CHAPTER II:
SOME OBSTACLES POINTED OUT, WHICH
STOOD IN THE WAY OF GOD'S PARDONING SINNERS WITHOUT AN
ATONEMENT
THAT some atonement was necessary, is
so clearly revealed in Scripture, and so evident from the
event of Christ's death, that among those who have professed
to believe the Bible, it has never been extensively denied.
The reasons why it was necessary, have furnished a subject
of more dispute. Some have supposed it was necessary to
conciliate the divine feelings, and render God propitious.
They have imagined, that when man sinned, the anger of God
was so enkindled against him, and his indignation so
excited, as to exclude from his bosom all compassion towards
him, and all disposition to do him good; and hence that the
atonement was necessary to cool the divine anger, and to
produce in the mind of God, a disposition more favorable to
the sinner. In short, that it was necessary Christ should
suffer, and die on the cross, that the Supreme Being might
become compassionate towards sinners.
But this differs very widely from the
view which the Holy Scriptures give us of this subject. They
represent the Supreme Being as feeling tenderly
compassionate towards sinners, antecedently to the
atonement, and as being no more compassionate towards them
since Christ died, than he was before. If there had been no
atonement, his compassion would have been the same. If
atonement had been impossible, or, in the view of infinite
wisdom, ineligible, still the divine compassion would have
been just as great, as it is now since Christ has died. In
this case, though God would have been under a moral
necessity of executing the penalty of his law upon sinners,
yet he would have felt the same compassion and kindness
towards them which he now feels; and if it could have been
consistent to do them any good, he would have been as much
inclined to do it as he now is.
We have abundant evidence in the
death of Christ itself, that his death was not necessary to
induce the Supreme Being to exercise benevolence, and the
tenderest compassion towards sinners. For surely, if God had
not been benevolent, if he had not been gracious, and full
of compassion to sinners, he would never have concerted the
scheme of atonement, at infinite expense, to do them good.
If he had not already loved the world, it is inconceivable
that he should have given his only begotten and well-beloved
Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but
have everlasting life. Accordingly, the Scriptures evidently
lead us to view the gift of Christ, to a lost world, as a
fruit of that tender compassion, and as a wonderful
expression of that love, which God felt towards sinners,
before any atonement was made for them. "God commendeth his
love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, in due
time, Christ died for the ungodly." Rom. 5:8. "Herein is
love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent
his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." 1 John 4:10.
This same love and compassion, under the influence of which
God gave his Son to be a sacrifice for sin, must forever
have remained his immutable disposition, even if Christ had
never died.
The scheme which supposes atonement
necessary that a change might be produced in the personal
feelings of the Divine Being or to render him compassionate
towards sinners, presents a very unscriptural idea, both of
the nature of sin, and of the character of God. It
represents sin as being injurious to God in a private
personal capacity only; and it represents God as being in
the highest degree inexorable. For, if sin be injurious to
God in a private personal capacity only, and he be not an
inexorable, but a compassionate being, he might certainly
pardon, at least as many sinners as repent, without any
atonement whatever. But sin should not be considered in this
light. It is an offence against God, in a public capacity,
as the Supreme Governor of the universe. Hence,
notwithstanding God is infinite in benevolence and
compassion, he cannot grant pardon to sinners, unless it can
be done under such circumstances, and in such a way, as
reader it consistent with the highest interest of the great
community over which his government extends. "If wisdom
obligeth a temporal prince, in his narrow sphere, on several
accounts, duly to guard and qualify his pardons; how much
more is it reasonable and expedient, that the Father and
Ruler of all things, whose government comprehends and
inspects the vast systems of intelligent natures that are,
and all that, to all eternity, may possibly be; how much
more reasonable is it, that he should order the grand
dispensation of granting pardons to a sinful world, in a
proper and suitable manner."
If, with the difficulties in view
which have stood in the way of dispensing pardon, even among
temporal princes, we place ourselves back, in our
imagination to the time when the parents of our race first
sinned, and inquire why God might not continue them in a
state of happiness, notwithstanding their transgression, it
is believed difficulties in the way, of very serious
importance, may be easily discovered. Though we certainly
shall find no want of kindness and compassion in the divine
feelings, yet other difficulties may readily be perceived,
to remove which an atonement was indispensably necessary, as
they were, otherwise, wholly insurmountable. God had given
his rational creatures a law, as the rule of their conduct,
and sanctioned this law with an awful penalty. Instead of
continuing obedient to this law, and conforming to this
rule, our first parents departed from it, and transgressed.
If, in these circumstances, God had directly pardoned them,
and continued them in a state of happiness, without any
adequate atonement, would not his character have appeared
questionable, in the view of other intelligent beings? By
such a procedure, would he not have given rational creatures
reason to conclude, or at least to suspect, that he had
either given them a law which he did not esteem good, or
that he was destitute of a disposition to vindicate and
support one, which he did esteem good? In this way, then,
how could he declare his righteousness? How could he appear
just? Perhaps, indeed, on a careful inquiry, it may be found
evident, that, if God had pardoned sinners without an
atonement, he would have appeared very unjust in several
things, which are infinitely important to the
universe.
1. He would have appeared unjust to
his holy law. It is unjust to treat any thing with less
respect than it really deserves. A law cannot be treated
with respect, unless it is executed. Every good law ought to
be respected; and, therefore, ought to be executed; while a
bad law is entitled to no respect; and, therefore, ought not
to be executed. Hence, to decline executing any law is to
treat that law as a bad one. It is treating it as every wise
and good being would treat a bad law. If, then, any being
should treat a good law in this manner, he would treat it
with great disrespect. He would practically say it ought to
be treated as a bad law; which must be exceedingly
disrespectful, and of course highly unjust. Every one must
see that to treat a good man, who deserves high respect, as
a bad man who deserves no respect, would be highly unjust.
The case is precisely the same with respect to a law. To
treat a good law as a bad one ought to be treated, is, in
the nature of things, as unjust as to treat a good man as a
bad one ought to be treated.
Now the law of God is infinitely holy
and just and good; and, being such, is infinitely deserving
of respect; and, since God is an infinitely just and good
being, it must be morally impossible, that he should treat
his law in any other manner than it ought to be treated. He
cannot treat it disrespectfully. But mankind have sinned,
and transgressed this law; for which transgression it
condemns them to eternal misery. If, in these circumstances,
God had given up the penalty of the law, and offered pardon
to guilty man, without an atonement, he would have treated
the law precisely as a bad law ought to be treated; and, of
course, with the highest injustice and disrespect. But if,
when man sinned, God had executed the penalty on him, he
would have treated the law with respect, as a good law ought
to be treated; and, since the law is perfectly good, this
would have been to treat it justly, or as it deserves to be
treated. Thus any procedure which should diminish aught from
this respect, would be injustice to the law. If, then, the
penalty should be remitted, something else must be done,
which would manifest for the law as much respect as the
complete execution of its penalty; otherwise, the law must
be treated unjustly. But if any thing of this kind could be
done, then God might grant pardon to sinners without doing
any injustice to the law; because, in bestowing pardon in
this way, he would show as much respect for his law as he
could show by executing its penalty. Any thing which should
fully answer this purpose, must be, so far, a complete
atonement. It is obvious, therefore, that, if sinners were
to be pardoned, atonement was necessary, in order that
proper respect might be shown to the divine law.
Besides, if God had pardoned sinners
without any atonement, he would not only have treated his
law with great disrespect, but he would have utterly failed
in the support of its authority. There is no way in which a
violated law can be supported, without either executing its
penalty, or doing something else, which, as a substitute,
will answer the same ends. To neglect the execution of the
penalty, when the law is violated, is, in effect, to destroy
the existence of the law to which it is annexed; for a law,
destitute of authority, is, in reality, no law. But every
good law certainly has a just claim upon the lawgiver, to
cause its authority to be respected. Hence, if God, by
neglecting to execute his law, should destroy its authority,
it is manifest that he would treat it with the greatest
injustice. If, when mankind sinned, God had proceeded to
execute on them the penalty of his law, he would, in this
way, have completely supported its authority; and, in this
respect, have done it justice. But, without executing the
penalty, he could not be just to his law, unless something
could be done, which, as a substitute, would as fully
support its authority. Any thing which would do this, would
be, in this respect, a satisfactory atonement. On the ground
of such an atonement, God might appear just to his law in
pardoning transgressors; because pardoning them, in this
way, would not injure its authority. But if God had pardoned
sinners without such an atonement, he must, of necessity,
have destroyed the life and authority of an infinitely good
law; and this must have been infinite injustice. Atonement
was necessary, therefore, that sinners might be pardoned,
consistently with doing justice to the law.
2. If God had pardoned sinners
without an atonement, he must have been unjust to his
kingdom.
That a king may be just to his
kingdom, he must adopt all proper means to promote its best
interest. That this may be attained, one thing, which is
essentially necessary, is, that peace and harmony may be
secured as far as possible. But that peace and harmony may
be secured among moral beings, they must be placed under the
authority of good and wholesome laws, which are calculated
to discountenance vice, and encourage virtue. There is no
other way in which moral beings can be properly governed.
If, then, a king desires to promote the interest and
happiness of his kingdom, this desire will lead him to enact
good laws for its government; laws which have a tendency to
restrain and suppress the various kinds of wickedness which
disturb the peace of society. But every good law must be
enforced with some suitable penalty. Should a law be enacted
without any penalty, however suitable and important its
provisions, it must be destitute of all authority. It would
be of the nature of advice, rather than of law. For it could
have no more power or tendency than mere advice, to restrain
from immorality. But if it be necessary that vice should be
suppressed or restrained, that the best interest of a
kingdom may be secured, it must be equally necessary that
efficient laws should be made against it; and, that laws may
be of this character, they must be enforced with proper
penalties.
Every king, therefore, is under
obligation to his kingdom, to enact laws, enforced with
suitable penalties, against the practice of vice. If he do
otherwise, he must conduct towards his kingdom with the
greatest injustice. Because, in no other way can he possibly
secure the great object of government.
But if the well being of a kingdom
require that laws be enacted against vice, and enforced with
penalties, it must equally require that these laws be
faithfully executed. However good laws may be in themselves,
if they are not carried into execution, they lose their
force and energy, and utterly fail of securing the ends for
which they were designed. A good king, therefore, having
made laws for the benefit of his kingdom, will be very
careful to have them executed. Should any king do otherwise
he would not promote the best interest of his kingdom.
Instead of restraining, he would encourage wickedness. His
subjects, perceiving that he disregarded and slighted his
own laws, would be encouraged to disregard and slight them
likewise. Seeing the laws were not executed, they would not
fear the penalty. They would be under no more restraint than
if no laws existed. The kingdom would be filled with vice
and confusion, and would soon come to an end. Whenever any
government ceases to execute the penalty of a law, that law
is virtually repealed, because it ceases to produce any
effect, and becomes a nullity. Some governments seldom
repeal laws in any other way. Whenever any law is judged to
be improper, or no longer necessary, instead of being
formally repealed, the execution of it is discontinued. The
penalty is no longer inflicted. This is designed to answer,
and does really answer, the purpose of a repeal. It is
necessary, therefore, in order that any king may be just to
his kingdom, that he should not only enact good laws,
enforced with proper penalties, but that he should cause
these laws to be faithfully executed.
All this is as necessary in the
divine government, as in human governments, and indeed as
much more necessary, as the former is more important than
the latter. It is, in the nature of things, impossible, that
God should govern moral beings, as moral beings, in any
other way than by laws. It is not intended, that God has not
power enough to govern them by impulse, as he governs the
material world; for he unquestionably has. This, however,
would not be to govern them as moral beings, but as material
objects. God may as well govern material objects, as such,
by the influence of motives, as he can govern moral beings,
as such, without the authority of laws. When God gave
existence to intelligent beings, he was under the necessity
either of leaving them to themselves, without retaining any
government over them, or of placing them under the authority
of a moral law. For, since it is absurd to suppose a race of
moral beings governed as such, without moral laws, it
follows, that God must govern moral beings by laws, or else
exercise no government over them. But it must be obvious,
that it is utterly irreconcilable with wisdom and goodness,
to create intelligent beings, and then leave them without
government. It clearly results, therefore, that God was
under a moral necessity of placing moral beings under moral
laws. It must be evident, moreover, that a penalty was no
less necessary to give efficacy to the law of God than it is
to any other law. Hence it follows, that when God placed
intelligent beings under a moral law, he was under a moral
necessity of enforcing that law with a proper penalty. He
is, also, under the same necessity of executing the law, by
inflicting the penalty on every transgressor; unless
something can be devised, which will, as a substitute,
equally secure the life and energy of the law.
From what has already been said, it
is evident that the law of God was necessary to secure the
best interest of his kingdom, by discountenancing
disobedience or wickedness. Justice to his kingdom required
that such a law should be given to his moral subjects;
because its best interests could not be secured in any other
way. But no law can have any influence to deter moral beings
from vice, unless enforced by a proper penalty; nor can it
continue to have influence, unless the penalty is executed
when the law is violated. Hence if when God gave a law to
the subjects of his kingdom, prohibiting wickedness, he had
suffered it to be transgressed with impunity, the law would
have had no tendency to restrain them. Every law must be
enforced, or its authority must cease. If, when mankind
transgressed the divine law, they had been suffered to
escape with impunity, it must entirely have destroyed the
authority and force of the law. Moral beings would have
perceived that it was not the determination of God to
execute the penalty of his law. When they had learned this,
all the restraints which the law had imposed on them would
be immediately removed. But if, instead of this, moral
beings perceive that God is determined to support his law by
executing its penalty they will be under a powerful
restraint, because they will be afraid to transgress, lest
the penalty should be inflicted on them. In no other way is
it possible that the law should impose any restraint, which
might not have been equally imposed by mere
advice.
If, when man transgressed, God had
executed the penalty on him, this would have afforded
evidence to all moral beings that he was determined to
execute the penalty of his law on transgressors. This would
have had a powerful tendency to restrain them from
disobedience. They would have been afraid to transgress. Had
God done this, therefore, he would have done something which
would tend to deter others from transgression, and to secure
peace and order in his kingdom. In this way he would have
been just to his kingdom. But if when man became a sinner by
transgressing the divine law, God had pardoned him without
any atonement, this would have been evidence to intelligent
beings that he was not determined to execute the penalty of
his law. They would, of course, have ceased to be afraid of
the penalty, and the law would no longer have imposed any
restraint upon them. If, then, God had pardoned sinners
without an atonement, he would not have done any thing to
deter others from disobedience. Instead of preventing, he
would have encouraged wickedness. For when moral beings
perceived that God did not respect his own law, they would
have been encouraged to treat it with disrespect. When they
perceived that God did not honor it, by supporting its
authority, they would have been encouraged to dishonor it,
by disobeying its precepts. In this way, instead of
deterring moral beings from disobedience, God would have
encourage them in it. This, instead of promoting and
securing, would have destroyed the best interests of his
subjects. Hence if God had pardoned sinners without an
atonement, he must have been infinitely unjust to his
kingdom. If, however, any thing by way of atonement could be
done which would tend to deter others from disobedience, as
effectually as would the execution of the penalty of the law
on transgressors, God might, out of respect to this, pardon
transgressors and be just to his kingdom still. But any
atonement which would not be as effectual in deterring
others from disobedience, as the execution of the penalty of
the law would be, must be insufficient; because this would
not secure the good of the kingdom so effectually. The
execution of the penalty of the law on those subjects who
had transgressed, would have deterred other moral subjects,
from transgression, and in this way have done justice to the
kingdom; but justice could not be done by any thing short of
this, unless it were something which, as a substitute, would
as fully answer the same purpose; that is, be equally
effectual in deterring others from disobedience. It was
necessary, therefore, that there should be an atonement in
order that God "might be just, and the justifier of" those
who had transgressed his law.
3. If God had pardoned sinners
without any atonement, he would have been unjust to
himself.
Every good being, in order to do
justice to his own character, must manifest his goodness. A
wise being, in order to do justice to his character, must
manifest his wisdom; or, at least, he must not manifest any
thing which is opposite to wisdom. All must allow that if
one being should knowingly give a wrong representation of
the character of another, who is wise and good, he would be
very unjust. But if a good and wise being should give a
wrong representation of his own character (if this were
possible) there would be, the same injustice done, which
there would if the same representation were made by another.
The injury done to the good character would be the same in
the one case as in the other. Hence it must be evident that
if God is good, if he is wise, and if he is consistent in
his conduct, he must manifest his goodness and his wisdom,
or be very unjust to his own character. But if God had
pardoned sinners without any atonement, he could not have
manifested either his goodness, wisdom, or consistency of
conduct. This may clearly appear from the following
considerations.
First. In this way, he could not have
manifested any regard for holiness, or any hatred of
sin.
By God's pardoning a sinner is meant
his receiving him to favor, and treating him as if he had
never sinned. If, therefore, he had pardoned sinners without
any atonement, it must have been impossible, in the nature
of things, for him to have given intelligent beings any
reason to believe that he is more opposed to sin than to
holiness. For, in this case, he would have treated sinners
in the same manner that he treats holy beings. He would have
put no difference between the holy and the profane. He would
have manifested no more disapprobation of the disobedient
than of the obedient; nor any more complacency in the
obedient than in the disobedient. It is plain, therefore,
that in this way he could not have manifested any regard for
holiness nor hatred of sin. Hence he would have done
infinite injustice to his own character. He never could have
appeared an object of holy love and reverence. Holy beings
never could have felt safe in his hands. They must have lost
that confidence and delight in his character, which resulted
from contemplating him as a being who loved righteousness
and hated iniquity.
It is vain to object to this, that
God might have manifested his hatred of sin by a public
declaration of it, even though he had pardoned, sinners.
There is no more sure method of determining what any being
is, than by ascertaining what he does. The declarations of
no being can command rational belief, while these
declarations are manifestly contradicted by his actions. If
an earthly sovereign should treat his obedient and
disobedient subjects precisely in the same manner, they
would both conclude, that disobedience is just as pleasing
to him as obedience. If a parent should neglect to punish
his disobedient child, and to reward the obedient, they
would justly come to the same conclusion. No professions of
the sovereign or of the parent to the contrary would command
rational belief, because their actions would contradict
them. The case would be precisely the same with respect to
the Supreme Being, if he should profess a regard to holiness
and a hatred of sin, and not act accordingly.
If, when mankind sinned, God had
executed the penalty of his law upon them, this would have
manifested his hatred of sin. By this, therefore, he would
have appeared just to his own character. But in no other way
could he be just to himself, unless it were by something,
which, as a substitute for the execution of the penalty of
the law, would make an equally bright display of his hatred
of sin. If any thing of this kind could be done, which would
manifest the divine hatred of sin as fully as would the just
punishment of it, this would be a satisfactory atonement.
Out of respect to such an atonement, God might pardon
sinners, and still be just to his own character. His
pardoning sinners on account of such an atonement, would not
lead holy beings to distrust the integrity of his character.
But if God should pardon sinners without such an atonement,
his character must appear at least doubtful, if not
decidedly bad. Holy beings, perceiving that he treated the
holy and wicked alike, would be utterly unable to determine,
from his conduct towards them, which acted most agreeably to
his mind. In this situation, being unable to learn his
character, they could not feel safe. His treating the unholy
as holy beings ought to be treated would, at least, lead
them to suspect, that he might treat his holy subjects as
unholy ones deserve to be treated. And thus, in their
perplexity, they might fear him, but they could never love
or trust him. But if they perceived that he would never
pardon sinners without an atonement, this would show them
his regard for holiness and his hatred of sin, and would
secure their confidence and inspire their love. Thus it
appears that an atonement was necessary to the pardon of
sinners, in order that God might manifest his hatred of sin,
and thus be just to himself.
Secondly. If God had pardoned sinners
without an atonement, he could not have manifested any
wisdom in giving the law, but would have been chargeable
with the greatest inconsistency of conduct.
It is evidently impossible for God to
manifest any wisdom in giving a law which could answer no
valuable purpose. But, certainly, if he had entirely
neglected to execute the law which he has given, this law
must have been utterly useless. Nor would he have appeared
merely destitute of wisdom; but his conduct would have
involved glaring inconsistency. This inconsistency might
have been thus stated: God has given a law to his creatures,
which he refuses, or, at least, entirely neglects to
support. This law is either good, or not good. If it is not
good, why did he give it? If it is good, why does he not
execute it? In either case, he must be chargeable with
imperfection. If God has given a law to his creatures which
is not good, it must be because he either could not devise,
or did not choose, a good one. In the one case, he must be
deficient in wisdom; in the other, he must be destitute of
goodness. But if the law be good, and God does not support
it, this must be either because he is not able, or because
he does not choose, to support it. Here, therefore, must be,
either a deficiency of power, or, as before, a destitution
of goodness. In either case, the divine character is ruined.
But if God had pardoned sinners, without art atonement, all
this must have followed. It must have been forever true,
that God had given a law, and refused or neglected to
support it; that he had denounced evil against
transgressors, and never fulfilled his threatening. In this
case, his character could never have been cleared of the
most glaring inconsistency, and imperfection.
Nothing can be plainer than this, if
God does not execute what he has threatened, he must appear
inconsistent, if not destitute of virtue. If it was
necessary, when God gave his law, that he should enforce it
with an awful penalty, or accompany it with the threatening,
"In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," it
must, for the same reason, be necessary, that this
threatening should be executed. If the execution of this
threatening would be hard, unmerciful, or unnecessary, then
the threatening itself must have been highly unreasonable.
If it would be wrong in God to execute what he has
threatened, it must follow, that he has threatened to do
wrong. But if it would not be wrong in God to execute his
threatening, then, certainly, it must be wrong not to
execute it; for if he should not execute his threatening, it
would be in reality an acknowledgment that his threatening
was unreasonable and unnecessary, and that, on this account,
it ought not to be executed. It would appear, on the part of
God, like repentance; as if he now regretted that he had
annexed any such threatening to his law, and resolved that
he would be more reasonable than to carry it into execution.
It is necessary, therefore, that God should execute what he
has threatened, unless something be done by way of
atonement, which, as a substitute, will fully answer the
same purpose, in order that his own character may remain
unsullied, and he appear glorious in holiness.
If, when mankind sinned, God had
executed the penalty of the law upon them, his conduct would
then have appeared consistent. He would have appeared just
to himself. Hence, in order that he might pardon sinners,
and still appear consistent, it was necessary that something
should be done, by way of atonement, which would answer
every purpose, which the execution of the penalty of the law
would have answered.
When all these purposes were
answered, by art atonement, as fully as they could have been
by the execution of the law, then God might pardon sinners,
and be consistent, and just to his own character. But any
thing, which would have failed of answering all these
purposes, could not have been a sufficient atonement. This
must be evident from the consideration, that nothing short
of the execution of the whole penalty could answer the ends
of the law.
Some have supposed that though an
atonement was necessary, in order that sinners might be
pardoned, yet it was not necessary that the atonement should
be sufficient to answer all the purposes which the execution
of the penalty of the law would have answered. But this
cannot be true, unless it is also true that if there had
been no atonement, it would not have been necessary to
execute the whole penalty of the law on transgressors. But
the same reasoning which shows that it was necessary that
any part of the penalty should be executed, also shows that
it was equally necessary that the whole should be executed.
For if it is not necessary that God should execute all that
he has threatened, it must follow that he has-threatened too
much, and, consequently, that his threatenings are
unreasonable and improper. If God's threatenings are too
severe, if they are unreasonable, then it was unreasonable
for God to make them. And it is readily granted, that if
divine threatenings are unreasonable, if the penalty of the
law is too great, then it is not necessary that it should be
fully executed. But if the penalty be not unreasonable, if
it be not too great, then it is necessary, that the whole
should be executed. Because if it should appear that God had
given a law, and annexed a penalty which is hard and
unreasonable, it must be impossible ever to clear the divine
character of imperfection. But if God had neither executed
the whole penalty of the law, nor done any thing by way of
atonement which would fully answer the same purposes, his
conduct must have implied an acknowledgment that the penalty
of his law was unreasonably severe, and ought not to be
fully executed. There was, therefore, the same necessity
that God should execute the penalty of his law fully, in
order to preserve his character, that there was that he
should execute it in part. No objection can be urged against
one, which will not lie against the other with equal force.
If God has made threatenings which are unreasonable, in any
respect, it as really proves him imperfect, as though they
were unreasonable in every respect. But if God should not
execute his threatenings in every respect, it would be an
acknowledgment that they are, in some respect, unreasonable.
It was necessary, therefore, that God, if he would do
justice to his own character, should execute, literally, all
his threatenings, unless something could be done by way of
atonement which, as a substitute, would fully answer all the
same purposes. Hence it is evident that an atonement was
necessary, in order that sinners might be
pardoned.
This exactly agrees with the view
which the apostle has given of the subject in the third
chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. Having freely remarked
on the universal and total depravity of mankind, and shown
the impossibility of their being justified by the law, he
introduces the method of justification revealed in the
gospel. "But now the righteousness of God without the law is
manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets;
even the righteousness of God, which is by faith in Jesus
Christ, unto all, and upon all them that believe. Being
justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that
is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a
propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his
righteousness for the remission of sins. To declare, I say,
at this time, his righteousness, that he might be just, and
the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Here the
apostle decides the point respecting the necessity and
design of atonement; that it was to manifest the rectitude
of the divine character; that God might be just in the
justification of sinners.
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