SERMON I.
THE NECESSITY OF ATONEMENT.
IN WHOM WE HAVE REDEMPTION THROUGH HIS BLOOD, THE
FORGIVENESS OF SINS, ACCORDING TO THE RICHES OF HIS
GRACE.--Ephesians 1:11.
THE doctrine of the forgiveness of sins is a capital
doctrine of the gospel, and is much insisted on by the
writers of the New Testament; above all, by the author of
this epistle. In our text he asserts that we are forgiven
according to the riches of grace; not merely in the exercise
of grace, as the very term forgiveness implies; but in the
exercise of the riches of grace; importing that forgiveness
is an act of the most free and abundant grace. Yet he also
asserts that this gratuitous forgiveness is in consequence
of a redemption by the blood of Christ. But how are these
two parts of the proposition consistent? If we be, in the
literal sense, forgiven in consequence of a redemption, we
are forgiven on account of the price of redemption
previously paid. How then can we he truly said to be
forgiven; a word which implies the exercise of grace? and
especially how can we be said to be forgiven according to
the riches of grace? This is, at least, a seeming
inconsistence. If our forgiveness be purchased, and the
price of it be already paid, it seems to be a matter of
debt, and not of grace. This difficulty hath occasioned some
to reject the doctrine of Christ's redemption, satisfaction,
or atonement. Others, who have not been driven to that
extremity by this difficulty, yet have been exceedingly
perplexed and embarrassed. Of these last, I freely confess
myself to have been one. Having from my youth devoted myself
to the study of theoretic and practical theology, this has
to me been one of the gordian knots in that science. How far
what shall now be offered towards a solution, ought to
afford satisfaction, is submitted to the judgment of my
candid auditors.
Our text naturally suggests these three inquiries;
Are sinners forgiven through the redemption or atonement
of Jesus Christ only? What is the reason or ground of this
mode of forgiveness? Is this mode of forgiveness consistent
with grace, or according to the riches of grace? Let us
consider these in their order.
I. Are we forgiven through the redemption or atonement of
Jesus Christ only? I say redemption or atonement, because,
in my view, they mutually imply each other. That we are
forgiven through the atonement of Christ, and can be
forgiven in no other way, the Scriptures very clearly teach.
For evidence as to the first of these particulars, I appeal
to the following passages of Scripture, which are indeed but
a few of the many which exhibit the same truth. First, our
text itself: "In whom we have redemption through his blood,
the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his
grace." Rom. 3: 24; "Being justified freely by his grace,
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Acts 20:
28; "To feed the church of God, which be hath purchased with
his own blood." Heb. 9: 12; "By his own blood he entered in
once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption
for us." 1 Pet. 1: 18; "Forasmuch as ye know, that ye were
not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold,
but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without
blemish and without spot." Ibid. chap. 2: 24; "Who his
ownself bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we,
being dead to sin, should live unto righteousness: by whose
stripes ye were healed." Is. 53: 4, 5, 6; "He hath borne our
griefs, and carried our sorrows; he was wounded for our
transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities, the
chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes
we are healed. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us
all." Ibid. 10, 11, 12; "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise
him; he hath put him to grief; when thou shalt make his soul
an offering for sin, he shall see his seed,--he shall bear
their iniquities,--and he bare the sins of many."
The Scriptures also teach the absolute necessity of the
atonement of Christ, and that we can obtain forgiveness and
salvation through that only. The sacrifices appointed to be
made by the ancient Israelites, seem evidently to point to
Christ; and to show the necessity of the vicarious sacrifice
of him, who is therefore said to be "our passover sacrificed
for us;" and to have "given himself for us, an offering and
a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savor;" and "now
once in the end of the world to have appeared, to put away
sin by the sacrifice of himself." 1 Cor. 5: 7. Eph. 5: 2.
Heb. 9: 26. As the ancient Israelites could obtain pardon in
no other way than by those sacrifices, this teaches us that
we can obtain it only by the sacrifice of Christ.
The positive declarations of the New Testament teach the
same truth still more directly, as Luke 24: 25, 26; "O
fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets
have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things,
and to enter into his glory?" verse 46; "Thus it behoved
Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day."
Rom. 3: 25, 26; "Whom God hath set forth to be a
propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his
righteousness,--that he might be just, and the justifier of
him which believeth in Jesus." It seems that God could not
have been just in justifying the believer, had not Christ
been made a propitiation. John 3: 14, 15; "As Moses lifted
up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of man be
lifted up." Heb. 9: 22; "Without shedding of blood is no
remission." 1 Cor. 3: 11; "Other foundation can no man lay,
than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." Acts 4: 12;
"Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is no
other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we must be
saved."
The necessity of the death and atonement of Christ
sufficiently appears by the bare event of his death. If his
death were not necessary, he died in vain. But we cannot
suppose that either be or his Father would have consented to
his death, had it not been absolutely necessary. Even a man
of common wisdom and goodness, would not consent either to
his own death or that of his son, but in a case of
necessity, and in order to some important and valuable end.
Much less can we suppose, that either Christ Jesus the Son
would have consented to his own death, or that the
infinitely wise and good Father would have consented to the
death of his only begotten and dearly beloved Son, in whom
his soul was well pleased, and who was full of grace and
truth, the brightness of his own glory, and the express
image of his person, the chiefest among ten thousand, and
altogether lovely, if there had not been the most urgent
necessity. Especially as this most excellent Son so
earnestly prayed to the Father to except him from death,
Matt. 20: 39; "0 my father, if it be possible, let this cup
pass from me ! Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou
wilt." The Son himself hath told us, John 11 : 42, "That the
Father heareth him always:" and therefore we may be sure,
that if the condition of his pathetic petition had taken
place, if it had been possible that the designs of God in
the salvation of sinners should be accomplished without the
death of Christ, Christ's prayer, in this instance, would
have been an. swered, and he would have been exempted from
death. And since he was not exempted, we have clear evidence
that his death was a matter of absolute necessity.
The necessity of the atonement of Christ is clearly
taught also by the apostle, Gal. 2: 21; "If righteousness
come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain." It is to no
purpose to pretend that the law, in this passage, means the
ceremonial law, because he tells us, chap. 3, 21, "That if
there had been a law given, which could have given life,
verily righteousness should have been by the law." But the
moral law was a law which had been given; and since no law
which had been given could give life, it follows, that
forgiveness and life could not be by the moral law, any more
than by the ceremonial, and that if they could, Christ is
dead in vain.
II. Our next inquiry is, what is the reason or ground of
this mode of forgiveness? or why is an atonement necessary
in order to the pardon of the sinner? I answer, it is
necessary on the same ground, and for the same reasons, as
punishment would have been necessary, if there had been no
atonement made. The ground of both is the same. The question
then comes to this: Why would it have been necessary, if no
atonement had been made, that punishment should be inflicted
on the transgressors of the divine law? This, I suppose,
would have been necessary, to maintain the authority of the
divine law. If that be not maintained, but the law fall into
contempt, the contempt will fall equally on the legislator
himself; his authority will be despised and his government
weakened.
And as the contempt shall increase, which may be expected
to increase, in proportion to the neglect of executing the
law, the divine government will approach nearer and nearer
to a dissolution, till at length it will be totally
annihilated.
But when moral creatures are brought into existence,
there must be a moral government. It cannot be reconciled
with the wisdom and goodness of God, to make intelligent
creatures and leave them at random without moral law and
government. This is the dictate of reason from the nature of
things. Besides the nature of things, we have in the present
instance fact, to assist our reasoning. God hath in fact
given a moral law and established a moral government over
his intelligent creatures. So that we have clear proof, that
inflnite wisdom and goodness judged it to be necessary to
put intelligent creatures under moral law and government.
But in order to a moral law, there must be a penalty;
otherwise it would be mere advice, but no law. In order to
support the authority and vigor of this law, the penalty
must be inflicted on transgressors. If a penalty be
denounced, indeed, but never inflicted, the law becomes no
law, as really as if no penalty had been annexed to it. As
well might no law have been made or published, as that a law
be published, with an the most awful penalties, and these
never be inflicted. Nay, in some respects it would be much
better and more reconcilable with the divine perfections. It
would be more consistent, and show that the legislator was
not ignorant, either of his own want of power to carry a law
into effect, or of the rights of his subjects, or of the
boundaries between right and wrong. But to enact a law and
not execute it, implies a weakness of some kind or other;
either an error of judgment, or a consciousness of a
depraved design in making the law, or a want of power to
carry it into effect, or some other defect. Therefore such a
proceeding as this is dishonorable and contemptible; and by
it both the law and legislator not only appear in a
contemptible light, but really are contemptible.
Hence, to execute the threatening of the divine law, is
necessary to preserve the dignity and authority of the law,
and of the author of it, and to the very existence of the
divine moral government. It is no impeachment of the divine
power and wisdom to say, that it is impossible for God
himself to uphold his moral government over intelligent
creatures, when once his law hath fallen into contempt. He
may indeed govern them by irresistible force, as he governs
the material world; but he cannot govern them by law, by
rewards and punishments.
If God maintain the authority of his law, by the
infliction of the penalty, it will appear that he acts
consistently in the legislative and executive parts of his
government. But if he were not to inflict the penalty, he
would act, and appear to act, an inconsistent part; or to be
inconsistent with himself. If the authority of the divine
law be supported by the punishment of transgressors, it will
most powerfully tend to restrain all intelligent creatures
from sin. But if the authority of the law be not supported,
it will rather encourage and invite to sin, than restrain
from it.
For these reasons, which are indeed all implied in
supporting the dignity and authority of the divine law, it
would have been necessary, had no atonement for sin been
made, that the penalty of the law be inflicted on
transgressors.
If in this view of the matter it should be said, though
for the reasons before mentioned it is necessary that the
penalty of the law, in many instances, or in most instances,
be inflicted, yet why is it necessary that it should be
inflicted in every instance? Why could not the Deity, in a
sovereign way, without any atonement, have forgiven at least
some sinners? Why could not the authority of the law have
been sufficiently supported, without the punishment of every
individual transgressor? We find that such strictness is not
necessary or even subservient to the public good, in human
governments; and why is it necessary in the divine? To these
inquiries I answer by other inquiries. Why, on the
supposition of no atonement, would it have been necessary
that the penalty of the law should be inflicted in any
instance? Why could not the Deity, in a sovereign way,
without any atonement, have pardoned all mankind? I presume
it will be granted, for the reasons before assigned, that
such a proceeding as this would be inconsistent with the
dignity and authority of the divine law and government. And
the same consequence, in a degree, follows from every
instance of pardon in this mode. It is true the ends of
human governments are tolerably answered, though in some
instances the guilty are suffered to pass with impunity. But
as imperfection attends all human affairs, so it attends
human governments in this very particular, that there are
reasons of state which require, or the public good requires,
that gross criminals, in some instances, be dismissed with
impunity, and without atonement. Thus, because the
government of David was weak, and the sons of Zeruiah were
too hard for him, Joab, a most atrocious murderer, could
not, during the life of David, be brought to justice. In
other instances, atrocious criminals are pardoned, in order
to obtain information against others still more atrocious
and dangerous to the community. In many instances the
principals only, in certain high crimes, are punished; the
rest being led away by artifice and misrepresentation, are
not supposed to deserve punishment. And it is presumed that,
in every instance wherein it is really for the good of the
community to pardon a criminal, without proper satisfaction
for his crime, it is because of either some weakness in the
particular state of the government, under which the pardon
is granted; or some imperfection in the laws of that state,
not being adapted to the particular case; or some
imperfection attending all human affairs. But as not any one
of these is supposable in the divine government, there is no
arguing conclusively, from pardons in human governments, to
pardons in the divine.
It may be added, that in every instance in human
governments in which just laws are not strictly executed,
the government is so far weakened, and the character of the
rulers, either legislative or executive, suffers, either in
point of ability or in point of integrity. If it be granted
that the law is just, and condemns sin to no greater
punishment than it deserves, and if God were to pardon it
without atonement, it would seem, that he did not hate sin
in every instance, nor treat it as being what it really is,
infinitely vile.
For these reasons, it appears that it would have been
necessary-, provided no atonement had been made, that the
penalty of the law should have been inflicted, even in every
instance of disobedience: and for the same reasons doubtless
was it necessary, that if any sinners were to he pardoned,
they should be pardoned only in consequence of an adequate
atonement. The atonement is the substitute for the
punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer
the same ends of supporting the authority of the law, the
dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency
of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the
atonement it appears that God is determined that his law
shall be supported; that it shall not be despised or
transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a
bitter thing to sin against God.
The very idea of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, is
something which, to the purposes of supporting the authority
of the divine law, and the dignity and consistency of the
divine government, is equivalent to the punishment of the
sinner, according to the literal threatening of the law.
That which answers these purposes being done, whatever it
be, atonement is made, and the way is prepared for the
dispensation of pardon. In any such case, God can be just
and yet the justifier of the sinner. And that which is
sufficient to answer these purposes has been done for us,
according to the gospel plan, I presume none can deny, who
believe that the eternal word was made flesh and dwelt among
us, and that he, the only begotten and well beloved Son of
God, John 1: 14, bare our sins in his own body on the tree,
1 Peter 2: 24, and gave himself a sacrifice to God for us,
Eph. 5: 2.
But perhaps some who may readily grant that what Christ
hath done and suffered is undoubtedly sufficient to atone
for the sins of his people, may also suppose, that if God
had seen fit so to order it, we might have made a sufficient
atonement for our own sins. Or whether they believe in the
reality and sufficiency of the atonement of Christ or not,
they may suppose that we might have atoned, or even now may
atone, for our own sins. This hypothesis therefore demands
our attention.
If we could have atoned, by any means, for our own sins,
it must have been either by our repentance and reformation,
or by enduring a punishment, less in degree or duration,
than that which is threatened in the law as the wages of
sin. No other way for us to atone for our own sins appears
to be conceivable. But if we attend to the subject, we shall
find that we can make no proper atonement in either of these
ways.
1. We could not make atonement for our sins by repentance
and reformation. Repentance and reformation are a mere
return to our duty, which we ought never to have forsaken or
intermitted. Suppose a soldier deserts the service into
which he is enlisted, and at the most critical period not
only forsakes his general and the cause of his country, but
joins the enemy and exerts himself to his utmost in his
cause, and in direct opposition to that of his country; yet,
after twelve months spent in this manner, he repents and
returns to his duty and his former service : will this
repentance and reformation atone for his desertion and
rebellion? will his repentance and return, without
punishment, support the authority of the law against
desertion and rebellion, and deter others from the Eke
conduct equally as the punishment of the delinquent
according to law? It cannot be pretended. Such a treatment
of the soldier would express no indignation or displeasure
of the general at the conduct of the soldier; it would by no
means convince the army or the world, that it was a most
heinous crime to desert ind join the standard of the enemy.
Just so in the case under consideration. The language of
forgiving sinners barely on their repentance is) that he who
sins shall repent; that the curse of the law is repentance;
that he who repents shall suffer, and that he deserves, no
further punishment. But this would be so far from an
effectual tendency to discourage and restrain from sin, that
it would greatly encourage to the commission and indulgence
of it; as all that sinners would have to fear, on this
supposition, would be not the wrath of God, nor any thing
terrible, but the greatest blessing to which any man in this
life can attain, repentance. If this were the condition of
forgiving sinners, not only no measures would be taken to
support the divine law, but none to vindicate the character
of God himself, or to show that he acts a consistent part,
and agreeably to his own law; or that he is a friend to
virtue and an enemy to vice. On the other hand, he would
rather appear as a friend to sin and vice, or indifferent
concerning them. What would you think of a prince who should
make a law against murder, and should threaten it with a
punishment properly severe, yet should declare that none who
should be guilty of that crime and should repent, should be
punished? or if he did not positively declare this, yet
should in fact suffer all murderers, who repented of their
murders, to pass with impunity? Undoubtedly you would
conclude that he was either a very weak or a very wicked
prince; either that he was unable to protect his subjects,
or that he had no real regard to their lives or safety,
whether in their individual or collective capacity.
2. Neither could we make atonement by any sufferings
short of the full punishment of sin. Because the very idea
of atonement is something done, which, to the purpose of
supporting the authority of the law, the dignity and
consistency of divine government and conduct, is fully
equivalent to the curse of the law, and on the round of
which, the sinner may be saved from that curse. But no
sufferings endured by the sinner himself, short of the curse
of the law, can be to these purposes equivalent to that
curse; any more than a less number or quantity can be equal
to a greater. Indeed a less degree or duration of suffering
endured by Christ the Son of God, may, on account of the
infinite dignity and glory of his person, be an equivalent
to the curse of the law endured by the sinner; as it would
be a far more striking demonstration of a king's
displeasure, to inflict, in an igmominious manner, on the
body of his own son, forty stripes save one, than to punish
some obscure subject with death. But when the person is the
same, it is absurd to suppose that a less degree or duration
of pain can be equal to a greater, or can equally strike
terror into the minds of spectators, and make them fear and
no more do any such wickedness. Deut. 13: 11.
Besides; if a less degree or duration of punishment,
inflicted on the sinner, would answer all the purposes of
supporting the authority of the divine law, &c., equally
as that punishment which is threatened in the law; it
follows that the punishment which is threatened in the law
is too great, is unjust, is cruel and oppressive; which
cannot be as long as God is a just being.
Thus it clearly appears, that we could never have atoned
for our own sins. If therefore atonement be made at all, it
must be made by some other person: and since, as we before
argued, Christ the Son of God hath been appointed to this
work-, we may be sure that it could be done by no other
person of inferior dignity.
It may be inquired of those who deny the necessity of the
atonement of Christ, whether the mission, work, and death of
Christ were at all necessary in order to the salvation of
sinners. If they grant that they were necessary, as they
exhibit the strongest motives to repentance, I ask further,
could not God by any revelation or motives otherwise,
whether externally or internally exhibited, lead sinners to
repentance? We find he did in fact, without the mission,
work, and death of Christ, lead the saints of the Old
Testament to repentance. And doubtless in the same way, he
might have produced the same effect, on men of modern times.
Why then doth the Scripture say, "Other foundation can no
man lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ:" and,
"neither is there salvation in any other?" If it be said
that these texts are true, as God hath seen fit to adopt and
establish this mode of salvation, it occurs at once, that
then it may with equal truth be said, concerning those who
were converted by the preaching of Paul, other foundation
could no man lay, for their salvation, than the apostle
Paul. In this sense, too, every event which ever takes
place, is equally necessary as the mission and death of
Christ: and it was in no other sense necessary, that Christ
should be sent and die, than that a sparrow should fall, or
not fall, to the ground. In short, to say that the mission
and death of Christ were necessary, because God had made
this constitution, is to resolve all into the sovereignty of
God, and to confess that no reason of Christ's mission and
death is assignable.
Besides, if the mission, death, and resurrection of
Christ, and the knowledge of them, he, by divine
constitution, made necessary to the salvation of sinners,
this will seem to be wholly inconsistent with the
fundamental principle of the system of those who deny the
atonement of Christ; I mean the principle, that it is not
reconcilable with the perfections of God to refuse a pardon
to any who repent. If bare repentance and reformation be the
ground of pardon, doubtless all who repent, though ever so
ignorant of Christ, his death and resurrection, and of the
motives to repentance therein exhibited, are entitled to
pardon; and if so, in what sense will the Socinians say, the
mission and death of Christ are necessary to pardon? Not,
surely, as purchasing salvation, for even those who are
ignorant of them; this is abhorrent to their whole system.
Not as exhibiting the strongest motives to repentance;
because, in the case now supposed, these motives are
perfectly unknown. And they will not say, it is impossible
for any to repent who are ignorant of Christ.
Again, how is it more consistent with the divine
perfections to confine pardon and salvation to the narrow
limits of those who know and are influenced by the motives
to repentance, implied in the death and resurrection of
Christ, than to the limits of those who repent and depend on
the atonement of Christ?
It may be further inquired of those gentlemen mentioned
above, whether the pardon of the penitent be according to
the divine law, or according to the gospel. If it be a
constitution of the law, that every penitent be pardoned,
what then is the gospel? And wherein does the grace of the
latter, exceed that of the former? Besides, is it not
strange to suppose that bare law knows any thing of
repentance and of the promise of pardon on repentance?
Surely such a law must be a very gracious law; and a very
gracious law, and a very gracious gospel, seem to be very
nearly one and the same thing. It has been commonly
understood that the divine law is the rule of justice. If
so, and it be a provision of the law that every penitent be
acquitted from punishment; then surely there is no grace at
all in the acquittal of the penitent, as the gentlemen, to
whom I now refer, pretend there is none on the supposition
of the satisfaction of Christ. Again, if the law secure
impunity to all penitents, then all the terror or punishment
which the law threatens, is either repentance itself, or
that wise and wholesome discipline which is necessary to
lead to repentance; these are the true and utmost curse of
the law. But neither of these is any curse at all; they are
at least among the greatest blessings which can be bestowed
on those who need them. But if it be granted that the bare
law of God does not secure pardon to the penitent, but
admits of his punishment, it will follow that the punishment
of the penitent would be nothing opposed to justice. Surely
God hath not made an unjust law. It also follows, that to
punish the penitent would be not at all inconsistent with
the divine perfections; unless God hath made a law which
cannot, in any instance, be executed consistently with his
own perfections. And if the punishment of the penitent,
provided no atonement had been made, would not be
inconsistent with justice, or with the perfections of God,
who will say, that the pardon of the penitent, on the sole
footing of an atonement, is inconsistent with either?
If neither strict justice, nor the divine law founded on
justice, nor the divine perfections, without an atonement,
secure pardon to all who repent, what will become of the
boasted argument of the Socinians, against the atonement,
that God will certainly pardon and save, and that it is
absurd and impious to suppose, that he will not pardon and
save all who repent? Are the Socinians themselves certain,
that God will not do that which eternal justice, his own
law, and his own perfections, allow him to do? The dilemma
is this:--eternal justice either requires that every
penitent be pardoned in consequence of his repentance
merely, or it does not. If it do require this, it follows,
that pardon is an act of justice and not of grace; therefore
let the Socinians be forever silent on this head. It also
follows, that repentance answers, satisfies, fulfils, the
divine law, so that, in consequence of it, the law has no
further demand on the sinner. It is therefore either the
complete righteousness of the law, or the complete curse of
the law; for cursed is every one that continueth not in all
things written in the book of the law to do them. It also
follows, that sin is no moral evil. Doubtless that which
deserves no punishment, or token of the divine displeasure,
is no moral evil. But the utmost that justice, on this
hypothesis, requires of the sinner, is repentance, which is
no token of the divine displeasure, but an inestimable
blessing. It also follows, that as eternal justice is no
other than the eternal law of God, grace and truth, life and
immortality came and were brought to light by Moses, since
the law came by him; that the law contains exceeding great
and precious promises, which promises however, exceeding
great and precious as they are, are no more than assurances,
that we shall not be injured. It follows, in the last place,
that justice and grace, law and gospel, are perfectly
synonymous terms.
Or if the other part of the dilemma be taken, that
eternal justice does not require that every penitent be
pardoned; who knows but that God may see fit to suffer
justice, in some instances, to take place? who will say that
the other divine perfections are utterly inconsistent with
justice? or that wisdom, goodness, and justice cannot
co-exist in the same character? or that the law of God is
such that it cannot be executed in any instance,
consistently with the divine character? These would be bold
assertions indeed; let him who avows them, at the same time
prove them. Indeed he must either prove these assertions, or
own that justice requires the pardon of every penitent, and
abide the consequences; or renounce the doctrine, that the
divine perfections require that every penitent be pardoned,
without an atonement.
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