Third leading proposition: God governs with rightful authority. -- This proved by his benevolence. -- Different opinions in respect to the method of proving his benevolence. -- If it cannot be proved by the light of nature, It cannot be proved at all. -- The Scriptures assert and assume that this benevolence is manifest by the light of nature.

 

 

To establish the leading proposition before us; viz., that God is administering a perfect moral government over men, it is necessary, as we have already said, to prove the equity of his administration and also his rightful authority. The former I have already attempted. To prove the latter, it is necessary to show his competence and also his disposition to govern in the best manner. His competence is proved by showing that he is a being of infinite knowledge and power. His disposition to govern in the best manner, which involves also his perfect or infinite benevolence, now claims our consideration.

 

Whether God is a being of perfect benevolence, is seen at once to be one of the most momentous of all the inquiries which can engage the human mind. It is not difficult for men to believe in what they may regard as the goodness of God, under an entirely false conception of its nature; nor is it uncommon that men believe it, even with some just views of what it is, without ever having seen or heard or formed an argument by which it can be proved. I need not say of what high concern it is to us, not only that we have a right apprehension of the nature of God's goodness, but that our faith in its unchangeable reality rest on evidence which can be weakened by no sophistry, and which can be shaken by no skepticism. We have seen how prone the human mind is to form fundamentally false views of the nature of God's goodness, and to hazard all the interests of its immortal being on its own vain imaginations--mere pictures of its fancy.

 

I must be allowed to say, that I have not met with any proof of this divine attribute, or any argument from reason in support of it, which would stand the test of a close logical scrutiny. Nor can it be pretended that there is such an argument fully drawn out and formally maintained in the Scriptures. Am I then asked, whether I suppose that the faith in God's moral perfection, of the pious, of those in humble life as well as of the great, the wise, and the learned, has had no sufficient basis or warrant? That is another question, and one to be answered with a decided negative. It is one thing for the mind to perceive proof or evidence, or even to go through a process of reasoning which fully sustains a conclusion, and another to state that process; and especially so to state it, that it shall be exposed to no objections which that mind cannot answer. As the knowledge of what a man is, what a tree is, what government is, what law is, what virtue is, is different from that which enables one to state with exact precision what he knows, so for the minds of men universally, to apprehend the evidence of God's goodness in such a manner as to authorize and demand their faith, and to be a just ground of condemnation if they disbelieve, is a very different thing from being able to present in formal statement, all the premises and principles on which a just conclusion depends, with such logical precision, that the argument when stated, shall be unanswerable. How much false reasoning has been used by great and good men in support of truth! How many just conclusions have been adopted and acted upon, even with reason, for which men can give no reason!

 

The difficulties which have been supposed to embarrass the great question now before us, have led some minds of singular acuteness and power to conclude, that there is no proof from any source, or from all sources combined, that God is good. Some have maintained, that the benevolence of God can be proved, both from the light of nature and from revelation, as separate and independent grounds of argument; others, that if. proved at all, the argument must be derived chiefly; others, that it must be derived wholly from revelation; and others still, that a conclusive argument can be derived exclusively from the light of nature, and that otherwise the divine benevolence cannot be proved at all.

 

It has been a question with some, whether it be of any importance that the two sources of proof be separated from each other. That they should frequently be combined, especially in popular exhibitions of the subject, I believe; that having evinced the benevolence of God, by satisfactory proof from the light of nature, we can and may augment it by appealing to revelation, I see no reason to doubt. At the same time, I am convinced that we must find satisfactory proof of the benevolence of God from the light of nature, before we can appeal with the least propriety or force to revelation; and that of course the light of nature must be resorted to, as furnishing a separate and independent ground of argument. If this be not done, then we must come to the revelation of God without proof of his moral perfection, either assuming, his veracity, which is only one, form of his benevolence, and therefore involves the very thing to be proved, without which we are forbidden by the laws of evidence to believe his declarations. The bearing of these considerations upon heathenism, and deism or infidelity, are sufficiently obvious to show the importance and necessity of producing from the light of nature, if possible, the universal and unhesitating belief of the perfect benevolence of the Creator. To the mind not fully convinced of the goodness, and consequently of the truth or veracity of God, the questions, whether God has actually given a revelation to the world, and what that revelation contains, must be comparatively trivial and uninteresting inquiries.

 

Beyond this, if there is no proof of God's moral perfection from the light of nature, then revelation itself finds the human mind free from all obligation to him, which results only from these prior proofs, and which imparts such high concern to the inquiry, whether such a being has given to man the oracles of eternal truth. How entirely different the questions are, whether a perfect God has given a revelation to the world, and whether it can only be claimed to be a revelation from a being whose moral perfection can be legitimately doubted or denied.

 

Besides, if God in his works of creation and providence, manifests his goodness to the clear apprehension of his moral creatures, who can doubt their obligation to mark his footsteps here, and to adore and worship with grateful praise amid these displays of his Godhead? Who shall refuse "to look through nature up to nature's God," because he has in his revelation manifested the same glories in still brighter splendors? If he has opened two books before us, why should we not learn from both what God is? Especially, if the light of nature furnishes the only proof of the moral perfection of the Creator in such a respect, that without it, none which is sufficient and satisfactory can be furnished by revelation, then, in exploring the field of evidence spread out before us in the works of God, the most diligent research becomes us.

 

In expressing the opinion that the benevolence of God cannot be proved from revelation, I would not be understood to affirm, that when the fact is once fairly proved from the light of nature, additional evidence in support of it cannot thus be derived. When I am convinced, on sufficient grounds, of the excellence of another's character, I reasonably regard those acts which may proceed from benevolence as actually proceeding from, and as additional proofs of it. Nor would I be understood to say, that no aid can in any respect be derived by us from a revelation, in the investigation of this subject. This is quite possible. Thus, without assuming the veracity of God, which, as I have said, would be assuming the thing to be proved, the revelation may contain propositions whose truth the mind perceives, independently of their divine authority. These propositions may furnish the premises of a conclusive argument. The argument however, would still be one from reason, as truly as a demonstration of a problem in geometry, though it depends on the definitions of Euclid. A revelation may even contain the same argument which is furnished by the light of nature. In this case also, it would be, strictly speaking, one from reason, though reason would never have discovered it without a revelation.

 

I shall now attempt to show,

That the benevolence of God cannot be proved by any argument derived merely from revelation, as distinguished from an argument derived from the light of nature.

 

Every proof on this subject, derived merely from revelation, must depend on some declaration or declarations of its Author. These must be supposed to consist of those in which he directly declares his own moral perfection, or of those in which he asserts such designs and doings, as in their own nature shall be proof of his moral perfection. In neither case however, can mere declarations be relied on, any further than we assume and rely, upon the veracity of the author. But veracity in God, in the only form in which we can rely upon it in him, is only one form of his benevolence, and necessarily implies it. To assume his veracity then, is to assume his benevolence, which is the very thing to be proved. Or thus: if we rely on the veracity of the Author of revelation, we must do so either with reason or without reason. If with reason, then we have proof of his veracity, and of course of his benevolence, prior to, and independently of his declarations. If we rely on his veracity, prior to and independently of his declarations, without reason, then we gratuitously assume his veracity, and of course his benevolence; that is, we assume the very thing which is to be proved. If then the benevolence of God cannot be proved from the light of nature, it cannot from revelation, and therefore cannot be proved at all.

 

The contrary however, has been strenuously maintained; and it may give more satisfaction if we examine some of the grounds of this claim. These, so far as I deem them worthy of notice, are the three following, viz.:,

 

1. It is claimed that the declarations of any being, and therefore of God, are entitled to credit, on the general principle which gives credibility to testimony.

 

2. It is claimed, that any being may establish, and that God has established his character for veracity, on the ground of the uniform coincidence of his declarations with facts--as that many of the historical facts of Scripture are confirmed by profane history; that all its predictions, promises, and threatenings, have in due time been fulfilled; and that in this way we have a full confirmation of the veracity of their author.

 

3. It is claimed, that the Scriptures themselves, in their own character, or in the nature of what they assert concerning God, his designs and doings, especially the giving of his perfect law, with the pure and holy precepts of the gospel, the grand scheme of redemption, and his purpose to counteract and overrule all evil for the production of the highest good of the universe, furnish abundant and decisive proof of the benevolence of God.

 

Now it is obvious, that the question at issue depends, in each of these modes of reasoning, on the veracity of the witness. If this be not presupposed and assumed, there can be no argument or proof in either case. What I claim then is, that the assumption of the veracity of the witness is, as the case is now presented, made on grounds which are wholly insufficient, and in a manner forbidden by the laws of just reasoning.

 

And first in regard to testimony, and the general principle of its credibility. It is so obviously for the interest of men, in most cases, to speak truth rather than falsehood, that there is a strong and convincing probability that, in most cases, they actually do so. With this probability the results fully accord; for men speak truth in a vast majority of instances. A declaration, with these presumptions in favor of its truth, is what we call credible testimony, and what we justly esteem, in many cases, even from a stranger, good and conclusive evidence. But how is it, when presumptions against its truth, and not in its favor, exist? If he who testifies is justly presumed to be liable from a regard to his own interest to do so falsely, it destroys the weight of his testimony. Hence no man is allowed to testify before any civil tribunal in his own case. "If I bear witness of myself," said the Saviour, "my witness is not true."

Here then we have one principle which utterly vitiates all the supposable proof of God's benevolence, which is derived merely from revelation, whether he bears witness of himself in asserting it, or in the form of asserting other facts as proofs of this. Who does not know how well it comports with the character of the most selfish and ambitious of rulers, even of the veriest tyrants, to boast of their benevolent designs, and to parade their schemes of public utility for the advancement of their selfish purposes? Can we then rely with confidence, and this in a case in which our highest interests are pending, on the veracity and so on the mere testimony of another, when he may be under a powerful inducement to testify falsely? But the case before us is much stronger. It is one in which, if real benevolence exist, proof of it must also exist, and yet does not. It is maintained on one side of the present question, that God as the Creator and providential governor of the world, furnishes by his acts no proof of his benevolence. Now such a fact, if it be a fact, is entitled to something more than a mere negative influence in the argument. It is a direct positive proof against his benevolence which sets aside every possible declaration of it. To what purpose would a parent whose treatment of his dependent offspring for a long course of years, had given no proofs of his love, make and repeat assertions of his kindness? It is the hypocrisy which unmasks itself by saying to the naked and to the hungry, "Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled, "and giveth nothing. "As the body without the spirit is dead" so benevolence without works, as truly as faith, is dead also.

 

This mode of reasoning applies not less to the Creator than to his creatures. That he should give existence to such a world as this, and govern it by his providence for thousands of years, and yet furnish no convincing evidence of his goodness to the pensioners of his bounty--that the most sincere and humble inquirer into the ways of his providence should be unable to find the least trace of goodness--one solitary footstep of benevolence to call forth his gratitude and praise--this surely were enough not merely to authorize doubt and suspicion, but it would amount to a direct and positive proof against his goodness. If he is good, why are there no proofs of his goodness in his acts? Why is the wide field of his providence thus barren of all that can bespeak the love of the Creator to his own creatures? What has employed the resources of his Godhead, while his dependent offspring have been thus forsaken and unblessed? Actions speak louder than words. His providence tells his character, and is a full revelation of a selfish heart. And is such evidence to be set aside by his own testimony to his own excellence? Is such the character of the being, revealed by the most decisive of all manifestations, confirmed by the most unquestionable of all proofs, by acts and doings, by his treatment of the myriads of his dependent creatures since time began; and is he to command our confidence by mere assertions of his goodness? Are mere words to be believed? Are creatures with such an experience at the hands of their Creator, to be required to render to him the homage of their gratitude and praise? Every voice would be dumb, every heart would be cold. And yet on no other basis have many able divines rested the proof of God's benevolence.

 

But we are told that God has established his character for veracity on the ground of the uniform coincidence of his declarations with facts. With our authorized and habitual convictions that the Author of the Scriptures is a being of perfect goodness and truth, our belief in his testimony is justly confirmed and strengthened by tracing the exact and uniform coincidence between his declarations and facts. But how would it be, provided we had no antecedent reason to believe that he would speak truth rather than falsehood; and especially if we had good antecedent reason for denying his moral perfection, and with it his veracity? Though we suppose a coincidence between facts and the declarations of another to any indefinite extent, still there are other ways in which he may wholly forfeit a character for veracity. There is truth in the vulgar saying--that he who will steal will also lie. A man may uniformly speak truth from selfish considerations, and yet in other ways evince that want of moral principle which destroys all ground of confidence in his veracity, and pre-eminently in his declarations of the excellence of his own character. Be the coincidence then between facts and the declarations of God what it may, still the principles already stated apply. In the case supposed, he testifies in his own case, while were he perfectly benevolent, there would be proof of his benevolence from his works. These considerations, especially the latter, set aside all evidence from his mere assertions that he is good, and even prove that he is not good. This is obviously, entirely overlooked by those who maintain, that the coincidence of his declarations with facts is proof of his veracity. They assume that a failure to manifest his goodness by his works, is no proof that he is not good. The more however we should reflect on such a fact, if it were a fact, the stronger would be its impression. For how could this world of creatures thus cast away from the favor and affection of their Maker--thus doomed to an exile and an orphanage in which no tokens of paternal love should gladden their existence--how could they confide in the character of such a Father?

 

But it is said, that in his revelation God declares his will in the form of his perfect law, as well as the great design of redeeming mercy, and the purpose to render evil, even moral evil, the means of the highest possible good to his creation. Be it so. But then it is his mere declaration which has no higher claims to our confidence than any other. As testimony in respect to his own particular designs, it is his testimony to his own excellence. It is his own testimony of his unexecuted will as a lawgiver, and of his unexecuted purposes as a providential disposer of events. And not only so, it is testimony designed to evince his goodness, when, according to the supposition on which we reason, there is no, proof of his goodness from his works; and when therefore as we have shown, there is decisive proof that he is not good; and of course when no confidence is due to the supposed testimony.

 

But let us briefly advert to the particular facts which are now alleged. And to take the last first; it is said that the Scriptures teach that moral evil in the world is the necessary means of the greatest good, and will be overruled for the production of this result; and great, even the chief reliance in this argument has been placed on this assumption. Without here proposing a full examination of this gratuitous assumption, I shall simply say that the Scriptures teach no such dogma; and that if they did, it would prove that their author, in preferring the worst kind of action to the best, is himself the worst of beings; is insincere as a lawgiver, the friend and patron of sin, and an enemy to the happiness of his own creation. But it is said that in his revelation God has given to men the best law. This is admitted; and further, that the act of giving such a law is good and sufficient evidence of his goodness were it uncounteracted by opposing evidence. He has given the best law. But how shall we know that this law is a real expression of his will, especially if, as it is also said, he prefers, all things considered, wrong to right moral action? The act of giving the best law is no proof of his benevolence, unless it be also proved that the law is a real expression of his will, of his preference of right to wrong moral action, all things considered. But it would not be out of character for a deceiver to resort to the artifice of giving the best law for the very purpose of deception; and especially when it is supposed as it now is, that all his other acts and ways of providence fail to prove his goodness and so prove that he is not good, how can we doubt that the act is done for the purpose of deception? I am not saying that the well attested fact that God has revealed the best law can have no place in any argument for his goodness, but in view of the supposed fact that there is no other proof of his goodness from his works of creation and providence, that the giving of the best law can furnish no proof of his goodness, but is rather to be viewed as an artifice of deception.

 

But it is said that God in his revelation declares his great design of redeeming mercy. This is of course admitted. But it is still simply his own declaration, and the same objections he against this as against all others considered as proofs of his goodness. The excellence of this scheme is obvious and undeniable. But what does it amount to but proof of wisdom to devise the most perfect means for the most perfect end, while it so greatly fails to accomplish under the government of its author, the end to which it is adapted, and for which it is professedly devised? And under this aspect, how is it to be regarded when it is supposed that the works of his providence decisively disprove his goodness, except as another artifice to deceive his dependent creatures?

 

The general principle on which the preceding discussion has proceeded is, that works, not words, are the legitimate evidence on a question of character. Though cases occur in which declarations are coincident with conduct, and augment the proof of moral rectitude, and though they may be entitled to credit, when they can be supposed to be made only with a benevolent design; yet in all cases in which the declarations may be fairly traced to some selfish or sinister desire, and especially in which benevolence or moral rectitude, if it exist, will manifest itself in conduct and does not, the proof is decisive against the existence of such a principle.

 

"The word of God itself," says President Edwards, "is no demonstration of the supreme distinguishing glory of God any otherwise than by the works of God, and that in two ways. First, as we must have the perfections of God first proved by his works, in order to know that his word is to be depended on. Secondly, as the works of God appealed to and declared in the word of God, declare and make evident that divine greatness and glory which the word declares. There is a difference between declaration and evidence. The word declares, and the works are proper evidence of what is declared."--MISCELL. OBSERVATIONS.

 

If these remarks are just, then whatever illustrations or additional evidence of the divine goodness nay be furnished by those works and designs of God, which are declared in his word, when we have acquired confidence in his moral perfection by a contemplation of his works of creation and providence, it is plain that without this previous ground of confidence, the word of God can furnish no sufficient proof that he is good.

 

The Scriptures also fully sustain the views which have now been taken of this important subject. First, in demanding the faith of men in Christianity, they always either assume on sufficient grounds the moral perfection of God, or they prove it from the light of nature. In those cases in which men admitted the moral perfection of God, the Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles for the most part at least, rest their claim for the reception of the gospel, on the fact that its doctrines and its precepts are from God. In those other instances in which the claim could possess no force with men who did not admit the moral perfection of the Deity, or when they would increase its power, they appealed to the works of God. One of the most decisive of these arguments, when properly understood, is used by our Lord in the short but incontrovertible assertion, "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." MATT. c. v. v. 45. To appreciate the force of this argument however, we must revert to the concession of those to whom it was addressed, and the corresponding and proper assumption of our Lord; viz., the great fact of God's perfect moral government over men as the best means of the best end, and as such the only system worthy of a perfect God. With this great fact admitted by the mind, we at once see and feel the force of our Lord's appeal to the ceaseless and rich bounties of God's providential goodness, as conferred on creatures so guilty and so ill-deserving. Another is made by the apostle when enforcing on the Gentiles at Lystra, and also at Athens, their obligation to become the worshipers of the true God: "Who in time past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways; nevertheless, he left not himself without witness--in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." ACTS, xiv. 16, 17; and xvii. 23, 28.

 

Secondly. The apostle in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, very fully affirms that the moral perfection of God is manifest under the light of nature. Here he not only asserts the abundant manifestation of God in his works, even his whole deity, but on this basis declares that under these manifestations merely, they are without excuse, because they glorified him not as God. What more could men do even under the light of revelation? And to put the particular question now at issue beyond all further debate, the apostle expressly asserts their inexcusableness, because they were unthankful. I only ask how could they be under obligations to be grateful to a being, of whose goodness they had no proofs and which therefore they were bound to disbelieve?