The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME I

 

SECTION II:

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD

AS KNOWN

BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

 

LECTURE VIII:

 

Third leading proposition continued, viz.: God governs with rightful authority. -- The benevolence of God may be proved, 1. From his natural attributes. -- Nature of the argument -- 2. From his works. -- Preliminary definitions and explanations. -- God Is proved to be perfectly benevolent, by showing, (a) that the present system may be the best possible; (b) that it is the best possible. -- Prop. (a) considered. -- Objection from existence of evil. -- Evil is natural and moral. -- Natural evil considered in the sufferings of infants, of animals, and of men as moral beings.

 

 

To complete the argument for the perfection of God's moral government over men, it remains to prove his benevolence.

 

On this interesting subject we have two sources of argument--the natural attributes of God, and his works of creation and providence.

 

I. The argument from his natural perfections.

 

This argument has not, I think, been often, if ever, presented in its full force. It being obvious that the evidence from this source, whatever it may be, must after all depend in one respect on what appears in his works--so depend on this, that if they, including what he does and fails to do, furnish decisive proof against his benevolence, little reliance can be placed on any argument derived from his natural attributes. Hence in almost all inquiries on the subject, the attention has been chiefly and properly directed to the works of God; and in view of the difficulties which these are supposed to offer, the argument from the former source has rarely been presented as having the strength which it actually possesses. In saying this however, I do not mean to imply that it has any force, until the difficulties which result from the existence of evil are fully removed. If this can be done, or if all decisive proof against his benevolence can be removed, then, in my view, this argument will be in a high degree conclusive.

 

I will here briefly attempt to unfold the nature of it, assuming that there is no counteracting evidence from any other source.

 

To estimate this kind of evidence of moral character--that which arises from the nature and circumstances of moral beings--it should be remembered, that while it is quite supposable that it should be wholly counteracted by opposing evidence from conduct or works, it is, when thus uncounteracted, in a high degree convincing and satisfactory. As contemplated, for example, our first parents in paradise, or the angels in heaven, and reasoned a priori from their constitution and circumstances, with no opposing evidence, we should conclude strongly in favor of their moral perfection. If however, we had known other beings of the same constitution and in similar circumstances, who had sinned, our confidence in this conclusion would be greatly diminished; and if such cases were common, it would be lessened still more, until it is easy to see that we should reasonably doubt, or form an unfavorable opinion.

 

In respect to the Infinite Being, this a priori argument can be weakened only by one or both of these considerations--that beings far inferior to him, though formed in his image, have become selfish; and that no account can be given of existing evils under his government, which shall be consistent with his benevolence. The former consideration loses nearly, if not all its influence, from the fact that the beings are creatures, finite, and greatly limited in their powers, to say nothing of the manner in which they commence their moral existence. The argument then, from the infinite natural perfections of God, for his benevolence, if weakened at all, must be weakened only by the existence of evil. This, we hope to show hereafter, has no such influence. If so, then the argument from his natural perfections is justly regarded as conclusive.

 

II. The argument from his works.

 

There is perhaps no single question in natural theology, to the investigation of which more theological talent has been applied, than to this--whether the benevolence of God can be proved from the light of nature, or from, his works? The difficulties which have been supposed to pertain to it, and which have been regarded as peculiarly formidable, result from the existence and prevalence of evil in the world. Accordingly. the problem, whence cometh evil under the government of a perfect God, has employed from the earliest ages the ingenuity of speculative minds, and given rise to various theories for its solution. The most celebrated of these are the theory of preexistence, the theory of the Manicheans, and the theory of optimism. The last of these, if we understand by it the general doctrine, that the present system of means and influences, compared with any other, is the best possible to the Creator, has not only obtained the greatest prevalence, but seems to me to be the only one which is entitled to consideration. Different philosophers however, who have agreed in this general doctrine, have adopted two different specific theories, or have maintained two kinds of optimism. One class have maintained that all evil, both natural and moral, is the necessary means of the greatest good; while the other has denied this in respect to moral evil, and maintained, that in respect to divine prevention, it is incidental to the best system of means. These specific theories they agree in this: that the system which God has adopted, including both the beings created and the influences under which they act, is to him the best possible system. They agree also in respect to natural evil, that it is the necessary means of the greatest good, but differ in respect to moral evil, as I have already stated. They both proceed however on the assumption, as every theory to be in the lowest degree plausible as a vindication of the divine benevolence must, that there is an impossibility somewhere in the nature of things, that God should adopt a system wholly excluding moral evil. They differ however in respect to the question, where in the nature of things this impossibility lies; the one supposing it to be in the nature of moral evil, as being the necessary means of the greatest good, and that therefore God could not produce the highest good or happiness without sin or moral evil as the means of it; the other supposes that the impossibility may or does lie, not in the nature of moral evil, but in the nature of a moral system, as the necessary means of the greatest good, and that therefore God could not produce the highest happiness without adopting a moral system, to which moral evil, in respect to his prevention, is incidental.

 

If time allowed, it might be useful to show how the controversies on this subject have been occasioned and prolonged by the ambiguities of language, and unauthorized assumptions in reasoning. This however I shall attempt no farther than I think it necessary to give precision to some of the phraseology which I adopt in the present discussion.

 

By benevolence then, when applied to God, I mean a disposition or governing purpose to produce the greatest good, or the highest happiness in his power. Of course, to evince his benevolence, he must show that he actually does that which is fitted on the whole to produce the greatest good in his power. It is however maintained by some able writers on the subject of the divine goodness, to be a sufficient proof of it, that there is more happiness than misery in the world, and that the present system, with its results, is better than none. It is undoubtedly true, that unless these things are so--at least, unless it can be shown that the present system with its results is better than none, it can furnish no proof of the benevolence of the Creator. But if these facts be established, it will not follow necessarily that God is benevolent; for that there is more happiness than misery in the world, is no proof that the Creator might not have produced a still greater amount of happiness than he does or will produce; nor from the fact, that the present system with its results is better than none, does it follow, that the Creator might not have adopted a system still better. And surely no argument can be necessary to show that a perfectly benevolent Creator will adopt the best system in his power.

In this assertion however, it is not implied that God has not given existence to some other world or worlds, in which there is more happiness than in this. My meaning is, that if God is benevolent, he could not have made a better world than this in its stead. For it by no means follows, that because he has made another world in which there is more happiness, that benevolence did not require the creation of this. Not to have created just such a world, or to have created any other in its stead, might have ruined all other worlds. Nor is this all. The existence of this world may be better than its non-existence, as resulting in a greater amount of happiness to the universe than would exist without it. Not to have created this world just as it is compared with creating it, or creating any other in its stead compared with creating this, might have diminished the amount of happiness on the whole, compared with that which depends on the creation of this world.

 

There is perhaps no view of this subject, which has so much plausibility, and which is more apt to embarrass the investigation of it, than that now adverted to. God it is said, or thought, has made one heaven of perfect happiness, why not make another, instead of such a sinful, suffering world as this? I answer: you overlook at least two things, either or both of which may be true in fact; the one is, the mutual dependence of worlds, like that of the members of a human body; the other is, that not to have created this world might have left a deficiency in the sum of happiness in the universe, which could not have been supplied by creating any other in its stead. Be these things however, as they may, the position is incontrovertible, that a benevolent God will produce the greatest good in his power; and that therefore whatever he does in any given instance, must be not only better than to do nothing, but the best thing which he can do in that instance.

 

It is well here to recur to an important distinction made in another connection, between the greatest possible good, and the greatest good possible to God. It has been often assumed, that the greatest good possible or the greatest conceivable good, is possible to God; and that therefore the greatest conceivable good, and the greatest good possible to God are identical. This is obviously an unauthorized assumption. For what is plainer, than that God may have created a system, which will result in the greatest good possible to him; i.e., the greatest good which he can secure; but which would result in still greater good, were creatures to employ their powers in a perfect manner. Whether it is to be assumed, that God can so control the agency or actions of his creatures, as to secure the greatest possible good, which would result from his agency and theirs combined and perfectly employed, will be a topic of future inquiry. The only remark demanded for my present purpose is, that if it may be true, that the greatest possible good is not possible to God, then it cannot be necessary to the proof of his benevolence to show, that he has secured, or will secure, the greatest possible good; for it is obvious, that a being decisively evinces his benevolence who shows that he does all the good possible to him, though less good be produced than would have been, had others afforded their active co-operation.

 

The phrase, greatest possible good, is often used by different writers, and even by the same writer in different senses, and has thus occasioned controversy and false conclusions. Hence has resulted the doctrine, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. Assuming that a benevolent God must produce the greatest possible good, meaning the greatest possible on the supposition that creatures produce as much good by their agency as they can, many have inferred, and justly from such premises, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest possible good. For if the greatest possible good, that is, the greatest good possible from the combined agency of God and of creatures, is produced, then it is done by that agency as actually employed, and is of course produced to a vast extent by sin. Of course, there, could not have been as much good effected by any action of creatures in its stead, as by sinful action. Sinful action therefore, would be the necessary means of the greatest possible good. Not here to dwell on the palpable absurdity, that the worst kind of action should be the best kind of action; nor even to specify other absurdities equally palpable, involved in this supposition, I wish only to remark, that it cannot be necessary to maintain, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, for the purpose of proving the benevolence of God. If the present system is better than none, it will be sufficient for the purpose of proving the benevolence of the Creator to show, that he will secure as much good as he can, or as is possible to him, although more good would have been the result, had men done their duty. It is surely a strange principle, that a being, to evince his benevolence, must produce more good than he can, even all the good which might be produced by the active co-operation of all other beings; or, that it is not enough for this purpose, that he produce the greatest good in his power.

 

The question then is this: What is sufficient proof of this fact? I answer, these two things; that it appears that what he does is better than to have done nothing; and that there is no proof that he could have done better. If these two things can be shown, they afford sufficient and decisive evidence that he does all the good in his power, and is therefore benevolent. This proof may be increased.

 

When what he does is better than to have done nothing, and when there is no proof, that he could have done better, then, if what he does can be clearly shown to be fitted in its true nature and tendency to produce the highest conceivable or the highest possible good, this greatly augments the proof of his benevolence; because it most decisively proves that he has done all the good he can, whether the greatest conceivable good be actually produced or not.

 

Take for illustration, a system of parental education. Suppose it, plainly better than none, and that there is not the slightest reason to believe that the parent could have done any thing better than he has done, who could doubt his benevolent intention? In addition to these things, suppose the system adopted by the parent is seen and known beyond a doubt, to be fitted to accomplish the result in the highest conceivable degree, then who can doubt whether he has done all he could to accomplish the best result, whether it be actually secured or not?

 

On these simple and obvious principles, I now propose to prove that-

 

GOD IS PERFECTLY BENEVOLENT.

 

I propose to show --

 

1. That the present system may be not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator.

2. That it is not only better than none, but is the best possible to the Creator.

 

The design of the former position is to meet in the outset of our argument the full force of the objection to God's benevolence, which is derived from the existence of evil. For if the present system, notwithstanding the evil which exists, MAY BE not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator, then the existence of evil furnishes no evidence at all that God is not perfectly benevolent.

 

The common assumption by those who regard the present subject as embarrassed with difficulty is, that evil so far as it exists, is so much evidence against the benevolence of the Creator. It is however an assumption which in this unqualified form is flagrantly gratuitous. It is not true that the communication of good or the infliction of evil Simply considered determines the design of its author. Good may be imparted by malevolence, and evil may be inflicted by benevolence or kindness. This remark in respect to evil is of vital importance in the present discussion, and one with which the mind should be familiar. There are two principles in respect to the existence of the evil in this world, which furnish a triumphant vindication of the divine benevolence; viz.:

 

First. Evil which is or which may be the necessary means of the greatest good possible to God, may be inflicted by benevolence, and is therefore no proof against his benevolence.

 

Secondly. Evil which is or which may be necessarily incidental (in respect to God's prevention), to that which is the necessary means of the greatest good possible to God, is no evidence that God is not benevolent.

 

These two principles may be illustrated by an example. A surgeon amputates the arm of a patient to save his life. There are two evils in the case. One is the loss of the arm, and this is the necessary means of the greatest. good. The other is the pain or suffering which is inseparable from the operation, and this is necessarily incidental, so far as the physician's power to prevent it is concerned, to that which is the necessary means of the greatest good in the case. Now who does not see how very irrational and perverse one must be, in this view of the evils supposed, or even if he only knew that they might be such evils, to deny the kindness of the physician in this attempt to save the life of his patient.

 

Under these two classes, I claim that all the evil in this world may be comprised, and that therefore it does not furnish the slightest evidence against the benevolence of God. This I shall now attempt to show:

 

The evil in the world is natural evil and moral evil. I propose to consider --

 

1. Natural evil.

 

All natural evil may be comprised in the sufferings of infants, the sufferings of animals, and the sufferings of men as moral beings.

 

1. The sufferings of infants. If infants are to be considered as moral and accountable agents--a doctrine which cannot be learned from the light of nature, their case furnishes no peculiar difficulty, since on this hypothesis it cannot be shown that they suffer more than they deserve. If however they are not moral agents at this period of existence, they are soon to assume this relation with all its responsibilities, and in circumstances of powerful temptation from natural good. How far it may be useful to such beings, to know by experience what natural evil is, before accountability commences, how far such knowledge may be necessary to weaken the power of temptation by augmenting the dread of the consequences of sin, how far it may serve to restrain from desperate wickedness, and even to prevent subsequent reformation from becoming morally impossible, it does not become us to decide. Some degree of suffering inflicted by the parental hand, even previous to ill desert, is the indispensable means of teaching the child its duty, and thus securing submission to parental authority.

 

Be this as it may, human ignorance is not competent to assert that the sufferings of infancy are not, much less that they, cannot be, either incidental to the necessary means of the greatest good, or be themselves the necessary means of the greatest good possible to God.

 

2. The sufferings of animals. These also may be unavoidably incidental to the necessary means of the greatest good possible to God, or the necessary means of that good.

 

It is undeniable that a great proportion of the sufferings of the animal creation, is occasioned by man; and though we are prone to inquire why they were made with such capacities of suffering, yet it is too much for human ignorance to determine, that they could answer all the purposes of their existence without these capacities. It may be true that the greatest good required that animals should be what they are, and men what they are, and that it were impossible to prevent those sufferings of the former which result from the cruelty of the latter. With respect to those sufferings which result from the fact, that different tribes of animals prey on each other, assuming that the greatest good required that they should be what they are in other respects, these sufferings may also be unavoidably incidental to their nature and condition; or this method of destruction, while some method may be required to prevent the evils of superfecundity, or to furnish that additional enjoyment that results from the succession of one race after another, may be the means of greater good in that increased happiness which is derived from this species of food, than could be produced without it. Be these things however, as they may, it is plainly too much for human ignorance to assert that the sufferings of animals may not be either the unavoidable result of the necessary means, or be themselves the necessary means of the greatest good which is possible to the Creator. Nor does it become us to decide, even on the supposition that no conceivable mode can be devised to explain the suffering of animals, which shall be consistent with the Creator's goodness to them, that no purposes can be answered by it in respect to his moral kingdom, which are worthy of his benevolence. The very mysteriousness of this providential procedure, may well heighten the awe of man toward the supreme Disposer of all. For if he inflicts such an amount of suffering on this part of his unoffending creation, what has man to expect for his provocations and crimes? What a lesson does the fact of animal suffering read to us respecting the sovereignty of the Creator? Who can say that this is not in many cases the indispensable means of convincing man that God can and will inflict suffering on him, and thus of keeping the moral universe in awe of its rightful sovereign? Without however, insisting that any of these specific suppositions accord with what is real, it is sufficient enough for my purpose, that the objector cannot show that they do not. It is enough that they may, in these and still other ways, which our minds have not conceived of, be consistent with the benevolence of the Creator. It is a case in which he might, for aught we can show to the contrary, furnish ample explanation of his goodness, and it must be shown that he cannot, or the objection from animal suffering must be abandoned.

 

3. The sufferings endured by men, as moral beings. These, with the sufferings of infants and animals, include the whole of natural evil. The consistency of natural evil, so far as it is endured by beings who are accountable to their Creator for their moral conduct, with his benevolence, it would seem could never be called in question, if it be remembered how much less these sufferings are than they deserve. For the most abundant goodness admits at least, that each should suffer all that he deserves. If it should here be said, that the greatest good did not require a system of moral government, and that therefore to establish it, and to inflict suffering on the transgressors of its law is not consistent with benevolence, I reply that this is a new objection, taken not from the infliction of suffering, nor from the degree of it, but from the nature of the system. In other words, the divine goodness is impeached on the ground, that God has adopted a system of moral government. This topic will presently be examined. The objection therefore now under consideration, and which is taken from the sufferings of men who are accountable for their conduct, is abandoned. And well it may be, so far as there can be any question respecting the divine goodness toward men in their individual capacity. For with what face can men who suffer immeasurably less than they deserve, complain that God is not good to them?

 

On the supposition, and we are authorized, after what has been said to make it, that the greatest good required this system of moral government, the sufferings of men as its accountable subjects, instead of proving that God is not good because they are so great, are proof, if of any thing, that he is not good because they are not greater. For if there be any proof from this fact, it must be that he disregards the public good, by not inflicting the full penalty of the law on transgressors. The consistency of this fact with his goodness, i.e., with his regard to the public good, has been already evinced. It is worthy of remark, that many, not to say all, writers on the present subject, have overlooked the most plausible ground of objection, viz., the deficiency of human suffering compared with human demerit, and rested their objection on the high degrees of it which exist; an objection which it would seem could be made by none but the culprit himself, and this only because he is perversely blind to the measure of his own guilt.

 

Besides this answer, furnished according to the first principle laid down, the second principle supplies another equally decisive. For who can doubt the necessity and utility of this influence of human sufferings? We have already shown that they are not legal sanctions, but simply paternal chastisements--corrective dispensations, whose design to recover men to virtue and to happiness cannot be unseen or unacknowledged by the most perverse. Viewed in this light, they are, as we shall show hereafter, to be ranked among the most decisive proofs of our heavenly Father's kindness toward the froward and guilty children of men. It may be said, that there are, general laws established by the Creator, which would still continue and result in great natural evil to men, were they exempt from sin; that teeth would still decay and ache, that manifold calamities, by accidents, by diseases, &c., would still be the portion of man in this world; that this shows that the sufferings which are brought on men are not the consequences of sin, but result from those laws and tendencies of things which the Creator has established, irrespectively of man's moral character.

 

This objection I have already had occasion to notice, though under a different bearing. It deserves however, particular notice in this application of the facts on which it rests.

 

In answering this objection, it is important to ascertain with as much precision as may be, how much and what kinds of evil would still befall men, were they to become perfectly and universally holy. And here it is undeniable, that if all the sufferings that result directly and indirectly from human selfishness, under all its modifications of ambition, pride, envy, avarice, lust and excess; and from all its acts in war, contest, fraud, falsehood and violence, were to cease from the earth; and if these were to be succeeded by universal benevolence, under all its modifications of kindness, forgiveness and compassion, with all the bright and inseparable train of beneficent deeds; and if with these things were to be associated that piety, which by, its confidence, its hopes, and its joys, can sustain and cheer and gladden the soul, even under the severest trials; in a word, if perfect and universal holiness were to reign on the earth, human miseries would shrink away almost from human thought. So trivial would be our remaining sufferings, compared with the abundance of our bliss, that we could scarcely think of them, except as at most, inexplicable phenomena, for which an omniscient Creator could easily account, and which could therefore never awaken a doubt in respect to his overflowing goodness.

 

Nor ought it here to be forgotten what effects universal holiness would produce on the animal constitution of man, in removing its present tendencies to disease and pain--on the mental constitution, in its greater vigor and more successful activity, in its discoveries of remedies for the remaining ills of life, and of the means of improving in all respects our earthly condition. It is easy to see that these things might, not to say, would, be beyond all our present conceptions. That the world, under these causes, would approximate to its paradisiacal state of happiness, can hardly be deemed a chimerical anticipation by, any one who compares the improvements and blessings of civilized life, especially under the influence of Christianity, with a state of barbarism.

 

It might still be insisted, that no such diminution of human sufferings would result from these causes, as to preclude the force of the present objection, that still many of the laws of nature would continue to operate, and to produce pain, disease, and death itself. To this I would further reply, that it is not incredible that the world, and the laws of its phenomena, are formed and established by the Creator as the fit and best residence of those whose universal and perpetual sinfulness he foresaw; and that what now goes on, without change or variation, in these laws and their results, because there is no change in the human character to demand it or to render it useful, would undergo all those alterations from the hand of the Creator, which should render the world a fit residence of holy beings, should such a transformation of human character take place. Even such changes, so far as they would be requisite, would be slight, if what has been said of the benign efficacy of universal holiness be true, and might be easily effected, if not by natural causes, at least by the miraculous power of the Almighty.

 

Or, if this be not a satisfactory supposition, it is still remote from an incredible hypothesis, that the Being, who, as we have already shown, reveals himself so illustriously as the rewarder of them that diligently seek him, should translate to a world of perfect happiness those whose character should fit them for that exalted state of being.

 

But not to dismiss the objection even here. Let the facts on which it rests be conceded in their utmost extent; let it be granted, that many evils would still befall us in this world as the result of its established laws, though men universally were to become holy; that teeth would decay and ache, bones be subject to fracture and pain, and the body to disease and death; still it is quite possible, and may therefore be supposed, that this remainder of evil should be either the necessary means of a benevolent end, or inseparable from the necessary means of such an end.

 

It is not enough to say of this class of evils, as Dr. Paley has said, "that they are never perceived to be the object of contrivance." There is doubtless truth in his remark, and it is happily illustrated when he says, "teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache." And again--"no anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate, this to inflame, &c." Though there is truth in the remark that the teeth are not contrived to ache, yet the fact falls short of the point of the objection which it is designed to meet; for the objector will ask, who made the teeth?--did not an omniscient and omnipotent God?--and why, knowing that if made they would decay and ache, did he not, as he might have done, make them so that no such evil should follow? I answer, that so far as the objection maintains that these evils could and would have been prevented by a benevolent Creator, it asserts what cannot be proved. For, allowing that the evils now adverted to would still befall men, though perfectly holy, it is not impossible that they are either the necessary means of good, or inseparable from such means. It is not incredible that even perfectly holy beings, to answer in the best manner the purposes of an immortal existence, may need to pass through a course of moral discipline, of which the experimental knowledge of natural evil shall be an indispensable part. To suffer from carelessness or indiscretion, is eminently fitted to produce watchfulness and prudence, and may in this case be even necessary to prevent the successful assaults of temptation in the present or a future world. And even suffering, which shall be unavoidable by any means, may be indispensable to give a strength and permanence to the principle of submission to the divine will, which God could secure by no other means. But it cannot be necessary to imagine the specific forms and ways in which the evils of life now referred to may be the necessary means of a benevolent end, or inseparable from such means. According to the principles we have laid down, to show that such may be the fact, is enough to remove all the weight of this objection.

 

I have thus attempted to show, that the natural evil which there is in the world furnishes no evidence that God is not benevolent. The argument rests on the general and undeniable principle, that the mere existence of evil, resulting either directly or indirectly from the agency of any being, is not evidence that he is not actuated by a benevolent purpose. We have seen that evil may be inflicted from a benevolent design, and this in different ways, or on different principles. We have seen also, that all the natural evil which there is in the world, for aught we know or can prove to the contrary, may be inflicted according to some one or more of these principles, from a benevolent design on the part of the Creator. Why then should this evil be alleged as proof that he is not benevolent? Is not chastisement dictated by love, and are its sufferings properly alleged as proof of unkindness? and though we cannot say that all the natural evil in the world either is or maybe placed in this category, yet we say that it may be as truly the dictate of kindness as the corrections of a father's hand. In this view of the subject, we may conclude that the existence of natural evil is absolutely NO EVIDENCE that the present system, with its results, is not the best system possible to God. It may therefore be the best system possible to God, notwithstanding the existence of natural evil.

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