion is, that it may be impossible that God should exclude all moral evil from a moral system; and of course from the best moral system; and that therefore, great as the amount of moral evil is under the present system, it may be the best possible to the Creator.

 

Some theologians however, instead of receiving the theory as now presented, have proposed a modification of it, maintaining that while God can prevent all sin under some moral system, it may be true that he cannot prevent all sin under the best moral system. More particularly they maintain that the present system may be the best, inasmuch as it comprises those high degrees of temptation and other moral means, which while they become the sure occasion of the sin of some, are necessary to secure higher degrees of holiness on the part of others, and thus higher degrees of happiness on the whole, than God could secure under some other system, under which he could prevent all sin.

 

My objection to this modification of the theory already presented, is not that it asserts that it may be true that God cannot prevent sin under the best moral system. That this may be true, I assert and maintain. But my objection is twofold; viz., the theory asserts that God can prevent all sin under some moral system; and that it affirms certain specific or particular characteristics of the present moral system as those which may constitute it the best system, when there is much reason for believing that they do not.

 

I proceed then to say:

 

First. That the affirmation that God can prevent all sin under some moral system, is gratuitous and unauthorized. I know no advocate of this part of the theory, who has attempted to prove the affirmation that God can prevent all sin under some moral system. I admit that it may be true that he can; but claim to have shown that it may be true that he cannot. If there is no proof either that God can or that he cannot prevent all sin under any moral system whatever, then the affirmation, that he can prevent all sin under some moral system, is wholly unauthorized. Besides when it is once admitted that God cannot prevent all sin under a moral system which is the best, how can it be shown that he can prevent all sin under a moral system which is not the best? May it not be true for aught that appears to the contrary, that God cannot prevent all sin under any other moral system, as well as that he cannot under the best moral system? Is not the assertion then that God can prevent all sin under some moral system, altogether unauthorized? Is there any evidence or proof that the assertion is true rather than false? Secondly. There is not only no proof that the higher degrees of temptation with other moral means, which are supposed to be essential to the best system, are necessary to secure or will secure the highest degrees of holiness, but much evidence to the contrary. How does it appear that a moral being cannot love God with all his heart, mind, soul and strength, i.e., as much as he can love him, under a low as well as under a high degree of temptation, or as well under one system of means, as under another? How can it be shown that a moral being can or will love God more than he can--more than with all his strength, because temptation is great? Can it be shown that his strength will be increased as temptation is increased? And if this cannot be shown, how can it be rendered in the lowest degree probable that the greater the temptation to sin, the greater will be the degree of holiness? On the contrary, if there is any principle to be reasoned from in the case, it is that the greater the degree of temptation to sin, other things being the same, the less will be the degree of holiness. It is on this very principle that orthodox divines as a class, account for the universal depravity of unrenewed men, and the low degree of holiness in those who are renewed. They trace these results to the high degree of temptation which arises from their propensity to sin. Is it a uniform fact that the increase of temptation results in the increase of holiness? Is temptation a means of grace? Or is it to be received as a general principle, that if good men would be perfect in holiness, they must shun temptation? There is plainly a strong probability then, against the supposition, that to increase the degree of temptation should increase the degree of holiness. But for the sake of the argument, let it be conceded that such would be the result of high degrees of temptation in respect to a part of the subjects of a moral system; how does it appear that what would thus be gained in holiness and happiness by them, would not be more than overbalanced by greater decrees of sin and misery to another? If it be said that it may not be so, the answer is, that it may be so, and there is no evidence that it would not be so, not to say, the probability is, that it would be so. Thirdly. There can be no proof that God can prevent all sin under a moral system, or that having adopted a moral system, he can prevent all sin without destroying moral agency. Suppose what is called the best system of means and measures to be adopted, God either can or he cannot prevent all sin under this system, and of course without destroying moral agency. If he can prevent all sin under this best moral system, and this by the mere exertion of his power, without at all changing the system of means, and of course without destroying moral agency, why? does he not thus prevent all sin? Would an omnipotent being in such a case deprecate the requisite interposition of his power? Why then as a benevolent and an omnipotent being, does he not interpose his power, and thus prevent all sin and secure perfect holiness and happiness forever under this best system of means and measures? Is it said that sin itself is the necessary means of the greatest good? But this preposterous dogma the advocate of this theory rejects. Can any reason then be given why God, having adopted the best system does not prevent all sin, except that he cannot without destroying moral agency? Is it said that to prevent all sin by the supposed interposition of power, would be preventing it "in such a way as would derange and impair the best possible system of means?" But the system of means according to the supposition, is unchanged. It remains the same in all that gives it excellence, or constitutes it the best system of means, whether sin be prevented in the manner supposed or not. Why then is not all sin prevented by the supposed interposition of divine power? Is it laid that it may be true that to prevent all sin and to secure universal and perfect holiness and happiness forever by this method, would lessen the amount of holiness and happiness compared with what would otherwise exist? Be it so. But it may also be true that such would not be the effect; and the reason that God does not prevent all sin may be another; viz., that he cannot without destroying moral agency. Besides, the thing supposed, viz., that God should prevent all sin under the system, and by so doing lessen the comparative amount of holiness, is impossible. To suppose less holiness than perfect holiness or the highest possible, to be the effect of the supposed divine interposition, is to suppose less holiness than ought to be, which is sin; and surely God cannot be supposed to adopt a method of preventing all sin which will produce sin! Is it then said that God cannot prevent all sin and secure universal and perfect holiness forever under the best system, merely by the direct interposition of his power? Be it so. Then the question returns, how does it appear that he can prevent all sin forever under any moral system, that is, prevent it forever without destroying moral agency? By doing this he can prevent all sin. How does it appear that he can prevent it, if he introduces a moral system without destroying moral agency? It is admitted that it may be true that God cannot prevent all sin under the best moral system. Why may it not be true that the very reason that he cannot, is that he cannot prevent all sin, having adopted any moral system, without destroying moral agency? And if this may be the reason that he cannot prevent all sin. under the best moral system, why may it not be a reason that he cannot under any other system which is not the best? Adopt what moral system he may, the possibility of sinning which is given by moral agency in despite of divine power to prevent it remains, and excludes all proof that sin will not take place under the system. No man therefore can either know or prove, that there is any way in which God can prevent all sin if he adopts a moral system, unless he destroys moral agency.

 

I now proceed to show as I proposed:

 

2. That if it be conceded that God can prevent all moral evil under some possible moral system, it may still be impossible that he should prevent all moral evil, even the present degree of moral evil under the best moral system.

 

I do not say that conceding the former, the latter would be probable. Still it may be true, that were God to adopt the system under which he could prevent all moral evil, either on account of the small numbers of beings which the system would require, or on account of their limited capacity, or for some other reason, he would greatly lessen the happiness of his creation compared with adopting another system under which he cannot prevent all moral evil. The present moral system as consisting of a given number of moral beings, and possessing exactly the nature, the powers, susceptibilities, propensities which they do possess, and placed in exactly the circumstances in which they are placed--for aught that appears to the contrary, may be the only system by means of which God can produce the highest happiness which he can produce.

 

Any other system, which would prevent the existing degree of moral evil--if such a system be possible--might greatly impair the results in happiness, as these depend, not indeed on the existence of moral evil as the means of happiness, but on the nature of the moral system itself; that is, on the number and nature, the powers and capacities of the beings, and the various kinds of influence and sources of happiness which the best moral system includes. There may then be an impossibility, not indeed that God should produce the greatest good without the existing moral evil as the means of it, but that he should prevent the existing moral evil under the present system. Moral beings, under this best moral system, must have power to sin, in despite of all that God can do under this system to prevent them; and to suppose that they should do what they, can under this system, viz., sin, and that God should prevent their sinning, is a contradiction and an impossibility. It may be true that such beings, in this respect, will do what they can do--that is, will sin--when of course it would be impossible that God, other things remaining the same, should prevent their sinning without destroying their moral agency. Granting then the possibility, that God should prevent all sin under some moral system, still it may be impossible that he should do it, without either adopting some other system of means than the best, or, having adopted the best, without destroying it by destroying moral agency.

 

In opposition to this conclusion however, there are some who will still reply, that "with God, all things are possible;" that, as an omnipotent being, he can prevent all sin under one system of means and measures as well as under another, even as well without means as with; that he can prevent all sin in moral beings, by the direct and immediate interpositions of mere omnipotence--by mere dint of power--by acts of literal creation, producing holiness in all.

 

It is readily admitted, that in the true sense of the language, "All things are possible with God." But what are often and properly called things in one sense, cannot be properly called things in another. In the most general sense, any mere object of thought is properly called a thing. Of these objects there are two classes. The one class are things (thought--things) which are not real, and those which are not possible; while the other class are things which are either real or possible. Thus to make two and two equal to five, is impossible. Does it then imply any deficiency of power in God, that he cannot make, two and two equal to five? No more does it imply any deficiency in power on his part, that he cannot prevent, in supposable cases, beings who can sin, in despite of his power, i.e., moral beings from sinning, under the best moral system. In the nature of things, there may be an impossibility which involves a contradiction. If such impossibilities limit the power of God, or are inconsistent with his omnipotence, who can believe or assert his omnipotence? When it is said, that "with God all things are possible," who can suppose that the all things includes things which involve contradiction and impossibility in their very nature, and infer that God can make two and two to be five, or the diameter of a circle to be equal to its circumference, or can prevent beings in all cases from sinning, who can sin, under every preventing influence from him?

 

Is it then said, that God, as an omnipotent being, can prevent all sin under one moral system as well as under another as well without means as with? Then I ask, why can he not secure any other result without means as well as with?--why can he not secure the greatest good, without sin as the means of it; and if he can, how is sin the necessary means of this end? If it is limiting the power of God to suppose that he cannot accomplish his designs without means, then it is limiting his power to assert that he cannot secure the greatest good without sin as the means. It is wholly unsupported by facts; for in what instance has God ever prevented sin in a moral being, without means? It is absurd and self-contradictory. If sin be prevented in moral beings, it must be prevented by their acting, and acting morally right, in view of motives. Is it then said, that God can prevent all sin in moral beings by any degree of motives, and especially by that degree which is comprised in the best moral system? But who knows, or can prove this, who is authorized to assert it? No one. The assertion is wholly arbitrary, and he who makes it knows not whether he asserts truth or falsehood. That system of means and measures, which is necessary to the greatest good which God can secure, may be inconsistent with God's preventing all moral evil under the system. According to this view, sin is wholly an evil--evil in all its tendencies; and still God permits and purposes its existence, rather than not adopt the best moral system. As the husbandman does not sow good seed in his field for the sake of the tares, i.e., because he prefers tares to wheat; but notwithstanding the tares, which he may foresee will come in among the wheat, and for the sake of the good, which will still far overbalance the evil; so God may have adopted the present moral system, not for the sake of the sin, or of any good of which it is the means, but notwithstanding the evil, and for the sake of the overbalancing good, of which the system is the necessary means.

 

After all, the great question, concerning the goodness and the power of God, which results from the existence of moral evil under his government, depends not so much on either of the particular theories which have now been propounded, in preference to the other, as on an assumption which is opposed to both, viz., that God can prevent all moral evil under any moral system whatever, by the direct and immediate interpositions of mere power. It is this which is relied upon in common by atheists, deists, universalists, and a large class of orthodox divines, in their reasonings on the subject. We have seen how this assumption, in connection with other premises, leads to Atheism, Infidelity, and Universalism; and also how utterly feeble find insufficient is the defence of the orthodox against these errors, while they admit its truth, So long as this assumption is made and conceded--so long as it is admitted that God, by the mere interpositions of his power, can prevent all moral evil under any moral system whatever, the problem, why does he not prevent it, will remain incapable of solution. Nor can it be thought strange, that one class of minds, in view of existing moral evil, should deny the existence of a being of boundless goodness and power; that another should deny, that the book which asserts the endless sin and misery of multitudes of our race is a revelation from a perfect God; that another, receiving the book as divine, should deny that it contains a doctrine so plainly inconsistent with the character of its author. That moral evil, with its manifold calamities and woes, exists, cannot be denied; and so long as it is admitted that a benevolent God can, by the mere interpositions of his power, prevent the evil under the best system, the conclusion, to a greater or less extent, will be, either that there is no such being, or that if there is, he will sooner or later terminate the evil, in the universal holiness and happiness of his moral creation. The monstrous absurdity, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, will not be received by all as the only alternative except that of Atheism; or if received as such by some, still the undeniable truth that a benevolent God will do all the good he can, will not be rejected by all for the sake of avoiding Infidelity and Universalism. The error obviously lies in the gratuitous and unauthorized assumption, that there can be no impossibility of God's preventing moral evil under a moral system, or at least under the best moral system, which impossibility shall be as truly consistent with his omnipotence, as is the impossibility of making two and two to be five, or a part equal to the whole. When this truth, that there may be such an impossibility, shall be seen and familiarized by the mind, as presented by just views of moral agency and of a moral system, then, and not till then, can the present system, notwithstanding the existence of moral evil, be seen to stand forth as all eternal monument of the wisdom, power and goodness of its Author; then, and not till then, will men learn to vindicate the ways of God to man, not by the far--fetched and unnatural principles of a vain philosophy, but by the natural, obvious, common-sense principle, by which they vindicate and applaud the wisest and best of earthly rulers, When his laws are transgressed--the principle, that notwithstanding the evil he has done, he has done the best thing which he can do.