V. A perfect Moral Government Involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. The nature of such a law further unfolded. -- 7. The law of a perfect Moral Government involves sanctions, (continued.) -- 5th. Legal sanctions the necessary proof of the Moral Governor's authority, as the necessary manifestations and proofs of his benevolence in the form of his approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. -- This shown by proving (1.) that legal sanctions are in some respect necessary as the proof of the Moral Governor's authority; (2.) that they are necessary for this purpose, as the necessary proofs of his benevolence; and (3.) that they are necessary proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience. -- The (1) and (2) of these arguments are treated in this lecture -- (1.) Legal Sanctions are necessary in some respect as proof of the Moral Governor's authority. -- Argued from the import of the phrase legal sanctions; from the nature of the law of a perfect Moral Government; from the nature of a law or rule of action without sanctions; from the fact that conformity and nonconformity to a rule without sanctions would subvert the Moral Governor's authority. -- (2.) They are necessary as proofs of the Governor's authority, as they are the necessary proofs of his benevolence. Reason given why attempts to prove the benevolence of God from the light of nature are so unsuccessful.

In the last lecture I proposed to show, that legal sanctions, or the sanctions of the law of a perfect moral government, consist in that natural good promised to obedience, and in that natural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor, which establish or ratify his authority as the decisive and necessary proof of it, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, and which include the highest possible degree of natural good in each case of obedience, and the highest possible degree of natural evil in each case of disobedience.

 

This proposition was divided into several particular propositions; the four following of which I explained, and endeavored to support, viz.:

 

1st. That legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of the moral governor.

2d. That they consist in the matter of them, exclusively in natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor.

3d. That they establish or ratify the moral governor's authority as the decisive proof of it.

4th. That they become the decisive proof of it, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

I now propose in this and the following lectures to show the necessity of legal sanctions, and for this purpose, to explain and prove the fifth of the particular propositions before stated, viz.:

 

5th. That legal sanctions are the necessary proof of the moral governor's authority, as the necessary manifestations and proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

This proposition I shall attempt to establish by showing --

 

(1.) That legal sanctions are in some respect or under some relation, necessary as the proof of the moral governor's authority.

 

(2.) That they are necessary for this purpose, as the necessary manifestations or proofs of his benevolence, and --

 

(3.) That they are necessary for this purpose, as the necessary manifestations or proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and of his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

(1.) Legal sanctions are necessary in some respect or under some relation, as the proof of the moral governor's authority.

 

This will appear --

 

In the first place, from the import of the phrase, legal sanctions. I have already remarked, that the word sanction denotes a particular kind of evidence or proof, viz., that which is the decisive and necessary proof of that of which it is the sanction. I have attempted to show that it denotes a decisive proof--that is, a proof which implies the absence of all opposing proof or evidence, and fully establishes or ratifies that of which it is the sanction. I now propose to show, that it denotes a necessary proof of that of which it is the sanction. By this I mean, that it is that, without which there is not only no proof of that of which it is the sanction, but proof to the contrary. On this point, I appeal to the example already referred to. Without the consent of the President and Senate, there is and can be not only no proof of the reality or validity of a treaty between this nation and another, but there is decisive proof to the contrary. We may suppose the evidence of the fact in other respects to be what it may, still without the consent specified, no instrument purporting to be such a treaty can possess the least validity. On the contrary, the want of such consent is decisive proof of its validity. Thus plain is it, that the word sanction denotes that which is the necessary proof of that of which it is the sanction--necessary as being that without which there can be no proof of the fact or truth to be proved in the case, but must be proof to the contrary. Since then the genus, as logicians speak, is always included in the species, it follows, that legal sanctions, in the universal conceptions of men, are the necessary proof of that of which they are the sanctions. In the second place, the same thing is evident from the nature of the law of a perfect moral government. It is essential to the nature of such a law, that it be, and that it be fully proved to be, an expression of the lawgiver's preference of obedience to disobedience, of his satisfaction with obedience and with nothing but obedience on the part of the subject, and of his highest approbation of obedience, and of his highest disapprobation of disobedience. But no possible proof without legal sanctions can be furnished, that it is an expression of such feelings. The moral governor may furnish all possible evidence of kind or benevolent feelings in all his other relations, he may prescribe the best rule of action in this relation, and all this may be prompted by other feelings than those of true benevolence; may be prompted by the feelings and purposes of a purely selfish mind. There can be nothing in the case to warrant the conclusion that he is not actuated by, purely selfish designs; nor that he has the feelings toward right and wrong moral action, which his law in words expresses. Rather, there is decisive proof to the contrary. As a perfect moral governor, he is as we have seen, under the necessity of manifesting these feelings; and as a benevolent being will manifest them. He cannot be a benevolent moral governor without having these feeling, nor without making a full and decisive manifestation of them. Not to manifest them therefore, is proof decisive that they do not exist. Nor is this all. This manifestation of these feelings toward right and wrong moral action must be made, as we have also seen, if made at all, by what he does in the relation of a moral governor. But he can do nothing in this relation, except give the best rule of action, annex sanctions to the rule, and execute them as occasion shall occur in the conduct of subjects. Merely to give the best rule of action will not make the requisite manifestation. This act alone is entirely consistent with selfish designs on his part. It is not the best evidence of the feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action, of which the nature of the case admits, and therefore not all the evidence which the case requires. It is only when the proof from legal sanctions is added that the evidence becomes all that the nature of the case admits of and requires, and is therefore decisive. I am not now saying that legal sanctions will fully prove the lawgiver's preference of obedience to disobedience. Nor aim I now saying any thing of the mode in which natural good and evil in the form of sanctions become the proof of the expression of such a preference. I am only saying, that without legal sanctions there can be no proof of such a preference on the part of the moral governor, that whatever else may be necessary, natural good and evil as sanctions are necessary to evince the reality of those feelings which the language of law expresses, and that the want of such sanctions is full proof that such feelings on the part of the lawgiver do not exist; and of course that what is called law in such a case, if any thing can be so called, is not law; and therefore there is no lawgiver having authority.

 

We may view this topic in another light. The law of a perfect moral government is an authoritative rule of action. Can then a rule of action without natural good and evil as the sanctions of its authority, or which is the same thing, of the lawgiver's authority, be regarded as an authoritative rule of action? Is it in this sense a law? Plainly to promulge such a rule in the form of a command--to give it forth in the manner of one having the right to rule, claiming for it the majesty of law, and for himself the unqualified homage of his subjects, would be a burlesque on all legislation. Can a moral governor claim the submission of the will of every subject to his will, and furnish no evidence that he will reward obedience and punish disobedience; or rather furnish decisive proof that he will do neither! Do you call this a law--an authoritative rule of action? No misnomer can be more palpable--none more ridiculous. Is this performing the high function of his office? Is such a rule of action the only means which one standing before his kingdom as its rightful sovereign, and the supreme guardian of its welfare, must use to promote and protect the highest happiness of all? Such a rule would not only leave this great end, which he is bound to protect, unprotected, and show that it is wholly uncared for by him who is responsible for its protection, but it would be an invitation to wrong doing from the throne itself. For not to promise to reward obedience, and not to threaten to punish disobedience, is not only a pledge not to reward the one and not to punish the other, but virtually to threaten to punish obedience, an to promise to reward disobedience; since not to reward is in a degree to punish obedience, and not to Punish is in a degree to reward disobedience. Such a rule of action therefore, instead of having the nature and tendency of law, instead of being adapted to secure the highest happiness of all, would tend to secure the highest misery of all. Who does not know this? Who would be governed, influenced at all, by a law without sanctions as an authoritative rule of action? Who would be concerned about doing or not doing the will of another, from whom to say the least, obedience has nothing to hope, and disobedience nothing to fear? He gives no security, furnishes no evidence that the obedient shall be protected and blessed and the disobedient be punished--none that he will not reverse the treatment of the two classes, should his sinister and selfish designs demand it, or rather, he furnishes good reason to believe that he will reverse it. Who then could respect his character or his will, and regard him as entitled to exercise the prerogative of absolute dominion, who confide in him as the friend and protector of a kingdom's happiness, who submit to his will as law? He may in words, express kind wishes, and in form propound the best rule of action. He may show kindness in every other relation. But as a moral governor he shows none to his kingdom. He is recreant to the high function of his office. He betrays his trust as the guardian of universal happiness. He sinks the power and majesty of law into the weakness of ineffective wishes, and justly incurs the scorn and contempt due to unmasked hypocrisy. He thus defeats the great and sole end of moral government, and tempts his subjects to war on each other and himself, without the shadow of restraint from law and authority.

 

Again; a rule of action without sanctions, viewed in the most favorable aspect, is justly considered as mere advice. But advice be the form of it what it may, is not law. The difference between them demands consideration. Advice be it ever so wise and good, is a mere declaration of what is best to be done. It implies no will or preference on the part of the adviser of that which is advised to its opposite. It would still be advice, though attended with a preference of the opposite doing, and though prompted solely by sinister designs. Law is the most unequivocal expression of the unqualified, absolute will or preference of the lawgiver, that what is commanded should be done. Compliance with the one is discretionary on the part of him to whom it is given. He has the right unquestionable and perfect, to rejudge the decision of the giver, and is responsible to none for his individual judgment in the case. He violates no right of another merely by rejecting the counsel which is given. Compliance with the other admits not of a question, even in thought. Law decides--settles the question of what ought and ought not to be done, by superseding the right of all further inquiry. Its violation is the violation of a right the most sacred and inviolable of all rights the right to control that, on which the highest happiness of each and of all depends. Advice whether complied with or not, involves in respect to him to whom it is given, not the least good or evil which depends on the will of him who gives it. Law enforces compliance by results in good and evil to the subject which depend on the will of the lawgiver, and which, while as motives to right reason, they must be decisive and final for obedience, reveal the perfect character and perfect will of him from whom it emanates. Advice carries with it no binding influence from the character or will of him who gives it, to the will of him to whom it is given. Law, instead of leaving compliance with its claim to the mere option, to the uninfluenced will of the subject, binds his will to compliance--not indeed by physical force or necessity, but by that obligation which is imposed by the right to command, the strongest influence by which the will can be bound. This, as we have seen, is the grand, peculiar, essential influence of law the influence of authority. But to prescribe a rule of action without sanctions, as the law of a moral government, is to give mere advice, which can possess no authority. It is to divest law of its peculiar and essential nature and influence, and to degrade it to a level with the counsels of imbecility, by committing the question of what ought and ought not to be done to the judgment and will of an equal. It is for the moral governor to disclaim, in the most formal manner, all authority or right to rule. It is an open avowal that he has not the character which entitles him to exercise the prerogative of dominion--that he is a governor who neither has nor can have the least governing influence. Surely a rule of action, a law without sanctions, involving such a palpable dereliction of all claim or pretense to rightful authority, cannot be an authoritative rule of action--cannot be the law of a perfect moral government.

 

In the third place, a law or rule of action without sanctions, is a decisive proof that the lawgiver, either by imbecility or by selfishness, or by both, is utterly disqualified to rule. As a proof on the question of his qualification to rule, it is altogether equivalent to refusing to reward obedience, and to punish disobedience, when they exist. In such a case, the moral governor cannot be supposed to be both competent and disposed to execute legal sanctions, for then he would execute them. He must then, either be both incompetent and indisposed to execute them--in which case he would be disqualified to rule in every essential respect--or, he must be incompetent and yet disposed, or competent and indisposed, to execute them. Now, he is either able to confer a reward on the obedient, in the form of protection and favor, or he is not. If he is not able to confer a reward, then he is the subject of an imbecility which is an utter disqualification for office. If he is able to confer a reward then, by conferring none, he manifests no approbation of obedience, when the public good demands that he should, and when, were he truly benevolent he would manifest it by rewarding the obedient. He stands before his kingdom therefore, convicted of indifference, or aversion to obedience--to the very thing on which the highest happiness of his kingdom depends. He thus shows himself to be, not a benevolent but a selfish being, and of course to be utterly disqualified to govern. Again; he is either able to inflict a penalty on the disobedient, or he is not. If he is not, then he is disqualified to govern by his imbecility. If he is able, then by inflicting no penalty for disobedience, he manifests no disapprobation of disobedience, when the public good demands that he should, and when were he truly benevolent, he would manifest it by the infliction of penalty. He stands before his kingdom therefore, convicted of indifference to, or approbation of disobedience, the very thing which tends to produce the highest misery of his kingdom. He thus shows himself the unconcerned spectator of disobedience on the part of his subjects, or rather the open patron of disobedience, and the open enemy of the public good. He occupies the place of the only guardian of the public good, as this depends on his manifesting his highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action. Indifference to either is unmasked enmity to the public good. His disqualification to rule on either supposition, is decisively proved. He gives a law without sanctions, and the fact must be traced either to incompetence or indisposition to execute sanctions, or to both. In either case, he is proved to be disqualified to govern. Legal sanctions then, are in some respect necessary, as proof of the moral governor's authority or right to rule.

 

In the fourth place, conformity and non-conformity to a law or rule of action without sanctions, alike disprove and subvert the moral governor's authority. Conformity to the rule in such a case would exist without a reward, and non-conformity without a penalty. Conformity to the rule takes place, in a case in which there is no proof of the governor's authority. The subject therefore, does not act in conforming to the rule, from respect to his authority, or under the influence of his authority. He conforms to the rule for some other reason, and under some other influence. The fact is undeniable and notorious. It cannot be otherwise. The act of conformity is not only no recognition of the moral governor's authority, but as done, and known to be done exclusively under another influence, it is a distinct declaration, testimony, or proof on the part of the subject, that the moral governor has no authority. He acts just as he would act, for aught that appears to the contrary, were no rule of action prescribed. He thus disclaims all right in the author of the rule to govern him, and gives an open and decided testimony against his authority. Nor is this all. The moral governor, by conferring no reward, acquiesces in this disregard of his authority; for did he promise and confer a reward, there would be no proof from the supposed act of conformity that it was not rendered from respect to his authority, but the contrary. Indeed, it would be impossible in such a case that the subject should conform to the rule and not be influenced by his authority. The moral governor therefore, by conferring no reward, acquiesces in the subject's disregard of his authority, and so confirms the testimony or proof from the act of the subject. Thus the act of conforming to the rule, contemplated as an unrewarded act, augments the proof, and shows, beyond all doubt or denial, that the author of the rule has no right to reign.

 

The same thing will appear, still more strikingly, from nonconformity to a rule of action without a penalty. The act of non-conformity or transgression is, in its true nature, an open proclamation by the transgressor, that the character of the governor does not entitle him to the submission claimed in his law. And the proof in this form of testimony or declaration is decisive, provided the governor himself does not counteract it by opposing proof in the execution of penalty. What force or influence can there be or ought there to be, in the mere dictum of one--call it law if you will; what force or influence is there or ought there to be, in an expression of his will us his will, when there is nothing in his doings and nothing in his character to give it the least weight, or to entitle it to the least respect? Now it is in exactly such a case that the supposed act of transgression, or as we may suppose, a universal revolt, occurs. What is it as an act, and what is it as a testimony? As an act, it is one of open defiance of the moral governor--of absolute contempt of his want of qualification to govern, and a decisive triumph of self-will over incompetence and usurpation. As a testimony, under what aspect does it present the supposed lawgiver except that of an utter disqualification to rule--as had infancy itself ascended the throne and given forth the law? The law and the lawgiver would be, and ought to be, despised. Rebellion would place its foot on his authority, and in a shout of triumph, seal its prostration. Nor is this all. The moral governor by inflicting no penalty, acquiesces in this contempt of himself and of his authority. He refuses to counteract the testimony furnished by the act of transgression to the fact that he has no right to reign. He thus confirms the proof furnished by the act of transgression; and so, the act as unpunished, utterly subverts his authority. Who does not know all this? Who does not know, that rebellion unpunished legalizes rebellion--that it hides from every eye the reality of a perfect moral governor, and covers with, infamy him who pretends to exercise his prerogative; that it annihilates all possible evidence of his authority, and puts all authority in the dust? The proclamation of the rebel is, that the mandate from the throne is unworthy of regard, and the moral governor by his quiescent good wishes, confirms the proclamation, and authorizes rebellion throughout his empire.

 

(2.) Legal sanctions are necessary to establish the authority of the moral governor, as the necessary manifestations or proof of his benevolence. If the relation of a moral governor is anything, it is a relation distinguished from every other by its peculiar function. This peculiar function as we have seen, is to create and establish the influence of his authority, that by this influence, he may secure obedience to his will as the means of the highest happiness of all, and prevent disobedience to his will as the means of the highest misery of all. The influence of his authority depends on his moral character, on his benevolence, and on the decisive manifestation or proof of his benevolence. He can as we have seen, possess no authority in the view of his subjects, unless it is made evident to them that he is a benevolent being, and feels toward right and wrong moral action on their part as a benevolent being must feel.

 

The question then is, can he furnish the requisite proof of his benevolence, and of the necessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action, and in this way establish his authority, or right to rule, without annexing sanctions to his law?

 

Here it is readily admitted, that other things beside legal sanctions are or may be necessary, that the moral governor may establish his authority by legal sanctions. Supposing him to evince by the proper proofs, his qualifications in respect to knowledge and power, it may still be necessary to the purpose under consideration, that his deportment in all, his other relations beside that of moral governor, should be free from all acts of unkindness or injustice--from every thing which would decisively evince the selfish principle; and also, that it should be characterized by all those positive acts of beneficence which are demanded by his other relations; since otherwise he would furnish decisive evidence against his benevolence, and so against his authority. It may be necessary for the same purpose, that he should prescribe the best rule of action. His blameless and kind deportment in his other relations may furnish beforehand a degree of presumptive evidence of the character which entitles him to assume the relation of a moral governor. These things, provided the requisite sanctions are annexed to his law, may be said to furnish additional evidence of his authority; because his benevolence and with it his authority, being in this case established by the requisite sanctions, it is reasonable to conclude that what may proceed from benevolence does proceed from benevolence. But it is now maintained, that none of these things, nor all of them together, nor any thing else, can without legal sanctions, prove his benevolence, and so establish his authority. The question of his benevolence, as we have before shown, depends, not on what he does or has done in his other relations, but on what he does in the relation of a moral governor. If he would establish his right to rule, he must act benevolently in this relation as well as in other relations. Benevolence imposes on him a momentous function which is peculiar to this relation, the fulfillment of which is absolutely indispensable as the proof of his benevolence. Whatever his conduct in his other relations may have been or now is, if he fails to fulfill the peculiar and momentous function of his present relation, this failure is decisive proof that he is not a benevolent but a selfish being. Benevolence therefore, requires him to manifest his benevolence by what be does in his relation as a moral governor. It requires him to fulfill the peculiar function of his office, which is, to create and establish the influence of his authority, by manifesting in his present relation his benevolence in its necessary feelings toward right and wrong moral action. If he would create and establish the influence of his authority, he must act the part of benevolence in his present relation; and if he would act the part of benevolence in his present relation, he must manifest the necessary feelings of benevolence toward the best and the worst kind of action on the part of his subjects, by what he does in his present relation. All that there is in the nature of benevolence which gives him the right to rule, or on which this right does or can depend in the view of his subjects, is, that it necessarily involves certain peculiar feelings toward right and wrong moral action, and that it does and will make a full manifestation of them in the moral governor, for the purpose of securing the one kind of action as the means of the highest happiness of all, and of preventing the other as the means of the highest misery of all. If then the moral governor does not in his relation as a moral governor, make a full and decisive manifestation of these feelings of benevolence, he cannot prove his benevolence, cannot fulfill the grand and peculiar function of his office, and of course cannot establish his authority.

 

To recur then to the question now before us; can the moral governor in his present relation manifest in any way, the necessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action, and so establish his authority without legal sanctions?

 

Can he do this by mere professions of the supposed feelings? Such professions may be made by the most insincere and false pretender to benevolence, or rather, would be made in most cases, by the veriest usurper and tyrant. Who that ever claimed the right of dominion over others, did not profess to aim at the general good, and to require submission to his will only to promote this high end? I do not say that such professions are necessarily inconsistent with benevolence; but I say, that in themselves they are utterly insufficient as proof of benevolence: while the want of all proof from every other source, would, notwithstanding such professions, be decisive proof to the contrary. Mere professions of a principle of action in cases in which if it exist, it will show itself in action, and in which it does not thus show itself, are ever and justly regarded as insincere and false. To say in such a case to a sufferer, (depart in peace, be warmed, be filled,) and yet to give nothing, is proof decisive of the want of the benevolent principle. So in the case before us. If there are acts which the moral governor may perform which would fully prove his benevolence, and which therefore he would perform were he truly benevolent, then no possible reason can be conceived for his failure to show himself benevolent by the requisite acts, except that he does not possess the character. Who would concede the right to govern to such a mere pretender to benevolence?

 

Again; there are strictly speaking but three acts which a being in the capacity or relation of a perfect moral governor can perform, viz., the act of prescribing the best rule of action; the act of annexing the requisite sanctions to the rule; and the act of executing these sanctions in cases of obedience and disobedience. These acts may be viewed as comprising all that he does or can do in performing the function of this high relation. In assuming this relation, he cannot reward obedience nor punish disobedience; for neither obedience nor disobedience can exist. The question then now before us is reduced to this: can he manifest the necessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action by merely prescribing the best rule of action. We have already said enough to show that such a rule of action without sanctions, not only could not be an authoritative rule of action, but could not possess other essential characteristics of the law of a perfect moral government; that it would be the mere advice of imbecility; that it could not be regarded as the truthful expression of any benevolent feeling whatever on the part of him who should give it, but would amount to an open, palpable disclaimer of all authority. I do not say, that the act of giving the best rule of action is not necessary, that the moral governor may by legal sanctions manifest or prove his benevolence. But I affirm, that the act itself without legal sanctions, is not proof of his benevolence. He does nothing in this case which a perfectly selfish being may not be believed to do. He does nothing to show that he feels toward right and wrong moral action, as a benevolent being must feel; nothing to show that he truly prefers the best kind of action to the worst, or the highest happiness of all to the highest misery of all; nothing to show that he will befriend and bless the obedient rather than the disobedient, or that he will not confer good on the latter, and inflict evil on the former to the extent of his power. He commits himself in no respect as the friend and patron of right moral action, nor as the enemy and avenger of wrong moral action. He refuses to do it when benevolence requires him to do it, and when were he a benevolent being, he would do it. He therefore proves himself not to be benevolent.

 

Again; if the manifestation of these feelings of the moral governor be made at all, it must be made by some act or acts, which are the appropriate and significant expressions of them, by some act or acts which shall be justly and universally regarded as such expressions of them. We have already seen, that by promising natural good to obedience, and threatening natural evil to disobedience in some supposable degrees, the moral governor in a case in which there is no evidence to the contrary, would decisively and in the most impressive manner conceivable, express the necessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action, and so establish his authority. Such sanctions as we have spoken of, would be decisive evidence of these feelings, because they furnish the best evidence of them of which the nature of the case admits. I now say, that legal sanctions are the necessary evidence of these feelings on the part of the moral governor. What then is--what can be, truly or justly regarded as the decisive, ambiguous expression of his feelings of approbation of obedience and his disapprobation of disobedience, except either, when giving his law, the promise to reward obedience and the threatening to punish disobedience; or the actual conferring of a reward for obedience when it exists, and the actual inflicting of a penalty for disobedience when it exists. In giving his law, he cannot reward obedience nor punish disobedience, for there can be no obedience to be rewarded nor disobedience to be punished. If then he does not promise to reward the one, and threaten to punish the other, he does nothing and can do nothing, to manifest the necessary feelings toward the two kinds of action, nothing to show that it is not a matter of perfect indifference to him whether his subjects obey or disobey his law. By annexing no sanctions to his law, he furnishes decisive proof that he wills no consequences in good or evil, no results in happiness or misery to his subjects as obedient or disobedient, and of course, that he is not willing to use the least influence in the form of motive, nor any influence arising from the expression of his approbation or disapprobation clearly and fully made, for the purpose of securing right and preventing wrong moral action, and thus securing the highest happiness of all, and preventing the highest misery of all. As a moral governor then, in such a case he can manifest no feelings, and of course no character, which entitles him to the least respectful consideration from his subjects. Whatever may be his claims or his professions or both, there can be no influence from his character to secure the one kind of moral action nor to prevent the other--none from his official prerogative or right to rule--none which would not result from the character of any other, even the most selfish being, who should make the game claims and the same professions--none in a word, to secure obedience and prevent disobedience to his will, because it is the will and proved to be the will of a perfect being.

 

Were obedience to exist, he would make no manifestation of such a will by conferring a reward. Were disobedience to exist, he would manifest no such will by inflicting a legal penalty. What then, shall be said of his moral character? Where in the view of his subjects is the proof of his benevolence? What becomes of the peculiar function of his office? He utterly refuses to do the very things, which his high relation as a moral governor, benevolence requires him to do, viz., to manifest his benevolence as a practical principle in its necessary forms of approbation of right and disapprobation of wrong moral action. He utterly neglects to establish his right to rule. He refuses to bring that influence to bear on his subjects, which is indispensable to secure the highest happiness of all, and to prevent the highest misery of all--the influence of his authority. Instead therefore, of manifesting his benevolence in its appropriate and necessary expressions, and so performing the peculiar function of his office by bringing this highest and best influence to control the moral conduct of his subjects, he betrays a character which entitles him only to execration, as a false and faithless protector of his kingdom's welfare. Legal sanctions then are necessary to evince the benevolence of a moral governor, and so to establish his authority.

 

Further; the same thing will appear if we examine some of the particular ways or modes in which it may be supposed that a moral governor may evince his benevolence, and so establish his authority without legal sanctions. -- Vide LECT. VII., p. 128. It may be said or supposed, that a greater amount of obedience to the best rule of action might or would be secured, and with it a greater amount of happiness without legal sanctions than with them, and that in this way the benevolence of the moral governor and his consequent right to rule may be fully established. I answer, that by obedience in this case cannot be meant conformity to the rule involving submission to authority; for according to the supposition, the so-called obedience must exist as the proof of the governor's benevolence, and in this way as the proof of his authority. There can therefore be no manifestation of his character as the ground of his authority prior to the supposed obedience, and of course no obedience involving submission to his authority. On the contrary, he who should give the supposed rule of action, would as we have seen, instead of manifesting the character, the manifestation of which is requisite to his authority, manifest the opposite character, and so disprove and subvert his authority. By obedience then in the present case, must be meant mere conformity to the rule of action, or right moral action performed solely under the influence of the perceived nature and tendencies of moral action, without involving the least submission to, or respect for, authority. But to say that there might be a greater amount of right moral action without than with legal sanctions, is saving nothing to the purpose, since it may as well be said that there might not be. To say either, is merely to assert a natural possibility of things--a possibility which must always be admitted in cases of moral reasoning. The question is one of probability. And the probability of a greater amount of right moral action is greater, other things being the same, under a greater degree of influence to secure it, than under a less degree of such influence; while the degree of this influence is greater with legal sanctions than without them. Besides, our object in the present inquiry is not to determine the comparative excellence of different systems of influence. It is, to ascertain what is the nature of a perfect moral government under the general or universal admission, that there is such a thing administered by an infinitely perfect being over his moral creation, and that whatever else it is, it is the necessary means of the greatest amount of right moral action and of happiness. We have said enough already, to show that without legal sanctions there cannot be a perfect moral government. To say then, that a greater amount of right moral action might be secured without legal sanctions than with them, is to say that such a result might be secured without a perfect moral government; that is, that the result might be secured without the necessary means of securing it; which is absurd. Thus if we view the present question as one of mere probability, all the probability in the case is, that there would be a greater amount of right moral action with legal sanctions than without them; while the fact that there would be, is fully admitted in the concession that a perfect moral government is necessary to the greatest amount of right moral action. But there is yet another view of this important topic which demands consideration. If then it be conceded that a greater amount of right moral action and of happiness would take place under the supposed system, and that its adoption would therefore be demanded by benevolence, still the benevolence of the being who should adopt it, could never be proved. It has already been shown, that neither his deportment prior to his assuming the relation of a moral governor, nor the act of prescribing the best rule of action, could be regarded as proof of his benevolence. Nor could the least degree of proof on this point be furnished by any degree of right moral action and of happiness supposable in the case. As I have already said, right moral action in such a case, must be performed solely under the influence of the perceived nature and tendencies of moral action. It cannot therefore be performed out of respect for the character of the lawgiver, and of course can furnish no testimony or proof of its excellence. There can be no connection between the right moral action and the character of the lawgiver. The former therefore can furnish no proof of the excellence of the latter. The amount of happiness consequent on such action can in no degree depend on the will of the lawgiver; for to suppose this, would be to suppose a legal reward in a case in which there is no legal reward. No possible proof then exists or can exist in the case supposed, that he who assumes the relation of a moral governor, feels toward right and wrong moral action, as a benevolent being must feel. Were he a perfectly selfish being, it is altogether credible that he should do all that he is supposed to do. Nor is this all. But by failing to show in his relation of a moral governor, the feelings of a benevolent being toward right and wrong moral action, he proves himself to be a selfish being. If then he is, according to the present supposition a benevolent being, he is benevolent in a case in which his benevolence cannot be proved, in which he acts contrary to the plainest dictates of benevolence, and in which therefore, according to the laws of evidence, he must be regarded as a selfish being. In such a case, there could of course be no authority; nothing which could be called a moral government. I do not say that a benevolent being would not adopt the supposed system, if the greatest good required its adoption; nor that it would not be one kind of a moral system. But I say that it would not be a perfect moral government. Its influence would be simply that of the perceived nature and tendencies of moral action; and nothing more and nothing less than were there no lawgiver supposed in the case. There could not be the shadow of that influence which results from the law, the authority and the character of a perfect moral governor. He who should assume the supposed relation without annexing sanctions to his law, would have, and would be entitled to have, no more and no other influence over the conduct of his subjects, than any individual among them who should propound the same rule of action. The great object and end of the relation is to secure the highest wellbeing of all, and to prevent the highest misery of all, by securing right and preventing wrong moral action; and the great and peculiar function of the relation is, to secure right moral action, and to prevent wrong moral action by the influence of his authority--an influence which depends on the manifestation of that approbation of the one kind of action, and of that disapprobation of the other, which a benevolent being must feel. But without legal sanctions he manifests no such feelings, and thus proves himself to be a selfish being and destitute of all authority.

 

Again; it may be said, that a moral governor by promising a reward to obedience, though he threatens no penalty to disobedience, would prove his benevolence and so establish his authority. I answer, that the thing supposed is impossible. For how could the promise of a reward to obedience prove the benevolence of the lawgiver, while he left disobedience to go unpunished? How could he show himself to feel as a benevolent being must feel toward right moral action, without also showing himself to feel as a benevolent being must feel toward wrong moral action? All the proof of such feeling toward right moral action furnished by the reward, would be wholly counteracted by manifesting no appropriate feeling toward wrong moral action; or rather, to manifest no disapprobation of wrong moral action, would be to show indifference or approbation in respect to it; and no being who feels either indifference to or approbation of wrong moral action, can feel as a benevolent being must feel toward either right or wrong moral action. But not to dwell longer on this topic. Make what supposition you will, if the moral governor confers no reward for obedience, he expresses no approbation of the only means of the best end, but rather disapprobation; and if he inflicts no penalty for disobedience, he expresses no disapprobation of the means of the worst end, but rather approbation.

 

In the one case, he virtually punishes obedience by withholding a reward; in the other, he virtually rewards disobedience by withholding penalty. Suppose then what else we may, if, in the capacity of moral governor, he does not annex sanctions to his law, and if he does not reward obedience and punish disobedience, his conduct must be traced to the selfish principle in some form. It may be selfishness in the form of caprice, despotic humor, favoritism, a spirit of self-aggrandizement, the love of applause, or of a weak, indulgent tenderness which sacrifices public good to individual happiness. But it is selfishness still, and not benevolence; for benevolence in a moral governor must feel, and must express, approbation of obedience and disapprobation of disobedience to the best law. Not to express these feelings, is not to show the necessary and due regard to the only means of the highest happiness of all, and the necessary and due abhorrence of the sure means of the highest misery of all. Not to do it, is to establish the fact that the moral governor is not himself governed by the principle of perfect and immutable rectitude. Whom he will reward, and whom he will punish, however it may be supposed to be decided by other considerations, is not determined by the perfection of his character. So far as this basis for confidence is concerned, the good have as much to fear as the bad, and the bad as much to hope for as the good. Perfection in character is wanting in him who occupies the throne. Obedience, as submission to authority--as that confidential homage and unqualified and joyous compliance in which the will of the subject goes along with the will of a perfect ruler of all, is impossible. There is no such ruler. The act of obedience, and the act of disobedience, alike in their true tendency and influence, disclaim and prostrate his authority, and the moral governor, doing nothing to counteract the effect, legalizes rebellion from one end of his dominions to the other.

 

 

REMARK.

 

We see why the attempts to prove the benevolence of God from the light of nature have been so often, not to say uniformly, unsuccessful. The fact I think will not be denied, that the arguments of the soundest theism on this most interesting and momentous question have been, and still are, in the view of many of the most acute and ingenuous minds, marred by manifest imperfection and weakness. Even many Christian divines confidently maintain that the moral perfection of God cannot be proved from the light of nature. My present design is not to trace minutely the defects of the arguments now referred to, but rather to present what I deem a fundamental defect common to them all, and which fully accounts for their inconclusive and unsatisfactory character, viz., that in these arguments the most important relation of God to his moral creation has been wholly overlooked in its true and proper bearing on the conclusion. And here let me not be misunderstood. I do not say that this important relation of God has been denied. It has been fully believed by every sound theist. But I affirm that, in the best conducted arguments on the subject with which I am acquainted, that no such account has been made of the relation of God as the moral governor of men as the exigency of the argument demands. If what has been said in the present lecture be just, the question, whether a being who assumes the relation of a moral governor is benevolent, depends on another, viz., whether the sanctions of his law manifest his benevolence in its necessary approbation of right, and necessary disapprobation of wrong moral action. But in what treatise or work in natural theology has the argument for the divine benevolence been made to depend on the relation of God to men as their moral governor--on the nature, principles and facts of this relation, and particularly on the sanctions annexed to his law? On the contrary, is not the uniform method of discussing the great question A God's moral character from the light of nature, after having proved his existence as Creator, and his natural attributes, to proceed directly to the proof of his moral attributes--that is, to the proof of his benevolence--without the least attempt to unfold the nature of his high relation to his creatures as their perfect moral governor? But if God sustains this relation to men and surely no sound theist will deny it--then manifestly it is the great, the paramount relation which he sustains to them a relation to which every other must be subservient, even that of their Creator, and that of the providential Disposer of all events in respect to them. This relation of God to his creatures must therefore control and modify all the manifestations of himself to them, and especially the manifestations of his moral character. How can we judge of the moral character of any being except from his works, his acts, and his doings, their nature, design, tendencies and results? And how can we judge of these without understanding and contemplating the relation which the being sustains to other beings whom his acts and doings respect? Suppose you were to witness a parent inflicting chastisement upon his child in some of its necessary and severer forms, and yet were so ignorant of the parental relation as not to be able to comprehend, or so thoughtless as not to consider, the design of parental discipline; or suppose you were to see a surgeon amputating the limb of a patient, without a suspicion or a thought of the necessity of the operation to save the life of the latter; or to see the executioner of public justice inflicting the penalty of the law upon the murderer, wholly ignorant or making no account of the design of such infliction--how, in either case, could you regard the evil suffered as the dictate and proof of benevolence, or as other than the decisive proof of the opposite principle? So, if God is acting in the relation of a perfect moral governor of his moral creation, and if all his acts and doings are controlled and modified by this relation, to what purpose, without appealing to this relation and to his acts and doings as dictated and modified by it, shall we attempt to prove his benevolence or to judge for ourselves, or to lead others to judge of his moral character? On this supposition no wonder that all such attempts are vain. If we would vindicate the ways of God to man, we must understand, and lead others to understand, his relation to man as a moral governor. To represent him as merely the Creator of men, and the providential Disposer of their allotments, and in these relations aiming only to produce the happiness and to prevent the misery of his creatures irrespective of their moral conduct, when he is acting in the paramount relation of their lawgiver, and adhering to every principle of strictest equity in his administration, is to pour darkness on all his works and ways, and therefore on his moral character; while to contemplate him in his true relation--the high and august relation of a perfect moral governor--would light up all the dark paths of his providence, and cause all his goodness to pass before us.

 

That God is in fact administering a perfect moral government over this world, will be readily conceded by every believer in divine revelation. It is true indeed that there is no ground for the pretense that he carries this system of government out to its full issues in the present life. Still it must be admitted by all who receive the Christian revelation, that God in his providence over men in this world, in no respect departs from or violates a single principle of a perfect moral government; but that on the contrary, he so adheres to every such principle in his administration, that its perfection can in no respect be impeached or denied. Why then is it incredible that his providence, were it rightly read in the lessons which it gives us, should show us that he is administering a perfect moral government over this world, if not in the form of a strictly legal economy with some delay of its just retributions not inconsistent with its nature, at least in what, as we think, is far more probable--in the form of an economy of grace? If the word of God reveals him to us as our moral governor, exercising his rightful dominion through grace, why should it be thought strange that his works and ways of providence, well considered, should present him in the same exalted and glorious relation? Or rather, how can it be supposed to be otherwise? Can it be supposed, that in his works and ways of providence he contradicts the testimony concerning himself given in his word? Does his written revelation exhibit him to our faith in one relation, and his acts and doings in another.? Is it credible, that his works when duly considered, should make no decisive manifestation of the character and the relation which he sustains to his intelligent creation? What shall be concluded, if his works furnish no confirmation of his declarations? What is this but contradicting in his word what he is doing in his providence? If the book of revelation reveals God administering over men a perfect moral government blended with an economy of grace, the book of nature the book that tells us what he is by what he does--if rightly read, must show him as the righteous Sovereign, and as the Rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.