The GOSPEL TRUTH

A GENETIC HISTORY OF THE

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY

By

FRANK HUGH FOSTER

1907

 

 CHAPTER VII:

Hopkins' System Of Theology

The progress of our history has brought us to the last decade of the eighteenth century. From the moment that Edwards began to exert his mighty personal influence, we have found New England seething with thought. Even the distractions of war have not been able to put a stop to theological reconstruction. The new school has been marked by great independence and originality, by great force and logical power. It has engaged in controversy in various directions, and has passed over a wide field of investigation and discussion; but its results have been somewhat miscellaneous and unsystematic. The time has now come for summing up what has been gained, and for presenting the system of theology, which Willard had last drawn out (1707) in entire conformity with Westminster, with the modifications which the study of three-quarters of a century had produced. This work fell to the lot of Samuel Hopkins, who published his System of Doctrines in 1793.

While the situation of our divines in the small and retired hamlets of a new country prevented them from being great readers of books, evidence has continually presented itself that they diligently improved such opportunities as they had, and that they were adequately equipped with a knowledge of the best that had been written upon the themes which they treated. Professor Park has spoken of Hopkins' learning in the following words:

He was a diligent reader of commentaries, particularly of Poole's Synopsis. He read through the whole of Poole's five folios in Latin. He commented three times on every chapter of the Bible in his expository discourses; and this extensive exposition required of him, what he pursued, a diligent perusal of the critics . . . Among the authors which are most familiarly mentioned by him are Calvin and Van Mastricht (both of whom he studied in their original Latin), Saurin, Owen, Manton, Goodwin, Bates, Baxter, Charnock, Prideaux, Sharp, Matthew Henry, John Locke, Whitby, Dr. S. Clarke, Dr. John Taylor, Mosheim, Doddridge, etc., etc.

We shall therefore not be surprised to find in Hopkins' system a due appreciation of the past. It was, in fact, the old system reproduced, for it rests throughout upon the ancient theological foundation, and is in essential agreement with Westminster and Dort. And yet it is a new system. It is permeated with new ideas, which do not fully reveal themselves or are not fully applied to the great subjects under consideration, but which are already beginning to work powerfully in remodeling and improving the system, and still more powerfully in preparing the way for subsequent improvement.

The affinity of the system with its predecessors among Calvinists is evident from the slightest examination. Its general course of topics follows closely the Westminster Confession. We have: Revelation; God; Decrees; Providence; the Fall; Redemption; the Redeemer; Regeneration; Faith; justification; Sanctification; Eschatology; the Church; the Christian Life. Repeated allusions to the Confession are made, as when decrees are defined in its language. The idea of a true system was warmly embraced by Hopkins. He explains:

Is not a system of divinity as proper and important as a system of jurisprudence, physic, or natural philosophy? If the Bible be a revelation from heaven, it contains a system of consistent important doctrines, which are so connected and implied in each other that one cannot be so well understood if detached from all the rest, and considered by itself; and some must be first known before others can be seen in a proper and true light.

Thus the presupposition which underlies Edwards' theory of virtue appears again in this form in Hopkins, that there is ultimate harmony in the universe. If this be so, truth is a harmony and is capable of being stated in a systematic and consistent form. To deny this, or to slight it, is to do violence to one's thinking. In the last analysis there must be a system of truth, or there is no such thing as truth, nor even such a thing as thinking.

As to the Scriptures Hopkins did not differ from the generality of his predecessors. The proofs given are the usual ones. The definition of scriptural infallibility and authority as the standard of faith and practice is the same with that of the Westminster divines. The effect of the controversy with the Deists is at once evident by the pains taken to show that unaided human reason is not enough to give man a knowledge of "every necessary and important truth." For the same reason, proofs are subjoined that these writings are not forgeries. The evidence of miracles is also discussed, though the question of their possibility is not argued at length, and the reliability of the Scripture record is assumed upon such proof as has already been suggested. The argument from prophecy is also considered. But the great reliance is placed upon the general view of the contents of the Scriptures, upon their harmony, and upon the truths revealed. In this Hopkins is in full accord with the Confession. "The greatest and crowning evidence" are the "contents of the Bible." The perfections and works of God, the rule of duty, etc., commend themselves to every reasonable mind. But

the honest virtuous mind only, which does discern and relish the beauty and excellence of truth and virtue [i. e., the converted mind], will see and feel the full force of this argument for the divinity of the Holy Scriptures . . . To such the true light shines from the Holy Scriptures with irresistible evidence, and their hearts are established in the truth. They believe from evidence they have within themselves, from what they see and find in the Bible.

Thus the Scriptures are proved from themselves, and Hopkins has the immense advantage of employing the Bible in the construction of the whole system, including the doctrine of God. At one point only does he fall short of the Confession--in not ascribing the illumination of the Christian, by which he perceives the truth, directly to the Holy Spirit. But this lack is made up in other parts of the work. No distinction is made between revelation and inspiration, and no special proof of inspiration is attempted.

Hopkins immediately takes advantage of the ground thus occupied in the development of the existence and character of God. All knowledge of God "depends greatly if not wholly on divine revelation." But, "when once suggested to us, it becomes an object of intuition in a sense, so that, though there be reasoning in the case, it is so short and easy that it strikes the mind at once, and it is hardly conscious of any reasoning upon it." Hence Hopkins gives briefly some rational arguments for the existence of God, but soon comes to the Scriptures whose mere existence is a proof of God's existence, but whose testimony is itself the great proof. The Scriptures are immediately employed as the chief source of knowledge as to God's attributes, and almost entirely so as to his moral character. Here we have introduced the distinguishing principle of New England divinity, the theory of virtue, and the moral character of God is defined as consisting in his holiness, which is comprehended in love. The proof of the love of God is scriptural, and the great example of it cited, and great proof of it, is the sacrifice of Calvary. And thus the benevolence of God is proved before difficulties are raised about the existence of evil, and the proof is made from Christ as the center and substance of the divine revelation. Here Hopkins passes far beyond the Westminster Confession in the spiritual character of his theology, and develops the best thought of his master, Edwards.

In the doctrine of the Trinity there is nothing new or different from the general course of presentation in the early church. There are references to some new opinions or to the revival of old ones, now becoming evident. The preacher of the sermon on the divinity of Christ in the Old South, Boston, in 1768, enters somewhat fully into the refutation of Socinian errors in the system of 1793. At one point there is an interesting connection between Hopkins and the subtle speculations of the Greek Fathers of the Nicene age. They held that the doctrine of the Trinity occupied the true meaning between the polytheism of heathenism and the abstract monotheism of Judaism. It displayed God as the source of the universe, as fitted in his divine nature to sustain it and communicate himself to it as well as to redeem it. Hence no philosophy which did not contain in it the essential elements of the Christian Trinity would be able to explain satisfactorily the origin and history of the universe. So thought the Greek Fathers. And now we hear Hopkins saying: "Had there not been this distinction of persons in God, there would have been no foundation or sufficiency in him for the exercise of mercy in the recovery of apostate man." He maintains also the usage of the early Fathers in respect to the terms "Son of God" and "eternal generation," employing the former of the second person of the Trinity, and the latter as describing the relation of the Father and Son within the Trinity itself.

The modifying ideas of Hopkins' system, as already stated, are the Edwardean, or: moral agency consists in choice; human ability; love, the essence of virtue. As to these ideas it may be well to repeat that in the theory of virtue Hopkins had nothing to change in the teachings of Edwards, except to introduce the incorrect idea that all sin is selfishness. In respect to the doctrine of the will there is a considerable difference. Hopkins does not seem to be entirely consistent, but upon the whole it is tolerably clear that the tone of his thought, if not his formulated conclusions, had undergone modifications which carried him somewhat away from the Edwardean positions toward what was finally to be a doctrine of a more genuine freedom. He seems to have been dependent upon Stephen West as well as upon Edwards, as we shall have occasion later to trace.

The new elements to be found in Hopkins' system, derived from these leading ideas, and constituting the gain made by New England up to this point of her history, are the following:

1. Hopkins meant to maintain a true freedom of the will--that freedom of which we are all conscious and which we regard as essential to accountability. There are many passages in which he exalts the agency of God, but he maintains with equal steadiness and firmness the liberty of man. He defines this somewhat differently from Edwards, so as to make a real advance upon him. While Edwards had put liberty in the external ability to execute our volitions, Hopkins places it in the volition itself. He says:

The internal freedom of which [a man] is conscious consisteth in his voluntary exercises, or in choosing and willing; that he is conscious that in all his voluntary exertions he is perfectly free and must be accountable, and has no consciousness or idea of any other kind of moral liberty, or that the liberty he exerciseth hath anything, more or less, belonging to it, or that it could be increased or made more perfect freedom by the addition of anything that is not implied in willing and choosing. He may, indeed, not be able to accomplish the thing or event which is the object of his choice, and in this respect be under restraint; but this a not inconsistent with his exercising perfect freedom in his choice and in all voluntary exertions or in all he does with respect to such object or event.

This is undoubtedly sound. The only further question would be whether Hopkins did not hold a theory of the action of the will and of the influence of motives which, like Edwards', introduced elements which destroyed the possibility of such freedom. He proceeds to examine and reject the so-called "self-determining power of the will" upon the same grounds as Edwards, by reducing it to the absurdity of the infinite series. Then comes the following remarkable passage:

Agreeable to this notion of a self-determining power, and in support of it, it is said that a man cannot be free in his voluntary actions unless he has a freedom to either side; that is, has a freedom to choose or refuse, to prefer one thing or the contrary, or has power and freedom to choose that which is directly contrary to that which is actually the object of his choice. If by this be meant that whenever any one freely chooses any particular object or act or is inclined any particular way, he is at liberty to prefer a contrary object or act and to incline the contrary way if he please, or wills and chooses so to do; this is no more than to say that, in the exercise of liberty, a man must choose agreeable to his choice, or has his choice; that is, must be voluntary, and therefore is not a contradiction to that which has been above asserted, namely, that liberty consists in the exercises of will and choice, or voluntary action.

At first sight Hopkins seems in this passage to deny the power of alternate choice, or, as was later said, "power to the contrary." But the next paragraph makes it clear, although it is a clearness somewhat muddied by the confusing psychology brought down from Edwards, that he is opposing the idea of the perfect indifference of the will as essential to freedom. He says:

If by a freedom to choose either side be meant that, in order to the exercise of a free act of choice, he must at the same time be as much disposed or inclined to choose the contrary, or be no more inclined one way than the other; there is no need of saying anything to expose the absurdity and inconsistence of this to those who allow themselves to think.

The rejected definition of freedom he understood as supposing an inclination to one alternative as great as that to the other. Had he distinguished inclination from choice, the sensibility from the will, he would have rejected as sharply as he did an indifference of inclination, which is certainly contrary to the facts of consciousness. He could then have recognized back of the desire, however strong it might be, a will as yet unmoved. But the inclination was confounded with choice, and then the impossible idea of an indifference of choice and a positive determination of choice in the same act was introduced which must, of course, be immediately rejected. In all this Hopkins does not differ from Edwards.

The first part of the passage quoted suggests, in connection with its surroundings, an advance upon Edwards. If we should ask Hopkins this question, "Before a given act of choice, may not the will choose either alternative?" he would answer first, with the instinctive tendency of the theologian to guard the great doctrines: "It is perfectly certain which alternative will be chosen?" "Yes," we might reply, "but, so far as the power of the will is concerned, may it not be exerted in either direction?" I think he would reply, "Yes." And this would be a near approach to the modern doctrine of the will as a first cause.

In confirmation of this interpretation, note (1) that Hopkins insists that the will cannot be compelled to a given choice. "No compulsion can be offered to the will or the freedom of it be any way affected by any operation or influence on the mind which takes place antecedent to the exercise of the will and in order to the choice that is made." (2) In the same line, he enters at one point a disclaimer of any knowledge of the connection which subsists between God's activity and man's. God, "by his own operation and agency" causes moral evil to take place as he does as also the holiness which takes place in men; "but as to the manner of the operation, as the cause of either, we are wholly in the dark--as much as we are with respect to the manner of the divine operation in the creation of the world and the different and various existences." We know that Hopkins believed in the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit upon man in regeneration. He probably held Edwards' theory of motives in general; but the fact that he never introduces that theory in his explanations of the various questions which gather about the will, the fact that he declares the manner of God's action inscrutable, and this doctrine of the immediate operation of the Spirit in regeneration, unite to show that he did not regard that metaphysical explanation as enough to exhaust the case. In other words, he purposed to hold fast to the freedom of the will, and in doing this found insuperable difficulties in the Edwardean scheme.

2. The next feature of Hopkins' system was his strong emphasis upon the doctrine of decrees.

It is always a question whether a theologian, in modifying the Calvinistic doctrine of the will in favor of a larger recognition of human freedom, will go in the direction of Arminianism. The New England school was kept from this by the influence of Edwards, who, having in mind the Arminianism of his own surroundings, which was associated with many departures from evangelical theology, had put forth his mightiest efforts directly and openly against it. Hopkins entertained the sentiments of Edwards as to the essential character of Arminianism, and therefore laid the more emphasis upon the distinguishing features of Calvinism. In fact, he was a high Calvinist--higher than his Calvinistic contemporaries.

Decrees are the plan of God in the government of the universe. This plan is the best conceivable, for God had all possible plans before him when he created the world, and he chose the best. This is the Leibnitzian optimism of Bellamy repeated. God chose the best plan, and he executes it in the best way, because he is himself infinitely good. And hence the divine decrees are founded in the love of God. This is a necessary consequence of the Edwardean theory of virtue. The following passage will exhibit this, and will also show, what needs to be borne in mind with reference to subsequent questions as to Hopkins' system, that the love of God is not first exercised when creatures have been brought into being, but respects primarily himself.

The moral excellence and perfection of God consists in love, or goodness, which has been proved in a former chapter. This infinite love of an infinite Being, is infinite felicity. This consists in his infinite regard to himself as the fountain and sum of all being; and his pleasure and delight in himself, in his own infinite excellence and perfection; and in the highest possible exercise, exhibition and display of his infinite fullness, perfection and glory. And his pleasure in the latter, so as to make it the supreme and ultimate end of all his works, necessarily involves and supposes his pleasure and delight in the happiness of his creatures. If he be pleased with the greatest possible exercise, communication, and exhibition of his goodness, he must be pleased with the happiness of creatures, and the greatest possible happiness of the creation, because the former so involves the latter that they cannot be separated; and may be considered as one and the same thing; and doubtless are but one in the view of the all comprehending mind; though we, whose conceptions are so imperfect and partial, are apt to conceive of the glory of God, and the good of the creature, as two distinct things, and different ends to be answered, in God's designs and works.

Thus whatsoever comes to pass from the beginning of time to eternity is foreordained, and fixed from eternity by the infinitely wise counsel and unchangeable purpose of God.

This is the point upon which Hopkins--and I may also say the whole line of New England divines--laid the chief emphasis. Few men would be so bold as to deny that God has a plan in the government of the world, and few so foolish as to deny that this plan is governed by infinite love. The tendency of Hopkins' whole scheme is thus to maintain the loving government of God. If there be any other element in this problem, it must be interpreted so as to preserve, not only the fact of his loving government, but the emphasis which belongs to this fact.

The fact of the divine decrees is proved from the Scriptures and from the divine foreknowledge.

But Hopkins has an eye also for the difficulties of the theme, and he states them with great force. The crucial objection is that decrees seem to destroy freedom, to make vice necessary, and thus to impugn the character of God. The reply is from the Scriptures. Cases are cited to show that God did decree certain acts, which were nevertheless free acts of men. Decrees, he says, include the freedom of man, because God makes use of that freedom to carry out his decrees. Particularly does freedom consist in volitions; and when God decrees that men shall be saved, it is that they shall be saved through their volitions--that is, that their freedom shall be preserved. This is not a philosophical defense of the doctrine. As we have seen, Hopkins had no theory of the action of the will which he was willing to introduce for such a purpose. He many times intimates that in a limited sphere we readily see how God through motives can govern man without infringing upon his freedom, and this proves that there is nothing in the nature of volition to prevent control of a free agent. But into any hopeless attempt to uncover the point in our subconscious nature where the divine and human action join, Hopkins does not go.

The second principal objection to decrees is derived from the existence of evil which the doctrine seems to charge home upon God. Hopkins' answer is the same as in his earlier treatise, except that he now states, without the slightest qualification, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. Next, the objection was raised that the doctrine made God the author of sin. Here no new points are brought out. But the great plainness of his language gives occasion to an important query. He says:

That God did will the existence of moral evil, in determining, at least, to permit it, when he could have prevented it, had he been pleased to do it, must be granted by all who would avoid ascribing to Him that imperfection, impotence, and subjection to that power, be it what it may, which introduced sin, contrary to his will; which is indeed shockingly impious, and real blasphemy, to every considerate, and rationally pious mind. We may infer from this, with the greatest certainty, that it is, all things considered, or in the view of the omniscient God, wisest and best that moral evil should exist. For to suppose that it was his will that it should take place; or that he has permitted it, when he could have prevented it; and yet that it was not wisest and best in his sight, that it should exist, is beyond expression impious, and at once strips the Deity of all moral good or holiness; and gives him the most odious and horrid character!

Finally, he sums up the whole subject of the divine and human operation in the volition of man in the following terms:

Here are two distinct agents, infinitely different; God, absolutely independent, and almighty; and a creature absolutely dependent for every thought and volition, having no power and sufficiency, that is not derived immediately from his Maker: and the agency or operation is as distinct and different as the agents. The creature's agency is as much his own as in the nature of things can be, and as it could be if it were not the effect of the divine agency, if this were possible. And the creature acts as freely, as if there were no agents concerned but himself, and his exercises are as virtuous and holy; and it is really and as much his own virtue and holiness, and he is as excellent and praiseworthy, as if he did not depend on divine influences for these exercises, and they were not the effect of the operation of God.

The question which is thus pressed upon us is whether Hopkins had escaped from the supralapsarian predestination of Willard and his predecessors in general. His treatment of this theme, as of all the remaining topics of theology, is marked by a certain largeness. He does not engage himself with mere scholastic details, but goes at once to the heart of his subject. Thus he never raises the question of the "order" of the decrees. But supralapsarianism is at bottom not a question of order, but of the universal prevalence of the divine decree to the exclusion of human agency. He might have escaped from such a theory by emphasizing the theory of virtue; for it leaves that place for humanity which Hopkins' evident tendencies toward a better doctrine of human freedom, elsewhere noted, should have led him to welcome. He does partially escape by this very path, for he makes decrees the realization of the love of God, and not of his "justice and grace" with which supralapsarians are so much engaged. In fact, justice merges with him into love. But decrees still continue to cover all the action of men as well as that of God. No place is left for an undecreed freedom of the fall, as Augustine seemed to leave it. The freedom of man is the mystery, not the decree of God. It is a mystery imbedded in the decree and providence of God. Its ultimate explanation must admit of the view that all things are finally done by God. He is the first, and in the last analysis, the only cause. Thus there is nothing placed in the will of man in distinction from the will of God, or done by man and not done by God. The day of struggle with supralapsarianism had come, indeed, but not the day of deliverance from it.

3. Original sin. Hopkins' doctrine is summarized in his own words as follows:

On the whole, it is hoped that the doctrine of original sin has been stated and explained agreeable to the holy scripture; and that it does not imply anything unreasonable and absurd, or injurious to mankind; but is the result of a constitution which is perfectly agreeable to the nature of things, reasonable, wise and good; that the children of Adam are not guilty of his sin, are not punished, and do not suffer for that, any farther than they implicitly or expressly approve of his transgression, by sinning as he did;--that their total moral corruption and sinfulness is as much their own sin and as criminal in them, as it could be if it were not in consequence of the sin of the first father of the human race, or if Adam had not sinned;--that they are under no inability to obey the law of God, which does not consist in their sinfulness and opposition of heart to the will of God; and are therefore wholly inexcusable, and may justly suffer the wages of sin, which is the second death.

The intimate connection of Hopkins with Edwards in all this is evident both from his phraseology and his ideas. He speaks of the "constitution" in the same language as Edwards. Even his figures are drawn from Edwards. There is no imputation "considering men as sinners when they are not," but sin is imputed because they are sinners. But how can they be sinners antecedent to any sin of their own? Is not all sin voluntary sin? "Yes," says Hopkins:

This sin, which takes place in the posterity of Adam, is not properly distinguished into original, and actual sin, because it is all really actual, and there is, strictly speaking, no other sin but actual sin . . . If the sinfulness of all the posterity of Adam was certainly connected with his sinning, this does not make them sinners, before they actually are sinners; and when they actually become sinners, they themselves are the sinners, it is their own sin, and they are as blamable and guilty as if Adam had never sinned, and each one were the first sinner that ever existed. The children of Adam are not answerable for his sin, and it is not their sin any farther than they approve of it, by sinning as he did: In this way only they become guilty of his sin, viz., by approving of what he did, and joining with him in rebellion. And it being previously certain by divine constitution, that all mankind would thus sin, and join with their common head in rebellion, renders it no less their own sin and crime, than if this certainty had taken place on any other ground, or in any other way; or than if there had been no certainty that they would thus all sin, were this possible.

It will require but a brief review of Edwards' positions upon this topic to show how entirely Hopkins is following his master in all this. There is the same "union" established between Adam and his descendants, the same "consent" to his sin, the following imputation, the consequent guilt for the sin consented to. With both Hopkins and Edwards the consequence of Adam's sin is to establish the certainty of this evil consent, and thereby to make all men sinners.

The first and most important result of this method of viewing the subject for Hopkins was that he accepted thoroughly the doctrine that all sin was voluntary, or that there is no sin but actual sin. His expressions of this principle are clearer than Edwards', though the substance of his doctrine is merely a repetition of what Edwards had laid down. We may see the preparation for a transfer from the theory of a constitution to that of the voluntary character of all sin under which the connection with Adam becomes a natural one (e. g., through heredity), in such a passage as this: "The posterity of Adam become guilty and fall under condemnation by consenting to his sin and by a union of heart to him as a transgressor; that is, by sinning themselves." More explicitly he says in the longer passage just quoted: "This sin which takes place in the posterity of Adam is not properly distinguished into original and actual sin, because it is all really actual, and there is, strictly speaking, no other sin but actual sin."

4. Ability and inability. The fall being included in the decrees of God, there is no reason why the condition of man before the fall should be a "probation" in any sense in which it is not later. Hence Hopkins taught that man after the fall is in a state of probation--that is, under a moral government--with the alternatives of life and death set before him, and with the full ability to choose the one or the other. Upon the subject of ability Hopkins is specially emphatic. Though he teaches total depravity, and emphasizes it against the Deists, it is a moral depravity.

Man has not lost any of his natural powers of understanding and will, etc., by becoming sinful. He has lost his inclination, or is wholly without any inclination to serve and obey his maker, and entirely opposed to it. In this his sinfulness consists . . . and in nothing else; and the stronger and more fixed the opposition to the law of God is, and the farther he is from any inclination to obey, the more blamable and inexcusable he is.

If there could have been any question, after the revival preaching of both Edwards and Bellamy, and after Bellamy had emphasized so strongly the ability of man to repent, whether that paralyzing doctrine of inability which had wrought unspeakable disaster to early New England was to be repudiated and replaced by a doctrine of ability which should pave the way for aggressive preaching and for the winning of souls, it was now settled favorably to progress by the clear adhesion of Hopkins to ability. From this point we shall have occasion only to mark the different forms given to the rationale of the doctrine. The conviction and the usage of the whole New England school is henceforth uniform.

5. The atonement. We should also expect that Hopkins would fall in with the course of progress upon this doctrine already marked out by Bellamy (1750) and Dr. Edwards (1785). How far this expectation is realized we are now to see.

He begins by exalting the law of God. This is the eternal, unchangeable rule of righteousness. It cannot be abrogated. An essential portion of it is its penalty threatened against the disobedient. This is as unchangeable as the law itself. Man by transgression has fallen under this penalty. By the nature of law, it must be executed in the true meaning and spirit of it, or else God himself joins with the sinner in dishonoring the law, and favors, justifies, and encourages rebellion.

This otherwise insuperable difficulty, this mighty bar and obstacle in the way of shewing any favour to man, and escaping eternal destruction, is the ground of the necessity of a Mediator and Redeemer by whom it may be wholly removed, and man be delivered from the curse of the law; and saved consistent with the divine character, with truth, infinite rectitude. wisdom and goodness; and so as not to set aside and dishonour, but support and maintain the divine law and government.

The fundamental idea of Hopkins' theory, then, is the necessity on God's part of a mediator before he could forgive sin; or, he teaches distinctly the objective theory of the atonement.

The work of the atonement consists of two parts: first, that accomplished by the suffering of Christ, and, second, that accomplished by his obedience. At first sight it would appear that Hopkins accepted exactly the old theory whereby the sufferings of Christ were the literal penalty of the law suffered in the place of sinners. Christ was to make atonement for the sins of men "by suffering in his own person the penalty or curse of the law under which by transgression they had fallen." The sacrifices of the Old Testament are quoted to prove the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. Christ "by his sufferings took on him the penalty of sin, and bore the punishment of it so as effectually to put it away from all who believe in him that it may never be laid to their charge to condemn them."

But modifying expressions begin soon to appear. In commenting upon the favorite text of subsequent divines (Rom. 3:25, 26), Hopkins says:

Here the design of the Redeemer is expressed, and the great thing he is to accomplish is to maintain and declare the righteousness the rectitude, and unchangeable truth and perfection of God in opening a way by his blood his sufferings unto death, for the free pardon of sinful man, consistent with his rectoral justice and truth, and doing that which is right and just both with respect to himself, his law and government, and all the subjects of his kingdom.

Note the phrases "rectoral justice," "right and just both with respect to himself, his law and government, and all the subjects of his kingdom." This points to a new understanding of the suffering of the penalty. A new kind of justice is introduced. Hopkins was perfectly familiar with, and accepted Edwards' doctrine that mere "natural justice," though having in itself a kind of beauty, had no moral beauty or virtue, and therefore was not fit to be the governing motive of the divine action, and could, accordingly, never be executed by God. The demands of love might make the execution of justice the only course left to the divine being. But a mere and exact satisfaction of natural justice as such could have no place in his government.

The word "equivalent" is often used to express the relation of the sufferings of Christ to those required by the law. They were equivalent because of the greatness and worth of his person. Says Hopkins further:

Thus we see how Christ suffered for sin, was made a curse, that is, suffered the curse of the law, the curse of God: and in his sufferings, he, in a sense, suffered and felt the displeasure and wrath of God; and the anger of God against sin and the sinner was in a high and eminent degree manifested and expressed in the sufferings and death of Christ, consistent with his not being displeased, but well pleased with Christ himself, and loving him because he laid down his life for his people.

We see here how completely Hopkins, in spite of infelicities of diction, has adopted the new theory of the atonement, how he has changed the view of God's position from that of the "offended party" to that of "Governor," has made the sufferings of Christ an example rather than the literal suffering of punishment, and brought the whole transaction under the rectoral, or public, justice of God.

At the heart of the matter Hopkins is, therefore, altogether Grotian (or Edwardean) in his theory of the atonement. But in the second portion of his doctrine, that referring to the obedience of Christ, he seems to remain with the older Calvinism. The Westminster Confession taught that the obedience of Christ was the price with which positive blessings were purchased for believers, and that his righteousness was imputed to them. Hopkins followed the Confession, and yet in his own fashion. The suffering of Christ atoned for the sins of men, and procured for them forgiveness. But it only delivers from the curse of the law, and procures the remission of their sins who believe in him, but does not procure for them any positive good: It leaves them under the power of sin, and without any title to eternal life, or any positive favour, or actual fitness or capacity to enjoy positive happiness. This would be but a very partial redemption, had the Redeemer done no more than merely to make atonement for sin, by suffering the penalty of the law for sinners, and in their stead. It was therefore necessary that he should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead, that by this perfect and meritorious obedience, he might honour the law in the preceptive part of it, and obtain all the positive favour and benefits which man needed, be they ever so many and great.

The foundation of this idea is the doctrine of the federal headship. Adam was a federal head. His obedience, though he owed it for himself, would have gained certain benefits for his posterity, and they would have been positively blessed with good and granted eternal life. But he fell, and so the federal headship resulted in their being sinners and lying under the wrath of God. just as his obedience might have procured them blessings, so the obedience of Christ procures them blessings. But as Christ is of far greater dignity than Adam, he procures blessings far greater than would have been bestowed in consequence of Adam's obedience.

By the obedience of Christ all the positive good, all those favours and blessings are merited and obtained, which sinners need, in order to enjoy complete and eternal redemption, or everlasting life in the kingdom of God. By this he has purchased and obtained the Holy Spirit, by whom sinners are so far recovered from total depravity, and renewed, as to be prepared and disposed to believe on Christ and receive him, being offered to them; and he carries on a work of sanctification in their hearts, until they are perfectly holy.

We perceive immediately that the conception of imputation here involved, like that already considered under the head of "original sin," is different from that ordinarily held by the Calvinistic divines of Hopkins' time. It will be best for us to defer our special consideration of its nature however, until a later point.

In conclusion, under this head, Hopkins teaches general atonement:

The Redeemer has made an atonement sufficient to expiate for the sins of the whole world; and, in this sense, has tasted death for every man, has taken away the sin of the world, has given himself a ransom for all, and is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, so that whosoever believeth in him may be saved, and God can now be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus. Therefore, the gospel is ordered to be preached to the whole world, to all nations, to every human creature. And the offer of salvation by Christ is to be made to every one, with this declaration, that whosoever believeth, is willing to accept of it, shall be delivered from the curse of the law, and have eternal life.

6. Regeneration. The distinction between regeneration and conversion, which Hopkins early established, enables him now to distinguish sharply between the divine and human part in conversion. God regenerates; man converts. The former is the rendering of the man willing; the latter is the performance of holy exercises by the man himself.

There are no express statements, so far as appears, which exhibit clearly Hopkins' views as to the nature of the depravity which men derive from Adam. It is, however, probable from not obscure intimations, that he accepted Edwards' theory that it consisted in no positive impairment of our faculties, but only in the results of one positive cause that is, the withdrawal of the Holy Spirit. If this be so, it is easy to understand why he puts our corruption wholly in the will, not the understanding (the second of the two faculties of the mind), and makes regeneration consist in an immediate operation upon this. There is no need of more light or of the use of any other means, in Hopkins' view, because the trouble is not with the intellect, but with the will. Man has light enough, only as his intellect is darkened by his perverse will. It is to the will, then, that the remedy must be applied. Here God works immediately and miraculously. When the will is inclined to the right by the Holy Spirit, the man's exercises become right, and he is himself right.

Regeneration is thus but one, though the chiefest, illustration of the "Divine illumination." The regenerated man now sees the being and perfections of God in their true nature, sees and approves of the law of God, discerns the character of Christ and the way of salvation; and, in view of these great motives now rendered accessible to him, he turns to God, accepting that law, obeying, believing, choosing, loving, all of which are essentially the same, or putting forth the holy volition, which is disinterested benevolence. This is conversion. I pause to quote a paragraph in which is not only described this "divine illumination" but also given the foundation of that "testimony of the spirit" upon the basis of which Hopkins constructed the proof of the Scriptures.

The real Christian is, in becoming such, turned from this darkness to marvelous light, which is effected by the omnipotent influences of the Spirit of God in the renovation of the heart, which was before totally corrupt, forming it to disinterested, universal benevolence, and so making it an honest and good heart; and forming the single eye, by which the truths revealed in the Scriptures relating to the being and perfections of God, his law, and moral government, the state and character of man, the character and works of the mediator, the way of salvation by him, the nature of duty and true holiness, etc., are seen in their true light, as realities, beautiful, divine, important, excellent, harmonious, glorious, and above all things else interesting and affecting, and the mind is filled with this spiritual, marvelous, glorious light. By this all the powers of the mind are enlarged and strengthened. Reason and judgment, being no longer biased by an evil heart, are rectified, and the reasoning, speculative faculty is exerted in an honest, attentive pursuit in the investigation of truth.

Here, again, we have seen the application of the theory of virtue.

Conversion, wrought by man in connection with the action of God in regeneration, an act of the will, is instantaneous. Hopkins says:

This change, of which the Spirit of God is the cause, and in which he is the only agent, is instantaneous; wrought not gradually, but at once. The human heart is either a heart of stone, a rebellious heart, or a new heart. The man is either under the dominion of sin, as obstinate and vile as ever, dead in trespasses and sins; or his heart is humble and penitent; he is a new creature and spiritually alive. There can be no instant of time, in which the heart is neither a hard heart, nor a new heart, and the man is neither dead in trespasses and sins, nor spiritually alive. The Spirit of God finds the heart of man wholly corrupt, and desperately wicked, wholly and strongly, even with all the power he has, opposed to God and his law, and to that renovation which he produces. The enmity of the heart against God continues as strong as ever it was, till it is slain by the instantaneous energy of the divine Spirit, and from carnal it becomes spiritual, betwixt which there is no medium, according to scripture and reason.

This is an advance in clearness of view upon his predecessors and prepares the way for the revival preaching of subsequent times. When conversion was viewed as instantaneous and human efficiency was exalted to its proper place, then it became natural to preach to men that conversion was their own work, that they could then and there, before leaving their seats--yes, while listening to the preacher--repent, believe, and be saved. Thus the last strand in the old doctrine of inability was broken. Immediate repentance became the distinguishing point urged by New England revival preaching, and was the source of its great effectiveness.

As to the nature of saving faith, Hopkins says concisely: "It is considered and represented as consisting in the exercise of the heart and choice of the will: this being essential to it and including the whole." This is the foundation of its instantaneous character, and also of its being an object of command. The belief of the truth of the gospel is also implied in it; holy love is essential to it; true repentance is included in it; obedience is connected with it; its ultimate nature is love. The formal definition of it is not as good as the enumeration of particulars just given. It is this: "Saving faith is an understanding, cordial receiving the divine testimony concerning Jesus Christ and the way of salvation by him; in which the heart accords and conforms to the gospel."

We are now prepared to consider more closely Hopkins' idea of imputation, which was deferred from an earlier point. The definition of justification contains no real imputation.

The justification of a sinner, now under consideration, consists in forgiving his sins, or acquitting him from the curse and condemnation of the law; and receiving him to favour, and a title to all the blessings contained in eternal life; which is treating him as well, at least, as if he never had sinned, and had been always perfectly obedient.

The sinner is received to favor, not for what he has done, because there is nothing in it to recommend him to God's favor; but for Christ's sake, because the believer is united with Christ. The righteousness of Christ is not transferred to the sinner that he may be regarded righteous. He is treated as though he were righteous, although he is not, for Christ's sake. There is a natural fitness that he it whose heart is united to Christ, as it is by believing, should be recommended to favour and justified by his worthiness and righteousness to whom he is thus united and in whom he trusts." So Christ gains by the merit of congruity, through his obedience, the title to eternal life for the believer.

We have thus passed in review the first complete, indigenous system of theology issued in New England. Distinguished by marked independence, it is nevertheless built upon the foundations laid by Hopkins' predecessors in dogmatic work from the beginning of Christian history, and is thus conservative and historical. Particularly does it maintain the historic connection of our theology with English Puritanism, and with its embodiment in the Westminster Confession. The great spiritual elements of this Confession it maintains without abridgment. It even amplifies them. The authority of the Scriptures is derived from the divine witness in the soul, and they are then employed in the development of all the system, by which circumstance the exaggerated emphasis given to the rational element in later New England theologians is avoided, and the distinction between natural and revealed theology, current since the days of Butler, is obliterated. The great ideas of Edwards are incorporated in the system, and already determine its character, though not yet perfectly wrought out. The work is great for its adherence to facts, and for its faithfulness to the Scriptures as the source of religious knowledge. It is pervaded by a marked religious purpose, for every major section is followed by an "improvement," as the application of a discourse was technically called in New England. On the whole, for comprehensiveness, thoroughness, high tone, power of reasoning, independence, ethical and spiritual value, and solid contributions to the advancing system of thought, it deserves to be called a great work--great in comparison with the great systems of the Christian world, and unsurpassed within its own special school. It illustrate the Ritschlian canon that the true spirit of a movement will be found in its earliest documents. He who will thoroughly know the New England school must read deeply in the system of Samuel Hopkins.

 

 

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