LETTER OF
The GOSPEL TRUTH CHARLES G. FINNEY
1874
To Mark Hopkins
14 November 1874
[MS in Oberlin College Archives, in the handwriting of Rebecca Finney]
Oberlin Nov. 14th 1874.
Rev. Mark Hopkins D.D.
My Dear Brother,
I
received your kind letter in due time.
I have read your book through once,
and have commenced the re-reading of
it. I like it much, but I am re-read-
ing it, because I am not certain that
I fully understood some parts of it.
I have long felt that writers on Moral
Philosophy had, after all, failed to write
on the true question of morals.
Strictly, all real morality, consists
in conformity to the spirit of moral
law, and this relates to the ultimate
immanent, supreme, preference of the soul.
This, writers on Moral Philosophy, have
overlooked, or at least, very inadequately
considered. Mental Philosophy has
[page 2]
also been faulty, in that it has been
mostly a Philosophy of the intellect, and
the will has been very much confounded
with the sensibility. Your Outline Study
of Man, is much the most satisfactory of
anything I have seen. There is one question
that I should like to see more thoroughly
considered. It is either assumed, or
asserted, by all Philosophers whose writings
I have read, that the will does not, and cannot
act, unless it is impelled or invited by an
impulse of the sensibility. That it is desire,
or some feeling in the sensibility that
stimulates the will into action, and that
we do not, and can not choose upon
the mere rational apprehension of the good,
or valuable, unless this apprehension produces
an impulse of the sensibility. But the idea of
the intrinsically valuable, once possessed,
[page 3]
can we not will under the pure affirmation
of conscience and reason, without any impulse
from the sensibility? And do we not affirm
our obligation to do so? I am afraid of a
philosophy that makes the possibility of
the will's action, dependent on an impulse
from the sensibility. The sensibility is the
condition of developing the idea of the good,
but the idea being once developed, does it
not impose obligation, without any further
impulse from the sensibility? In my former
letter, I think I failed to make myself un-
derstood. I agree with you, that a moral agent
affirms obligation to choose the good, for its own sake,
simply upon the apprehension of the intrinsic
value of the good itself. The good is the sole
ground of obligation, and the sole object of choice.
It is the good itself, that determines the choice.
But, are there not, two latent assumptions,
not at all thought of, at the time, that are
essential conditions of the affirmation of obligation
to choose? namely, Ability & moral propriety,
[page 4]
or fitness. Or, either, it may perhaps
strictly be said, that the idea of moral
propriety, and moral obligation are identical.
I do not mean that the idea of moral propriety
or fitness, enters at all into the ground
of obligation. But, should we have the con-
ception of moral obligation in con-
templating the value of the good, did we
not assume, both our ability, and the
moral propriety of the choice? We
think at the moment, of neither of
these conditions, but the question is,
does not a moral agent, necessarily assume
the reality of both of these conditions, in
every case of affirmed obligation to
choose? I will not affirm this dogmatically,
but will you not look again, narrowly
into this question? It seems to me, that
either we necessarily assume the moral
fitness of the choice, as a condition
[page 5]
of obligation to choose, or that the
affirmation of this fitness, and of
moral obligation are identical.
You wonder at my inclination to
still pursue this subject. I
deem the question of the found-
ation of moral obligation fundamental,
and cannot rest, as long as there is so
much error and darkness, upon the
minds of ministers upon this question
I want to have this matter searched
to the bottom, and especially, to have
the Collegiate and Theological Schools
set right upon this subject.
The Colleges and Theological
Seminaries, are all in the dark
on this fundamental question.
I almost never, hear a sermon that
does not pain me because the
preacher is in a muddle upon this
[page 6]
question. The seminaries are
all, either rightarian, or utilitarian,
consequently, the true nature of
morals & religion are is misrepresented
and preachers are all in confusion.
You are doing a great and good
work, in publishing on this
subject. You are still so vigorous
and clear a thinker and writer that
I much desire to converse with
you. Especially upon the two
points I have noticed in this letter.
You have the ear and the confidence
of the best minds in the country,
and your writings are greatly
needed throughout this country and
Europe. What a pity it is, that our
foreign missionaries are in the dark
upon this subject. It does pain
me exceedingly, to know that they
are sowing the seeds of false philos-
ophy, and consequently Theology,
[page 7]
in heathen lands. I get along
with your book slowly, because
of the pressure of so many
other things upon my mind, and
because that I am of late, troubled
with dizziness, if I overwork
my brain. From my law habits
of close reading, I am not one of those
that can sit down, and read such a
book as yours, through in an evening,
or any book, that has any thought
in it. I read it searchingly, and
ponderingly, as I would a statute.
I presume the fault was my own
but in my first reading, I thought,
especially in the last few chapters,
some of your statements were
not quite clear. If my health
holds out, I intend to give your
book another searching perusal.
Then, if I need more light, and
God will, you may expect
[page 8]
to hear from me again.
In the meantime, any suggestion
from you, will be thankfully
received.
God Bless You, My Dear Brother!
C. G. Finney, by Mrs. Finney.
Finney received the following reply from Mark Hopkins:
Williams College Nov. 24th 1874
Rev. C. G. Finney,
Dear Brother,
If we could
converse on the two points you
mention I think we should
agree. You say, "The intellect could
not have the idea of good except through
an experience of the sensibility." On that
we agree. A sensibility is the condition
of any moral idea. You say again, "But
the idea of the intrinsically valuable once
possessed, can we not will under the pure
affirmation of conscience and reason with
out any impulse from the sensibility?
And do we not affirm our obligation to do
so"? I say yes - without any impulse that
is not necessarily involved in such action. The
simple fact I suppose to be, as is implied in
what you say farther on, that the idea of
the good being once developed obligation
[page 2]
is affirmed without "any further impulse"
from
of the sensibility." Observe &endash; further impulse &endash;
that implies the exact doctrine I hold in re
gard to the complex nature of the Moral
Reason as both rational and emotive. I have
used the expression in regard to it some-
where, "The wheels are full of eyes round about."
There is, as I hold, not only a rational apprehen
sion of the good, but a sensibility in the mor-
al nature itself by which we are led
or impelled to choose it. This is not properly
desire, certainly not in such a sense
that any thing selfish can be con-
nected with it. If we had had a good
word for it probably it would have
prevent[e]d many disputes.
On the other point I am inclined
to the solution you suggest, that is, that
"the idea of moral propriety, and moral
obligation are identical". That
freedom is presupposed by us as a condi
tion of any moral act I agree. so are
our existence, and our moral nature.
But, these being given, I see no
need of any idea of moral pro-
[page 3]
priety, or rightness, at least in those
cases to which I have drawn attention,
in which choice only is required, in
immediate view of the good with[out]
volition.
Have you ever happened to see a work
by me &endash; the "Law of Love"? I should like
to have you look at the preface to
the 3d. edition where my views are
condensed into a few short propopsi
tions. You will see by the 9th that
I had thought of right as synono
mous with obligation. You will
see also by referring to the other pre
face &endash; the one that stands second in
the book &endash; that I refer to you as
having first stated fully the necessity of an
underlying sensibility.
If I was surprised at your reading
my book at all I was more so at your
reading it a second time. I did the
best I could to make the statements
plain, but am sure there must
be something wrong in it since
[page 4]
you find it difficult to understand
it. However most of the great and diffi
cult topics of philosophy are touched
on, and my space was quite too
limited. I hope the second perusal
will be satisfactory, and any sug
gestion of error or obscurity would
be thankfully received, especially
if future editions should be called
for. I find the method by the black
board, and the chart at the end
a decided help in making those
subjects plain.
Observing that your letter was "by Mrs.
Finney", I feel inclined to reverse what
Tertius did who wrote the Epistle to the Romans
He said, "I Tertius who wrote this Epistle,
salute you." I would salute her who
wrote the Epistle. Praying that
you may long continue too be spared
to the world and blessed I am
cordially Yours
Mark Hopkins
Footnotes:
The ninth proposition reads:
When an act of choice alone is required without volition or the use of means, as in love or good-willing, obligation is affirmed at once without the intervention of the idea of right, and with no place for it unless it be regarded as synonymous with obligation. (The Law of Love and Love as a Law; or, Christian Ethics [New York: C. Scribner & Co., 1871], p. vii)