V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law--The nature of such a law further unfolded. -- Third characteristic of the law so demanded in a perfect Moral Government, viz.: it requires benevolence and forbids selfishness. -- Relation of predominant to subordinate action. -- Benevolence and selfishness defined. -- These constitute the only kind of action possible to a moral being. -- Manner in which the law requires and forbids subordinate action. -- Benevolence and selfishness the only morally right and wrong actions.

 

 

THIRDLY. The law of a perfect moral government requires benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbids selfishness as the sum of disobedience on the part of its subjects.

 

By this I mean that the law of a perfect moral government absolutely and universally requires benevolence and benevolence only, and that it absolutely and universally forbids selfishness and selfishness only, while by this universal requirement, it virtually or in effect requires subordinate action only as such action becomes in the variable circumstances of its subjects, the appropriate expression of benevolence; and by this universal prohibition, it virtually or in effect forbids subordinate action only as it becomes in the variable circumstances of its subjects, the appropriate expression of selfishness.

 

Before I proceed to offer the proof of this proposition, I deem it important to distinguish the different kinds of action on the part of moral beings, which the law of a perfect moral government may be supposed to respect.

 

Premising that by a moral being I mean not one who acts or has acted morally, but one who, from his nature and condition, is qualified to act morally, and is under a necessity of so acting, I proceed to say, that --

 

All the action which is predicable of such a being when he acts, and which now demands consideration, may be included in two kinds, viz., that in which he electively prefers some object or end as his supreme or chief object, and that action which is dictated or prompted by this preference. Every moral being as such comes under the necessity, from his nature and condition, of acting with his will and heart in respect to some object or end, as his supreme or chief object or end; that is, of electively preferring some object or end to every other in competition with it, as an object of preference; or of supremely loving some such object or end. This act or state of the mind, as contemplated under somewhat different aspects and relations, we commonly call the supreme affection, the prevailing disposition, the governing principle, the controlling purpose of the mind. The true nature and tendency of this state or act of the mind is to dictate or prompt, to control or govern all other action of the being. This state of mind, considered as action cognizable by law, is too often lost sight of by moralists, as if moral obligation had no respect to the acts of the will and heart--the most important of all action, because the word action is most frequently applied to executive doings. To avoid this error, I propose to distinguish the two kinds of action by one peculiar and prominent characteristic, and shall call the one predominant action, and the other subordinate action.

Each of these kinds of action may be subdivided into two other kinds.

 

Predominant action consists either in benevolence or in selfishness. These are the only predominant acts of which a moral being is capable, and one or the other is predicable of every being of whom moral character, viz., morally right or morally wrong action, is predicable. Benevolence consists in the elective preference of, or in electively preferring, the highest well-being of all sentient beings, for its own sake, to every object in competition with it, as an object of choice or preference. Selfishness consists in the elective preference of, or in electively preferring, some inferior good to the highest well-being of all sentient beings, and is, of course, a preference of this inferior good to the prevention of the highest misery of all; that is, a preference of the highest misery of all to the absence of the inferior good, as these objects come into competition as objects of choice or preference.

 

It is important to our purpose to specify some of the characteristics which are common to the two kinds of predominant action, and those wherein they differ.

 

Each then, is an act of the will and heart, or an elective preference, by which I mean that it includes two elements, viz., choice and affection. Each is an intelligent act, or an act done with the present knowledge or intellectual apprehension of the nature of action, as related to the great and true end of action on the part of a moral being. Each is a free act, or an act done with entire exemption from the influence of every cause of the act, which, in the circumstances in which it takes place, renders the act necessary. Each is a permanent act, or an act which tends to its own perpetuity, and is for the most part perpetual. Each is predominant action, or action which tends to secure all other action, as it becomes the necessarv means of accomplishing the end of the predominant action. Such are the elements in which the two elective preferences called benevolence and selfishness agree.

 

Wherein do these kinds of action differ? Thus. Benevolence is action whose direct end is the great end of all action on the part of a moral being, and which is perfectly fitted, in all the circumstances of such a being, to produce this end, viz., the highest well-being of all other sentient beings and of the agent himself. Selfishness is action, whose direct end is some end inferior to the great end of action on the part of a moral being, and which, is perfectly fitted, in all the circumstances of such a being, to defeat this end, and to produce the opposite end, the highest misery of all other sentient beings and of the agent himself.

 

There is one end of action on the part of moral beings which, as determined by their nature and their relations, may be said to be the great end of all action on their part, or, as it is sometimes called, "the chief end" of such beings, viz., the highest possible well-being of each and of all. This is an end, to the promotion of which, or to the prevention of which in the promotion of the opposite end, the highest misery of all, all action on the part of moral beings has, in a greater or less degree, a relation of tendency or fitness. It is, therefore, emphatically the great end or the chief end of all action on their part--not, indeed, as the end at which they actually aim, but as that end at which they are qualified to aim and to promote, and at which they must supremely aim if they would promote or secure the great end of their being. There is one, and only one hind of action on the part of a moral being, whose direct end is the great end of all action on his part, viz., benevolence, or the elective preference of this end to every other in competition with it, as an object of election or choice. In this sense benevolence, as action whose direct object or end is the great end of all action on the part of a moral being, may be said to be the action, and the only action, which is perfectly fitted to promote or accomplish this end. There is one, and only one kind of action on the part of a moral being, whose direct end is some end inferior to this great end, instead of this great end, viz., selfishness, or an elective preference of the inferior end to this great end, in which the agent virtually and actually proposes to destroy all other good, and to produce the highest misery of all for the sake of this direct and inferior end. In this sense selfishness may be said to be perfectly fitted, and to be the only action which is perfectly fitted to prevent the highest well-being of all and to produce the highest misery of all.

 

Thus every moral being who possesses a moral character, or who acts morally right or morally wrong, electively prefers some object or end as his supreme object or end. In this state of his will and affections, and when under its controlling influence, he ever aims to promote or accomplish that object or end. it maintains an habitual ascendency in the mind, dictating and controlling his particular acts, as these include particular thoughts, affections, desires, dispositions, volitions, and overt doings, in subservience to the accomplishment of that object or end. Without this predominant act or state of the mind there could be no consistency in his conduct as a moral being, and no uniformity of character--nothing which can be called moral character.

 

Again, there is, as I have said, another kind of action, viz., subordinate action. By subordinate action is meant all that kind of action which is dictated and controlled by predominant action, by the supreme affection, governing principle or purpose of the mind, and which is done in subservience to, or to promote the end of the governing principle or purpose. This kind of action may be divided into two particular kinds of subordinate action. The one consists in particular elective preferences, voluntary affections, dispositions or purposes, in which no present or immediate action of either mind or body is directly willed. This may be called immanent subordinate action. The other consists in willing directly some present mental or bodily action, and in the action willed. This may be called executive subordinate action. Examples of the former--justice, honesty, veracity, gratitude, humanity or kindness to fellow-beings, patriotism, natural affection or love of kindred, friendship, honor, etc.; and their opposites--all these, considered as habitual dispositions, affections, Purposes, principles--as mental acts or states, which involve acts of Will or are elective preferences of their particular objects in which no present acts are directly willed, are examples of immanent subordinate action. Examples of the latter are the act of rendering to another his due, the act of speaking truth, the act of giving alms, etc., etc., and their opposites. These, considered as including in each instance the act willed and the act of willing it, are examples of executive subordinate action. For the purpose of distinguishing the elements of any action of the latter class, We may call one element the imperative volition, and the other the overt action.

 

In this view of subordinate action, it is obvious that the direct end of such action, that is, the end directly aimed at by the mind in such action, is not the great end of all action on the part of a moral being, nor the opposite end, and that, in this sense, subordinate action is not fitted to promote this end nor to defeat it. On the contrary, the mind, the agent in all subordinate action, directly aims only at some limited degree of happiness or misery. In so acting, he can aim at the great end of action only indirectly--that is, through the predominant action. When such action is directly fitted to produce some limited degree of happiness, which is necessary to the highest well-being of all, then it is indirectly fitted to promote this great end; and when it is directly fitted to produce some limited degree of happiness which is inconsistent with this great end, or some limited degree of misery which is inconsistent with it, then it is indirectly fitted to defeat this great end, and to promote its opposite.

 

Having thus distinguished the different kinds of action on the part of moral beings, I now proceed to show that the law of a perfect moral government requires benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbids selfishness as the sum of disobedience; in other words, that it absolutely requires benevolence and benevolence only, and forbids selfishness and selfishness only, in all circumstances; while by this requirement and prohibition it virtually or in effect requires and forbids other action, only as such action becomes in the variable circumstances of its subjects, the appropriate expression of benevolence and selfishness. This will appear from the following considerations:

 

First. Predominant action, either in the form of benevolence or selfishness is not only unavoidable, but it is the only action on the part of moral beings which, in all the circumstances essential to their condition, is possible. The circumstances of moral beings are of two kinds; those which are essential to their condition as moral beings, which are invariable, and which are common to all their actual circumstances; and those which are not essential to their condition as moral beings, which are variable, and therefore not common to all their actual circumstances. Now every moral being as such exists in such circumstances and sustains such relations, that he is under an absolute necessity from his nature and his circumstances to perform predominant action, either in the form of benevolence or of selfishness. He must choose either the highest well-being of the sentient universe, or some inferior object as his supreme object. The former is to him an object of possible choice. On the choice of it depends his highest well-being. He is therefore under the necessity either of choosing it, or not choosing it as his supreme good. If he chooses this object as his supreme object, he is a benevolent being. If he does not, then he chooses some interior object, rather than this; and is a selfish being. He is therefore under an absolute necessity of performing predominant action, of becoming in heart--in principle--in the governing purpose of the mind, either a benevolent or a selfish being, which necessity is as fixed and unavoidable as are his nature and his circumstances. Nor in those circumstances which are essential to his condition as a moral being, is any other action possible than predominant action, either in the form of benevolence or of selfishness. All other action is in the nature of things, dictated or prompted by predominant action--is the consequent and effect of predominant action--and therefore utterly impossible without prior predominant action. All other action is subordinate action; and all subordinate action is, in different respects circumstantial or conditional action. The possibility of such action depends on variable circumstances, which are not essential to the condition of a moral being, nor common to all his actual circumstances. No moral being can in disposition, principle, affection, volition, purpose, become either just or unjust, true or false, honest or dishonest, or perform any other immanent, subordinate act or action, until he has become either benevolent or selfish; and therefore not until predominant action in the form of benevolence or selfishness has taken place. The same thing is true in respect to all executive subordinate action; for this also depends on prior predominant action. All subordinate action therefore, since it depends on prior predominant action, is in this respect circumstantial, as it depends on variable circumstances, which are not essential to the condition of a moral being. Nor is this all. A moral being, in one set of variable circumstances, may be under the necessity of performing either one kind of subordinate action or its opposite; for example, of being either just or unjust in disposition or purpose, or in another case, of acting executively either justly or unjustly. In another set of variable circumstances, he may be under the necessity of performing either another kind of subordinate action or its opposite; for example, of being in purpose or will either true or false; or in another case, of speaking truth or falsehood. Thus, when subordinate action becomes possible by the existence of prior predominant action, whether such possible subordinate action be of one kind or of another kind, depends on those variable circumstances which are not essential to the condition of a moral being. And further, there is no kind of subordinate action, which in any circumstances is fitted to subserve the end of benevolence, which in some other circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of selfishness, and be prompted by this principle. Thus a man may love his kindred, or his country, he may purpose to be just, honest, faithful and true; to give all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned, either from the benevolent or the selfish principle. At the same time there are few if any kinds of subordinate action, which in all circumstances are fitted only to promote the end of selfishness, or which in some possible circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of benevolence, and be performed from this principle. Thus the general purpose to destroy, or this purpose in connection with the act of destroying the dwellings of others, in ordinary circumstances would be ascribed to the selfish principle and pronounced under this complex conception injustice; and yet the same act as immanent subordinate action, in the form of a purpose or as including the executive act, when contemplated as necessary on the part of firemen to prevent the burning of a city, would be demanded by benevolence, and may be prompted by this principle. So the immanent act including the executive subordinate act which respects taking the life of our fellow-beings, in one case is justly esteemed an act of selfishness, and in another case an act demanded by benevolence; and may be prompted by benevolence. It may be a question with some, in view of the example of the Saviour in LUKE xxiv. 19-28--to say nothing of defeating the design of an assassin by stratagem or of attacking an invading army by ambuscade, whether the act of deceiving so commonly considered as in all cases resulting from the selfish principle, and equivalent to lying, may not in some cases be dictated by the benevolent principle. Without deciding however, whether there be any kind of subordinate action, which in all the variable circumstances of moral beings, can be dictated only by the selfish principle, it is evident that all that action which I have called subordinate action, is prompted by predominant action; and that such action is absolutely impossible on the part of moral beings, without prior predominant action.

 

Now that the law of a perfect moral government should require and forbid action, which in the circumstances of the beings to whom it is given, is utterly impossible on their part, is preposterous and incredible. It is equally preposterous and incredible, that the law of such a government should not require benevolence and forbid selfishness in all circumstances in which they are possible on the part of subjects. Since then the law of such a government, absolutely requires and forbids predominant action, and predominant action only in all the circumstances of its subjects which are essential to their moral condition, and therefore in all their circumstances, and since benevolence and selfishness are the only kinds of predominant action, it follows, that the law of a perfect moral government absolutely and universally requires benevolence, and benevolence only, and forbids selfishness and selfishness only, on the part of its subjects.

 

This view of the subject will be further confirmed, by considering the manner in which the law of a perfect moral government requires and forbids subordinate, action. This law, as we have said, by its requirement and its prohibition of predominant action, virtually or in effect requires and forbids subordinate action only as such action becomes in the variable circumstances of its subjects, the appropriate expression of benevolence and of selfishness.

 

As we have seen, predominant action on the part of the subjects of law, is possible in all their circumstances as moral beings, while in some of their circumstances subordinate action is impossible. Now it is the nature and tendency of predominant action to go forth into the appropriate expressions of itself in subordinate action, according to the variable circumstances of the subject, in which the possibility and necessity of such action arise. Hence, to require predominant action in the form of benevolence absolutely and universally, is virtually and in effect, to require all its appropriate expressions in subordinate action, as the possibility and necessity of such action arise in all the variable circumstances of the subject; and to forbid predominant action in the form of selfishness absolutely and universally, is virtually and in effect, to forbid all its appropriate expressions in subordinate action, as the possibility and necessity of such action arise, in all the variable circumstances of the subject. Nor is there any other mode in which the law of a perfect moral government can require and forbid subordinate action. To suppose that it should, is to suppose that it should go beyond the obligation of the subject in its requirement and prohibition; subordinate action being utterly impossible in some circumstances of the subject. The law therefore, does all it can do by absolute and universal requirement, to secure all the subordinate action, which in all the variable and all the possible circumstances of the subject, can become the appropriate expression of benevolence; and all it can do by absolute and universal prohibition, to prevent all the subordinate action which in all the variable and possible circumstances of the subject, can become the appropriate expression of selfishness. In its absolute and universal requirement of benevolence, it requires a permanent predominant principle of action in all the circumstances of the subject, which gives the best security which the nature of things admits of, that all subordinate action which is the appropriate expression of this principle in all the variable circumstances of the subject, will be performed; and in its absolute and universal prohibition of selfishness, it forbids a principle of action in all the circumstances of the subject, which gives the best security which the nature of things admits of, that all subordinate action which is the appropriate expression of this principle in all the variable circumstances of the subject, will be prevented.

 

Should it here be said that, according to this view of the law under consideration, it cannot absolutely and universally require and forbid any subordinate action whatever--not even thus require justice or veracity, nor thus forbid injustice or falsehood--I answer, that the law cannot require and forbid action which, in the circumstances of the subject, is, from the nature of the case, utterly impossible. It cannot require justice and forbid injustice, when it is thus impossible that the subject should be either just or unjust; and the subject can be neither just nor unjust, in any import of the language, until he has become either benevolent or selfish. He must act in one or in the other of these forms of predominant action before he can perform any subordinate act whatever. When therefore, we speak without qualification, as we often do, and yet with sufficient precision for all ordinary purposes of the law, as requiring and forbidding certain kinds of subordinate action, all that can be meant is, that by requiring and forbidding it in its principle, it requires and forbids it virtually or in effect in all the variable circumstances of the subject in which such action becomes possible. In this mode the law requires and forbids subordinate action, in the only conceivable mode of requiring and forbidding it, by a perfect and universal law. Indeed, were this mode of requiring and forbidding subordinate action not adopted, subordinate action must be left, to an interminable extent, wholly without requirement and prohibition in any respect whatever; the supposition of particular precepts to regulate all subordinate action being preposterous in the extreme.

 

It is readily admitted, that the law of a perfect moral government, like the decalogue, may, for good reasons and to a limited extent, specify in the form of particular requirements and prohibitions, subordinate action to be done and not done. But it is maintained that all such precepts, so far as they respect merely subordinate action, are only formal specifications or statements of such action, which as the appropriate expression of benevolence and selfishness in the variable circumstances in which it becomes possible, becomes in some sense binding on the subject; and not moral precepts or laws which imply the moral quality of such action; that all such precepts, though useful and important in many respects, especially as they relate to--action which is possible in nearly all the variable circumstances of the subject, are yet to be interpreted in regard to the universality of their application, as all such language is, by the known limits of possibility and impossibility, and by the known object and design of the precepts themselves. The universal form of the language of particular precepts is one thing; the universal application of such precepts, even in all the variable circumstances of the subject, is another. This distinction is recognized in respect to every particular precept, so far as such relate to merely subordinate action, in both parental and civil governments. This shows that such precepts are not of the nature of absolute and universal law, but are rather highly useful directions, which, however extensive their application within the variable circumstances of the subject, and however unqualified the language in which they are expressed, depend on the variable circumstances of the subject for their binding force, and which, therefore, admit of possible, though rare exceptions, so far as changes in these circumstances may require exceptions, in view of the great end of all action on the part of moral beings. Vide PALEY, MOR. AND POL. PHIL., P. VI., c. 4.

 

It is evident then, that the law of a perfect moral government absolutely and universally requires and forbids predominant action, and only requires and forbids other action virtually or in effect, as it becomes in the variable circumstances of the subject, the appropriate expression of predominant action. It is equally evident, that benevolence and selfishness are the only kinds of predominant action on the part of moral beings. It follows therefore, that the law of a perfect moral government requires benevolence as the sum of all obedience, and forbids selfishness as the sum of all disobedience on the part of its subjects.

 

It seems greatly to perplex some moralists to distinguish the mode in which, or the ground on which, the law of a perfect moral government requires and forbids predominant action as the principle of subordinate action, from the mode in which, or the ground on which, it requires and forbids subordinate action itself. It seems to them that a law which, in the manner explained, requires and forbids subordinate action in the variable circumstances of the subject, only virtually or in effect, by the absolute and universal requirement and prohibition of predominant action, furnishes as a rule of action no adequate security for the existence of one kind, and for the prevention of another kind of subordinate action, and so jeopardizes the interests of practical morality. To show how entirely groundless such views are, it is sufficient to say that it is impossible, in the nature of things, that the law in its absolute and universal requirement and prohibition, should extend beyond the two, kinds of predominant action, since in such a case, it would extend beyond the limits of obligation on the part of the subject. Besides, if the requirement of the one and the prohibition of the other of the two great predominant principles of action, will not secure the sufficiently known and obvious expressions of the one, and prevent the sufficiently known and obvious expressions of the other of these principles in appropriate subordination, how would such subordinate action be secured in one case and prevented in the other, by formally expressed particular precepts? The subject who should obey the essential requirement and prohibition of the law, would also, while the principle remains active and controlling in the mind, obey all its sufficiently known and obvious virtual requirements and prohibitions in subordinate action, as they become applicable in all his variable circumstances; while if he should not obey the former, there would not only be no security that he would obey the latter, but an absolute certainty that he would disobey them in every instance in which such disobedience should be necessary to accomplish the end of his governing principle, though they were formally expressed in particular enactments. Such enactments could be only formal expressions of the virtual requirements and prohibitions of the fundamental law, and could be of no advantage to the cause of practical morality in those cases, in which these virtual requirements and prohibitions were sufficiently known without them.

 

If these things are so in the cases supposed, i.e., in all cases in which the virtual requirements and prohibitions of the fundamental law are sufficiently known or sufficiently obvious for all practical purposes, it may be naturally asked, why are particular precepts in the form of requirement and prohibition confessedly necessary in all forms of moral government, even in that which is undeniably perfect? I answer, that these precepts are necessary in all cases in which they are so, for certain purposes peculiar to subordinate action in the variable circumstances in which such action becomes possible. In some cases they are necessary to remove unavoidable ignorance in respect to the subordinate action, which were it not for such ignorance, would be virtually required or forbidden by the fundamental law. In some cases they are necessary to render more manifest the fitness of the subordinate action thus virtually required and forbidden, and thus to remove doubt and uncertainty, and to prevent perverted and false judgments in respect to it, and so to give greater security to the performance of one kind of such action, and to abstinence from the other, than would otherwise exist. In some cases, if not in all, they give definiteness to the kind of subordinate action which they respect, as such action is the proof of obedience and disobedience to the fundamental law. But, more than all, such precepts are binding to an extent so nearly universal in all the variable circumstances of men, and with exceptions so rare, that exceptions need not be made, or if made, prove the rule, and therefore can never be violated without great caution, and in cases of obvious and undeniable utility. But the necessity of these particular precepts for these or other similar purposes shows that they respect only that kind of action which is virtually required or forbidden in the variable circumstances of the subjects of law, and not the action which constitutes the sum of obedience and the sum of disobedience to the law of a perfect moral government.

 

It may be further said that particular precepts are often, not to say commonly, promulged in that absolute and universal form of language which imply their strictly universal application and obligation. In reply to this, it were sufficient to allege the utter and obvious impossibility of such an application of this class of precepts, since all action to which they can be applied is impossible, until the subject of law has become either benevolent or selfish. If, by the universal application of these precepts, be meant an application as extensive as the possibility of subordinate action, this may be admitted in respect to some kinds of such action, particularly some immanent subordinate action; for example, justice and injustice as mere dispositions of the mind. Still, it must be remembered, that such subordinate action may be prompted either by benevolence or selfishness; and that, therefore, considered in itself as merely subordinate action, it can be no part of that which essentially constitutes obedience or disobedience to the law of a perfect moral government. Thus considered, such action can be required and forbidden by the law, only virtually or in effect, as circumstantial action--action which becomes the appropriate expression of benevolence and of selfishness in the variable circumstances of the subject. As such action and such action only, can particular precepts be applicable to it in any case whatever. As to those particular precepts which are designed to regulate much other subordinate action, they are still more remote from having a universal application; particularly those which respect executive subordinate action. The principle on which universal forms of language are used in common life is not that of the most strictly universal application, but that of an application so nearly universal, that the exceptions are so rare and so obvious that they require no specification, while the object of such precepts will be better answered by an unqualified use of language than by the useless attempt to specify exceptions. This principle, which might be illustrated and confirmed to any extent, is peculiarly applicable to particular legal enactments, which respect executive subordinate action. The common-sense application of it to the interpretation of such absolute precepts by the Saviour, and the same familiar application of it by Christians generally to justify works of necessity and mercy on the Sabbath, are decisive on this point. A parent forbids a son, in the form of absolute prohibition, who is but partially recovered from recent illness, to go into the water; but unexpected circumstances occur, and the action thus absolutely forbidden becomes necessary to save a brother from drowning. Who, in such a case, would interpret the precept to the letter? None would deny the propriety and truth of saying that the fundamental requirement of the divine law is binding on all men; and yet the proposition is not true to the letter, since the obligation implies not merely the existence, but the moral relations of its subjects. None would deny the propriety of the absolute form in which the penalty of law is denounced against the transgressor, and yet, if the language be pressed to the utmost, the penalty can never be remitted consistently with truth.

 

In the use of all language, and especially in the use of the language of law, there is an object to be attained. Such language is therefore to be interpreted in reference to that object. The object of language in the form of particular precepts is to secure and to prevent subordinate action, as in the variable circumstances of the subjects of law it will in one case pronate, and in the other hinder in some limited degree, the general good. The subordinate action may be supposed to be that which, in all the variable circumstances of the subject in which it becomes possible, will promote the general good. The subordinate opposite action may be supposed to be that which, in all the variable circumstances of the subject in which it becomes possible, will binder the general good. At the same time, the subordinate action which in some cases is fitted to promote the general good, will in other cases be fitted to defeat this end, or the subordinate action which in some cases is fitted to defeat, may be fitted in others to promote this end. Be these things however as they may, the application of particular precepts is in all cases to be determined in view of the nature and tendency of the executive subordinate action required and forbidden in such precepts, in the variable circumstances of the subject of law.

 

These things are deemed sufficient to show the truth of the unqualified proposition, that he who is perfectly benevolent, perfectly obeys the law of a perfect moral government. Nor can this be denied on the ground that one who is thus perfectly benevolent, may not fulfill all the precepts which respect subordinate action; for it is undeniable, that he will obey every such precept.

 

Once more. It is conceded, at least by all Christian moralists, that the sum of all duty on the part of moral beings is comprised in the great law of love or benevolence. But how this can be true, except according to the views and principles now presented, it would be impossible to show.

 

The same thing will appear, if we consider--secondly, That predominant action in the form of benevolence, is the only morally right action, and in the form of selfishness, is the only morally wrong action on the part of moral beings.

 

It will be admitted, that the law of a perfect moral government requires morally right: action as the slim of obedience, and forbids morally wrong action as the sum of disobedience. If then it can be shown, that benevolence is the only morally right action, and that selfishness is the only morally wrong action, it will follow, that the law of a perfect moral government must require benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbid benevolence as the sum of disobedience.

 

That benevolence then is the only morally right action, and that selfishness is the only morally wrong action, I argue--

 

1st. From the established meaning of the words right and wrong in common life, and from the meaning of the word moral as applied to action.

 

The errors and incongruities of moral philosophers, which so notoriously mar their discussions, and which occasion so much apparently hopeless controversy, seem to result chiefly from overlooking the true nature of the moral quality of action and the kind of action to which moral quality exclusively pertains. This oversight may be traced to several causes, primarily it is believed, to the entire want of scientific precision in the use of the words right and wrong, and other kindred terms. Without however, attempting to unfold these causes, or to show the magnitude of this error in scientific speculation, I propose to distinguish right action which is moral, from right action which is not moral; and wrong action which is moral, from wrong action which is not moral.

For this purpose I remark, that among the most common and important conceptions of the human mind, are those of the different and opposite relations of different things to some given end, either as fitted. to accomplish or to prevent that end. To express these conceptions, the words right and wrong are of the most common and familiar use; and when thus used in their general import, may be thus defined: the word right denotes the fitness of that to which it is applied, to produce or accomplish some given end; and the word wrong denotes the fitness of that to which it is applied, to prevent the same given end. In the use of these words, some given end is always assumed, in respect to the accomplishment or prevention of which they are always applied. Thus assuming the familiar end to be accomplished by a pen, a clock or a watch, we apply the word right to its structure, to denote its fitness to accomplish that end; and the word wrong to denote its fitness to defeat or prevent that end. In this manner, one or the other of these words may be properly applied to any and to every thing of which either of the two specified relations of fitness to some given end, can be predicated. Even the stroke of the assassin, as by its direction it is fitted to accomplish or to defeat its end, may be properly said to be right or to be wrong. Nor can either of these words, when used antithetically or in opposition to the other, be properly used except to denote the specified relation to some assumed end. We can no more predicate right or wrong, the one as opposed to the other of any conceivable thing, except to the specified relation to some given end, than we can predicate red or blue of ideas or other mental states. When a thing is said to be right as opposed to wrong, it is said to be so as fitted to produce some given end, and when it is said to be wrong as opposed to right, it is said to be so as fatted to prevent that end. Thus in the use of these words as opposed in import, an end is always assumed, in relation to which a thing is said to be right or wrong. In this antithetic use of the words, they can have no conceivable meaning, unless they are used to denote some relation to an end. The end assumed in respect to a particular thing, as a pen, a clock or a watch, in respect to which it is said to be right or wrong, is the end, the great or chief end, for which the class of things and of course each particular thing of the class is made.

 

Now, according to the universal principle of giving the same general names to things of the same general nature, the same general relations of fitness to promote or hinder the end, or the great end of any thing, are denoted by the words right or wrong. Of course, the same general ideas of fitness to produce or prevent the end, or the great end of action on the part of moral beings, are denoted by the words right and wrong, when applied to such action. To deny this, is to deny a fixed and universal principle in the use of words. It is to deny, in the language of logic, that the genus is predicable of the species; or that the same word has one and the same general meaning as applied to different things to which it can be truly applied in that meaning. It is the same as to deny, that the word black or white has the same general meaning when applied to a bird and a horse of the same color, or that the word rectangular or triangular has the same meaning when applied to different figures of the same general form. It would not be less preposterous to suppose, that the words right and wrong should be properly applied to action in the general meaning now given to each, and that they should also be thus applied to action, in another and a widely different meaning. For it is undeniable, that one kind of action, as fitted to promote the great end of all action on the part of moral beings and to prevent the opposite end, is truly and properly called right action. It is equally undeniable, that another kind of action, as fitted to prevent the great end of all action on the part of moral beings, and to promote the opposite end, is truly and properly called wrong action. It is therefore as utterly incredible, that the word right or wrong should be applied to action in another meaning which excludes this meaning, or in any other generic meaning, as that the word round should be universally applied to a body to denote its form, and yet be properly applied also to denote its color.

 

Since then all action on the part of moral beings is either fitted to promote the great end of action on their part and to prevent the opposite end, or fitted to prevent this great end of action and to promote its opposite; and as the great end of all action on the part of such beings is the highest happiness of all, it follows, that the word right when applied in its general meaning to such action, denotes its fitness to promote the highest happiness of all, and to prevent the opposite or highest misery of all, and that the word wrong when thus applied, denotes the fitness of action to promote the highest misery of all and to prevent the opposite.

 

Again; right action may be subdivided into two particular kinds, viz.: right action which is moral or morally right action, and right action which is not moral, or not morally right action. Wrong action may be subdivided into two particular kinds, viz.: wrong action which is moral or morally wrong action, and wrong action which is not moral, or not morally wrong action.

 

The word moral as applied to action is a common predicate of two very different kinds of action. Hence, to distinguish moral action from action not moral, we have only to determine this common import of the word moral as applied to two kinds of action, or to right and wrong action.

 

The word moral is from the Latin mores, which denotes manners or character; more exactly, that permanent, predominant act of the will and heart, which constitutes character as a predicate of a moral being. For philosophic purposes however, it is necessary to contemplate this meaning of the word moral more elementarily. With the explanation already given of the terms now to be used in the definition, I proceed to say--that moral action is the intelligent, free, permanent, predominant action of the heart, in which the agent elects some given object or end as his supreme end, and which is thus directly fitted to promote this end, and to prevent its opposite.

 

That all action of which the several characteristics now specified can be truly predicated, is moral action, I have attempted to show in a previous lecture. I shall, therefore, only remark at present, that the feelings of self-complacency and remorse are the distinctive effects of moral acts experienced by the agent in view of the nature of such action, and that it is impossible to conceive that any being should experience either of these feelings in view of any other action than that now specified, and that he should avoid one or the other in view of such action. The being therefore, acts morally who acts in the manner now specified, whether he acts or can act in any other manner, or not; while if we suppose him to act in any other manner without acting in this manner, we cannot conceive him to act morally. The action then now specified is moral action, and the only action which is moral.

 

From what has now been said respecting the nature of right and wrong action and of moral action, it follows, that the intelligent, free, permanent, predominant action of the will and the heart, in which the agent electively prefers the highest wellbeing of all as his supreme object or end, and which is thus fitted to promote, this end and to prevent its opposite, the highest misery of all, is morally right action, and the only morally right action, and that the intelligent, free, permanent, predominant action of the will and the heart, in which the agent electively prefers some object or end inferior to the highest wellbeing of all as his supreme object or end, and which is thus fitted to prevent this end and to promote its opposite, the highest misery of all, is morally wrong action, and the only morally wrong action.

 

The same thing will be still further confirmed by considering the only other kind of action on the part of a moral being; viz., that which I have called subordinate action. This kind of action is either right action, which is not morally right, or it is wrong action, which is not morally wrong.

 

Though a moral being in respect to predominant action, may be properly said to be always acting either morally right, or morally wrong, yet in much of what is called action on the part of a moral being, there is no moral quality. This is true of all that action, which may be distinguished from the act of the will and the heart, or predominant action, and in which the Agent aims only at some limited degree of happiness or misery, or natural good or evil compared with the highest degree, and which in this respect, is fitted directly to produce only such a limited result. There are two kinds of such action; one is right action, but not morally right--the other is wrong action, but not morally wrong.

 

When such action, that is subordinate action, is directly fitted to produce some limited degree of natural good or evil, which is necessary to the highest happiness of all, and thus indirectly fitted to promote this great end of all action on the part of moral beings and to prevent the opposite, then it is right action but not morally right. It is right in the generic import of the word as already defined, when applied to action on the part of moral beings. As indirectly fitted, it is of course fitted to promote the great end of all action, and to prevent the opposite; and is therefore right action. But it is obvious at once, from what has been said, that it is not morally right action. It has no one of the essential characteristics of morally right action. It is not in the sense explained, either the intelligent, or free, or permanent, or predominant action of the will and heart. Nor is it the action in which the agent supremely and directly aims at the great end of all action, and which in this sense is perfectly fitted to promote this end, and to prevent its opposite. Beside, the same action with the same relation of fitness to the great end of all action and to prevent its opposite, would be right in the same sense, whether done from the morally right or from the morally wrong principle. To suppose the right subordinate action to be morally right, is to suppose that one may act morally right, when he acts morally wrong at the same time.

 

Again; when subordinate action is directly fitted to produce some limited degree of natural good or evil, which is inconsistent with the highest happiness of all, and thus indirectly fitted to prevent this great end of all action (and to promote the opposite), then it is wrong action but not morally wrong action. It is wrong in the generic import of the word; for being indirectly fitted, it is of course fitted to prevent the great end of all action, and to promote its opposite. It is therefore wrong action. But it is plainly not morally wrong, inasmuch as it is obvious that it has no one of the essential characteristics of morally wrong action.

 

In addition to these things, it is to be remarked that the quality of all subordinate action changes as the variable circumstances of moral beings change; so that an action of this kind which is right in one set of circumstances is wrong in another set of circumstances; and an action of this kind, which is wrong in one set of circumstances, is right in another. But morally right action is morally right in all the circumstances of a moral being; and morally wrong action is morally wrong in all the circumstances of a moral being. But action, the quality of which as right and wrong changes as circumstances change, cannot be morally right nor morally wrong action. Subordinate action, therefore, though it may be right or wrong, cannot be either morally right or morally wrong. It thus appears that no action except predominant action, is or can be either morally right or morally wrong. But there is no predominant action, except either benevolence or selfishness. No action then is morally right except benevolence, and no action is morally wrong except selfishness; in other words, benevolence is the only morally right action, and selfishness is the only morally wrong action. Since therefore, it is admitted that the law of a perfect moral government requires morally right action as the sum of obedience, and forbids morally wrong action as the sum of disobedience, it follows, that the law of such a government must require benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbid selfishness as the sum of disobedience.