Second leading proposition continued, viz. -- God administers an equitable moral government; also, God administers a moral government under a gracious economy. -- Proof 3. We must suppose God to administer his government in the way of exact retribution, or through an atonement. -- One of these is true, or God Is deficient in power, or malignant in intention -- Just conception of Benevolence in God. -- What is Justice in God. -- Infidels have false views of both. -- Dispensations of God's Providence prove him not to be weak. -- The equity of a Moral government can be consistent with mercy only through an atonement. -- Alternative for the unbeliever.

 

 

IN the preceding lecture, I entered on the proof of the proposition, that God is administering an equitable moral government over men under an atonement.

 

I now resume the same subject, and, with some recapitulation of principles and arguments adduced in former lectures, shall attempt to prove the same thing, by showing --

 

In the third place, that the only admissible suppositions are, that God is administering his moral government over men either in the way of exact retribution, or through an atonement; and that as the former supposition is wholly inadmissible, it follows that he is administering it under an atonement,

 

I propose to show --

 

First, That God is administering his moral government over men either in the way of exact retribution or under an atonement; and

Secondly, That he is administering it not in the former, but in the latter mode, or under an atonement.

 

First. God is administering his moral government over men either in the one or the other of these modes of administration. If he is not, it must be that it is either through want of power, or through an unkind or malignant intention toward individual subjects, or through that excessive lenity which sacrifices the general good to individual happiness.

 

It is not through want of power. On this point no argument, in view of the omnipotence of God, can be necessary.

 

It is not through malignant intention; i.e., not with the design of inflicting punishment hereafter with undue severity, or of treating his subjects worse than they deserve. This supposition would be wholly gratuitous, since there is not a pretense that in the whole course of his providence there is the least violation of individual rights. Nor would it be merely gratuitous, but against strong evidence to the contrary. Every thing that can bear on the question, in the divine administration, is decisive of benevolence to man; all that can be alleged with the least plausibility, against the exact equity of his government, being the fact that he treats his subjects better than they deserve--a fact surely very remote from authorizing even a conjecture that he will treat them hereafter more severely. Besides, malignity itself, though the manifestation of it might subvert rightful authority, cannot violate the principles of equity, in treating the rebellious subjects of God (and such are all men) worse than they deserve, for they all deserve evil. God then cannot be supposed to depart from the principles of exact equity in his moral administration, through malignant intention toward individual subjects.

 

Again; nor can he be supposed to do this through excessive lenity. This, in the form in which it is often presented, is the most plausible of the suppositions which are now to be exploded, and derives its plausibility wholly from the name given it. It is called benevolence, and thus held up to our admiration as the sum and perfection of moral excellence and beauty. And what is more calamitous to the cause of truth, the defenders of the equity of God's government have often conceded, that benevolence is the proper name of the thing intended; denying that the divine moral perfection is comprised in this attribute, even when an apostle has said that "God is love, and maintaining, that justice in God, instead of being only a modification or specific form of benevolence, is another and distinct attribute, dictating and demanding what benevolence forbids.

 

Let us then form some definite conceptions on this most momentous of all questions--what is benevolence in God? At least let us distinguish it from what it is not, and from what often bears its desecrated name. What then is benevolence in, God?

 

Is any thing which does not disapprove and abhor sin as the supreme evil, and which will not show even the highest disapprobation of it? In opposition to this, we are told that such is not the benevolence of God, and that instead of viewing him in the character of a just and righteous Sovereign, we are to regard him in no other relation than that of a benignant, tender parent, who so delights in the happiness of his family, that to promote it he will sacrifice all that can be called law, justice and equity.

 

We here come to the stronghold of Infidelity. Let us then ascertain the precise question to be decided. It is not whether God, as a benevolent Being, delights in the happiness of his moral creation, and desires to promote it in the only way in which it can be secured. But can he accomplish that end without the influence of an equitable moral government; in other words, can God be benevolent without being just?

 

What then is benevolence in God? And what is justice in God? Benevolence in God is a disposition to secure the highest happiness, and to prevent all misery. Of course it must disapprove, hate, and abhor that which necessarily destroys the highest happiness and tends to produce all misery. But such is the nature and tendency of sin. What then is justice in God? It is simply one specific form or modification of benevolence; i.e., in respect to sin, it is benevolence, and nothing but benevolence, disapproving, abhorring, and determining to punish sin in the subjects of his government, as that which; undermines his authority, and tends to destroy the highest happiness, and to produce all evil. God then, as a benevolent being, must feel the highest disapprobation and abhorrence of sin. In proportion as he loves happiness and hates misery, he must abhor sin, as that which destroys the one and produces the other. To suppose a benevolent God then, who is not also a just God, is to suppose a benevolent God who is not benevolent.

 

Nor is this all. God as the governor of moral beings must show by his acts that he thus disapproves of and hates sin. He must come before his kingdom with the demonstration of his benevolence in the form of justice, either by a retribution or some equivalent manifestation of his supreme abhorrence of this evil. Words without actions in such a case are no proof in a question of character. In a moral kingdom all results in happiness and misery depend on the moral conduct of its subjects, and that depends on the influences under which they act. Of all these there is one which is absolutely essential; viz., that of the moral governor's supreme approbation of right and supreme disapprobation of every wrong moral action on their part. This is the only influence by which as a moral governor, he can move them. Motives as consisting simply in natural good and evil, whether furnished by the perceived nature and tendencies of action, or through the medium of promised good and threatened evil, are not the influence of moral government. This influence arises only from the perfect character of the governor, as manifested in his supreme approbation of right and supreme disapprobation of wrong moral action. If he has these feelings then he will manifest them by his acts. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose him not to use the most perfect means for the most perfect end; to give no evidence of his real character and of his right to govern--no proof that he is not the friend and patron of iniquity, none that he is entitled to the confidence or submission of his subjects. Nay more, it is to suppose him to give decisive proof to the contrary; for in such a case, if he had the feelings of supreme approbation of right and supreme disapprobation of wrong action he would manifest them. The good of his kingdom demands it. Benevolence dictates and imperiously requires it, as the necessary means of the best end. If then he does not manifest these feelings, the proof is decisive against their existence, and of course that he is not worthy of the confidence and submission of his subjects, and not entitled to the throne.

 

Were the whole moral universe a heaven of joy and rapture, what security for its continuance even for an hour?

 

And why under the government of a selfish deity, will not all good and all hope terminate at any moment in the agonies and woes of sin? What sort of obedience to God would that be, secured by such influences, when there is no ground of confidence, respect or love furnished in his character? And what such ground could there be in the character of a God whose so-called benevolence dispenses with all justice and all equity, which does not supremely abhor, but actually patronizes and befriends, protects and rewards iniquity? Than that sort of benevolence, there is nothing worse in point of principle in Satan himself. Adorn it with what tender names you will, of parental love and kindness, you would actually despise it in an earthly parent or a civil magistrate, and it ought to be and would be despised in God himself by all his intelligent creation. It sinks all that is venerable and awful in heaven's sovereign as a God of benevolence, guarding the general good of his kingdom at the sacrifice of individual good, not into that which is lovely, but into that which is contemptible. Such is the God whom Infidelity worships, cheating itself with names and words, while in the incense it offers to a fancied deity, it despises the object of its own adoration. Nay, rather it forgets that the real object of its homage is and must be in principle, a being of absolute selfishness or infinite malignity. I only ask, is it possible, is it conceivable, THAT A BENEVOLENT IS NOT ALSO A JUST GOD? Can there be a benevolent God who does not supremely abhor and who will not show that he abhors the worst thing in the universe? Can a perfectly benevolent God be supposed to depart from the principles of eternal righteousness? Will he despoil his high and inviolable sanctuary of all its sacredness--his dominion of all its majesty? Will he yield to that excessive lenity or indulgent tenderness which will darken all his glories--will he by this most fearful act of infinite malignity fill his moral creation with terror and dismay?

 

Let us now briefly appeal to the providence of God. Here let it be remembered, that God must be supposed either to be strictly just as a moral governor, or to be so concerned for the happiness of individual subjects, that he consents for their sake to sacrifice the equity of his moral government, and with it the highest happiness of his moral kingdom. Do then the dispensations of his providence authorize us to ascribe to him, even in conjecture, the latter character? Why--if he relinquishes the character of a righteous moral governor for that of an indulgent parent--does he give such clear and decisive indications of his supreme approbation of virtue and disapprobation of vice? Why does he render it the most manifest of all truths, that there is no way in which man can secure his own perfect happiness, or be safe against perfect misery, except by the practice of virtue? Why has he created beings whose very nature and condition on the least reflection, bring before the mind the everlasting distinction between right and wrong moral action, and constrain them to feel that by the latter they are defeating the high end of their own creation, and doing the most palpable violence to the will of an infinite Creator? Why if reluctant to make man ultimately as miserable as strict equity demands--why if thus indifferent to the rights of the public, is there no instance of individual, or at least of public injustice? Why, if God is all tenderness, does he so distinctly express his displeasure toward iniquity in the various ways of his providence, and actually produce such fearful forebodings of a coming retribution that the heart of every man trembles while going on in iniquity--that every man is afraid of death because he is to meet God? Why is it that no error, artifice or system of opinions has ever been devised, adequate to quell the dread and the disturbance which the wicked feel when they think of the Sovereign of heaven? Why is it that Universalism, Infidelity, Atheism have so often cried for his mercy when summoned by death into his presence?

 

Advert to another class of evils; I mean those which God brings on men, not as the natural consequence of crime, but in the exercise of his high and irresponsible sovereignty, such as those which result from disease and pestilence. Is there not a cause? Who can suppose that they are brought on moral beings without reference to their character? Who that knows that he is a sinner, a rebel against God, can feel these evils in his own person without the reflection, if not that he deserves them, at least that God is not too good to inflict the extremist evils on his creatures? What is their design but to tell us of a degree of displeasure, which confines not its expressions in evil to the direct natural results of wrong doing, and that he has still other and more fearful treasures of wrath for the workers of iniquity? What if all the sufferings and death which have been endured on the face of this earth since its creation, could be arrayed before the eye in present and distinct vision? What if all the sorrows and pains, and sighs and tears, and all the distress by sickness, pestilence, famine, earthquakes, shipwrecks, wars, the rack, the gibbet, and the fire--what if all the weeping widows and orphans, all the lamentation and mourning of parents and children, of husbands, wives, brothers, sisters what if all the massacres, the shrieks, agonies and groans of the dying--the seas of human blood and the mountains of human corpses--what if these scenes of woe and horror which have been witnessed on earth could be brought before us, and all be acted and felt over again as a present reality under our direct inspection. How should we be overwhelmed, and what should we think of that God who made and governs such a world as this? With such a spectacle of terror before us, should we reflect on nothing but his tenderness, and with our consciousness of guilt expect nothing but favors from his hands? What does the history of this world disclose, if not visible marks and traces of the vengeance of God upon it, in every age and every hour? And do these bespeak mere indulgence? Surely whatever other weakness or inconsistency may be ascribed to God, nothing is more inconsistent with the whole course of his providential dealings with men, than the weakness or inconsistency of excessive lenity. On whatever other basis man may rest his hopes of God's favor, that of mere tenderness, it would seem, must be the last. The entire history of his providence furnishes not an instance of kindness at the expense of justice, but discloses to all who read the record, a severity of dispensation which proclaims that a sovereign lawgiver and a righteous judge is on the throne of the universe. We do, we must see a God frowning at sin. And if amid these frowns we also witness the smiles of mercy, still they are too dark and awful to authorize the hope of his favor through the mere relentings of tenderness.

 

We are then brought to the conclusion, that God is administering an equitable moral government over men, either according to the principles of exact retribution or through an atonement. In other words, God will show his supreme disapprobation of sin, either by inflicting unmingled and endless misery on a world of transgressors, or by some other expedient which shall equally manifest such disapprobation.

 

Solemn and tremendous as is this alternative, it is and must be real; and from it there is no escape, according to any principles of correct reasoning. The benevolence of God, if we assume it as the infidel does--his providence, in all its facts and principles--every consideration that bears on the subject, conducts to our conclusion; while no fact, no principle, furnishes the least opposing evidence. Deny our conclusion, and you deny the perfect justice of God; deny his justice, and you must deny his benevolence. Admit then, that he is a God of absolute selfishness, of infinite malignity, or admit his benevolence, and with it his supreme abhorrence of sin, and the manifestation of that abhorrence, either in an exact retribution hereafter or through an atonement.

This brings us to the question, in which of these only possible or conceivable modes, is God administering his moral government over this sinful world? This leads me to say,

 

Secondly, That he is administering it, not in the former mode, but under an atonement.

 

This position is fully sustained by two facts and a principle. The facts are these: the first, that God is administering an equitable moral government over men; the second, that the entire course of his providence bespeaks his design to restore man to duty and to favor. The principle is, that the perfect equity or justice of a moral governor, can be reconciled with mercy to transgressors Only through an atonement.

 

In respect to the first of these facts, we have seen that God administers a moral government over men; that he does it through the medium of the best law; and that this fact, uncounteracted by any opposing evidence, is decisive proof of the perfect equity of his administration; that instead of furnishing any opposing evidence, the entire course of his providence shows him, as it were, most scrupulously avoiding every shadow of injustice--discloses the true tendency of obedience to his will, to bless, and of disobedience, to ruin the soul of man forever, and exhibits him in that severity of dispensation which comports only with the majesty of a sovereign lawgiver and righteous judge. We have seen that he has destined the subjects of his government to a future state of being, thus furnishing an opportunity for the perfect display of the equity of his administration; while the manner in which he removes them to that world tells of such a result, in the most fearful forebodings of every departing spirit; and that whether we assume and reason from his benevolence or from the facts of his providence, no other supposition can for a moment be admitted, than that of the perfect equity of his government. Shut up then to this conclusion on the one hand, we see at the same time on the other, the most satisfactory indications of his benignant design to restore man to duty and favor. The same course of providential dispensations, along with the lessons it gives of the equity of his administration, shows not less clearly the lessons of his mercy to the penitent transgressor. Every thing, as we have seen, entirely harmonizes with such an economy, and is fitted and adapted to the end of bringing man back to his duty and the friendship of his Maker; every motive which can reach and move a rational, voluntary being, whether derived from his present or future well-being; every thing in the form of manifested kindness and good-will on the part of a divine Benefactor; every thing in the form of paternal chastisement, in the nature and condition of man, adapted and designed to form his character to permanent virtue; his happiness placed so completely in his own power as a moral being every thing to invite to obedience, and to awe from transgression, which is conceivable in such a system; while all these adaptations, influences, efforts to reclaim, must be worse than in vain--must evince even malignity of intention on the part of the Creator, if he has no design to forgive and to save.

 

With these things in view, let us now advert to the principle, viz., that the perfect justice of God, as a moral governor, can be reconciled with mercy to transgressors only through an atonement. This is the impossibility, already sufficiently illustrated, that God should be either benevolent or just, without manifesting his supreme abhorrence of sin. I need not say, that it were easy for infinite wisdom to devise, and infinite power to execute, a plan by which such a manifestation shall be made, in the pardon of transgressors. Here then let us judge, whether God has not adopted some plan by which the principles of eternal justice are consistent with favor to a revolted world. What else can be true, or even supposed possible, but that he is administering a perfectly equitable system of moral government over men under an economy of grace?

 

I say not here what will be the actual results of this economy in a future world. All that the light of nature can give on this point is at most, the general conclusion, that these results will be such as will accord with that benignity of design so conspicuous in his providential dealings. The great fact itself however, appears, to my own mind, to be shown by all the evidence of which the nature of the case admits. If it be possible to manifest to rational beings the adoption of such a system without a revelation, i.e., by merely providential dispensations, I see not why the evidence actually furnished ofA JUST GOD AND A SAVIOUR, does not demand the most unhesitating belief.

 

To conclude. If these things are so, we see on what ground Infidelity must stand. The infidel must believe either in a malignant Deity, or in a future exact retribution of this sinful world, or in the great cardinal fact of Christianity, viz., that there is an atonement for sin. Let us look at this. If the infidel denies a full, just and exact retribution of this sinful world, and also an atonement for sin, then he is shut up to the admission of a selfish, malignant Deity. He may call him benevolent; but it is a name without the reality. Such a God is not benevolent, for he is not just. He is unjust. He is regardless, reckless of the greatest happiness of his moral creation--unjust to his kingdom--malignant.

 

Again; if now the infidel still denies an atonement for sin, and admits the benevolence of God, then he is shut up to the admission of a full and exact retribution of this sinful world in utter and endless misery. On his own premises there is no escape. If any thing is true in moral reasoning, it is this: that a benevolent God, as a moral governor, and thus the guardian of his kingdom, must feel and must express an abhorrence of the supreme evil of sin, and must make that expression either by a full and exact retribution or in some other way; i.e., through an atonement. The infidel denies an atonement. The consequence is inevitable. Every subject of God's moral government is a transgressor, and doomed, without hope, to utter and endless misery. Does he say, this is in itself incredible, impossible? I reply, it is neither. The destruction of such a world as this for its rebellion against God, may be less, in comparison with his universal kingdom, than the penalties which every benevolent parent inflicts on his children compared with the end of their infliction; it may be, as I have said, an infinitesimal compared with unlimited vastness. The infidel then, on his present premises, is compelled to admit, that every human being is doomed to everlasting destruction. And if he will adopt such premises, let him abide the conclusion. He professes to reason. Let him see that he adopts premises that throw the midnight of despair over a guilty world; premises, which give only "a certain fearful looking--for of judgment and fiery indignation."

 

Again; if the infidel denies that such a retribution awaits this sinful world, and still maintains that God is benevolent, then, as a rational man, he must admit an atonement, even that of Christianity. If God is benevolent, he is also just; and if his justice is not manifested and vindicated by a future just retribution, then it must be by an atonement. But will any rational man admit an atonement and reject that which Christianity reveals? Let him ask, how--by what other means or expedient--can a sin-avenging God become merciful to transgressors of his law? How can he make a manifestation of his abhorrence of sin equal to that of turning a rebellions world into hell? How can the throne of eternal justice be upheld in all Its strength and glory, and the defied penalties of sin be averted from the guilty? Here, all is mystery and utter darkness. Before this problem, the intellect of man retires baffled, and confounded. No answer can be given; no conception can be formed. Christianity--Christianity alone, gives the solution. Christianity alone reveals a triune God, and shows us his throne upheld by the man that is also the eternal Logos, and a guilty. world redeemed. Christianity thus solves the problem which God alone can solve. Christianity, on this most momentous of all subjects, and with this sufficient proof of its divine origin, removes all rational doubt, satisfies all rational inquiry, and gives all rational assurance. If there is an atonement for sin, then we safely affirm, it is and must be that which Christianity describes. It is the only adequate atonement conceivable by the human mind. It is this alone which can still the agitations of conscious guilt, and bring relief to the laboring heart of sinful man. In its very nature and perfection, it bears the impress of God as its author. And can man, reasoning from his necessities as a sinner against a just and holy God, and admitting the fact of an atonement for sin, deny the atonement of Christianity? No man has done, no man ever will do it. The only alternative here is, either no atonement, or the great atonement of the son of God.

 

You see then what ground the infidel--every man that reasons from any possible premises in the case, must take. He must either deny the benevolence of God,--i. e., believe in a selfish, malignant deity, or in a benevolent God, with a future just retribution of this sinful world; or he must receive Christianity, with its great atoning sacrifice.

 

And now, what are the facts? The infidel rejects all atonement for sin. He rejects the doctrine of a future retribution, and, of course, actually lands in the belief of a selfish, malignant deity! I know indeed, that the words will not suit him; that he calls God benevolent, and loves to dwell on the goodness, and the kindness, and the tenderness of the Creator toward his creatures, as if he could cause an infringement on the Godhead by mere words, or compliment it with tender epithets out of its own divinity, and so make a benevolent, an unjust God. Such is however the fact, in his own conceptions. He conceives of a God who will sacrifice the majesty of law, the glory of his moral dominion, and the happiness of his moral creation, in tenderness to rebels; a God, who stands before his intelligent universe the friend and patron of iniquity. This is the real, the only conception which he can form. It is no exaggeration, no caricature; it is given in his avowed creed of a benevolent God who is not just. In the sincerity of my heart then I say it; and if the infidel would reflect on his own conception, he would see that the real object of his homage, instead of a perfect God, is a perfect demon. Man, sinful, immortal man, has nothing better to confide in, than the tender mercies of an infinite fiend!

 

And now permit me to add; Christianity is false or Christianity is true. If false, then you must either believe in a selfish malignant deity, and consent to dwell forever amid the darkness and terrors of his fearful dominion, or you must believe in God's benevolence and, abide the more fearful doom of his just and eternal indignation. If Christianity is true--I had almost said, if it can be true--if there is but a slight probability of its truth--if it reveals what the intellect of man could never have conceived--tells us of an adequate and perfect atonement for sin under the government of a holy and just God; and proffers pardon and life where otherwise all is hopeless guilt and death for eternity; if it thus harmonizes with, illustrates, unfolds, confirms the clearest intimations of his providence--then what is Christianity, and what is Infidelity? Christianity with only these characteristics comes as a messenger from God with God's credentials. It conducts us into the very sanctuary of his glories, where justice reigns and mercy triumphs in still brighter splendor. In this holy of holies it points us to the great and perfect sacrifice for this world's redemption, and shows us without a vail of mystery, A JUST GOD AND YET A SAVIOUR. Infidelity sneers and prefers a malignant deity. The infidel rejects the message, denies the proof, despises the sacrifice, and seals his own damnation. Who that has reason and will use it, will reject Christianity for the darkness, the terrors of Infidelity? Who that has reason, will reject Christianity, with its consolations in time, its prospects for eternity, its deliverance from sin and hell, its regions of immortality and joy--its God--its Saviour? The gospel--the gospel--how unquestionable--how sure its announcement of its own character--"glad tidings of great joy to all people!"