The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME I

 

SECTION II:

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD

AS KNOWN

BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

 

LECTURE V:

 

Second leading proposition continued, viz.: God administers an equitable moral government God administers his moral government under a gracious economy. -- Explanation. -- Proof 1. The manner in which he administers. good and evil harmonizes with such an economy. -- 2. Distribution of good and evil proves a design to recover. -- (a) A virtuous life the happiest. -- (b) Gifts of God tend to gratitude. -- (c) Natural evils prove the same design. -- (d) The present a state of discipline -- (e) The happiness of man in his own power. -- (f) Without forgiveness, reclaiming influences vain. God's favor can be secured only on the terms which Christianity prescribes, whether Christianity Is or is not from God.

 

 

IT has been extensively maintained by the advocates of revelation, that it is the exclusive honor of Christianity, not merely that it reveals THE MODE of God's favor to the guilty, but that we are also indebted to it for the belief of even the possibility of his favor. How far the human mind, uninstructed by a divine revelation, would in fact have pushed its inquiries on this interesting subject, is one question; how far it could have done this, is another. The probability is, that the conclusions of the human mind would in fact have been in a high degree doubtful and unsatisfactory, if not against the doctrine of the divine placability. This however might easily. be traced to other causes than the want of sufficient evidence of such placability. The aversion of man to the knowledge of God would be a sufficient cause both of imperfect investigations and false conclusions; Christianity may have suggested truths or principles, which would not, though they could, have been discovered without it; and in this way at least we may be able to prove the placability of, God, without assuming any of the declarations of Christianity as of divine authority. The demonstration of a problem in geometry is not less independent of Euclid's authority, because he first suggested the constructions on which the demonstration depends.

 

Nor is there any dishonor done to Christianity by maintaining the sufficiency of human reason to make this discovery; but rather the magnitude of the gift, and the grace that conferred it, are greatly diminished on the contrary supposition.

 

To Christianity, we may still be indebted for our conclusion, in point of fact, though not of necessity. For although the doctrine of the divine placability might be traced by the light of reason, this by no means shows that revelation was not, in one sense, necessary to the actual knowledge or belief of the doctrine. It only shows the ground of that necessity to be, not the want of evidence in the works and providence of God, nor of incapacity in the human mind to discover it, but the perverseness and criminal blindness of the mind itself. And surely the kindness of a benefactor, who secures the actual vision of those who willfully shut their own eyes, is not less conspicuous than that of one who first brings upon them the constitutional calamity of blindness, and afterward removes it. On this principle, we see not only the grace and mercy of God manifested in the most illustrious manner, in giving a revelation to men; for it is a gift to the guilty, made necessary by their own perverseness'. On the other, though it may indeed be a gift of goodness, it cannot be a gift of mercy, there being no obligation to believe without it. Nor is this all. On the supposition that the providence of God clearly evinces his placability to guilty, man, we have a double testimony to the truth of the revealed declaration, that God is reconciling the world to himself. We see the ways of God, his acts and his doings, to be coincident with his declarations; while on the other supposition, there is palpable contradiction between what he does and what be says. How is the stamp of divinity impressed on God's revelation by such a coincidence.

 

It is not true however, that all the advocates of Christianity have denied that the divine placability can be discovered from the light of nature. President Edwards, speaking of the outward provision which God makes for the temporal well-being of man, says, "that it is a great argument, that God is not an implacable enemy of mankind, in a settled determination finally to east them off, and never again to admit them to favor."-MISCEL. OBSERVATIONS.

 

The Apostle also, (HEB. ii. 7) has laid down a general principle, which must be decisive on this point with the believer in his authority. "He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him." He also declares, that men, having not a revelation from God, are without excuse for not glorifying him as God. (Rom. i. 20.) It is not impossible then that the heathen should come to God, or that they should glorify him as God; and of course it is not impossible that they should believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him. There is evidence then furnished by the light of nature, that God is a rewarder. True it may be, that I may not be able to exhibit this evidence as it actually exists. That it does exist, admits of no doubt, if the Scriptures be true. With the full persuasion of the fact that such evidence does exist, the propriety of attempting to unfold it cannot be doubted.

 

The argument for the equity of God's moral government, in a previous lecture, rested on two suppositions, which I proposed to show are matters of fact. This was attempted in the last two lectures in respect to the first supposition, viz., that of a future state.

 

It now remains to show, that

 

God administers his moral government over men under an

economy of grace.

 

By this, I mean an economy under which, through an atonement, God can consistently with the perfect equity of his administration, show favor to the guilty. It will be remembered, according to the principles already advanced, that God, to evince the equity of his administration, must show the highest approbation of obedience to his law, and the highest disapprobation of disobedience. By an atonement then, I mean some expedient or provision, by which he shows as high disapprobation of transgression as he would by the punishment of transgressors. Here I admit and maintain, that it would be wholly beyond the power of the human mind to devise or discover any expedient by which this equivalent manifestation of disapprobation could be made. At the same time it is to be remembered, that man is not to limit the conceptions of the omniscient mind by those of his own. Whether man can or cannot see how, or by what means an adequate atonement can be made, it would be manifest presumption to affirm that the infinite God cannot. We must admit the possibility of the fact, and if we find good and sufficient evidence, must believe, that though we know not the particular mode that God has devised and adopted, yet that he has some expedient by which he can reconcile the pardon of transgressors with the equity of his moral administration.

 

In support of the fact, that God administers his moral government under an economy of grace, I remark --

 

In the first place, that the manner in which God distributes good and evil in this world, entirely harmonizes with such an economy. This appears in the general fact, that in distributing good and evil in this world, he evinces no undue or inappropriate feelings toward virtue or vice. That he shows any want of a due regard to virtue, cannot be pretended, on the supposition of a gracious economy. There is no deficiency of reward no treating of virtuous subjects worse, though all are treated better than they deserve, which perfectly accords with a system of grace.

 

Again; God evinces no approbation or disapprobation of vice as such. Let us briefly examine the providential facts which can be supposed to bear on this point. We see that the imperfectly virtuous--and such only are the best of men--do, so far as virtue is in its nature connected with self-complacency and peace of conscience, or with any attendant or consequent happiness, reap the appropriate benefits of their imperfect virtue. These are indeed, in some degree, beyond prevention, except by the annihilation of the subject, and are therefore no evidence of God's approbation of sin in good men, even under a merely legal. dispensation. Besides, were these benefits of imperfect virtue not experienced by its subjects, how could there be any evidence of God's gracious design to allure men to the practice of virtue, or to restore them to his favor? It is plain, that without them no manifestation of an economy of grace could be made; and instead of being inconsistent with such an economy, they perfectly harmonize with, and are even demanded by it.

 

Another fact, which may be supposed to bear on the point now before us is, that those who are wholly vicious, even the most abandoned, experience only in a very imperfect degree the appropriate evils of vice in remorse of conscience. In this fact we see, on the part of man, an obvious counteraction of the design of God, as it is decisively manifested in the nature and tendencies of things. The fact therefore that wicked men avoid these evils by thus obviously counteracting these tendencies, is not properly and truly the effect of what God does, or fails to do, except in one respect, viz., that he does not place them in such a condition, or in such circumstances, that the fall effects of vice, in remorse of conscience, will be felt. But to do so, would be to place them under the fall retribution of law. Of course all indications of an economy of grace must cease, and absolute despair of the divine favor must be the consequence. This exemption then, in the case of the wicked, from the full measure of remorse of conscience, while it evinces on the part of God no approbation of vice and no want of disapprobation of it, under an economy of grace, is plainly consistent with, and required by, such an economy.

 

Further; the enjoyment of various other kinds of good which are not deserved, and exemption from various other kinds of evil which are deserved require consideration. I remark then, that the enjoyment of this good and the exemption from this evil are obviously the effects of those general laws whose operation and results are seen to be wholly independent of the moral character of man as marking its diversity; and that therefore they do not evince any approbation of vice, or any want of disapprobation of it, on the part of God. If we consider the enjoyments of this class possessed by the imperfectly virtuous man, we shall see that God in bestowing them evinces no approbation of his moral imperfection. For example, such a man by his skill and activity acquires wealth with its numerous advantages and comforts. But it is manifest at once that these blessings are not the appropriate effects of his moral imperfections, but of his skill and industry. To confirm this view of the subject, we see others equally virtuous, either through unskillfulness or by unavoidable providential calamities, the victims of poverty with all its evils. We are unavoidably led therefore to trace this class of enjoyments to other causes than moral character, so far as the present question is concerned. We see clearly that the providential Disposer of events does not, in the distribution of these favors, act on the principle of expressing approbation of imperfect virtue or of vice, but that they result from the operation of those general laws, which act irrespectively of moral character. These laws and their results for aught we can see, must exist, or the appropriate indications of an economy of grace must wholly cease. For the same reason the good things enjoyed by the vicious are no expression of God's approbation of vice. We see indeed the industrious knave cultivate the soil and reap the harvest, and also the indolent, be their moral character what it may, leave it uncultivated and live in penury. Hence no one ascribes this difference in providential allotment to diversity of moral character; none regards the prosperity of the skillful and industrious villain, as an expression of God's approbation of his character, but all ascribe it to other causes whose operation and effects are wholly irrespective of moral character. If it here be said, that under the providence of God it is the appropriate tendency of certain vices to procure enjoyments; of avarice for example to secure wealth, of ambition to acquire honor, etc. I reply that these things are not true in any respect which bears on the present subject; for we see avarice, for example, acquiring wealth only when connected with skill and industry, while we find it existing in an equal degree when attended by indolence or unskillfulness, acquiring nothing besides, it is apparent that a virtuous regard to wealth, connected with skill and industry, has a direct tendency to secure an adequate, not to say an equal, degree of wealth, and greatly to augment its enjoyments. Indeed it would be easy to show, were it necessary, that under the providence of God the amount of happiness connected with avarice, ambition and sensuality, is far less than results from the opposite virtues. The supposed tendency of these vices is not real, and the acquisition of wealth by avarice, of honor by ambition and of pleasure by sensuality, is no expression of God's approbation of these vices. These enjoyments then are to be traced to other causes--to that operation of general laws which is independent of moral character, and which is in no respect inconsistent with God's disapprobation of vice, except that he does not place men in a state of exact retribution; and therefore under an economy of grace they are in no respect inconsistent with his disapprobation. in other words, all that can be called the good consequences of vice, are the unavoidable results of those laws which necessarily pertain to an economy of grace, and therefore harmonize with and are required by such an economy.

 

Once more. Exemption from that class of evils in the case of the wicked, to which I have referred, is no expression of God's want of disapprobation of vice. This is sufficiently obvious from the principles already advanced. Such exemption or exact retribution is the only conceivable alternative. At least it must exist to some extent, or the system of general laws which for aught we can see is inseparable from an economy of grace must be abandoned, or man must be placed in a state of exact retribution, which would render such an economy impossible.

 

Thus it appears that the mode in which God distributes good and evil in this world is not inconsistent with the administration of a moral government under an economy of grace, but perfectly harmonizes with such an economy. If now we reflect on the proofs adduced in former lectures, as furnished by the nature of man and the condition in which he is placed, that God is administering a moral government over him in some form, that there is nothing in his providential dispensations at all inconsistent with his adhering to the strict principles of equity in his administration, but clear and satisfactory intimations that he does adhere to them, then we are shut up to one of these conclusions; viz., either God will execute after the short respite of human life a full and exact retribution on every individual of this sinful world; or show that he is administering his government under a gracious economy. If we reflect again on the view of the subject that has now been given, particularly on the fact, that while in all his dispensations God so scrupulously avoids any expression of feelings, which appear to be at variance with a due degree of approbation of virtue, and of disapprobation of vice, every thing in this distribution of good and evil harmonizes with an economy of grace, just as we should suppose it would. We see also a coincidence and harmony which remove all presumption against, if they do not create a presumption in favor of the conclusion, that God is administering an equitable moral government under a gracious economy.

 

I now proceed to offer more direct evidence on the point before us, and remark-

 

In the second place, that God in the distribution of good and evil clearly and decisively evinces a design to restore man to virtue and happiness.

 

This design of God is so conspicuous and capable of such extensive illustration and confirmation, and yet to every contemplative mind is so remote from demanding either, that I shall advert only to the leading sources of argument, and in the briefest form possible.

 

I observe --

 

(1.) That the providential dispensations of God furnish decisive proof, that in respect to worldly or physical enjoyments, a virtuous course of life is the happiest. Whatever may be the practical estimate of mankind on this question--whatever obscurity the sophistry of the passions or of the heart may throw around it, none fail to perceive and know that intemperance or excess of every kind, i.e., selfishness in all its specific forms of action, greatly impairs our comfort and our happiness on earth. In illustration and proof of the fact, I can only advert to a few obvious instances. Who does not know that honesty is the best policy? By honesty I mean not overt action merely, but that which is dictated by right moral principle. Who does not know the advantages of a virtuous compared with a vicious course of life in respect to health and all our bodily enjoyments, to the possession of wealth and the pleasures it is capable of affording--in a word, to all those blessings which we comprise under the general name of worldly prosperity? Here also might be considered the favor, kindness, honor, influence secured by the one, and the alienation, neglect and infamy entailed by the other; the warm approbation and interest felt in the prosperity of the virtuous, and the indignation occasioned by the triumphs of villainy; and especially the obvious desire of all men to sustain in the eyes of others a character for virtue. How does this last fact show the value of a reputation for virtue as the means of human happiness, and that to insure the results we must sustain the character.

 

Here it is proper to mention the consequences of virtue and of vice to mankind as subjects of parental and civil governments. These are too obvious to need any specification. They bear however as directly on our argument as any other forms of good and evil, since they are the results of institutions inseparable from our earthly condition, and made so by the appointment of God.

 

The consequences of a virtuous and vicious course of life to the inner man claim a more particular consideration. I have already had occasion to exhibit the nature and tendency of virtue to give perfect happiness to its subject, and those of vice to produce unqualified misery. I now refer to their actual effects, to some of which I will briefly advert. Consider their influence on our worldly desires and sensual appetites, which if ungratified, are the most fruitful source of unhappiness to man. But let the objects of these desires and appetites be what they may, wealth, honor or pleasure, they are never gratified. So long as they are uncontrolled by virtuous principle, they are always excessive, always stronger than the nature and value of their object warrant, and beyond its power to gratify. Lust, ambition, avarice torment the breast which cherishes them, and in their nature are only specific forms of selfishness, deceiving, enslaving and vexing the mind, while in their consequences they are often calamitous and dreadful. The abandoned drunkard is only a full length portrait of uncontrolled appetite. Though avarice, ambition and other lusts do not in each individual instance produce the same degree of evil, yet the aggregate which each has occasioned in this world is scarcely less, perhaps greater, than that which drunkenness has produced. Assuredly we all know that the world is full of unhappiness through the influence of ungoverned and selfish appetite. Now true virtue leads its possessor to love and desire, different objects according to their relative and real value. It gives to the greatest and to every inferior good its proper place, and thus removes all excessive desires and with then the cause of inward torment.

 

Consider now the influence of virtue, as it regulates our passions. No small portion of the unhappiness of man results from envy, anger, peevishness, impatience, revenge. Who can deny their power to annoy and torment the mind? Who can say, as he wishes for enjoyment tomorrow, that he hopes to be angry, fretful, envious, revengeful? Is he who indulges these tempers happy in himself, or is he the man who contributes to the happiness of others, or is he a tormentor of himself and of others? And yet these passions disquiet more or less every human bosom in which true virtue has not broken their dominion. Look now at the man who governs himself. How gracefully he sways the scepter! With what serenity and dignity he passes onward through life! How equable his career! In a world full of jarring elements and violent changes, no clouds of discontent, no whirlwinds of passion, obscure or disturb the steady sunshine of the soul. Like the sun in the heavens, he is far above the storms and tempests that infest and darken and agitate all beneath him.

 

Similar remarks apply to all those peculiarities of temper and propensity, which are seriously calamitous to individuals. Is one the victim of that melancholy that throws its gloom over every bright prospect--is he hurried into calamities by indecision and levity of spirit--has be that selfish insensibility that shuts him out from all the sympathies and joys of earthly friendships--has he become the victim of dissipation and wayward prodigality, what other remedy so effectual as to bring him under the influence of virtuous principle? What like this can fix the inconstant, embolden the timid, strengthen the weak, reclaim the abandoned, and save the lost--what else can correct every infirmity, heal every mental disease, and give health and strength and perfection to the soul of man?

 

But the most terrible of all calamities which shake the soul, is the fear of an avenging God. We know what thoughtlessness and worldliness, absorption in business and pleasure, can do to blind us to this evil. But we know as well that it cannot be wholly avoided by wicked men. Even the hardiest in guilt cannot become wholly insensible to these forebodings. Catiline and Nero felt remorse of conscience. The hardihood of, a fiend cannot prevent it. There is the impression of a futurity on all human spirits. Every one has a conscience. All know that they have always and deliberately crossed and thwarted the will of another, and that he is no less than an infinite Being; they know, that thus to cross the will of that Being is to offend him, and that they have always done it. They are afraid of death because they are afraid of God. They know that if there is a just retribution to sustain the prerogatives of heaven's Sovereign, and unfulfilled penalties to avenge their violation, they must fall on them. There is an emphatic voice of remonstrance and warning which they cannot quell, and a fearful looking for of judgment they cannot avoid. What is the remedy for these evils, and for those that spring from this alienation of the creature from his Creator--from this aversion of heart to the Almighty Sovereign of heaven and earth, but to return to affection and friendship--what but virtue, religion? I say not here whether God be placable or not. But I ask, what other hope have we, or can we have, if not from conformity, to his will? Suppose him a selfish, even a malignant Being, what better can we do than to return to duty; what better, if we would secure the friendship of such a Being, than to do his will. If he is placable--aye, if too he is infinitely good, then what may we not hope for? The answer is in the feelings of an immortal, who has seen and felt his desert of punishment--of the vengeance of the Almighty, but is now reposing in the bosom of infinite love.

 

I might dwell here on the advantages of virtue in every condition of human life. In youth, what else can so protect from every danger and evil, and open such bright prospects for future life? In old age, when decrepitude of body and the sinking faculties of the mind seem to open our graves, what else shall console us? Under affliction, how disconsolate were human sorrow, with no appeal but to the unfeeling rock that crushes us. Friends forsake or betray us--all whom we love die--disease assails, which no remedies can reach, poverty sinks us from affluence to want; death comes--every arm is palsied, every countenance is pale in weakness and despair what shall sustain us? Nothing but virtue--nothing but religion--nothing but doing the will of God. The love of God, the fixed purpose to do his will, gives hope of his favor. Nothing else can convert our very trials into blessings, and give the hope of a brighter world. This can change the gloom of the dark valley into the twilight of an eternal morning, and the dark grave into the gate of heaven. All else is darkness without light, guilt without hope, fear, remorse, terror, ruin and wretchedness.

 

Why then are there, in the providence of God, such clear and abundant advantages in the practice of virtue, if it be not his design to allure men to the practice of it? Why does he thus shut them up to virtue, to religion, as their only hope of his favor, if not to assure them that in this way they shall obtain it.

 

(2.) The blessings of life, contemplated as the gifts of a divine Benefactor, tend by a strong influence, to reclaim men to the practice of virtue. It is philosophic truth, that "the goodness of God leadeth to repentance." Nor is there any kind of moral influence so powerfully adapted to this end as manifested kindness, which is sure to produce affection in return. This influence reaches the last and lowest stages of human profligacy; for few are so obdurate as not to feel its thrilling efficacy. Nor can I conceive it possible, that an unperverted mind should contemplate this sinful world, in its unworthiness of the favors of its Maker, and also the ceaseless and abundant Communication of blessings to those who deserve only his displeasure; the solicitude with which he watches, the care with which he protects, the compassion with which he relieves, the kindness with which he blesses, and not feel a mighty and an almost irresistible attraction to do the will of such a Benefactor. How is it possible that intelligent beings, qualified as we are, to read the clear intimations of our Maker's will in our constitution and circumstances as moral beings, and made as we are, the constant objects of his more than paternal care and kindness, can doubt or disregard his design to recover us to obedience and to the enjoyment of his favor? What child. in similar circumstances, could question the design of paternal love?

 

(3.) The natural evils of life justly and soberly estimated bespeak the same design. We no sooner inquire into the end which these evils are fitted to accomplish in respect to man, than we see that it is to restrain men from vice and restore them to virtue. The most striking fact in regard to these evils is, that to a vast extent they result from the wrong state of the heart and conduct of the life. It is suffering in connection with sin, telling us a truth we cannot fail to know, that if we would prevent the effect, we must remove the cause; and far more distinctly and more impressively, that as God loves our happiness he loves also our virtue, and that he will secure the one only by means of the other. So plainly, so forcibly is this great truth taught in the providence of God, that every man knows and feels it in much the same manner as that, if he would avoid the sensation of being burned he must keep himself from the fire. By these evils too the insufficiency and vanity of earthly joys are made obvious in a manner the most impressive to the wayward mind of man. Let him take his lesson from these evils, let him take it from the sufferings, the agonies, the last breath of a dying man, and who would not realize what the world is? In the evils of life we are furnished with abundant opportunities for the exercise of all, and especially of the more difficult and nobler virtues. Even in those evils to which we are subject through what we call inadvertence or rashness, rather than by the execution of any criminal purpose, we find a powerful check to imprudence and temerity, and an impressive lesson of discretion and care, which may be indispensable to our moral well-being. Who can estimate the benefits of watchfulness to moral beings? The necessity of continued occupation and labor for our comfortable subsistence is also indirectly, and yet in the most important respects subservient to our moral interests. Its single influence to remove us from the temptations of sloth, and to deprive us of leisure to contrive and perpetrate iniquity, is sufficient to show its salutary effects on the conduct of men--to show us that what we are so apt to esteem one of the most intolerable calamities, is one of the greatest of heaven's blessings. It can scarcely be pretended, that the moral and of course all the real interests of a world in which calamities, disease, pain and death possess so benign a tendency and yet produce so little good effect, would be improved by any diminution of these evils; nor can it well be doubted that they evince the design of their author to restrain man from the perversion of his moral nature, and to restore him to virtue and happiness. What would this world be without these? Were there no disappointments, no sufferings, no death, how ferocious, how desperate were human selfishness. It would be a pandemonium rather than a paradise, over whose crimes and woes even God's mercy would despair. In a word then, in all the evils of human life we discern only the discipline and the chastisements of a father's hand, and see only "the graver countenance of his love," intending our profit by making us partakers of his holiness and his favor.

 

The present state of man is obviously one of trial and discipline, and as such is fitted and designed to form his character to permanent virtue. On this most important topic I have not time to dwell. The illustration of it by Bishop Butler in his ANALOGY, (P. I., Chaps. 4 and 5,) to those who will read his remarks, supersedes the necessity of any attempt on my part to exhibit the subject. Not merely the theological student and the Christian, but every man who would understand the true nature and design of his existence in this world, should read and read often, these chapters of Butler.

 

The general doctrine which he establishes is, that the present world is a state of moral discipline adapted and designed to improve and ultimately to confirm man in virtue and happiness in a future world. This adaptation he has traced in a variety of particulars with such clearness of illustration and force of argument, that the reality of it cannot be doubted by any candid mind. He has not indeed applied this great fact to this particular purpose, but the fact being admitted, who can doubt its application? If it be obvious and undeniable, that the constitution of man and the entire course of God's providential dispensations toward him are fitted to reclaim him from sin and to improve and confirm him in virtue and happiness, I ask whence such adaptation, if God does not design to accomplish this end. It is to no purpose to say that in respect to the greater part of men this design is not accomplished. The light of nature leaves the future particular results of the present state in many respects unknown and indeterminate. Probation, and with it this course of moral discipline, may also be continued under even more favorable auspices, till the end shall be accomplished in manner and degree worthy of the attributes of its Author. Admit however the Pact to be as supposed, it must be traced to the voluntary perversion of the design of God on the part of men, and the perversion of a design is decisive of its reality.

 

(5.) The happiness of mankind, to a great extent--I may even say their perfect happiness--is placed in their own power. Immeasurably the greatest portion of the miseries of human life are the result of sin and moral imperfection. Suppose that all men were perfectly conformed to the rule of benevolent action, how would this dismal world, as we are often prone to esteem it, and darkened and afflicted as it is by sin and its woes, be cheered and brightened! Let all unkindness between man and man cease; let envy and malice, fraud, cruelty, contention, covetousness, pride, ambition and sensuality come to an end; let these be followed by perfect benevolence, under all its forms of meekness, humility, contentment, self-denial, uprightness, confidence, sympathy, a universal courteousness and cordiality; let benevolence go forth in an uninterrupted train of deeds of beneficence, and liberality pour abroad its gifts, and let gratitude and love reign pure and unruffled in every heart, and these be attended with submission, trust and joy, with the other delightful emotions of piety, and how trivial would be every possible evil--how would this world of sorrow cease to groan, and be transformed into a primeval Eden. How would all nature smile in beauty and pour forth its bounties to bless, and the sunshine of every heart welcome a present God, and tell us of a paradise regained! Does such a fact, in respect to this world of his creatures, bespeak no design of their Maker?

 

Can an individual doubt, in respect to the part which God desires that he should act? Can such a weight of motive as arises from this amount of good to each and to all, from the obvious practicability of its attainment as placed in their power, be furnished without being designed to move such beings to act accordingly? The question admits of but one answer, and this too plain to be stated. The whole world feels this influence. With it there is a sense of duty and of obligation, which presses hard and almost irresistibly on the human conscience, to embark in this enterprise of blessing the world; and there is a sense of guilt and self-condemnation which fastens on the soul, and compels those who live only to defeat this design of their Maker, to carry a wounded spirit with them through all their pilgrimage. Who can reflect on these things as the result of God's providential dispensations, without regarding them as the ceaseless efforts of his grace to recover man to virtue and to happiness?

 

There is another fact, which has too important a relation to this part of the argument to be left unnoticed; one which gives a peculiar grandeur and glory to a moral agent--that such is the nature of a moral being, that perfection in character is perfection in blessedness. Moral agency involves, in its very nature, the power so to occupy the mind and bless the moral being with the right object of affection, that any loss of good, and any pain or suffering which are possible in the case, shall be accounted almost as nothing. (I might say, and maintain the position, that it would be in the power of a moral being, if morally perfect, to avoid all suffering, even from omnipotence at least from every created cause. I have no doubt of this fact, as one given in the true philosophy of the mind. But I present the position with the slight qualification, almost entirely to avoid suffering.

 

This may be illustrated in many forms, and in the commonest things. How frequently then, when thought and sensibility are wholly given to some object of absorbing interest, do we receive bodily injury without feeling or knowing the fact? Every thing is relative, not only in thought but in feeling. How unworthy in a Croesus to grieve for the loss of a farthing! Archimedes was so absorbed in the solution of his problem, that he lost his life in the sacking of the city, without being aware of his danger. Soldiers, wounded and bleeding in battle, have fought on, insensible of their wounds, till they were falling in death. Paul, in his own language, "suffered the loss of all things, and counted them but dung, that he might win Christ;" and considered himself "as having nothing, and yet possessing all things." Martyrs, on the rack and in the fire, have triumphed, with hymns of praise on their lips and heaven in their hearts. The nature of mind explains all this. When then the object that engrosses the mind of a moral being is God--as he is, his designs, the end, the results at which he aims and which he will accomplish--when the heart, the whole soul of a moral being, is fixed as it may be on such an object, and so becomes "filled with all the fullness of God," why should it be thought strange that the tortures of the rack and the fire should leave the perfect blessedness of the mind unimpaired? Such is undeniably the nature of a moral being. By perfection in character he secures perfection in happiness, and becomes incapable of misery! Evil, Buffering is possible to man only through his moral imperfection.

 

I am not saying that perfect holiness will ever exist in this world; experience and observation forbid us to expect it. But I have called your attention to the fact now stated, that I might ask, what is the design of God, in giving existence to moral beings? Has he not placed their happiness in their power happiness without alloy, absolute and perfect? And what is, what can be his design, but to induce man to attain it; what but to persuade him to do the will and enjoy the friendship of his Creator?

 

(6.) I only add in support of this conclusion, that if there is no forgiveness with God, and if the proof is decisive that there is none, then all this course of effort to reclaim to obedience must of necessity be vain and worse than in vain. Under the conviction that there is no forgiveness with God, the world would become desperate in rebellion. That God then by the entire course of providence should thus aim to restore man to virtue, and yet authorize and even render unavoidable a conviction which must render all his efforts to reclaim abortive, is incredible. The providential dispensations of God then authorize and require the conclusion that there is forgiveness for the guilty. Indeed in view of what has been said, I ask is there in the entire providence of God any thing in the least degree inconsistent with this great design of his grace--is there any want of adaptation in the means adopted for its accomplishment; can any course of providential dispensation be conceived more decisively expressive of a design to restore a lost world to duty and to happiness.

 

I now recur to what I claim to have proved, that God is administering his moral government on the principles of exact equity. In view of this fact we are brought to the unavoidable conclusion, that he will in a future world unfold these principles either in exact retribution or through an atonement. The former is indeed far more probable, than that he has abandoned the principles of eternal justice in his moral government. At the same time that man's present state is simply that of respite from deserved punishment under a merely legal dispensation, must be regarded as highly, even altogether incredible, when compared with the supposition of a gracious economy. In view then of the equity of God's administration, and all those influences to restore man to virtue, and those intimations of forgiveness so conspicuous in this course of his providence, the only conclusion is that God is administering his moral government through an atonement, or under a gracious economy.

 

One remark in conclusion. You see that if you ever become the objects of God's favor, you must do so on the same ground and on the same conditions which Christianity reveals and prescribes. Without an atonement for your sins, like that which Christianity reveals, there is no hope that you can be forgiven; without repentance for sin, the renunciation of it by doing the will of God, and a cheerful unqualified trust in his pardoning mercy, there is no true happiness for you here or hereafter.

 

Come then and act up to the dictates of right reason. If you have not proof that Christianity is from God, you have proof that with God there is forgiveness for the penitent sinner, and for none but him. There is, there can be no religion for you but one whose basis is an atonement for sin--a religion which involves a penitent and a contrite heart which hopes for mercy from God as the righteous avenger of sin. Act up then to the dictates of your sober judgment--conform the dictates of conscience to the will of the Being who made you, who in all his providence either smiles to invite you to his friendship, or frowns only to deter you from the guilt and the ruin of sin. Embrace that religion by which the infinite God, your Maker, your Redeemer would bless, and without which he will curse you forever--that religion which is the perfection of your nature, the end of your existence. If truth is better than falsehood, if happiness is more desirable than misery, if God as your friend is better than God as your enemy, if to meet him as your Saviour is better than to meet him as the avenger of sin, if to go to his judgment-seat fearless and triumphant is better than to go there in despairing terror, if heaven is better than hell, choose this hour with a penitent, humble and steadfast heart, the service of a redeeming God.

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