THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT
IN ITS
RELATION TO GOD AND THE UNIVERSE.
By the
REV. THOMAS W. JENKYN, D.
D. ON THE ATONEMENT IN ITS
RELATION TO THE PERSON OF THE SON OF
GOD If a peasant offend or injure a
peasant, a plebeian umpire might settle the difference
between them. If he offend a magistrate in the exercise of
his office, the plebeian umpire, will not be competent to
treat in his behalf: he must have a daysman of a higher
grade. If he offend the king, by treason or rebellion, the
one and the other of these umpires would be inadequate to
interpose for him: some person high in rank, or official
dignity, would alone be thought suitable, competent, and,
admissible to such an undertaking. Should it be proposed to a government
that a prisoner, convicted of a high offence, should be set
at liberty, at the instance and intercession of another,
that is, for the sake of another person, it is natural to
suppose that, among all the members and friends of the
government, there would be a general inquiry-who and what
was that person? The following circumstances would require a
very satisfactory explanation: What is his rank in the
state? What is the nature of his connection with the
offender? What is his character in the estimation of the
government? What measure will he substitute instead of the
offender's punishment? Why does he interfere? How does the
king regard such an interference? The high rank of such a person in the
state is of consequence in such a transaction, because such
alone would be competent to treat with the king. With such
only could the king treat, on such a subject, without
lowering his dignity. The interference of such a personage
would draw public attention to the magnitude of the offence.
If the personage were nearly related to the king, and
obliged to sustain some great inconvenience, humiliation, or
hardship by his interference, it would show that the king
did not dispense his pardons, except on good, wise, and
worthy grounds. In such a transaction, regard must
also be had to the kind of connection or relationship in
which the intercessor stands to the offender. There would be
no propriety in dispensing pardon at the instance of a
stranger, utterly unconnected, either by neighborhood,
office, or kindred, with the offender. There is, however, a
congruity in showing favor, caeteris paribus, at the
instance of a person in some way related to the peculiar
circumstances of the offender, say, the Home Secretary of
the State, the Lord Lieutenant of the county, the Magistrate
for the district, the Minister of the parish, the Colonel of
the regiment, etc. The interference of such a person shows
that he is interested in the welfare of the district or
community in which the offence was committed. It draws the
attention of that particular district or community to the
heinousness of the crime. His respectability is a pledge
that just authority and the public good will not be injured
by granting pardon; and it secures honor, love, and esteem
to the interposing benefactor, as the means of conveying the
pardon; and, through him, reverence and attachment to the
government that granted it. He who would interpose, in such an
affair, must be a person possessing great private worth and
weight of character in the estimation of the government. It
would lower and sully the dignity of any government to treat
with one, who had been a sharer in the crime, or who thought
slightly of it. In treating with a person of worth and
character, the government would show that the throne was
quite clear of contributing to the offence, or of conniving
at it,--that it did not regard the offence as a
trifle,--that it was not reluctant to administer mercy, when
practicable with honor and safety,--that its pardon was so
dispensed as not to afford the slightest encouragement to
the crime,--and that the liberation of the offender came
entirely from the sovereign prerogative of the throne,
though indeed through the intercession or for the sake of
another. In this way the offender could not boast of his
case as deserving pardon;--nor could his compeers in guilt
boast of his release as a triumph over
righteousness. In such a dispensation of pardon, it
is not enough that the character of the government appear
honorable, but the interests of it must also be safe. We may
therefore suppose one of the friends of the government to
rise and say, "It is well known that a law without a penalty
is only an advice, a mere recommendation; and that, annexing
a penalty without executing it when required, makes
government a mere name. If the punishment in this case be
cancelled, what provision will the offender's friend
substitute instead of it, that will secure the ends of good
government? For though the letter of the law be not
executed, yet the spirit of it ought to be preserved, that
mercy may not clash with public justice." Another friend might rise and
say,--"It should be remembered that the illustrious person
who interferes in this affair, is a friend to the
government, as well as a friend to the offenders; and
withal, is no friend to the offence. He is high in rank and
in official dignity, and his character is unblemished. He
has suffered much pain and anguish for the offenders; and,
in this undertaking, has borne great fatigue and expense, as
well as the hazard of his good name. He now pledges that his
private worth in his own district, his rank in the state,
his nearness to his sovereign, and his high office, will
guarantee that no injury shall accrue to the government by
issuing forth a pardon. It has been observed that the spirit
of the law might be preserved without adhering to the letter
of it: I beg also to suggest, that the nearer the provision
of satisfaction or atonement comes to the letter of the law,
with out being the literal infliction of the penalty, the
more full and glorious might such an atonement appear. I am
therefore instructed to say that, on this principle, as the
offenders are condemned for public execution, the
illustrious personage who has interposed in their behalf,
will, on a given day, take their place on the scaffold, lay
his head on the block, and appear again in court, as the
medium of conveying pardon to them." Upon this information, all
considerate persons saw that such an expedient would fully
answer the ends of government, viz., to check offenses and
promote the public good: and these ends would be more
secured by the humiliation and sufferings of such a
personage than by the infliction of the penalty on all the
offenders. There would, however, be a farther
inquiry concerning this personage, viz, whether his
undertaking were perfectly voluntary, and whether in his
humiliation he were altogether free and unconstrained. If he
were not free and voluntary, such an undertaking would be
unjust, unreasonable, unbecoming, and unacceptable to the
government. Hence would arise the question, "How
did the king, as the public head of the commonwealth, regard
such an undertaking?" If such a spectacle were made without
his approbation and appointment, it would be no expression
of the king's abhorrence of the offence; it would in nowise
strengthen the claims of righteous authority; it would be no
satisfaction to the government, as it neither kept the
letter nor preserved the spirit of the law; and it would
secure no honor or esteem to the intercessor, as his
undertaking was self-willed, neither appointed nor approved
by any competent authority. But should the king express
himself well pleased, in such an undertaking of such a
personage, and declare himself willing to pardon any
offender, who would ask forgiveness for the sake of the
intercessor, such a spectacle of substituted degradation
would present all the elements of an ATONEMENT to the public
justice of the government. Let us now apply the supposed topics
of the above inquiry to the person of the Son of God, the
declared mediator between an offended sovereign and sinful
man. SECTIONS I Thru SECTIONS
6 SECTION 1 THE PERSONAL DIGNITY OF
CHRIST. What saith the scripture
concerning his rank in the state, his gradation in the scale
of being, the grandeur of his person? The language of the scriptures
concerning the person of Christ is never reserved, cautious,
qualified, or ambiguous: it is free, open, certain,
high-toned, and exulting. It never formally proves the
divinity of Christ, as it never formally proves the
existence of God. It ascribes unhesitatingly to Christ the
same perfections, the same titles and names, the same works,
and the same worship as are ascribed to the Father. If these
particulars be left out of the induction of proofs for the
divinity of the Father, it will be impossible to prove the
Father's deity. If these particulars prove the divinity of
the Father, they must, by fair sequence, prove the divinity
of the Son. And if they do not prove the divinity of the
Son, they do not prove the deity of the Father. There is nothing in the testimony of
the scripture to encourage the morbid caution and jealousy
that would begrudge the honors of the Son, lest they should
infringe on the honors of the Father. There is no such mean
jealousy implied in any transaction between the Father and
the Son, in any description given of heaven, in the design
and tendency of the gospel dispensation, or in the graces of
the Christian character. When the Lord Jesus Christ was at
the lowest point of his humiliation, the identity of his
Father's honor with his own is most clearly recognized, John
xii. 28; xiii. 31, 32; xvii. 1, etc. In heaven, the same
honor and power and glory are ascribed to the Lamb as to Him
that sitteth upon the throne. In the dispensation of the
gospel of the Mediator, "Glory to God in the highest," is
secured by all its provisions. The faith, and the hope, and
the love of Christians, honor the grace, the mercy, and the
whole paternal character of God, while they triumph in
Christ, and boast and glory in his cross. In the memorials
which we have of the lives and doctrines and feelings of
eminent saints who excelled in the love of God, we find no
dread of displeasing the Father by giving due honors to the
Son; no fear of idolatry by calling, like Stephen, on the
name of Jesus; nor any checking of their religious
affections, saying, "hitherto shall ye go and no farther"
No: they felt as free and unconstrained as the heaven they
breathed. They saw that the mediatorial constitution was so
arranged as to secure "many crowns" to the Mediator, without
unsettling, or dimming, a single gem in the crown of the
Father. They never used the cold, sophistical, and unsavory
language of the modern opposers of the divinity of Christ.
They knew that "the Father judgeth no man, but hath
committed all judgment to the Son: that all men should honor
the Son, even as they honor the Father. And he that honoreth
not the Son, honoreth not the Father which hath sent him."
John v. 22, 23. The divinity of the person of the Son
of God is indispensably necessary to the worth, the
sufficiency, and efficacy of the atonement. The grandeur of
his person preserved unsullied the public honor of God in
treating with a days-man for sinners. It not only vindicated
the character of the high party proposing reconciliation,
but it magnified that character in the whole of the
transaction. He is one high enough, in rank and
personal worth, to draw public attention to this amazing
expedient of the divine government. This was his meaning
when he said, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all
[men] to myself;" that is, "I will draw the
attention and the gaze of all beings to my person and
work." The humiliation of a Person so
exalted, gave a greater expression of God's abhorrence of
sin, than any other measure of his administrations. God set
him FORTH, an atonement, to declare his righteousness--to
make a deep and lasting impression, on all intelligences, of
the divine displeasure against disobedience. If Christ was a
mere man, like Moses, or David, or Jeremiah, or John the
Baptist, whose humiliation was no condescension, and whose
obedience and sufferings were mere duty, it is impossible
that his sufferings and death could have been a public
expression, or declaration of righteousness in forgiving
sin. What would be thought of a governor summoning public
attention to the equity of his government, by "cutting a
dog's neck," or "offering swine's blood?" There would be no
dignity in such a medium for expressing either the justice
of his law, or the majesty of his clemency. But in the
divine administration, the sufferings of a person of such
dignity and worth as the Son of God, supplied a medium of
sufficient dignity for expressing the righteousness of God,
both in his abhorrence of sin, and in his exercise of
clemency. The dignity of his person is
calculated to secure the esteem due from offenders to him as
the Mediator. If pardon be dispensed in such a manner as is
not calculated to secure honor and esteem, for the person
who is the medium of conveying it, and through him, for the
throne which originated it, the pardon will be prejudicial
to the public good. It is, therefore, wise to grant pardon
through some person whose rank and character are calculated
to secure honor and respect. The Father thought so in the
appointment of his Son as Mediator, and said, "They will
reverence MY SON." Had the Son been a mere man, we would
have esteemed him, something as we esteem the writers of the
scriptures, or the ministers of the gospel, and others, who
have been the means of conveying to us the knowledge of the
truth. But is this the esteem which the apostles expressed
towards the person of Christ ? Is such esteem at all
adequate to that which the scriptures demand from us towards
Christ? Is such a system in any wise akin to "honoring the
Son even as we honor the Father?" Even a greater esteem than
that which is due to apostles and ministers, is deserved and
warranted by the disinterestedness of his condescension, by
the amiableness of his mission, and by the magnitude of the
blessings which he has procured but, the DIVINITY of his
person tends to secure an esteem that will count all things
but loss for his excellency, that will exult in him with joy
unspeakable and full of glory, that will cast every crown at
his feet, that will love him as "all in all." It is his
claim to such esteem that can alone fully justify the awful
and tremendous anathema, which is denounced against those
who do not love him. Above all, the Godhead of the Son
unites in one person and in one administration the honors of
the Mediator with those of the Governor, and blends the
interests of the Saviour with those of the Lawgiver. He
doe's not exalt the Mediator by sinking the Governor. He
never gives salvation in a manner that is calculated to
beget low sentiments of his legislative
character. These considerations fully justify
the deductions of scripture, that the value and efficacy of
the death of Christ as an atonement, arise from the grandeur
and dignity of his person. It is the blood of Jesus Christ,
HIS SON, that cleanseth from all sin. It is He, "who being
the brightness of his Father's glory and the express image,
of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his
power, that by HIMSELF purged our sins." It is because "God
spared not HIS OWN SON, but delivered him up for us all,
that he will also give unto us all things." THE PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIP OF CHRIST TO MANKIND. We have already seen that, there is a
propriety in dispensing pardon to offenders, at the instance
of a person in some way related to them, either by
neighborhood, office, or kindred. The scriptures represent
the Author of the great atonement for sinners as sustaining
a near and intimate relationship to them. He is related to men by office,
having "power over all flesh;" by kindred, being "made of a
woman;" and by neighborhood, having "tabernacled among them,
full of grace and truth." It became him for whom are all
things, and by whom are all things, to offer reconciliation,
and to bring many sons to glory, by SUCH a personage. "For
both he that expiates, and they who are expiated, are all of
one; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them
brethren. Forasmuch then as the children were partakers of
flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the
same, that through death, he might destroy him that had the
power of death, that is, the devil: and deliver them, who
through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to
bondage. For verily he took not on him the nature of angels,
but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all
things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren;
that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in
things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the
sins of the people." Heb. ii. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17. Let this energetic and beautiful
passage be applied to any good man, to any deliverer, to any
prophet, to any apostle, to any martyr; or let it be read
irrespective of the doctrine of atonement; and the whole
becomes pointless, vague, and flimsy. The atoning priesthood
of the Saviour, on the contrary, gives it body and
consistency, weight and edge. The expedient of an atonement was
introduced into the administration of God's moral government
to "declare" the righteousness, or the public justice, of
God in forgiving offenders. It was therefore necessary that
the atonement be "shewn forth," that is, that it be
effected, and published, in the province where the offence
was committed. An atonement effected solely by the divine
nature, or by an angelic being, could not have been "shewn
forth," and made visible and tangible to mankind;
consequently the author of atonement took upon him the
nature of the offenders, "before whose eyes Jesus Christ
hath been evidently set forth crucified among them." An
atonement, thus visibly wrought, in the nature, and in the
province, of the offenders, was calculated to produce
salutary impressions on them. It would humble the offenders
to witness, in the moral government of which they were
members, such a decided demonstration of firm justice. It
would gain their confidence, by showing that the divine
government had been devising means for the honorable
exercise of mercy in their district. And the whole
arrangement would endear to them the friendly Mediator "who
though he was rich, yet for their sake became poor, that
they through his poverty might be made rich." The nature of things, and the order
of society, also, seem to show the propriety, that an
atonement should be as much like the infliction of the
threatened punishment, as could, under the direction of
infinite wisdom, be consistent with its nature as an
expedient for the suspension of the literal penalty. Hence,
the illustrious Mediator assumed a nature that could sustain
visible sufferings, and endure a public death, even the
accursed death of the cross. By such an arrangement, the
whole government has been honored in the nature, if not in
the persons of the offenders. "If one died for all, then did
the ALL die." To pardon an offender for the sake of
the relationship which a friend of ours sustains towards
him, and, especially, to pardon at the instance of that
friend, is a fact in common life every day. A child disobeys
his father, and, through the intercession of his mother in
his behalf, is forgiven. We receive a wrong at a neighbor's
hand, but at the interposition of a mutual friend, we
overlook it. Such a circumstance often occurs also in the
administration of civil government, when it is deemed
honorable and safe; as when the life of a condemned criminal
is spared through the petitions of the respectable
inhabitants of his native place, or when a king shows favor
to any one on account of his connection with an honorable
and worthy family. It was something of this kind that we see
in David showing kindness to Mephibosheth for the sake of
Jonathan his father, 2 Sam. ix. 1-8. David as a king felt
that there was no impropriety, danger, or dishonor, in
restoring Mephibosheth to all his inheritance in such a way
as this. By doing it for Jonathan's sake, it showed that he
had a high regard for Jonathan, that he considered nothing
in the house of Saul as forming a claim on his clemency;
and, consequently, no friends of that house could think that
the king was relaxing his government, and that they might,
therefore, safely rebel against his crown. It is in this manner that God is, in
Christ, reconciling the world unto himself--but it is for
Christ's sake. For Christ's sake, he is willing to forgive
the greatest sin, to accept the vilest sinner, and to confer
the greatest favor. In thus acting for Christ's sake, the
boasting and the worthiness of the sinner are excluded, and
the divine government is safe and honorable in proclaiming
pardon. THE PERSONAL CHARACTER
OF CHRIST; OR, WHAT IS CALLED, HIS ACTIVE
RIGHTEOUSNESS. Mere relationship to the offender is
not a sufficient ground for a safe dispensation of pardon:
the person who intercedes must have also a worth, and weight
of character, in the estimation of the
government. When Amyntas interceded with the
Athenian senate for the life of his brother AEschylus, he
pleaded, by lifting up the stump of his arm, the honors
which he had achieved for the government at the battle of
Salamis. The senate, at the instance of a person of such
character and worth, granted the pardon. It was on this
principle that Abraham interceded for the sparing of Sodom
and Gomorrah. His plea was the moral worth of fifty
righteous souls: and the efficacy of the plea is distinctly
recognized by the Angel Jehovah. Paul also interceded with
Philemon for Onesimus, by pleading his own character in the
estimation of Philemon, as "being such a one as Paul the
aged, and now also a prisoner of Jesus Christ." This is the
principle on which the Lord Jesus Christ makes intercession
for transgressors, by representing, to the moral governor,
his own infinite worth as an honorable ground for sparing
them. It is as THE JUST, that he died for the unjust. It is
as THE RIGHTEOUS, that he is now an advocate with the
Father. Hence we learn the design, and the
place, of what is called the active obedience of Christ, in
the plan of the atonement. The atonement did not consist in
the death of Christ, simply as death, or as the death of a
person so related to the offenders, but it consisted in
being such a death of SUCH a person. The Lord Christ would
not have been SUCH a person in his sufferings and death, had
not the perfect obedience of his life preceded his agonies.
The obedience of his life gave him a mediatorial character
in the estimation of the divine government, so that it is an
honor to the moral law to honor him. The personal worthiness of Christ is
so great and meritorious, that were we to consider him in
his moral character alone, irrespectively of his divinity,
it would have been no wonder, but rather the expectation and
the delight of all intelligences, had the divine government
in all its authorities interposed, in the justice-hall of
Calvary, to vindicate and to honor such a character; to give
him the "life" promised in the law which he had honored, and
to confer upon him the recompense Of THE JUST. But, to the
eternal astonishment of all the worlds of God, there on that
spot, he stood, THE JUST for the unjust; in their stead; and
voluntarily suffering death, not as the inflicted penalty of
the law--because for a person of his character the law had
no penalty-- but, voluntarily suffering death, as an agreed
arrangement, and as a received "commandment" from his
Father. The result is that the divine government has been
more honored by the obedience of such a person, than it has
been dishonored by the disobedience of the offenders. The
obedience of Christ is worthy of honor from the law, because
that he himself was not worthy of its threatened death. He
did not die because the law required it, for the law could
not require a just person to die. He died because he had
received a commandment to die from his Father, in order
that, for the sake of the dying of a person who did not
deserve to die, he might pardon those who had deserved
death. In such an arrangement, no subject will think lightly
of the divine government, for mercy is exercised only for
the sake, and in the name, of one who has done so much to
honor the law; far rather must every one, in obedience and
homage, fall down before the Lamb of atonement, saying,
"Thou art worthy to take the book, for thou wast slain, and
hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." THE PERSONAL
SUBSTITUTION OF CHRIST. A mediator interposing for offenders
puts himself in their place, and, as we have seen, proposes
to substitute some expedient instead of their punishment.
Thus did Paul in his interposition for Onesimus. Philem. v.
17, 18. On the same principle the Lord Jesus Christ has
mediated for sinners. The sin of man is a public injury to
the divine commonwealth; and for such a public injury the
law has provided a public punishment. Before this public
punishment can be honorably suspended, some public expedient
must be substituted, that will answer the same ends. Why?
The very reasons which required the original penalty to be
annexed as a sanction to the law, require, in case of its
suspension, that what is substituted for it should secure
its ends. It is not the letter of the penalty that is
essential to good government, but the influence of the
penalty on the subjects, and the ends aimed at in
legislation. What Zaleucus substituted for the
infliction of the total blindness due to his son, was
honorable to his government as a king, and to his character
as a father, and was likewise full of grace to the offender.
The principle of substitution is recognized, owned, and
acted upon, by every man in the world. It is only the
application of substitution to "the offence of the cross"
that makes men stumble at it. Every victim that has ever
bled on a sacrificial altar, every trouble and expense which
it has cost a father to relieve and forgive an offending
son, every instance of kindness shown to one for the sake of
another, every instance of giving and taking hostages among
nations, every honorable exercise of a government's clemency
towards offenders at the intercession of worthy characters,
recognizes the principle of substitution. The persons who deny the substitution
of the atonement of Christ, nevertheless recognize the
principle of it, by asserting that the repentance of the
sinner is a sufficient reason for suspending his punishment;
or, in other words, they assert that the repentance of the
sinner is a satisfaction to the divine government, as
furnishing it with an honorable ground for his acquittal;
and as such, to be substituted instead of his punishment.
The theology of this assertion is, indeed, unscriptural and
bad; but its testimony to the necessity, and to the
propriety of some substitutionary satisfaction is distinct
and irrefragable. Our opponents then believe in
substitution, but not in the substitution of Christ. They
are for substituting, as a safe ground for pardon, the
sufferings of a sinner in repentance: we are for
substituting the sufferings of Christ. They believe that the
tears of repentance speak well enough for pardon: we believe
that "the blood of sprinkling speaketh better." What measure, then, do the Scriptures
reveal as THE GREAT EXPEDIENT, substituted in moral
government, instead of the punishment due to offending
mankind ? This is its testimony; "All have sinned, and come
short of the glory of God; being justified freely by grace,
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God
hath set forth to be the propitiation through faith in his
blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of
sins that are past, through the forbearance of God: to
declare I say at this time his righteousness, that he might
be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."
"The Son of man came to give his life a ransom for many."
"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being
made a curse for us." "Him that knew no sin, he hath made
sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God
in him." Rom. iii. 23-26. John xx. 28. Gal. iii. 13. 2 Cor.
v. 21. The substitution of Christ was
twofold,--a substitution of his person instead of the
offenders; and a substitution of his sufferings instead of
their punishment. By this substitution is meant a voluntary
engagement to undergo, for the ends of divine government,
degradation, trouble, reproach, and sufferings, in order
that the penalty threatened by the law may not be executed
on the offenders. Such a substitution implies no transfer of
moral character, no commutation of delinquency and
responsibility: for the nature of things makes such a
transfer and commutation impossible. This substitution of
suffering also, excludes the idea of a literal infliction,
upon the substitute, of the identical penalty that was due
to the offender. It is not sufficiently borne in mind
that, the substitution of Christ is a measure introduced by
God, as the public organ of moral government, on public
grounds, and for public ends, and that consequently it did
not need the infliction of the literal punishment on the
substitute. Had Pythias actually died for Damon, Pythias
would have endured the identical penalty due to Damon. But,
except in the principle of substitution, this case is not at
all analogous to the substitution of Christ for sinners. The
case of Damon and Pythias was one of mere private
friendship, and not of public principle; consequently it is
not a case in point for illustrating the atonement of
Christ. Pythias did not substitute himself for Damon, from
any love to the government of Dionysius, nor from a wish to
express his abhorrence of the offence of Damon. Had Pythias
actually died, Damon would have loved and honored his
friend, but he would never have honored the government. As
the result of the death of Pythias, he would claim his
release as a matter of justice, and never beg it as a matter
of grace. After all, he would hold the character of the king
in utter contempt; because the king did not admit of the
substitution of Pythias from love to Damon, but from a
desire of revenge, and a thirst for blood, contriving that
if the offender himself did not suffer, he would have the
sufferings of his nearest and dearest friend. Such assuredly is not the
substitution of Christ instead of sinners. For though the
Scriptures represent the death of Christ to be fully and
literally "in the room and instead" of others, as that of
Pythias, instead of Damon, would have been, yet they never
connect it with private feelings of attachment, but always
with the public principle of government. The substitution of
Christ is more like the substitution of the person and
sufferings of Zaleucus, instead of the total blindness of
his son, which at once manifested his high regard for his
law and government, his abhorrence of the offence, his love
and mercy towards the offender; while it also showed how
vain it was in any subject to expect to offend with
impunity. In this substitution there was no interchange of
character, and no transfer of blameworthiness; the innocent
was innocent still, the offender was offender still.
Zaleucus was treated AS IF he had been the offender,--but
the character of the adulterous son was never the personal
character of his father. No one ever thought of calling him
the adulterer; much less the greatest adulterer in the
world. No: he knew no offence, though he was treated as if
he had been an offender. In this very case the literal penalty
was not executed upon the substitute. The letter of
Zaleucus's law threatened total blindness, and this
blindness is threatened only to "the soul that sinned; "yet
in the substitution and sufferings of the father were found
a sufficient satisfaction and atonement to the law without a
literal infliction of the penalty. The substituted
sufferings of the father preserved the spirit of the
threatening, and were as much like it as was deemed suitable
without being identical with it. It supplied safe grounds to
the government for dispensing pardon. The substitute made a
sufficient atonement to the law without suffering total
blindness. In like manner, I think, the atonement of Christ
did not consist in bearing the identical punishment
threatened to the sinner. The letter of the law never could
have reached the person of Christ with its penalty; for he
had, both personally, and in his representative character,
kept the whole law, and consequently, was honorably entitled
to the life which the law promised to the obedient. Nor
could the letter of the law have met him as the substitute
in the offender's room; for such a substitute was beside and
above the letter of the law. Except in the mere article of
dying--of separation between soul and body, there was
scarcely anything, in the sufferings of Christ, identical
with the original penalty threatened in the law. In the
sufferings of Christ there was no pang of remorse, no
consciousness of demerit, no moral and eternal death, no
execration of the authority that inflicted the pains. On the
contrary, there was in him a consciousness that he was JUST,
and that the law did not curse him, and also the assurance
that God approved of him in his sufferings, as obeying his
will, and doing his pleasure. "The hypothesis of a literal
infliction of the penalty on the person of Christ destroys
the benevolence and weakens the authority of the divine
government. It supposes that the divine government would not
admit of any diminution of misery, or any accession of
happiness, in the universe, but would bring about the entire
flood of sufferings due for sin. It must, on this showing,
have every iota and tittle of the misery incurred, either by
the person of the offender himself, or by his substitute. It
supposes also that the penalty cannot with justice be
executed again on the offender himself, after it has been
once inflicted and exhausted on his substitute, though we
know that it will be actually inflicted upon the rejecters
of the gospel. Such views make the offender secure,
presumptuous, and licentious. The substitutionary atonement
of Christ does not abrogate a single claim of the law upon
any sinner, until that sinner believe in Christ, and "walk
not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit."
While therefore the sinner rejects the Lord that bought him,
and atoned for him, he is still liable to the curse of the
law;" and if he die impenitent, this "curse of the law" will
be inflicted on him, notwithstanding the atonement that had
been made for his sin. THE PERSONAL
VOLUNTARINESS OF CHRIST. To render a substitution valid,
honorable, and efficacious, there must be free and perfect
voluntariness in the substitute. The atonement of Christ was to be an
index to the whole operations and bearings of the
mediatorial system; to point it out as a system adapted to
reasonable, free, and voluntary intelligences. It was, in
fact, to be a specimen of the voluntariness of the whole
economy. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay
down my life, that I might have it again. No man taketh it
from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it
down, and I have power to take it again. This command have I
received of my Father." John x. 17, 18. Man was free and voluntary in the
offence. God was free and voluntary in providing an
atonement. The Father was free and voluntary in accepting
the satisfaction, and the Spirit is free in applying
salvation to sinners, dividing to every one according as he
will. The sinner is free in rejecting or receiving the
atonement; and the divine government is free and voluntary
in forgiving the sinner; the Christian is free and voluntary
in his course of obedience and holiness; his admission to
heaven is entirely of free grace and unconstrained good
will; and all the employments and exercises of heaven are
free and voluntary. Free, uninfluenced voluntariness, then,
is stamped on the whole transaction, and is exercised by all
the parties concerned. This voluntary principle was
conspicuous in the whole life and character of the Lord
Jesus Christ. Though he was rich, yet for our sakes he
became poor. He was led as a lamb to the slaughter. His
whole undertaking was an act of free choice, of--perfect
voluntariness: without constraint without reluctance. When
he disappeared from among the Jews, who sought to kill him,
it was only because "His hour" was not yet come. When the
right period arrived, he said, "Father, the hour is come;" I
am ready; ready to go to Calvary, ready to be sacrificed on
an accursed altar, ready to make an atonement for the sin of
man. When this "hour" came upon him, he
felt as a man, and prayed, "Father, if thou be willing,
remove this cup from me: nevertheless, not my will, but
thine be done." Yet, this circumstance betrayed no
reluctance to his work. Aversion from sufferings is an
affection essential to every living being. Such an affection
is in itself innocent and sinless; without it, man would not
be the subject of hope or fear, and, consequently, not a fit
subject of moral government. Had the blessed Mediator been
without such aversion to pain, he would not have appeared
really and truly a man; nor would he have appeared so great
a sufferer. He loved his Father; and in proportion as he
loved his Father, he would be averse to any effects of his
displeasure. His love to his Father, his innocent aversion
from suffering, the nice susceptibilities of his holy frame,
put his obedience to the fullest trial; yet, as a sheep
before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth,
except to say, "not my will, but thine be done." This voluntariness originated in
himself, He emptied himself and made himself of no
reputation. No one took his life from him, but he laid it
down of himself. He said, "Lo, I come to do thy will." He
had in himself the absolute right of self-disposal. No
creature in the universe can possess this right; for his
all, all that he is, and all that he has, is owing in duty
to the law. He, then, who could say of his life, "I have
power to lay it down, and power to take it up again," must
be above law, above a creature--he must be God. This
absolute right, and this unconstrained voluntariness of
self-disposal, were essential to the lawfulness of his
undertaking, and to the acceptance of his work, as
Mediator. Though substitution is often above
law, it must never be against law. An involuntary
substitution would be a measure void of all justice, and
void of all grace; but voluntariness makes it just and
gracious. The law of the land does not constrain any man to
become a surety; but if any person voluntarily become a
surety for an insolvent, the law is not unjust in allowing
him "to smart for it." The law does not constrain any man to
undertake great trouble and expense, and to part with a
great portion of his estate, to deliver a thoughtless and
profligate friend or relation; but if he voluntarily do so,
the law is perfectly just in letting him bear such a loss,
though he never personally deserved it. The law will not
force any man to enter into recognizances for the good
behavior of another person; yet if he voluntarily enter on
such an engagement, and his friend break the peace, no one
thinks the law unjust in making the bail suffer the
loss. When Judah voluntarily substituted
himself instead of Benjamin, and when Zaleucus substituted
his sufferings for the punishment due to his son; no one
thinks of charging such transactions with injustice and
wrong. It is not right reason, nor the moral sense, but it
is jaundiced prejudice, that sees any color of injustice in
the voluntary substitution of Jesus Christ for sinful man.
It must be something wrong, something that sees not as God
seeth, that can detect injustice in the very measure which
God himself, with all authority, "sets forth To DECLARE his
righteousness." If God declares the substitution of the
atonement of Christ to be a demonstration of his
righteousness--and any set of men declare it to be an
evidence of injustice, we cannot be at a loss whose
declaration to receive as truth. An involuntary substitution would,
indeed, have been unjust, unreasonable, and inadmissible;
therefore much of the acceptableness of the work of Christ
is, in connection with the dignity of his person, ascribed
to the grace, the love, and the voluntariness which he so
freely displayed in the whole undertaking. We are enriched
through his poverty, because it was from mere grace, that
he, though he was rich, for our sakes became poor. Christ
hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering and
a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savor. That Jesus
Christ came to the world to save sinners was a step
cordially approved of by God, and is worthy of all
acceptation among mankind. "Him hath God the Father sealed"
to be a Mediator; and his great atonement he has appointed
to be the only medium of communication between the offenders
and the throne. "Neither is there salvation in any other;
for there is none other name under heaven given among men,
whereby we must be saved." THE PERSONAL SUFFERINGS
OF CHRIST We have now seen, in the substitution
of the Lord Jesus Christ, all the elements essential to the
reality and sufficiency of an atonement to a government:
viz., dignity of person, relationship to the offender, worth
of character, voluntary substitution, and appointment by the
authority of the government. In this enumeration of the
essential elements of atonement, I have not inserted the
article, intensity of suffering, simply because, that to the
atonement, as an atonement, I did not consider it
indispensably or essentially necessary. The reasons for it
will be found in the following remarks The reality of the atonement has, in
this discussion, been tried by the connection of its great
elements with the person of Christ; let us now try the
question of the extent of the atonement by the same test. It
is self-evident that not one of these great elements of
atonement could possibly be more or less than it is; from
which we argue, that neither could the atonement itself be
possibly more or less than it is. The atonement of Christ is generally
represented in the writings of men, and generally believed,
to consist in an actual suffering of the identical penalty
due to the offenders for whom he suffered. They who take this view of the
atonement argue thus: "Some offenders will eventually endure
the penalty of the law themselves, as some of them already
endure it now in misery. It would be unjust to inflict the
penalty on the offender which had already been endured by
the surety; therefore the surety did not endure the penalty
for those offenders who shall suffer it
themselves." This hypothesis measures the
atonement by the number of the persons to be saved. The
measurement is just as reasonable as measuring a king's
prerogative to pardon by the number of culprits whom he has
actually reprieved; or measuring the power of the sun to
give light, by the number of eyes that actually see it; or
the efficacy of a medicine, by the number of patients
actually cured by it. Many of the advocates of this view of
atonement argue farther than this, and their argument arises
naturally from their premises. "Jesus Christ," say they,
"suffered the identical punishment or penalty due to the
elect; this penalty is always justly proportioned to the
greatness of the offence. Consequently had the elect been
more or less in number, or had their individual and
aggregate sins been more or less in amount of number and
guilt their surety would have had to suffer more or less for
them." This hypothesis measures the
atonement not only by the number of the, elect but by the
intensity and degree of the suffering to be endured for
their sin. It adjusts the dimensions of the atonement to a
nice mathematical point, and poises its infinite weight of
glory even to the small dust of a balance. I need not say
that the hand which stretches such lines, and holds such
scales must be a bold one. Such a calculation represents the
Son of God as giving so much sufferings for so much value
received in the souls given to him; and represents the
Father as dispensing so many favors and blessings, for so
much value received in obedience and sufferings. This is the
commercial atonement, the commercial redemption, with which
Supralapsarianism theology degrades the Gospel and fetters
its ministers; which sums up the worth of a stupendous moral
transaction by arithmetic, and, with its little span, limits
what is infinite. They who take this view of the
atonement call it, indeed, infinite; but infinite it cannot
be in the sense of unmeasurable or unlimited. The number of
the actually saved is certainly definite, and, accordingly,
the sufferings of the blessed Redeemer might have been more
or less, and therefore, not infinite. I have hinted that I do not consider
an infinite intensity of suffering essential to the
sufficiency of the atonement. My hand trembles lest I should
write a single word, or syllable, that would convey a low
idea of the greatness of Christ's sufferings. The sufferings
of Christ were indeed infinite, not simply in intensity of
agony, but, as they were the sufferings of a person of
infinite dignity, purity and worth. Probably, the sufferings
of some martyrs may have exceeded his, as far as the mere
infliction of physical pain is concerned. Even the
sufferings of the damned spirits are not infinite, except in
duration. In reading the accounts of the sufferings of
Christ, we cannot avoid the supposition that they might have
been greater, or they might have been less, without
affecting the reality or the sufficiency of the atonement.
There might have been, for instance, more or fewer thorns in
his crown; the scourges might have been more or fewer in
number, or administered with more or less energy, without
adding to the sufficiency of his satisfaction or diminishing
from it. The design of atonement is, as we
have seen, to answer the same ends in the administration of
government as the punishment of the offender. The end of a
government in awarding punishment is, not simply to give
pain to the offender, but, by giving a demonstration of the
government's abhorrence of the crime, to deter others from
committing it. This is precisely the design of an atonement.
As the infliction of pain is not indispensably necessary to
the design of punishment, neither is it necessary to the
design of the atonement. The Scriptures never ascribe the
efficacy of an atonement to intensity of sufferings. In the
Jewish sacrifices, there is a recognition of a proportion
between the costliness of the sacrifice, and the rank of the
offender, as the sin of one priest required the same
atonement as the sins of all the people. In such recognition
there is no trace of any proportion between the magnitude of
the offence, and the degree of the victim's sufferings; or
between the intensity of the sufferings, and the sufficiency
and extent of the atonement so effected. Take a case. A
family of Israel, in a given year, having no children, would
present their lamb for a sacrifice; and it bled and died,
Annually for ten or twenty years, they offered a "lamb for
the family:" but in that time the number of sinners, and the
number of sins, in the family had greatly increased,
possibly in aggravation as well as in number; yet the lamb
of atonement was not put to greater torture than in the
first year. Take another case. The tribes of Israel, in a
given year, might be larger in population, and might have
committed, nationally, some greater enormities than at any
previous time; yet, on the great day of atonement for the
whole congregation, the sacrificial victim was not to die a
more excruciating death than on former occasions. When scripture and analogy are
opposed to such a principle of proportion, we can have no
solid grounds for applying it to the death of Christ, or for
measuring the extent of his atonement by the intensity of
his sufferings. The number of the saved, and the degrees of
the sufferings of Christ, are the only things connected with
the atonement that we can suppose to be capable of being
greater or less, more or fewer. And these, we have seen, are
not indispensably necessary either to the reality or to the
sufficiency of the atonement. We cannot suppose that the
atonement would have been less real and extensive, had, for
instance, the articles of the crown of thorns, and the
scourges, been left out of the list of his sufferings. Nor
can we think that the atonement would have been more
extensive or efficacious, had his body, while hanging in
agony, been pierced with a thousand spears. The sufficiency
and the extensive aspect of the atonement would be the same,
even if not one soul were saved and the greatness of
Christ's merits is no more to be measured by the number of
the saved, than the demerit of Adam's sin is, by the number
of mankind. All the elements essential to an
atonement are utterly incapable of increase or diminution.
Let us think: Could the Son of God have had more or less
dignity of person than he actually had? Could he have been
more or less nearly related to the offender, that is, more
or less incarnate, than he really was? Could his moral worth
and active obedience to the law have been more or less
perfect than it was? Could the voluntariness of his
substitution have been increased or diminished? Could his
mediation have been instituted with more or less authority
and approbation than it was? These elements are, even in
thought, incapable of being more or less. They are infinite,
unlimited, unmeasurable. They are immutable, and are as
unaffected by the number of the objects which they benefit,
as the light of the sun is by the multitude of objects which
it unfolds. Not only all the elements, but all
the effects of the atonement, with the mere exception of the
number of the saved, are likewise incapable of variableness,
increase, or diminution. Let us think again; could the
divine perfections have been more or less vindicated and
glorified than they were? Could the evil of sin have been
more or less powerfully demonstrated than it was? Could
God's determination to defend his law have been more or less
proved than it was? That is, would a less atonement have
done these things sufficiently: or would a greater atonement
have done them efficiently? I trow not. The honors conferred on the person of
the Redeemer are among the effects of the atonement. These
also, with the exception of the number of the saved, are
incapable of being more or less than they are. The Son of
God could not have been more or less suitable and able to
be, an advocate and a judge than he is. To say, the greater
the number there will be in heaven, the more honor there
would be to the Saviour, is true; but it is true only by
giving another meaning to the word honor. The honor of the
Saviour is the same and unalterable, but this sentiment only
means that, in the supposed case, there would be a greater
ascription of honor to him, but it forgets that it is an
honor due, and already rising from his atonement, even if
such a number were not there to ascribe it. Daily accessions
to the church, and to heaven, do not give honor to the
atonement, they only own and ascribe to it the dignity, and
the worth, which they have already found in it. The gradations of gracious reward and
heavenly glory among the saints made perfect, are never
traced to the capableness of the atonement being more or
less; but to the personal exercise of moral agency in
faithful services for God. It is he that soweth sparingly
that shall reap also sparingly; and it is he which soweth
bountifully that shall reap also bountifully. It is not
because more glory was purchased for one, and less for the
other, that one star shall differ from another star in its
glory. Such considerations as these persuade me, that, the
atonement would not have been greater or less, had the
agonies of Christ been more or less; and, therefore, that
the sufficiency and extent of the atonement do not at all
depend upon the degree or intensity of his
sufferings. This view of the atonement does not
destroy the propriety and necessity of the sufferings of
Christ. It might be asked, if the value and sufficiency of
the atonement arise from the dignity, worth, and
voluntariness of the person of Christ, and not from the
degrees of his sufferings, then, what was the necessity of
his suffering to such a degree as he did suffer? and where
is the propriety of the Scriptures so constantly referring
us to his cross and sufferings? It must be remembered that the
atonement is not a measure of law, but of prerogative and
grace. Had the atonement been a measure of law, it would
have been under the direction of pure equity; but as it is a
measure of grace, it is, like all such measures, under the
direction of infinite and benevolent wisdom. This infinite
wisdom arranged the time and period in which the atonement
was to be effected; and, no doubt the same wisdom ordered
and regulated the degree of sufferings and humiliation which
were to be endured in its execution. There is no incongruity
in supposing that, had infinite wisdom seen fit, the time of
atonement might have been otherwise; nor is there any
absurdity or impiety in supposing also, that the degree of
humiliation and suffering might have been
otherwise. In accounting for this, we cannot
tell all the reasons of the divine government, for annexing
such a penalty to the law, or for executing such a
punishment on offenders. But we are not afraid to assert,
that the humiliation of the Son of God to assume, on account
of sin, the nature of man and the form of a servant, was,
even without personal sufferings, an event of such
unfathomable degradation, as to appear more calculated to
secure those ends of government, than would have been the
eternal degradation of the whole human race under the
penalty. Therefore, when we stand on the shore of the great
atonement, and pose ourselves with questions, and weary
ourselves with guesses, as to why he was wounded for our
transgressions, and why he was bruised for our iniquities,
infinite wisdom only says, "IT BECAME HIM for whom are all
things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons
unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect
through SUFFERINGS." The perfection of infinite wisdom
demands our implicit confidence and gives us an assurance
that if the sufferings of the blessed Mediator might, for
all the ends of atonement, have been of less intensity, they
would have been so arranged. We think, however, that right
reason and analogy point out to us a propriety, and a
congruity, in an atonement being as much like the threatened
punishment as might be consistent with the nature of a
satisfaction. To answer the same ends as a penalty, the
atonement must be somewhat like it. As an attempt to account for the
relation between the sufferings of Christ, and the
atonement, we submit the following thoughts. All rational
intelligences are capable of hope and fear, of praise and
blame, and consequently, of pleasure and pain. An aversion
to blame and pain is inherent in every moral agent; and so
is the desire of praise and pleasure. It is to these
affections that the whole administration of moral government
addresses itself. Without them moral government cannot
exist; as its promises and threatenings would be mere
nullities. The threatenings of the law cannot be safely
suspended by any expedient or atonement, unless the
atonement be calculated to impress our hopes and fears as
powerfully as the original penalty itself. This, according
to our habits of conception, is most effectually done by the
exhibition of sufferings; as, by addressing itself forcibly
to our aversion from pain, it is adapted to deter us from
offending. As offenders were to be delivered from
sufferings, it was arranged by infinite wisdom, that they
should be delivered by the sufferings of another, in order
to impress them with a sense of the evil of their
transgression, of the benevolence of the divine government,
and of their obligation to the Mediator. Sufferings were,
therefore, introduced into the atonement, because they
supplied the greatest number of motives to deter from sin,
afforded the greatest amount of reasons for returning to
allegiance, gave the soundest grounds of assurance of a
cordial reception and pardon, and laid the most numerous and
pressing bonds of obligations on the offenders. One of the ends of the divine
government in annexing a penal sanction to the law, was to
deter us from sin, by addressing our hopes and fears; and,
this was the reason why it threatened sufferings to the
sinner. If the atonement that justifies the suspension of
the threatening, answers this end of the government more
effectually than the original penalty, then, the atonement
is of a greater value to the government than the penalty
itself. The, history of salvation shows that the atonement
is of greater value than the original penalty, because it
contains, in its arrangement, a greater number of motives to
deter from sin, and to attach the subjects to the
government. It is invested with this kind of value by the
introduction of amazing sufferings. I say, this kind of
value; because I do not consider this value essential to the
atonement, as it works upwards towards the divine
perfections, but I consider it as auxiliary to the
atonement, as it works downwards, towards the feelings of
the sinner. The great sufferings of the Son of
God were not intended, nor were they calculated, to affect
the character of a single attribute in God; but they are
intended, and eminently adapted, to affect the disposition
and the character of the sinner. Hence arose the necessity
and suitableness of perfecting the atonement by sufferings.
The sufferings of one so illustrious in rank and worth, of
one so full of love to the offender, of one so much
abhorring sin, of one so much honoring the law--and such
sufferings-are more adapted to deter men from sin, than the
tidings, or even the sight, of the sufferings and the
torments of all the fallen beings of the
universe.