By
IN WHOM WE HAVE REDEMPTION THROUGH HIS BLOOD, THE
FORGIVENESS OF SINS, ACCORDING TO THE RICHES OF HIS
GRACE.--Ephesians 1:7. HAVING, in the preceding discourses, considered the
particulars at first proposed, which were, that we can
obtain forgiveness in no other way than through the
redemption of Christ,--the reason or ground of this mode of
forgiveness,-and the consistency between the complete
atonement of Christ, ind free grace in forgiveness,--the way
is prepared for the following inferences and reflections If the atonement of Christ be a substitute for the
punishment of the sinner according to the divine law, and
were designed to support the authority of that law, equally
as the punishment of hell; then we may infer, that the
atonement of Christ does not consist in showing that the
divine law is just. With regard to this, I venture to assert
two things,--that the obedience and death of Christ do not
prove that the divine law is just,--that if they did prove
this, still, merely by that cir. cumstance, they would make
no atonement. 1. The obedience and death of Christ do not prove that
the divine law is a just law. The sufferings of Christ no
more prove this than the punishment of the damned proves it.
The former are the substitute of the latter, and were
designed, for substance, to prove and exhibit the same
truths, and to answer the same ends. But who will say that
the torments of the damned prove the justice of the divine
law? No more is this proved by the sufferings of Christ. If
the justice of the divine law be called in question, the
justice and moral perfection of God is of course equally
called in question. This being the case, whatever he can
say, whether by obedience or suffering to testify the
justice of the law, must be considered as the testimony of a
party in his own cause; and also as the testimony of a being
whose integrity is as much disputed as the justice of the
law. It cannot therefore be received as proof in the case.
The testimony of God, whether given in obedience or
suffering, so Iona as his character is disputed, as it will
be so long as the justice of his law is disputed, proves
neither that the law is just, in reality, nor that it is so
in his own estimation. A being of a disputed character may
be supposed to testify, both contrary to reality and
contrary to his own knowledge. And as the character of the
Deity is disputed by those who dispute the justice of the
divine law, so there is the same foundation to dispute the
character and testimony of the Son of God. Therefore the
obedience and death of Christ do not prove that the divine
law is just. 2. If the obedience and death of Christ did prove that
the law is just, still, by this circumstance, they would
make no atonement for sin. If it were a truth that the
obedience and death of Christ did prove the divine law to be
just, and merely on that account made atonement, the ground
of this truth would be, that whatever makes it manifest that
the law is just, makes atonement. The essence of the
atonement on this hypothesis, is placed in the manifestation
of the justice of the divine law. Therefore this
manifestation, however or by whomsoever it be made, is an
atonement. But as the law is really just, it was doubtless
in the power of infinite wisdom to manifest the justice of
it to rational creatures, without either the obedience or
the death of Christ, or of any other person. If it were not
in the power of infinite wisdom to manifest the justice of
the divine law without the death of Christ; then if Christ
had not died, but all men had perished according to the law,
it never would have appeared that the law is just. But bare
attention to the law itself, to the reason, ground, and
necessity of it, especially when this ittention is excited,
and the powers of the mind are aided, by even such a divine
influence as God does in fact sometimes give to men of the
most depraved characters, is sufficient to convince of the
justice of the law. But there can be no dispute, whether the
sanctifying and savingly illuminating influences of the
spirit of God, without the obedience and death of Christ,
would convince any man of the justice of the law. We have no
more reason to dispute this, than to dispute whether the
angels who kept their first estate did believe the justice
of the law before they were informed of the incarnation and
death of Christ. According to this hypothesis, therefore,
all that was necessary to make atonement for mankind was to
communicate to them sanctifying grace, or to lead them to
repentance; and as to Christ, he is dead in vain. Besides; if the obedience and death of Christ did ever so
credibly manifest the justice of the law, what atonement,
what satisfaction for sin would this make? how would this
support the authority of the law? how would this male it
appear that the transgressor may expect the most awful
consequences from his transgression? or that transgression
is infinitely abominable in the sight of God? And how would
the manifestation of the justice of the law tend to restrain
men from transgressing that law? Whatever the effect of such
manifestation may be on the minds of those innocent
creatures who have regard to justice or moral rectitude;
yet, on the minds of those who are disposed to transgress
and have lost the proper sense of moral rectitude, the
manifestation would have no effectual tendency to restrain
them from transgression; therefore would in no degree answer
the ends of the punishment threatened in the law, nor be any
atonement for sin. Perhaps some may suppose that what hath now been
asserted, that the death or atonement of Christ does not
prove the justice of God and of his law, is inconsistent
with what hath been repeatedly suggested in the preceding
discourses, that it is in end of the death or atonement of
Christ to manifest how hateful sin is to God. If the death
of Christ manifest God's hatred of sin, it seems that the
same event must also manifest God's love of holiness and
justice. In answer to this I observe, that the death of
Christ manifests God's hatred of sin and love of holiness in
the same sense as the damnation of the wicked manifests
these, namely, on the supposition that the divine law is
just and holy. If it be allowed the divine law is just and
holy, then every thing done to support and execute that law,
is a declaration in favor of holiness and against sin; or a
declaration of God's love of holiness and of his hatred of
iniquity. Both the punishment of the damned, and the death
of Christ declare God's hatred of all transgressions of his
law. And if that law be holy, to hate the transgression of
it, is to hate sin, and at the same time to love holiness.
But if the law be not holy, no such consequence will follow
: it cannot, on that supposition, be inferred from the
divine hatred of transgression, that God either hates sin or
loves holiness. Again; we may infer from the preceding doctrine, that the
atonement of Christ does not consist essentially in his
active or positive obedience. By atonement I mean that
which, as a substitute for the punishment which is
threatened in the law, supports the authority of that law,
and the dignity of the divine government. But the obedience
of Christ, even in the most trying circumstances, without
any tokens of the divine displeasure against the
transgressors of the law, would never support the authority
of the law and the dignity of the divine government. It by
no means makes it appear that it is an evil and bitter thing
to violate the law, and that the violation of it deserves,
and may be expected to be followed, with most awful
consequences to him who dares to violate it. A familiar
example may illustrate this matter. It is the rule or law of
a certain family, that a particular child shall steadily
attend the school kept in the neighborhood, and that if he
absent himself for a day, without license, he shall feel the
rod. However, after some time the child being weary of
observing this law, does absent himself, and spend the day
in play. At night the father being informed of it, arraigns
the child, finds him guilty, and prepares to inflict the
punishment which he had threatened. At this instant, the
brother of the offending child intercedes, acknowledges the
reasonableness of the law which his brother hath
transgressed, confesses that he deserves the penalty, but
offers himself to make satisfaction for his brother's
offence. Being interrogated by what means he expects to make
satisfaction, he answers, by going himself to school the
next day. Now can any one suppose that in this way the
second child can make satisfaction for the offence of the
first? Or that if the father were to accept the proposal, he
would find the authority of his law, and the government of
his family, supported with dignity? Or that the offending
child, or the other children of the family, would by this
means be effectually deterred from future offences of the
like nature? And however trying the circumstances of going
to school may be, if those circumstances be no token of the
father's displeasure at the disobedient child's
transgression; still the going to school of the second
child, will not make the least satisfaction for the offence
of the first. I venture to say further, that not only did not the
atonement of Christ consist essentially in his active
obedience, but that his active obedience was no part of his
atonement, properly so called, nor essential to it. The
perfect obedience of Christ was doubtless necessary in order
to the due execution of his prophetical and priestly office,
in order to his intercession; and also in order that the
salvation of his disciples might be a reward of his
obedience. But that it was necessary to support the
authority of the divine law in the pardon of sinners, does
not appear. If Christ himself could possibly have been a
sinner, and had first made satisfaction for his own sin, it
does not appear, but that afterward he might also satisfy
for the sins of his people. If the pretender to the crown of
Great Britain should wage war against king George, in the
course of the war should be taken, should be brought to
trial, and be condemned to the block; will any man say that
the king of France, by becoming the substitute of the
pretender, and suffering in his stead, could not make
atonement for the pretender, so as effectually to support
the authority of the British laws and government, and
discourage all future groundless pretensions to the British
crown? Yet the king of France could plead no perfect
obedience to the British laws. Even the sinner himself, but
upon the supposition of the infinite evil of sin, could, by
his own sufferings, atone for his sins. Yet he could not
exhibit a perfect obedience. Besides; if the bare obedience of Christ have made
atonement, why could not the repentance and perfect
obedience of Christ's people themselves have answered,
instead of the obedience of Christ? Doubtless if they had
suffered the penalty of the divine law, it would have
answered to support the authority of the law, and the vigor
of the divine government, as really as the death of Christ.
And since the eternal sufferings of the people of Christ
would have answered the same end of supporting the authority
of the law as the sufferings of Christ; why would not the
eternal perfect repentance and obedience of the people of
Christ, have answered the same end, as Its obedience in
their behalf? If it would, both the death and obedience of
Christ as our substitute, are entirely in vain. If the elect
had only been converted, and made perfectly and
perseveringly obedient, it would have answered every purpose
both of the death and obedience of Christ. Or if the
obedience of Christ in the flesh were at all necessary, it
was not necessary to support the authority of the law and
government of God; but merely as it was most wise that he
should obey. It was necessary in the same sense only, as
that the wind should, at this moment, blow from the
north-east, and not from the south-west, or from any other
quarter. If the mere active obedience of Christ have made
atonement for sin, it may be difficult to account for the
punishment of any sinners. If obedience without any
demonstration of divine displeasure at sin will answer every
purpose of the divine authority and government, in some
instances, why not in all instances? And if the obedience of
sinners themselves will answer as really as that of Christ,
why might not all men have been led by divine grace to
repentance, and perfect subsequent obedience, and in that
way been saved from the curse of the law? Doubtless they
might; nor was there originally, nor is there now, without
any consideration of the atonement of Christ, any other
necessity of the punishment of any of mankind according to
the law, than that which results from mere sovereign wisdom;
in which sense, indeed, it was necessary that Christ should
be given to be the Saviour of sinners, that Paul should be
saved, and that every other event should take place, just as
it does take place. From our doctrine we also learn the great gain which
accrues to the universe by the death of Christ. It hath been
objected to the idea of atonement now exhibited, that if the
death of Christ be an equivalent to the curse of the law,
which was to have been inflicted on all his people; then
there is on the whole no gain, no advantage to the universe;
that all that punishment from which Christians are saved,
hath been suffered by Christ, and therefore that there is
just as much misery and no more happiness, than there would
have been, had Christ not died. To this I answer, 1. That it is not true that Christ endured an equal
quantity of misery to that which would have been endured by
all his people had they suffered the curse of the law. This
was not necessary, on account of the infinite dignity of his
person. If a king were to condemn his son to lose an ear or
a hand, it would doubtless be esteemed, by all his subjects,
a proof of far greater displeasure in the king, than if he
should order some mean criminal to the gallows; and it would
tend more effectually to support the authority of the law,
for the violation of which this punishment should be
inflicted on the prince. 2. That if it were true that Christ endured the very same
quantity of misery which was due to all his people; still,
by his death, an infinite gain accrues to the universe. For
though the misery, on this supposition, is in both cases the
same, and balances itself; yet the positive happiness
obtained by the death of Christ, infinitely exceeds that
which was lost by Christ. As the eternal Logos was capable
of neither enduring misery, nor losing happiness, all the
happiness lost by the substitution of Christ, was barely
that of the man Christ Jesus, during only thirty-three
years, or rather during the three last years of his life:
because it does not appear, but that during the rest of his
life he was as happy as men in general, and enjoyed as much
or more good than he suffered evil. But the happiness gained
by the substitution of Christ, is that of a great multitude,
which no man can number, of all nations, kindreds, and
people, and tongues. Rev. 7: 9. Now if the happiness of one
man for three years, or at most for thirty-three years, be
equal to that of an innumerable multitude throughout
eternity, with the addition of the greater happiness which
Christ himself must enjoy now that he has brought so many
sons to glory, beyond what he would have enjoyed, if all
these had been plunged in inconceivable and endless misery;
then it may be justly said, on the present hypothesis, that
by the substitution of Christ no advantage is gained to the
universe. But if the latter infinitely exceed the former,
the gain to the universe, even on the supposition that the
sufferings of Christ were equal to those to which all his
people were exposed, is infinite. I may also hence take occasion to oppose an opinion which
appears to me erroneous; which is, that the perfect
obedience of Christ was in a great measure designed to show
us, that the divine law may be obeyed by men. It shows,
indeed, that it may be obeyed by a man in personal union
with the divine nature. But how does this, show that it may
be obeyed by a mere man? If we should also allow that it
shows, that a man born into the world in perfect innocence,
and who is not a fallen creature, may obey the law; yet how
does this prove that it may be obeyed by a fallen creature,
dead in trespasses and sins? It is an undoubted truth, that
there is no inability In men to obey the law, except that
which is of a moral nature, consisting in the disinclination
or disaffection of their own hearts, which does not in the
least excuse them in their disobedience. But this is
manifest by other considerations than the per. fect
obedience of Christ; if it were not, it would not be
manifest at all. Another remark which naturally offers itself in
discoursing on this subject is, that Christ's obedience to
the precepts of the law, without submitting to the curse,
would by no means prove the justice of that curse. This is
the idea of some: that God sent his Son into the world, to
obey the precepts of the law, and that his mere obedience of
these proves the justice both of the precepts and of the
penalty of the law. I have already given the reasons by
which I am made to believe, that the obedience of Christ
does not prove the precepts of the law to be just. But if it
did prove the precepts to be just, it would not therefore
prove the penalty too to be just. As the precepts of any law
may be just and reasonable, yet may be enforced by a penalty
which is unjust and cruel; so the proof that the precept is
just, does not at all prove but that the penalty may be
unjust and cruel. Indeed as the penalty of any law is
designed to support and enforce the precept of that law, so
to prove the justice of the penalty-, proves the justice of
the precept; because not the slightest penalty can be just,
when applied to enforce an unjust precept. But this rule
when inverted, doth not hold good. To prove the justice of a
precept, does by no means prove the justice of the penalty
by which that precept is enforced. So that if Christ have
proved the precepts of the divine law to be just, this by no
means infers the justice of its penalty. On the other hand,
if Christ came to prove the justice of the law, and all that
he has done to this effect have an immediate reference to
the precepts only; and if he have done nothing to establish
the justice of the penal part, considered by itself; the
aspect of the whole will be, that the penal part is
unjustifiable, and that for this reason he did not pretend
to justify it. The subject which hath been under our consideration also
shows us, in what sense the sufferings of Christ were
agreeable to God. It has been said, that it is incredible
that mere pain should be agreeable to a God of infinite
goodness; that therefore the sufferings of Christ were
agreeable to God only as a proof of the strength of the
'virtue of Christ, or of his disposition to obey the divine
law. If by mere pain be meant pain abstracted from the
obedience of Christ, I cannot see why it may not be
agreeable to God. It certainly is in the damned; and for the
same reason might have been, and doubtless was, in the case
of our Lord. The Father was pleased with the pains of his
Son, as they were necessary to support the authority of his
law and government, in the salvation of sinners. Another reflection naturally suggested by this subject
is, that in punishing some sinners according to the curse of
the law, and in requiring an adequate atonement in order to
the salvation of others, God acts, notfrom any contracted,
selfish motives, but from the most noble benevolence and
regard to the public good. It hath often and long since been
made a matter of objection to the doctrines of the future
punishment of the wicked, and of the atonement of Christ,
that they represent the Deity as having regard merely to his
own honor and dignity, and not to the good of his creatures,
and therefore represent him as deficient in goodness. But
can it be pretended to be a proof of goodness in God, to
suffer his own law, which is the perfect rule of virtue, to
fall into contempt? However it might afford relief to some
individuals, if God were to suffer his moral kingdom to be
dissolved; can it be for the general good of the system of
his creatures? Is it not manifestly necessary to the general
good of the created system, that God's moral kingdom be
upholden? and that therefore the authority of the divine
law, and vigor of the divine govermment be maintained? If
so, then it is also necessary to the general good that
punishments be inflicted on the disobedient and lawless; or
that they be pardoned in consequence only of a proper
satisfaction or atonement. So that those very doctrines which of all others are made
matter of the most objection to the divine goodness or
benevolence, are clear proofs of goodness, and are
absolutely necessary to it. If a prince should either make
no laws for the government of his subjects, or should never
execute them, but should suffer all crimes to pass with
impunity, you would by no means esteem him a good prince,
aiming at the good of his subjects; you would not hesitate
to pronounce him either very weak or very wicked. In reflecting on this subject, we may notice the reason
why so many who profess to be advocates for the doctrine of
atonement, yet place the atonement in that in which it does
by no means consist. The principal reason seems to be, that
they have conceived that the idea of Christ's having
suffered an equivalent to the punishment to which all his
people were exposed, is inconsistent with grace in their
pardon. But if I have been so happy as properly to state the
ideas of justice and grace, it appears that there is as much
grace in the pardon of sinners on account of such an
atonement as that just mentioned, as there would be on
account of an atonement consisting in mere obedience; or as
there would be in pardon without any atonement at all. Hence also we see, that the death of Christ in our stead,
is nor useless or in vain. The opposers of Christ's
substitution and atonement assert, that no good end is
answered by the sufferings of an innocent, amiable, and
virtuous person, in the stead of the guilty. But surely to
support the authority of the law and of the moral government
of God, is not a vain or unimportant end. It was not in vain
that Zaleucus, having made a law that all adulterers should
have both their eyes put out, and his own son being the
first who transgressed, put out one of his own eyes and one
of his son's. Hereby he spared his son in part, and yet as
effectually supported the authority of his law, as if it had
been literally executed. Nor was it in vain that, during the
late war, a soldier in the American army, of a robust
constitution, pitying his fellow-soldier of a slender
constitution, who was condemned to receive a certain number
of stripes, petitioned to be put in the place of the
criminal, and actually received the stripes. For the
authority of the martial law was effectually supported, and
perhaps by this means, the life or future health and service
of the criminal were preserved, which would otherwise have
been lost. Neither was the death of Christ, in the stead of sinners,
any injury done to an innocent person. As well may we say
that Zaleucus, or the soldier just mentioned, were injured;
or that a man is injured when another man receives the money
of him, which he voluntarily tenders in payment of the debt
of a third person; or that a man is injured by the surgeon,
who takes off his leg to preserve his life, the man himself
consenting, and desiring him so to do. Again; we may observe in what sense justice and the
divine law are satisfied by the death of Christ; and in what
sense the atonement of Christ is properly called a
satisfaction. It is only the third kind of justice before
mentioned, that is satisfied by the death of Christ. No man,
for the reasons already given, will pretend that commutative
justice is satisfied by Christ; for the controversy between
God and the sinner is not concerning property. Nor is
distributive justice satisfied. If it were, there would
indeed be no more grace in the discharge of the sinner, than
there is in the discharge of a criminal, when he hath
endured the full punishment to which, according to law, he
hath been condemned. If distributive justice were satisfied,
it would have no further claim on the sinner. And to punish
him, when this kind of justice has no claim on him, is to
treat him more unfavorably or severely than his personal
character deserves. If so, the penitent believer, considered
in his own person, deserves, even according to the
strictness of the divine law, no punishment; and that merely
because he repents and believes: and if so, repentance and
faith satisfy the law, or are the curse of it, as I have
already, shown. If distributive justice be satisfied, it
admits of no further punishment, and to punish him further,
would be as positively unjust, as to continue a man's
punishment, after he hath endured the full penalty of any
law. If distributive justice be satisfied by Christ, in the
behalf of sinners, then the rule of distributive justice is
not the personal character of a man, but the character of
his friend, his advocate, or representative; any man has a
right, on the footing of distributive justice, to be treated
according to the character of his friend or representative.
Therefore if a subject rebel against his sovereign, and
procure a man of a most unexceptionable and amiable
character, to represent him and plead his cause before his
severeign, he has a right, on the footing of distributive
justice, to be treated according to the character of his
representative; and if he be not thus treated, he suffers an
injury; he is abused. On this principle, no prince or
magistrate will have a right to punish, for any crime, a
subject who can procure a man of a virtuous life to
represent him and plead his cause. But perhaps it will be said, that distributive justice is
satisfied by the death of Christ, because he placed himself
in our stead, and suffered in our room; and that whenever a
person thus substitutes himself for another, and suffers the
punishment due to that other, that other hath a right to a
discharge, as distributive justice is then satisfied. Now,
according to this objection, the true idea of distributive
justice is, to treat a man either according to his own
sufferings, or according to the sufferings of his
representative. And if according to the sufferings of his
representative, why not according to the obedience of his
representative? And this brings us just where we were; that
every man may, in justice, demand to be treated according to
the character of his representative; which is absurd. Distributive justice, therefore, is not at all satisfied
by the death of Christ. But general justice to the Deity and
to the universe is satisfied. That is done by the death of
Christ which supports the authority of the law, and renders
it consistent with the glory of God and the good of the
whole system, to pardon the sinner. In the same sense the law of God is satisfied by the
death of Christ; I mean as the divine glory and the general
good, which are the great ends of the law, are secured. In
this sense only is the atonement of Christ properly, called
a satisfaction; God is satisfied, as by it his glory and the
good of his system are secured and promoted. Objection. But is not distributive justice displayed in
the death of Christ? Answer. The question is ambiguous; if
the meaning be, is not distributive justice satisfied? I
answer, for the reasons already given, in the negative. If
the meaning be, is there not an exhibition made in the death
and sufferings of Christ, of the punishment to which the
sinner is justly liable? I answer in the affirmative:
distributive justice is, in this sense, displayed in the
death of Christ. But it is no more displayed, than the
punishment of the sinner is displayed in the death of
Christ. It may be proper here to notice the sense in which
justice admits of the salvation of sinners. It hath been
said, that justice admits of several things which it does
not demand; that it admits of the salvation of Paul, but
does not demand it. And it would admit also of the damnation
of Paul, but does not demand that. But in these instances
the word justice is used in two very different senses, which
ought to be carefully distinguished. When it is said justice
admits of the salvation of Paul, the third kind of justice
before described must be intended. The general good admits
it; neither the glory of God, nor the good of the system,
opposes it. But distributive justice, which requires every man to be
treated according to his personal character, does not admit
that Paul should be saved; so far as this kind of justice
says any thing concerning this matter, it demands that Paul
be punished according to law: and if this justice be made
the rule of proceeding in the case, Paul will inevitably be
cast off This kind of justice no more admits of the
salvation of Paul than it admits of the salvation of Judas.
But it is said, that "justice admits of the salvation of
Paul, but does not demand it." Justice to the universe does
demand it, as fully as admit of it, and the universe would
suffer an injury, if he were not to be saved; but justice to
the universe neither demands nor admits of the salvation of
Judas. Whereas distributive justice to Paul personally, as
much demands that be be not saved, as that Judas be not
saved. But if we will make a distinction between what justice
admits and what it demands, the true and only distinction
seems to be this: justice admits of any thing which is not
positively unjust; of any favor however great or manifold;
but it demands nothing but barely what is just, without the
least favor, and which, being refused, positive injustice
would be done. Distributive justice, then, admits of the
salvation of Judas or of any other sinner, as surely no
injustice would be done Judas in his salvation; but it
demands not this, as it is a mere favor, or something beyond
the bounds of mere justice; or it is no injury to Judas,
that he is not saved. Neither does distributive justice
demand the salvation of Paul. But public justice both admits
and demands both the salvation of Paul and the damnation of
Judas. On the other hand, it neither admits nor demands the
damnation of Paul, nor the salvation of Judas. But
distributive justice, according to the present distinction
between the meaning of the words admit and demand, though it
admits both of the salvation and damnation of both Paul and
Judas, yet demands neither the salvation nor damnation of
the one or the other; or, to express the same thing in other
words, no injustice would be done either to Paul or Judas
personally, if they were both saved or both damned.
Distributive justice never demands the punishment of any
criminal, in any instance; because no injury would be done
him, if he were graciously pardoned. It demands only that a
man be not punished being innocent; or be not punished
beyond his demerit; and that he be rewarded according to his
positive merit. These observations may help us to understand a
distinction, which to many hath appeared groundless or
perplexing; I mean the distinction of the merit of
conclignity and merit of congruity. Merit of both these
kinds refers to rewards only, and has no reference to
punishments; and that is deserved by a merit of condignity
which cannot be withholden without positive injury. That is
deserved by a merit of congruity which is a proper
expression of the sense which the person rewarding has, of
the moral excellency of the person rewarded; which, however,
may be withholden without positive injury. Of the former
kind is the merit, which every good and faithful citizen
has, of protection in his person, liberty, and property, and
the merit of a laborer who has earned his wages. These
cannot be withholden without positive injury. Of the latter
kind is the merit, which some eminently wise arid virtuous
citizens have, of distinguishing honors or marks of esteem.
If these be withholden, the proper objects of them may,
indeed, be said to be neglected, but not positively
injured. This subject teaches, also, in what sense God was under
obligation to accept, on the behalf of the sinner, the
mediation and atonement of Christ. It hath been said, that
when Christ offered to make atonement for sinners, God was
under the same obligation to accept the offer, as a creditor
is to accept the proposal of any man who offers to pay the
debt of another. This is not true; because, in matters of
property, all that the creditor hath a right to is his
property. This being offered him, by whomsoever the offer be
made, he has the offer of his right; and if he demand more,
he exceeds his right; and he has no more right to refuse to
give up the obligation, on the offer of a third person to
pay the debt, than to refuse the same when the same offer is
made by the debtor himself All will own, that if a creditor
were to refuse to receive payment and give up the obligation
when the debtor offers payment, it would be abusive and
unjust; and let any man assign a reason why it is not
equally abusive and unjust, not to receive the payment and
to give up the obligation when payment is offered by a third
person. But it is quite otherwise in atoning for crimes in which
distributive, not commutative justice, is concerned. As the
rule of distributive justice is the personal character of
the person to be rewarded or punished, and not property; if
a magistrate refuse to accept any substitute, and insist on
punishing the criminal himself, he treats him no otherwise
than according to his personal character, and the criminal
suffers no injustice or abuse. Nor is the magistrate under
any obligation of distributive justice, or justice to the
criminal himself, to accept a substitute. It is true, that the circumstances of the case may be
such that it may be most conducive to the public good that
the offered substitute be accepted; in this case wisdom and
goodness or public justice will require that it be accepted,
and the criminal discharged. This leads me to observe that it hath also been said,
that when Christ offered to become a substitute and to make
atonement for sinners, God was under no obligation to accept
the proposal. This, I conceive, is as wide of the truth, as
that he was under the same obligation to accept the
proposal, as a creditor is to accept the proposal of a third
person to pay the debt of his friend. The truth is, the
glory of God and the greatest good of the moral system did
require that Christ should become a substitute for sinners,
and that his offered substitution should be accepted by God.
This was dictated and recommended by both wisdom and
goodness. So far, therefore, as wisdom and goodness could
infer an obligation on the Father to accept the substitution
of his Son, he was under obligation to accept it. But this
obligation was only that of the third kind of justice before
explained, a regard to the general good. This subject further teaches us, that that constitution
which requires an atonement in order to the pardon of the
sinner is nothing arbitrary. That divine constitution which
is wise and good, as being necessary to the good of the
moral system, is not arbitrary. But if an atonement was
necessary, in order to support the authority of the divine
law, and the honor, vigor, and even existence of the divine
moral government, while sinners are pardoned, undoubtedly
that constitution which requires an atonement in order to
the pardon of the sinner, is the dictate of wisdom and
goodness, and by no means of an arbitrary spirit. Hence we also learn in what sense the death of Christ
renders God propitious to sinners. It does so only as it
supports the authority of his law and government, and
renders the pardon of sinners consistent with the good of
the system and the glory of God. Finally; this subject teaches the groundlessness of that
objection to the doctrine of atonement, that it represents
the Deity as inexorable. If to refuse to pardon sinners
unless it be in a way which is consistent with the good of
the moral system, is to be inexorable; then that God will
not pardon sinners without atonement, or in a way which is
consistent with the authority of his law, and with the
authority and even existence of his moral government, is
indeed a proof that God is inexorable. But unless it be an
instance of inexorability that God will not pardon sinners,
unless it be in a way which is consistent with the good of
the moral system, there is no ground to object to the
doctrine of atonement, that it represents the Deity as
inexorable. On the other hand, that God requires an
atonement in order to pardon, is an instance and proof of
truly divine goodness; and if he were to pardon without an
atonement, it would prove that he is destitute of goodness,
and regardless not only of his own glory, but of the true
happiness of the system of moral creatures.