The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME I

 

SECTION II:

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD

AS KNOWN

BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

 

LECTURE XI:

 

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURE, TO PROVE THAT

CHRISTIANITY IS FROM GOD.

Nature of Divine Revelation. -- Argument for its necessity. -- Different views of the grounds of this. -- I. Not necessary, because man cannot discover moral and religious truth: but 11. Necessary, 1. To make known the truth In the most perfect method, especially by language. -- Absurdity of objecting to this medium -- 2. To receive the practical Influence of such truth. -- The experiment by the light of nature decisive, shown by the ancient philosophers. -- Their views Beauty, vacillating, erroneous. -- Practical influence feeble on themselves and others. -- Prevalence of Immorality. -- Their teachings and example limited.

 

 

By a divine revelation, we may understand some mode adopted by our Creator of imparting the knowledge of religious and moral truth to the human mind, more direct than any such knowledge obtained by the light of nature; or employing human reason on the character, the works and providence of God. On the question whether a divine revelation is necessary to man, the parties have, in my view, often adopted unqualified assertions, which are erroneous and even fatal to a satisfactory conclusion.

 

On the one hand, it has been affirmed that all the knowledge which is necessary or useful to man as a moral being may be obtained from the works of God, and that every other mode of discovering truth to the human mind on the part of God, is impossible, incredible, and useless. On the other, the utter insufficiency of human reason to make the least useful discovery of moral and religious truth from the mere light of nature, and the consequent absolute necessity of a direct revelation from God, have been strenuously maintained. It is true, that some of the advocates for the necessity of a revelation, concede that the light of nature furnishes the means of much important knowledge, and often seem to contend only for the necessity of further discoveries by the light of revelation. And yet the same writers assert with frequency, "that human reason CANNOT attain any certain knowledge of the will or law of God, or of the true happiness of man." This incongruity, which appears to characterize the discussions on this subject by leaving the real question vague and indeterminate, has contributed in no small degree to unsettle opinions and to perpetuate discussion. To what extent the necessity of a divine revelation exists, and what are the precise grounds or reasons of it, are points of the first importance to all satisfactory views on the subject, as well as to the termination of the controversy with the opposers of revelation.

 

It may be admitted generally and indefinitely, that a revelation is necessary to man, and yet its ends or purposes, and the extent, grounds, or reasons of the necessity, may be left undecided. In a state of utter darkness, light is necessary as the only medium of vision. But we may suppose a degree of light adequate for a distinct sight of surrounding objects, and yet that a man should refuse to see them, and this in a case in which greater light would result in actual vision. In the one case, light is necessary, because man cannot see without it; in the other, to secure his actual vision, because he will not. Again, there may be a degree of light adequate to the distinct vision of some objects and not of others; and the consequence may be, either that neither class of objects will be seen, or that the former only will be. In these cases, the particular purposes or ends, on account of which greater light is necessary, are different, as are the objects to be seen. The grounds or reasons of the necessity differ--greater light in the one case, being necessary to actual vision of any of the objects; in the other, necessary to the actual vision of all the objects. Further; a greater degree of light may be necessary, not because man cannot, nor because he will not see every object, but to enable him to see every object with greater distinctness and effect than would otherwise be possible.

 

So in respect to a divine revelation. It may be necessary for a great variety of particular purposes or ends, and the grounds or reasons of the necessity in respect to these ends may be very different. To maintain the general proposition that a divine revelation is necessary, is not fitted to convey precise and definite views on this important subject, nor to terminate this part of the controversy with the opposers of revelation.

 

While therefore, I maintain the general doctrine, that a divine revelation is necessary to man, to prevent misapprehension,

 

I remark --

 

I. That a divine revelation is not necessary to this world, because man cannot discover much moral and religious truth without it. The advocates of the utter incompetence of human reason to make any such discoveries, seem to have fallen into the error, by mistaking the lamentable ignorance of the world, for proof of an entire incapacity for knowledge, and from a misguided zeal to magnify the gift of a revelation, and the grace that conferred it. That this mode of reasoning is unauthorized, may be confidently decided, in view of its intrinsic deficiency, and on the authority of revelation itself. It is intrinsically deficient, since the mere fact of ignorance is no proof of incapacity for knowledge. In revelation itself the ignorance and crimes of the heathen world are never traced to incapacity for knowledge, but the clear manifestation of God, and the consequent inexcusableness of man both for his ignorance and his crimes, are constantly asserted, and these are traced to the humiliating fact "that men did not like to retain God in their knowledge."

 

The attempt to exalt the grace of God in the gift of a revelation by depreciating man's capacity for knowledge, is still more to be regretted. Admit, as the reasoning assumes, the entire incompetence of the human mind to obtain any knowledge of religious truth, and the grace of God in conferring a revelation on the world is wholly subverted. On the part of men there could be neither obligation nor crime. The necessity of a revelation is created by their Maker and not by themselves. Revelation could not be a gift to a sinful world, criminally resisting the light of truth and perverting the means of knowledge, and thus deserving to be given up to a reprobate mind. But it is a provision absolutely necessary to constitute men moral and accountable beings, and therefore demanded, if they are held responsible for their conduct by every principle of equity. It is a matter of debt, of justice; and grace is no more grace. This attempt therefore, to magnify the grace of God in the gift of a revelation wholly defeats its object.

 

In proof of the position that the human mind is competent to discover much important truth without a revelation, I might appeal to what I have already shown to be true concerning God and concerning man, from the mere light of nature. I might appeal also to the actual discoveries of such truth, especially to the writings of many of the ancient philosophers.

 

The appeal to revelation itself on this point would be still more decisive. On this authority it might be shown that man cant know the very truths to a considerable extent, without a revelation, which the advocates for its necessity affirm that he cannot know without it. For example, the being and perfections of God, his moral government, his moral character; the law of his moral government, and of course the sum of human duty--to a great extent the specific duties toward God, toward man, and toward himself; the doctrines of human sinfulness, of the necessity of a change of moral character; the placability of God; the immortality of the soul, future rewards and punishments.

 

Here it would be a very useful inquiry, how far the Scriptures will bear us out in the assertion of this matter of fact not only by appealing to their explicit declarations, and their clear implications, but especially to the variety of forms, and to the great extent in which the sacred writers make the previous knowledge of mankind the basis of their reasonings, instead of resting on their authority as inspired teachers, although this is never abandoned.

 

But whatever ground the advocate of Christianity may take, the infidel will admit that the human mind is competent to discover much religious and moral truth without a revelation.

 

I proceed to show --

 

II. That a divine revelation is necessary to the world --

 

(1.) To give the highest conceivable perfection to the mode of making known the truth to the human mind.

(2.) To any extensive and useful discovery of truth to the human mind.

(3.) To the discovery of some important truths, which man could not discover without it.

 

(1.) A divine revelation is necessary to the highest conceivable perfections of the mode of making known the truth to the human mind. There are only two conceivable modes of discovering truth to the human mind by our Creator: viz., through the medium of his works of creation and providence and by a revelation. My object is not to compare the excellence or desirableness of these two modes, but simply to show that the mode which combines both, is better than that which should include but one; or rather is the best conceivable. Nor does my object require me to examine the different specific modes of making a revelation which are possible, although it were easy to show the superiority of that mode to every other in which it is claimed that God has made a revelation. I speak only of some mode of revelation, as additional to the mere light of nature, and maintain that it is indispensable to the highest conceivable perfection in the mode of discovering religious and moral truth to the human mind. This position is, to my own mind, so palpably obvious, that had it not been denied, it could scarcely require or justify an attempt to prove its truth. Who does not know the power of speech and written language to convey truth with peculiar precision, clearness, and effect? Why is it that the very men who deny all revelation, and profess, while so doing, to impart to the world the light of truth, resort to oral and written language as the medium of conveyance? Why not leave the world to spell out truth on this great question from the nature of things, as affording ample right without the addition of speech and writing to instruct them? Plainly because they believe that by this addition they adopt the most effective mode of imparting knowledge and of giving it permanence, impression, and prevalence in the minds of other men. And will they pronounce their own condemnation, by pronouncing that mode of conveying truth useless, on which themselves rely as the best? And if not useless on the part of men, why useless on the part of God? God has confessedly formed the human mind to be taught and instructed by himself, through the medium of his works. And is it not equally manifest that he has formed the human mind to be taught and instructed through the medium of language? Is not this mode of conveying knowledge one which involves every facility and every advantage? If God has qualified men to learn truth from what he does, has he not also qualified them to learn truth from what he says? Why then should it be thought a thing incredible, that God should adopt one method as well as the other, or rather, that he should adopt both? If his children are to read and learn his character, will, and designs, their duty and destiny from his teachings, why not avail himself of their capacity to be taught through the medium of language? Why may he not instruct them by his words as well as by his works; why not give them two books as well as one--the book of revelation as well as the book of nature? Would not the latter mode be as natural, as effectual as truly in accordance with their accustomed manner of learning truth as the former? Are not the advantages of the latter so great, so obvious, as to render it exceedingly desirable to all who would wish to learn? Why is it that we wish every thing in art, science, literature, history, morals, and religion, that is true and of importance to be known, reduced to writing? Why is it that laws must be written and published, that contracts, bonds, deeds, mortgages, every title to an estate, must be put upon record? Because this is confessedly the most perfect method of securing the knowledge of facts. No man is ignorant of the importance and necessity of written records and books on every subject of moment pertaining to this world. And yet if we speak of a book from God, teaching man how to secure the great end for which God made him, we talk of a useless book--aye, of one worse than useless. Books from men, even on religion, if it be of the right sort, are of inestimable value; but a book from God, teaching such a religion as God might be supposed to teach, would be a thing of naught. You cannot feel too much contempt for it! And this is a consistency of which to boast!

 

But not to dwell on absurdity so glaring, let us for a moment reflect on the end to be secured and the mode of accomplishing it. The end is, so to instruct this sinful world in religious and moral truth, that it shall become effectual to its moral reformation. Now, without disparaging at all the light of nature, without supposing God to reveal one other truth to man than what may be learned from it, I ask what mode of bringing this very system of truth before the human mind would be best fitted to the end to be accomplished? Simply that which we call the light of nature, or that which should combine with it--the light of a revelation through the medium of human language. Such a revelation, such books from deists, from infidels, are at least regarded by themselves as an improvement in the method of imparting instruction to men. Why then may we not suppose that such a book as God could make, would also be an improvement on their productions? Suppose then God to qualify certain men, to declare the same system of truth to the world through the medium of written language; suppose him to give the most indubitable proofs that they are thus qualified and commissioned by God himself for this work; let us suppose the book actually written, containing simply that system of truth which the light of nature discloses, presenting these sublime doctrines concerning God--his nature, his character; the great facts respecting man--his nature, his character, his destiny; his relations to him, promulgating the great law of God's moral government in its perfect requirement; its diverse specific precepts, its high and awful sanctions; making known an economy of mercy, unfolding with new clearness a future state with its regions of immortality in bliss and woe let us suppose this system of truth set forth to the human mind in all the simplicity, perspicuity, force, and conclusiveness of which human language admits; by argument, illustration, exemplification; shown to us in real life, embodied in rites of worship, and carried out in all the forms of human action; presented in history, poetry, parables, allegory, epistles--in every conceivable form fitted to render it intelligible, impressive; easy to be fixed in the memory, and ready for use at all times; accessible to all minds, fitted to all classes of men in all circumstances and relations; capable of being brought in all its clearness and power on the human mind, from the beginning of moral and accountable agency, and ever and always from its own pages, as well as through its ordinances and appointed ministry, pouring its light over a world like the sun in midheaven. Suppose God to give such a book to this world, having that perfection which his own inspiration could give it, would it be no valuable addition to the mere light of nature? Would such instruction from God possess no value? Would this light from heaven, truth enforced by the authority of God, the very testimony of the living God, be nothing? Would it be nothing to man that his God should speak to him? Or, is such a revelation from God absolutely necessary to give the highest conceivable perfection to the mode of discovering religious and moral truth to the human mind? Let any honest man who understands the use and power of language answer this question.

 

(2.) A divine revelation is necessary to secure to any extent, the practical influence of religious and moral truth on the human mind.

 

In support of this position I shall attempt to show, that such an experiment has he seen made, as to prove, that the great end of man's creation would be entirely defeated without a revelation from God. In other words, facts enable us to decide what the human intellect would accomplish in the discovery of religious and moral truth, and what would be the practical results under the mere light of nature; and that these discoveries and results show that the moral reformation of men would never be accomplished to any considerable extent, without a divine revelation.

 

The question is not as to the sufficiency of this light, but as to its actual efficacy in leading men to duty and to happiness. HAS IT IN FACT EVER DONE IT?

 

I appeal then in the first place, to the ancient heathen philosophers. And here I might say, there is great reason to believe that nothing in the writings of these philosophers, of the least value either in theology or morals, was strictly the result of their own mental efforts. Many of them confess that they derived their knowledge from very ancient traditions, to which they assigned a divine origin. "What Socrates said of the deity," observes Dryden, "what Plato writ, and the rest of the heathen philosophers of several nations, is all no more than the twilight of revelation, after the sun of it was set in the race of Noah;" while the Christian fathers furnish abundant proof that Plato especially learned much from the Hebrews while he was in Egypt. Of Zoroaster, of whom deists have had much to say, it has been shown by Dr. Hyde in his treatise "De Religione Veterum Persarum," that Zoroaster had been a disciple of one of the Jewish prophets, and that all the writings ascribed to this philosopher are unquestionably spurious. I cannot but add here the apparent prediction, but yet real conjecture of Plato, founded probably on the traditions and truths he derived from the Jews in Egypt. He says, "We cannot know of ourselves what petition will be pleasing to God, or what worship to pay him, but that it is necessary that a lawgiver should be sent from heaven to instruct us;" and such a one did he expect; and "oh," says he, "how greatly I do desire to see that man and who he is!" He goes further, and declares this lawgiver must be more than a man, "for since every nature is governed by another nature that is superior to it, as birds and beasts by man, he infers that this lawgiver who was to teach man what he could not know by his own nature, must be of a nature superior to man--that is, of a divine nature." He gives indeed, as lively a picture of the person, qualifications, life, and death of this divine man, as had he been acquainted with the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. He says "that this just person must be poor, and void of all recommendations but that of virtue alone; that a wicked world would not bear his instructions and reproof; and that therefore within three, or four years after he began to preach he should be persecuted, imprisoned, scourged, and at last be put to death." Would it then be strange if all in the writings of Plato and other ancient philosophers, which has been held up to our admiration, should have been directly or indirectly derived from divine revelation?

 

Laying aside however, this consideration, and conceding all that can be claimed in respect to the unaided powers of the ancient philosophers, let us inquire what they actually accomplished in morals and religion. The answer must be admitted to be decisive upon the point before us. The fact appealed to, is that of the employment of the most powerful human intellects on this subject, with unparalleled devotion, and under the highest advantages. Who will pretend that more would ever be accomplished in this department of human knowledge, under the mere light of nature, than was done by Socrates, Plato, Seneca, Cicero, and other eminent philosophers of antiquity? When has the world seen, when could it expect to see, men of brighter genius, of higher intellectual power, of superior literary accomplishment, of such unrivaled industry, toil, and self-consecration too, in philosophic research? Whatever may be thought of the intellectual stature of Bolingbroke, Gibbon, Hume, and Voltaire, they appear diminutive compared with these giants of the Academy and the Lyceum.

 

What then did these philosophers accomplish? What for themselves, and what for the world?

 

And here we have no occasion to deny any excellence or impute any imperfection or defect which is not real, in their systems of philosophy. It is conceded then that passages may be found which seem to express exalted conceptions of God and of some of his attributes. In some of their moral codes, particularly in the Ethics of Aristotle and the Offices of Cicero, some beautiful theories of morals and precepts fitted for the regulation of external conduct are to be found. Some of them admit that virtue is the chief good and its own reward; and some of them, at times at least, indulged in sublime speculations respecting the nature and immortality of the soul. But after all, what was the amount of their knowledge or belief on these great subjects, and what were the actual results to them and to the world?

 

While some of these philosophers asserted the being of God, others openly denied it; few, probably none of them believed God, in the proper sense, to be the Creator of the world; most of them were polytheists, and all of them either sincerely or hypocritically sanctioned, defended, and practiced idolatrous worship, and enjoined it as the duty of every citizen.

 

In respect to a future state, whatever may be said of their arguments, the best of the philosophers spoke DOUBTFULLY; none of them applied the fact to its proper use and end; most of them entertained of it the most puerile and contemptible conceits. They did believe in future punishment, and their ideas of future rewards were so indefinite, low, and sensual, as to give no importance to their faith. In short, as to the merit and demerit of right and wrong moral action, the happiness and misery in kind and degree of which the soul is capable, a just judgment of a righteous God, and the grand and awful idea of accountability--they believed nothing--or at least entertained conceptions so inadequate and so false as to amount to nothing.

 

In respect to morals, nothing like a true system was to be found in the writings of any one of them, nor of all of them together. On the great, the vital question--in fact the only question--viz., in what does the supreme happiness of man consist, Varro tells us that there were three hundred different opinions among the philosophers. Cicero says, that these opinions were so numerous and discordant that it is impossible to enumerate them; while it may be added, that in respect to the true nature of moral excellence--viz., disinterested love true benevolence either in God or man--no one of them seems to have formed a conception. Where this is not understood, it is in vain to talk of morals, of piety, or religion. Every thing is wrong in principle. Call it by what names you will, ascribe to it what restraining and regulating power you will on the conduct of the life, it is nothing but the selfish principle, the sum and essence of all moral evil. Did these philosophers then ever teach intelligibly and truly, that love to God and love to man is the sum and substance of all moral excellence?--that love is the fulfilling of the law--and that all else without it is in a moral respect nothing but sin? So far as I can find, never in any decisive instance, while, with the exception of a few, instead of inculcating the expression of this principle in loving enemies and forgiving injuries, they accounted revenge lawful and commendable. Pride and ambition (principles which have caused more wretchedness on earth than any other), were esteemed the best incentives to virtuous and noble deeds. Suicide was deemed lawful, and a proof of true heroism. Lying lawful, when profitable; theft, adultery, fornication, infanticide, cruelty to children, inhumanity to slaves, degradation of the female sex, gratification of sensual appetite and unnatural lusts; in a word, the most flagitious practices were countenanced on the part of the philosophers, both by argument and example.

 

Even the doctrines of the wisest and best, notwithstanding the slight hints or the faint and transient glimpses of truth they include, were as a whole, uncertainty, darkness, jargon, puerility. Mat truth concerning God, his character, law, government; or concerning man, big character, his relations, big prospects, at all fitted in its combination with error, to give any just or adequate conception of either God or man, or to reform a lost world? The answer is given in matter of fact. Philosophers, statesmen, poets, priests, and people, were avowedly addicted to the most abominable uncleannesses and crimes; the gods they worshiped were guilty of the same enormities, their sacrifices were deformed with cruelty and the most horrid rites; their sacred groves were consecrated to prostitution, their temples were brothers. Think of such worship rendered to the three hundred Jupiters mentioned by Varro, or to the three hundred and sixty-five gods mentioned by Orpheus, or to thirty thousand by Hesiod--gods celestial, aerial, terrestrial, and infernal; gods worshiped by rites profane, cruel, debauched; gods worshiped by shameless prostitution and the immolation of human victims! With this entire corruption of all religion was of course connected an equal corruption of morals both in public and private life. Fraud, theft, injustice, suicide, adultery, fornication, systematic abortions, murder of infants, and the most unnatural crimes, ambition, hatred, and fell revenge; gladiatorial shows, and all the atrocious cruelties of war and rapine not only abounded but were patronized, countenanced, authorized by law, connived at and practiced by statesmen and philosophers, and publicly reprobated by none. From this source, the corruption of all religion and morals, aided by the depravity of the human heart, flowed forth a torrent of crimes and abominations desolating a world of all that is good and happy in virtue and religion, and leaving all, all in moral darkness and moral death. Its state became more and more hopeless as time rolled on. Even in the land of Judea the last feeble rays of divine truth were almost extinct, while this vast portentous cloud hung over the nations, thickening, darkening, and foreboding only the blackness of darkness forever.

 

I now ask, whether God has not made a sufficient experiment on the question, what human reason would accomplish in the discovery of religious and moral truth, and what would be the practical results under the mere light of nature? What reason or shadow of reason is there to believe that modern deists, or any other men, or any individual man, under the more light of nature, and to the end of time, would have become wiser or better than Socrates, Plato, Seneca, or Cicero? When or where has human genius shone more brightly, or the power and majesty of the human intellect more excited our admiration and wonder than in the poets, the orators, the legislators, the philosophers of antiquity? And when, to the end of the world, could we hope for better results in the discovery of moral truth in the formation of moral character? What then could be hoped for from philosophy, from human reason, under the mere light of nature? Is not the experiment absolutely decisive? Is not the necessity of a divine revelation to secure to any extent the salutary practical influence of religious and moral truth on the human mind, placed beyond all denial?

 

In confirmation of this argument, if it can need any, we might appeal to many other considerations. So far as there was any thing really commendable in the instructions of the philosophers, they were delivered to their immediate pupils, and in no respect to the great mass of the community. Indeed, their ethical systems were far too refined for the common people; their discourses being rather subtle disputations, where truth was left obscure, doubtful, and subject to controversy. Nothing was settled. What one affirmed, another denied What could be expected of the common people, when the penetration and the labors of the philosophers resulted in disagreement, contradiction, and uncertainty? Allow that they discovered and proved some truths in speculation, what authority could they give them in practice? What philosopher could secure submission to his rules of life; or what can human law effect in the renovation of the heart? "Your systems of virtue," says Tertullian, "are but the conjectures of human philosophy, and the power which commands is merely human; so that neither the rule nor the power is indisputable, and hence the one is too imperfect to instruct us fully, the other too weak to command us effectually; but both these are effectually provided for by a revelation from God. Where is the philosopher that can so clearly demonstrate the true good as to fix the notion beyond dispute? And what human power is able to reach the conscience and bring down that notion into practice? Human wisdom is as liable to error as human power is to contempt." What would be the influence of a system of truth coming from man, compared with that of the same system clothed with God's authority? In addition to all this, let the idolizers of human reason remember that the wisest of the ancient philosophers and legislators were fully convinced, by their own experience, on the great question. Socrates and Plato both confessed that they needed a divine revelation to instruct them in matters of the greatest consequence. Cicero and others, instead of the vain conceits of some modern deists respecting the powers of man employed in religious and moral inquiries, often acknowledged their imbecility and darkness. These great men were so impressed with the actual state of the world, and the waywardness and corruption of the human heart, that they not only often acknowledged that there were no human means of reformation, but expressed a strong hope and expectation, that God would one day give to man a revelation that should dispel the dark cloud in which the human mind was involved. In short, it is notorious that nearly the whole system of religion and of worship, with its sanctions of feature rewards and punishments, with its oracles, divinations, mysteries, were in fact political expedients, useful fictions, originated and perpetuated by legislators, from the necessity of keeping the people in awe, and under greater veneration for human laws. If the world could stand without a real revelation, experience had proved at least one thing, that it could not stand without a pretended revelation from God. After such an experiment then, an experiment which left the world in a most deplorable condition of darkness, crime, and wretchedness; an experiment which convinced the very men that made it of its utter inefficacy; which actually led them to abandon all hope of the world's reformation without a revelation from God, and which actually compelled them to resort to the pretense of such a revelation, to give even any salutary restraining influence to human law; I say, who after such an experiment can doubt the absolute necessity of a revelation from God, to secure to any extent the reforming influence of moral truth on the human mind?

 

One brief reflection! What a value does the view we have taken of this world, of the ignorance, the depravity, the crimes, the miseries of mankind in every age and in almost every country for six thousand years, give to Christianity, and this, whether it be a revelation from God or not. Who will not read and study the Bible, whether he be an infidel or a Christian? Christianity, as a system of morals, whether it be of God or not, is true. Here, here, it gives light where all was uncertainty, confusion, darkness, without it. Here, where the thickest gloom of moral midnight overspread a lost world, it comes as the morning sun to remove the darkness and reveal the day. Nor is this all. In its proposed way of our acceptance with an offended God, if there is any way--I mean in the general form of an atonement for sin--it is also true. The great question then, in every substantial respect, is not between Christianity and Infidelity, but between Christianity and nothing. If Christianity is false, Infidelity is false. Reject the morals of Christianity as false, and all here is midnight. We can know nothing to be true. Reject also the great fact of some atonement for sin, under the government of a just and perfect God, and there is no mercy, no hope. Oh, how would Socrates, how would Plato, have hailed such light as this! Who that has it shall despise it? Who will not study, understand, apply, such truth as the Bible contains? Whose eye will not weep, and whose heart not break, that a fellow-creature, a friend, a companion, is not willing to read this book and weigh with candor the evidence of its origin from God? Oh! what maniac madness to sport on the verge of eternity, with the dream that Christianity is false--an immortal mind, denying such truth, and attempting to sustain and cheer itself, as it were, at the foot of God's judgment-seat, with the empty, vapid declamation about the sufficiency of human reason--and this with the knowledge of the fact, that for six thousand years this boasted human reason has only plunged a lost world into error, sin, and death, without hope! And if all these were without excuse, what will, what must become of the man who will not love the truth, and embrace the truth, and obey the truth, which he knows Christianity reveals?

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