V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. The nature of such a law further unfolded. -- 7. The law of a perfect Moral Government involves sanctions. -- The relations of a Moral Governor to his kingdom more particularly considered. -- Legal sanctions defined. -- They establish or ratify the authority of the Moral Governor. -- They consist in natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience. They establish the Moral Governor's authority as its decisive proof. -- They become decisive proof of the Moral Governor's authority by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedience. -- It is not incredible that God in the Scriptures, should express his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience to His law.

IN preceding lectures, after defining. a perfect moral government in general terms, I entered on the inquiry, What is the law of a perfect moral government? In answer to this inquiry, I attempted to show that such a law is a decisive rule of action to subjects; that it must require benevolence as the best kind of action, and forbid selfishness as the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of subjects; that it requires benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbids selfishness as the sum of disobedience on the part of subjects; that it expresses the lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered; that it implies that the lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience and with nothing but obedience on the part of subjects; that it expresses the lawgiver's highest approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedience on the part of subjects.

 

Continuing these remarks concerning the nature of law, I proceed to say,

 

Seventhly: That the law of a perfect moral government involves sanctions.

 

In treating of this important and much controverted part of our subject, I propose to unfold the nature, the necessity, and the equity of legal sanctions in relation to the authority of the moral governor. Before however entering directly on these topics, I deem it important to consider more particularly than I have done, the relation which the moral governor sustains to his kingdom, the qualifications for the office, especially the moral character which he must possess and manifest as the ground of his authority, and also the mode of manifesting his qualifications to his subjects.

 

Assuming then what is now properly assumed, that a perfect moral government is the best means of the best end, and therefore dictated and demanded by benevolence, I remark --

 

That a moral governor sustains a peculiar relation to his kingdom--a relation distinguished from every other by its peculiar object or end, and also by its peculiar function. Every relation of every moral being toward other moral beings which is dictated and demanded by benevolence, has its peculiar object or end, and hence also its peculiar function, or what are called in most cases its peculiar duties, including those acts or doings, or some general comprehensive mode of acting necessary to the accomplishment of the peculiar object or end of the relation. Accordingly, benevolence in a moral governor, while it aims at the highest happiness of all, is also committed to another great object or end which is peculiar to his relation, viz., to secure to the extent of his power, right moral action, and to prevent wrong moral action on the part of his subjects, by means peculiar to the relation of a moral governor. I say that benevolence is committed--pledged--in its very nature, and from the nature of this relation, to accomplish, as far as possible, this end by these means. Under a system of moral government, as I have before said, all--all depends on action. On the right and wrong moral action of its subjects depend its issues in happiness or misery. The weal or woe of the moral kingdom depends therefore, on what the moral governor does or fails to do, to secure right and to prevent wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. To secure right moral action with its results in happiness, and to prevent wrong moral action with its results in misery, by the peculiar influence of a perfect moral government, must be the grand object or end, and compared with any thing which can come into competition with it, must be the supreme object or end of a perfect moral governor. He may care for and promote individual well-being, only so far as this shall be consistent with securing the greatest amount possible to him of right moral action, as the means of the highest happiness of his kingdom by the peculiar influence of a perfect moral government. But to the accomplishment of this end BY THIS MEANS, every thing which interferes with it must be sacrificed; and every thing which is necessary to the accomplishment of this end by THIS MEANS must be done, or the great end of benevolence must be defeated. To accomplish this particular end then--to secure the greatest amount of right moral action which he can secure, as that which is necessary to the highest well-being of all, by that influence which is peculiar to his relation as a moral governor, is the entire function of his office. A moral governor therefore from the very nature of his relation as a benevolent being, is under the necessity not merely of aiming to produce the highest happiness of his kingdom, but of aiming to produce it by securing the greatest amount of right moral action. Nor is he as some vainly imagine, under the necessity merely of aiming to produce the highest well-being of his kingdom by securing the greatest amount of right moral action which he can secure; but he is under the necessity of aiming to produce the highest amount of right moral action which he can secure by the peculiar influence of a perfect moral government.

 

What then is the peculiar influence of a perfect moral government? It is we have already seen, the single influence of authority--of that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey. This is that peculiar essential influence of a perfect moral government, without which such a government can have no existence. If right moral action can take place under other influences, it cannot take place as obedience to a moral governor "without the influence of his authority on the subject. Other influences may be combined with this influence, not to say must be combined with it, from the very condition of all moral beings. But such other influences are entirely distinct from this influence, and though necessary to its existence, they are no part of it. They may exist without this influence; but when this influence does not exist, moral government does not exist. Right moral action done under the direct influence of natural good and evil as merely so much motive and without any regard to the will of another, is not done in submission to authority, and therefore is not obedience to a moral governor. Wrong moral action not done in rejection of authority, is not disobedience to a moral governor. The only influence by which one acting simply in the relation of a moral governor can control, or attempt to control the conduct of others as his subjects, is the single influence of authority. To suppose a moral governor therefore without authority, is to suppose a moral governor without the least governing influence, and is the absurdity of supposing one to possess an influence which he does not possess--of supposing a moral governor who is not a moral governor. When therefore there is no authority, there can be neither obedience nor disobedience to a moral governor--neither a moral government nor a moral governor. Authority then--the right to command which imposes an obligation to obey--is the peculiar, essential, constituting influence of moral government; so that where this influence exists moral government exists; and where this influence does not exist moral government does not exist.

 

Again; the authority of the moral governor--that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey--depends on his competence and disposition to govern in the best manner; that is, on his knowledge and power as qualifying him, and on his benevolence as disposing him to govern in the best manner, and on the decisive manifestations of these qualifications and this character to his subjects.

 

That the moral governor's authority depends on the knowledge and power which qualify him to govern in the best manner, and on the full manifestation of these qualifications for his office, is too obvious to be denied. These qualifications not manifested to the conviction of his subjects, would be in respect to constituting any part of the ground of his authority, as though they were not; and who can suppose that ignorance and imbecility can give that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey?

 

The qualifications of knowledge and power admit of different modes of manifestation in different cases--modes which are peculiar to these attributes, when compared with that of manifesting a perfect moral character. In that Being who possesses omniscience and almighty power, these attributes are abundantly manifested by his works of creation. Essential however, as the existence and the full manifestation of these qualifications are to the authority of the moral governor, it is in no respect necessary or important to my present purpose to dwell on either, since the existence and the manifestation of them in a moral governor in no respect depend on legal sanctions. Legal sanctions, whatever may be their nature, their relations or their necessity, can neither impart the requisite attributes of knowledge and power, nor be necessary to prove their existence. At the same time, if we suppose the moral governor to furnish the most abundant proof of his qualifications in respect to knowledge and power, this fact doer, not imply that he possesses the shadow of authority; for his authority depends not merely on his knowledge and power but also on his benevolence, and the full proof or manifestation of it to his subjects. If then legal sanctions have any influence in establishing his authority, it must be some influence on, or in relation to, the great question of his benevolence.

 

That I may hereafter exhibit what I consider just and adequate views of legal sanctions, I now invite further and particular attention to benevolence on the part of the moral governor and its manifestation as one essential ground of his authority.

 

It is then undeniable, that benevolence is one thing in the character, or rather that it is itself the character of the moral governor, which, in connection with the requisite knowledge and power, constitutes the essential ground of his authority. When it is once decided on sufficient evidence, that he possesses that knowledge and power which qualify him to govern in the best manner--so far as such qualification depends on these attributes--and if this be not decided, the fact of his authority cannot be established; then the fact, and the only fact which remains to be proved for the purpose of fully establishing his authority, is the fact of his perfect moral character--his benevolence.

 

In this fact is involved another. The moral governor who is truly or perfectly benevolent, must feel the highest approbation of right moral action, and the highest disapprobation of wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. These particular emotions in view of the true nature and tendency of right and wrong moral action, are inseparable from the nature of benevolence in every mind.

 

Again; benevolence in the specific form of it now stated as the character of the moral governor, must from the very nature and design of his relation, be supremely concerned and absolutely committed to secure so far as he is able, right moral action in every instance, and to prevent wrong moral action in every instance by the influence of his authority. To accomplish this end by this means, is the great object of benevolence in a moral governor--the object by which this august relation is distinguished from every other relation. Benevolence on the part of a moral governor acting in this single relation, can be conceived to aim at no other object. The relation can be conceived to involve no other peculiar function than the accomplishment of this end by this means. We say then, that the grand, peculiar function of a moral governor is, by the influence of his authority, to aim to secure right, and to prevent wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. But if he who occupies the throne does not aim to secure right moral action, with the highest approbation of it as the means of the highest well-being of all, and to prevent wrong moral action, with the highest disapprobation of it as the means of the highest misery of all, then he is not benevolent--he does not possess the character which is requisite to his right to reign--he has no authority.

Besides, there is nothing in benevolence itself, on account of which it can be requisite to the moral governor's authority, except that it involves these feelings of highest approbation of right, and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action. Suppose benevolence to be any thing which it can be supposed to be, without involving the feelings of highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, and what is it but downright selfishness, showing no smile of favor for that which is the means of the highest welfare of all, and no frown of wrath for that which is the means of the highest misery of all? What is it but selfishness in the form of malignity, welcoming and conniving at crime and wretchedness, to subserve some private interest or purpose of its own? And what is there in such a character, to give to its possessor the right to control at will the conduct of others? Or soften the character as you will, if it does not involve the feelings of highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, its possessor can have no will in respect to right and wrong moral action in accordance with their true nature and tendency--no preference of the one to the other as the one is the means of the highest happiness of all, and the other the means of the highest misery of all. Law as a rule of action, cannot with truth express such a will or preference. Its language is the utterance of falsehood. The lawgiver has no such will, no such preference as the very nature of law involves, and the very language of law expresses. Whatever then the thing may be, by whatever name it may be called--whatever amount of good it may impart in other relations; in a moral governor it is worthy only of execration and contempt. Call it benevolence if you will, but as the attribute of a moral governor, if it does not involve the highest approbation of right, and the highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, it can give him no right to reign -- no authority. Benevolence--benevolence in the form of the highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, is essential to the authority of the moral governor.

 

Nor is this all. The manifestation of benevolence in the form of the highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, is also essential to the moral governor's authority.

 

The grand and peculiar object or end of a perfect moral governor, is to secure right and prevent wrong moral action on the part of his subjects, by the influence of his authority. But his subjects cannot be reached by this influence and act under it, or rather the influence itself cannot exist, except as it results from a full manifestation of that character of the governor which is a requisite ground of his authority, even perfect benevolence with its feelings of highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action. Indeed these feelings are as we have seen, those very elements of his perfect moral character, which constitute it an essential ground of his authority. It is obvious therefore, that the full and decisive manifestation of these feelings to the view of his subjects, is as necessary to his authority as the existence of the feelings themselves, or of the character which involves them. To suppose him to authorize a doubt in the minds of his subjects of this character and these feelings, is to suppose him to authorize a denial of his authority. For what right to command can he possess in the view of subjects, while he leaves it with them an unsettled question, whether he feels the highest approbation of right, and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action.

 

We may view this topic under other aspects. Responsibility for actual results in the weal and woe of his kingdom belongs to the moral governor, so far as these results depend on his maintaining the influence of his authority. His business the grand function of his office, so to speak, is to secure, as far as may be, right moral action as the means of the highest wellbeing of all, and to prevent as far as may be, wrong moral action as the means of the highest misery of all, by the single influence of his authority. If the result in happiness fails, or if through wrong moral action the highest misery of all follows, in consequence of his failure to sustain and use the influence of his authority, the responsibility is emphatically his own. The highest happiness of all, and the prevention of the highest misery of all, so far as they depend on the existence and influence of his authority, are committed to his keeping. He is responsible for these high interests of his kingdom, so far as they depend on the influence of his authority. His concern is to maintain this influence unimpaired and perfect, be the sacrifice what it may. Nothing of equal value can come into competition with the maintenance of his authority. When it is once decided that a perfect moral government is the best means of the best end, then it is also decided, that the maintenance of the moral governor's authority is the best means of the best end. His only alternative therefore, is, either to betray his trust, and thus to forfeit his character and his throne, or to manifest those feelings toward right and wrong moral action, which are the essential ground of his authority. Or thus, the moral governor from the nature of his relation, is to be looked to and confided in, as the faithful guardian of the welfare of his kingdom by the influence of his authority. To secure to his kingdom the highest happiness by this influence, and to be confided in accordingly, is the sole purpose and end of his high prerogative. Is he worthy, and does he show himself to be worthy of this confidence in the view of his subjects? If so, then he must manifest those feelings toward right and wrong moral action, which as a perfect being be must possess, and the manifestation of which is essential to his authority. How else can his subjects confide in that guardianship, which is to be extended to his kingdom only through the influence of his authority? What confidence can be reposed in one, who, for aught that appears to the contrary, is indifferent to the conduct of his subjects, on which the happiness or misery of his kingdom depends, or who is or may prove himself to be, so far as any evidence to the contrary exists, the friend and patron of wrong moral action? And yet this is the only just view of his character. Failing to furnish decisive proof of his highest approbation of right, and of his highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, he furnishes not the shadow of proof, that he would express these feelings, even should the expression of them be necessary to prevent the universal wrong-doing, and with it the universal and perfect misery of his kingdom forevermore. I do not say, that the expression of these feelings is necessary to prevent this result in his kingdom. He however, in the case supposed, can furnish no proof to the contrary by what he does as a moral governor. His own declaration cannot be proof, for as yet his benevolence is not proved. Of course his veracity is not proved, and is therefore justly questioned. There can therefore be no possible proof, in the view of his subjects in the supposed case, that the supposed result would not follow; and no possible proof that the moral governor, foreseeing the result, would in any instance express the specified feelings toward right and wrong moral action, were it necessary to prevent the direful catastrophe; no proof, that he would manifest the highest approbation of right moral action in a single instance, or the highest disapprobation of wrong moral action in a single instance, were it necessary to prevent his kingdom from becoming a pandemonium of sin and misery. He proves himself to be a selfish being; and there is not the shadow of reason to conclude, that he would not consent to and so become the responsible author of, the unmitigated and endless woes of his kingdom, rather than express the feelings requisite to prevent them, through legal sanctions. What authority or right to reign can such a being possess? Or thus, a being who has the right to reign as a moral governor, is a benevolent being, and has of course the necessary feelings of a benevolent being toward right and wrong moral action, the feelings of highest approbation of the one, and of the highest disapprobation of the other. Having this character with its necessary emotions toward right and wrong moral action, he will furnish the requisite manifestation or proof of this material fact; since otherwise he can possess no authority in the view of his subjects; that is, cannot use the necessary means of the great end of benevolence, or of the highest happiness of his kingdom, which benevolence requires him to use. Benevolence no more requires him to aim at this end, than it requires him to use the necessary means of it -- than it requires him to manifest his highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action. Or thus: to suppose a perfect moral governor not to manifest the highest approbation of obedience to the best law, and the highest disapprobation of disobedience to the best law, is a palpable absurdity. It is to suppose him to use the influence of his authority, an influence which depends wholly on the manifestation of these feelings, and yet that he does not manifest the feelings on which the influence thus depends; that is, it is to suppose him to use an influence which can have no existence and which of course he does not use.

 

Does the moral governor then establish and sustain his authority This question depends on another; does he fully, manifest his highest approbation of right, and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action; does he show that he regards the one kind of action as the means of the highest wellbeing of all, and as such, as valuable as the end itself, and the other as the means of the highest misery of all, and as such, as evil as the end itself? This is the grand problem. I say then repeating the question, does the moral governor show that he regards right moral action with supreme approbation, and wrong moral action with supreme disapprobation? Does he so prove it as not. to authorize a doubt of it? If he does not, then there is no proof of his benevolence and therefore no proof of his authority. There is proof to the contrary. Failing as the responsible guardian of the welfare of his kingdom fully to manifest these feelings toward right and wrong moral action--the highest approbation of the one as the means of the highest welfare of all, and the highest disapprobation of the other as the means of the highest misery of all--he decisively evinces the opposite character, and can make no claim or pretense to authority.

 

I remark once more, that the requisite manifestation and proof of the moral governor's benevolence, in the form of his highest approbation of right, and his highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, and in this way the requisite proof of his authority, must depend not merely on what he does in other relations, but also on what he does in this relation. From inadequate views of the relation of a moral governor and the peculiar function of his office, it seems not to be an uncommon opinion, that he may by acts and doings in other relations, fully establish his character for benevolence; that, from his character thus established, may be inferred his appropriate feelings toward right and wrong moral action; and that in this way his authority or right to rule, so far as it depends on this character and these feelings, may also be fully established.

 

On this fundamental point it is readily conceded, that to the establishment of his authority as a moral governor, his character as manifested in all his other relations must be unimpeached and unimpeachable. lt is indispensable to this purpose, that his acts and his doings in all his other relations, should not only be free from every thing which would evince the selfish principle, but consist in or include all the positive acts of beneficence which are demanded by his other relations. Otherwise he would furnish decisive proof against his benevolence, and of course against his authority. But it is now maintained, that these things--even the most decisive proofs of benevolence possible in his other relations merely--cannot prove his benevolence, and so establish his authority as a moral governor. They may furnish a degree of presumptive evidence--nay, the best evidence supposable in the case--of that character which entitles him to assume the relation of a moral governor. But no matter what proofs of his benevolence he may furnish in his other relations, they are not sufficient proofs of his benevolence, if in this relation he does not perform that appropriate function of his office which benevolence requires him to perform. To what purpose is it, that a being furnishes every possible proof of his benevolence in some or in many relations, if in another relation he utterly fails to perform the duties or functions which in this relation benevolence requires him to perform? All his conduct in other relations be it ever so unexceptionable, may be the dictate of the selfish principle; while his failure to perform the duties or functions of this relation, is decisive proof that it is the dictate of the selfish principle.

 

Now the moral governor sustains a peculiar relations relation widely different from every other, and involving a peculiar responsibility and a peculiar function. He is the responsible guardian of a kingdom's welfare, as its Weal or woe depends on what he does, to bring his subjects under the influence of his authority, The grand and peculiar function of his relation or office is to bring this influence to bear on his subjects, that by it he may secure right and prevent wrong moral action, the one being the means of the highest wellbeing of all, and the other the means of the highest misery of all. The question of his benevolence therefore, depends not merely on what he does or has done in other relations, but also on what he does in this relation, Does he as the moral governor, perform the peculiar function of his office?--does he create the influence of his authority by what he does in this relation? If not--if he does not bring his subjects under this influence, so that they in acting must either submit to it or resist it, then he is recreant to the grand and only function of his office, and betrays the trust which he pretends to assume. He thus shows himself not to be benevolent, and of course to possess no authority. Benevolence therefore, requires him to manifest his benevolence by what he does in the relation of a moral governor, and in this way to establish his authority.

 

Nor is this all. Benevolence requires him also to manifest in his relation as a moral governor, his benevolence in that form which is peculiar and appropriate to this relation, viz., in its necessary feelings toward right and wrong moral action on the part of subjects. The happiness or misery of his kingdom depends on his showing himself to feel toward right and wrong moral action, as a benevolent being must feel. If he does not show these feelings, he shows himself not to be benevolent. As we have seen, all that there is in the nature of benevolence which qualities him to rule and can give him the right to rule, is, that it involves these feelings and will manifest them, for the accomplishment of the great end of benevolence. If benevolence has any peculiar feelings toward happiness and misery, it must have peculiar feelings toward right moral action as the means of the highest happiness of all, and toward wrong moral action as the means of the highest misery of all. If benevolence requires the moral governor to make a full and decisive manifestation of his feelings toward the highest happiness of all and the highest misery of all, then it requires him also to manifest not less decisively its peculiar feelings toward right moral action, as the means of the highest happiness of all, and toward wrong moral action as the means of the highest misery of all. But if he does not manifest his benevolence in its peculiar and necessary feelings toward right and wrong moral action, by what he does in his relation as a moral governor, he cannot manifest it at all; and the proof from this is decisive, that he is not benevolent, and can have no right to rule; nay more, that he is not willing to use the best and only proper means of securing the highest happiness of all and preventing the highest misery of all, and therefore is a selfish being and in moral character, nothing better than a fiend.

 

Thus plain is it, that a moral governor is under an absolute necessity of maintaining his authority in the view of his subjects, if he maintains it at all, by what he does in the relation of a moral governor; in other words, by manifesting in this relation his benevolence, in the form of his highest approbation of right moral action, and his highest disapprobation of wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. If he would use the peculiar and essential influence of a perfect moral government, the influence of authority--if he would establish his right to reign, he must appear before his kingdom as the unchangeable friend and patron of right moral action, and the uncompromising enemy and avenger of wrong moral action, showing that he loves the one as he loves the highest happiness of his kingdom, and that he hates the other as he hates the highest misery of his kingdom. He must appear in all the excellence and loveliness and majesty of this character, without a cloud or a spot to obscure its splendor. The glory of his rightful dominion must be as the sun shining in his strength.

 

In view of what has now been said concerning the relation of the moral governor to his kingdom, his qualifications for the office, and especially concerning the moral character which he must possess and manifest as the ground of his authority, I now proceed to the direct consideration of legal sanctions. My object is, to ascertain their nature, to show their necessity to the existence of law and moral government, and to unfold their equity in respect to the degrees of natural good and evil which are requisite to their design. For the purpose of presenting what I deem just and adequate views of the subject, I propose to define, in somewhat general terms, the phrase legal sanctions, or sanction of law, and to explain and defend the several parts of the definition.

 

Legal sanctions then--by which I mean the sanctions of the law of a perfect moral government--consist in that natural good promised to obedience, and in that natural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor, which establish or ratify his authority as the decisive or necessary proof of it, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, and which for this purpose include the highest possible degree of natural good in each case of obedience, and the highest possible degree of natural evil in each case of disobedience.

 

This definition may be fully comprised in the following particular propositions:

 

1st. Legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of the moral governor.

 

2d. They consist in natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience, by the moral governor.

 

3d. They establish or ratify the moral governor's authority, as the decisive proof of it.

 

4th. They become the decisive proof of his authority, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

5th. They are the necessary proof of his authority, as being the necessary manifestations and proof of his benevolence, in the necessary form of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

6th. They include the highest possible degree of natural good in each case of obedience, and the highest possible degree of natural evil in each case of disobedience.

 

These several particular propositions I propose to explain and to vindicate.

 

1st. Legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of the moral governor. If legal sanctions are things of any significance, they sustain this particular relation to law--they establish or ratify it as an authoritative rule of action to subjects. To speak of law as an authoritative rule of action, is only to say, that it is a rule of action given by one who has authority or that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey.

 

That which gives to the law of a moral government its binding force, or which constitutes its whole influence or character as a decisive rule of action, considered as the will of one which ought to be obeyed because it is his will, is the authority of the lawgiver or moral governor. Whether we speak of legal sanctions as establishing the authority of law, or establishing law as an authoritative rule of action, all that we can mean is, not that they constitute but determine or establish the fact, that it is the law of one who has the right to command--who has authority. The authority of law therefore its binding force or influence upon the subject, if established at all, must be established by establishing the authority of him whose law it is--by showing that he has that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey. This being done, all is done which can give force to law, or invest it in the view of subjects, with that characteristic which constitutes it an authoritative and decisive rule of action to them. Nothing can be, nothing can need to be established or sanctioned, for the purpose of giving to law all the binding force which law can have, except, that he who assumes the right to rule actually possesses and shows himself to possess the right. The peculiar influence of legal sanctions then, is to establish or ratify, in the view of his subjects the authority of the moral governor.

 

2d. Legal sanctions consist in natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor. By this I mean, that in respect to the matter of them, they consist exclusively in such natural good and evil. Whatever natural good and evil are as sanctions, and whatever else may be necessary to their being sanctions of law, they are the only things which are or can be sanctions of law. All men concur in calling natural good and natural evil annexed to law in the manner now specified, legal sanctions. Nor can this language be applied to any thing else, with the least propriety or truth. Other things which are not legal sanctions may be necessary on the part of the moral governor, that he may establish his authority by natural good and natural evil as legal sanctions. Other things may be necessary to this purpose, because the want of them would be proof against his authority, and thus prevent the promised good and threatened evil from sanctioning his authority, however adapted in themselves to the purpose. The impossibility that the moral governor should establish or sustain his authority by other means than by annexing natural good and evil to his law as sanctions, I shall attempt to show hereafter. He cannot do this as we have already seen, merely by furnishing the requisite evidence of his qualifications to reign in respect to knowledge and power. If in addition to this we suppose, that by giving the best rule of action, and by a blameless and kind deportment in all other relations than that of a moral governor, he does what he can without natural good and evil as legal sanctions, to establish and sustain his authority, still none of these things nor all of them combined can be legal sanctions; in other words, they cannot sanction his authority. Indeed this supposition is wholly inadmissible, for all these things may be done, and be justly believed to be done by a selfish being who of course can possess no authority. His authority could not be established by these things. When all this is done, more must be done, or there can be no legal sanctions. The best evidence of his authority must be furnished of which the nature of the case admits. But such evidence cannot be furnished without the promise to obedience of a proper degree of natural good, and the threatening to disobedience of a proper degree of natural evil. This is the evidence and the only evidence, which when any thing else supposable has been done, determines--settles the question of his authority beyond reasonable doubt. The sanctioning influence then, whatever it is, pertains exclusively to natural good promised to obedience as a reward, and natural evil threatened to disobedience as a penalty. What is true in the nature of things however, may more fully appear hereafter. I now appeal to the universal conceptions of mankind, as evinced by the only authorized use of language. On this ground I claim, that neither the act of prescribing the best rule of action nor a blameless and kind deportment, nor both combined, nor any thing else except natural good as the reward of obedience, and natural evil as the penalty of disobedience, can with the least propriety or truth be called legal sanctions. The authority of the moral governor then, cannot be either wholly or partially sanctioned by other things than natural good as a legal reward, and natural evil as a legal penalty. If his authority is not fully and exclusively sanctioned by these, it is not sanctioned at all. Legal sanctions then in the matter of them, consist exclusively in natural good promised by the moral governor to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience.

 

3d. Legal sanctions, or natural good and evil as legal sanctions, establish or ratify the moral governor's authority as the decisive proof of it. The word sanction denotes a particular kind of evidence or proof, viz., that which is the decisive and necessary proof of that of which it is the sanction. I shall now speak of it only as decisive proof, proposing to consider its necessity hereafter. In some cases of moral evidence it is justly deemed too weak to authorize belief, at least for practical purposes. This may be owing to its intrinsic insufficiency, or to its being opposed to contrary evidence of the same kind. In some cases of opposing evidence of this kind, we speak of the balance of evidence or probability as in favor of what we believe. In come such cases of belief, the degree of our assent or the strength of our conviction, is not such as to exclude all doubt, or is at least less than it would be, were there no opposing evidence. What we believe is not fully or decisively established--there is not that ground for unqualified belief which there would be, were the evidence wholly uncounteracted by evidence on the other side. By decisive proof I mean, not merely a slight balance of probability, nor merely what may be called sufficient proof; but I mean that which implies the absence of all opposing evidence or of all ground for doubt or hesitation, and which in its own nature, there being no opposing evidence, fully confirms and in this sense establishes or ratifies that of which it is the proof.

 

Now to every one tolerably acquainted with the use of language, it must be obvious, that nothing can be truly and properly called a sanction, except under the idea of it as a proof nor unless it implies, in the circumstances or case in which it is a sanction, the absence of all opposing evidence or proof, nor unless it is conceived to be a decisive proof, a proof which in its nature so establishes or ratifies that of which it is the sanction, as to remove all reasonable doubt. To illustrate by an example. The sanction of a treaty with this country, is the consent of the President and Senate. This consent is not only a proof of the reality or validity of a treaty, but a proof which implies the absence of all opposing evidence or proof, and which in its own nature establishes or ratifies, to the exclusion of all doubt, the reality or validity of the instrument or writing called a treaty. It is under this view of it as essential to a sanction, that such consent is called a sanction.

 

In accordance with this view of the nature of a sanction in one respect, I maintain that legal sanctions are the decisive proof of the authority of a moral governor. Or thus I maintain, that natural good and evil as legal sanctions, are that kind of evidence or proof of the moral governor's authority, which implies the absence of all opposing evidence, and which being in its own nature the best evidence of which the nature of the case admits, establishes or ratifies his authority beyond all reasonable doubt or hesitation. I do not say that natural good and evil, be the degree of them what it may, are legal sanctions in a case in which there is evidence from any other source against the moral governor's authority. On the contrary I maintain, that they cannot be legal sanctions, except in a case in which there is no such opposing evidence, and that therefore, as legal sanctions, they imply the absence of all evidence against the moral governor's authority. It is under this idea or notion of them as legal sanctions that they exclude all doubt of his authority, while in their own nature and tendency when thus uncounteracted by opposing evidence, they establish or ratify his authority. With this explanation in view, I now ask, what can be more obvious in the use of language, than that natural good and evil considered as legal sanctions, are universally conceived of as the decisive proof of the lawgiver's authority? If as legal sanctions they prove nothing, then they sanction nothing; and how then, or in what possible meaning can they be called sanctions? If as sanctions they prove or establish any thing, it must be as we have seen, the authority of the moral governor. And how can they establish or ratify this, that is, confirm it beyond all reasonable doubt, except as implying the absence of all opposing evidence and as being in their own nature decisive proof of his authority?

 

4th. Legal sanctions or natural good and evil as legal sanctions, become decisive proof of the moral governor's authority, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. Our object is now to show how or in what manner natural good and evil become decisive proof of the moral governor's authority. This cannot be, as we have before shown, by proving his qualifications for the office in respect to knowledge and power. These qualifications and the requisite proof of them must be presupposed. Nor can it be, except in a case in which there is opposing or counteracting evidence of any kind whatever. For what we claim and all that we claim is, that natural good and evil are legal sanctions, by being such in their true nature and tendency, as to be decisive proof of his authority, when in their influence as evidence, they are uncounteracted by opposing evidence. In this case, we say that they become decisive proof of his authority, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and of his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

While natural good and evil constitute the matter of legal sanctions, they do not, considered simply as natural good and evil, become or constitute legal sanctions. Natural good proffered or conferred, and natural evil threatened or inflicted, may sustain very different relations; and it is in respect to these different relations, that we conceive and speak of them as very different things. Natural good under one relation we call payment, and under another hire, wages and the like. We call it reward also, as conceived of under very different relations. The word reward is often applied to the consequence of wickedness. Natural evil under one relation--that is, when inflicted with the design of reforming an offender, we call chastisement, discipline, and sometimes punishment; while evil inflicted with no such design is also often called punishment. What then, is the precise nature of a legal reward and of a legal penalty or punishment? What is the peculiar relation of natural good and evil as sanctions of law! And here, according to what has been already said, it is obvious, that to become sanctions of law, they must sustain some relation to law; and not only so, but in this particular relation to law, they must tend to secure or render effectual, by establishing or ratifying the peculiar and appropriate influence of law, which as we have seen, is its authority or the authority of the lawgiver. Here then we have a sure criterion by which to determine what causes natural good promised to obedience, and natural evil threatened to disobedience to be legal sanctions; viz., that they tend to secure and render effectual the peculiar influence of law--the authority of the lawgiver or moral governor--by establishing or ratifying this authority. What we now claim is, that they have this tendency as decisive proof of his authority, by manifesting his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

It will not be denied, that natural good promised as the reward of obedience, is a decisive manifestation of approbation of obedience, by him who promises it; nor, that natural evil threatened as the penalty of disobedience, is a decisive manifestation of disapprobation of disobedience, by him who threatens it. The promise and the threatening would be all which the case would admit of, prior to any acts of obedience or disobedience. If now we suppose the fulfillment of the promise in every case of obedience, and the execution of the threatening in every case of disobedience, the most impressive manifestation of the feelings specified is made which is conceivable. And yet the promise of reward, and the threatening of penalty prior to all acts of obedience and of disobedience, being all the evidence of which the nature of the case admits, are as truly decisive proof of the feelings specified, as would be the actual conferring of the reward in the case of obedience, and the actual inflicting of the penalty in the case of disobedience. In either case, the feeling of approbation of obedience, and the feeling of disapprobation of disobedience would be fully and decisively proved to be real.

 

Nor is this all. The degree of natural good promised or conferred as the reward, and the degree of natural evil threatened or inflicted as the penalty, would be, in all just estimation, the criteria and measure of the degree of the feelings of which they would be the manifestations. When therefore, the natural good conferred in such a case on the obedient subject is such in degree as to manifest on the part of him who confers it, the highest approbation of obedience, and the natural evil inflicted on the disobedient subject, manifests on the part of him who inflicts it the highest disapprobation of disobedience, then supposing no counteracting evidence, the authority of the moral governor is established or ratified. He thus manifests the feelings which are essential to his character as a perfect moral governor. He thus decisively proves the fact and the only fact which needs to be proved in the case, viz.that he possesses that moral character which invests him with the right to govern--that is, with authority. Having already evinced, by their proper evidence, his qualifications in respect to knowledge and power for his responsible office, and having furnished by his deportment, his acts and doings, no evidence against his perfect moral character, he now proves what only remains to be proved--that he has the feelings and the character, and will act the part, of a benevolent moral governor. By thus showing through the medium of natural good and evil, his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, he shows that he regards obedience to the best law as it is the best kind of action, and disobedience to the best law as the worst kind of action--the one, as that which, in its true nature and tendency, is the means of the highest well-being of all, and the other as that which in its true nature and tendency is the means of the highest misery of all. These are the feelings and the only feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action. This decisive manifestation of them through the requisite degree of natural good as a reward, and the requisite degree of natural evil as a penalty, is therefore decisive proof of benevolence, and of course, decisive proof of authority. Indeed, suppose what other mode of manifesting these feelings and this character we may, if any such mode were supposable, how feeble and unimpressive it must be, compared with that which would be made through that degree of natural good as a reward, and of natural evil as a penalty, which should be the expression of these feelings? How would any other evince that weakness of heart which would provoke contempt, when compared with the power and majesty of emotions which, for the sake of the highest universal good, express themselves in such results of happiness to the obedient, and of misery to the disobedient!

 

Thus natural good and evil as legal sanctions, become decisive proof of the moral governor's authority, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. They reveal his moral character, holding forth, in defiance of doubt, his perfect benevolence, in its essential emotions of love of right and abhorrence of wrong moral action. They show the full strength of his will, fixed on securing so far as may be, the best means of the best end, and on preventing so far as may be, the sure means of the worst end. Thus they bring out, in full and vivid manifestation, the glories of Him who occupies the throne. Removing all ground of doubt in respect to that character which gives him the right to command, they tend to secure the fall force and efficacy of his authority in the confidential homage and unqualified submission of his subjects, and, with these, the perfect blessedness of his kingdom.

 

 

REMARK.

 

It is not to be thought strange or incredible, that the sanctions of the law of God, as these are presented in the Scriptures, should express his highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. Without here affirming that such sanctions are necessary to establish his authority as the perfect moral governor of his moral kingdom, I now ask, who can show that they are not necessary for this purpose? Who can show that the legal sanctions, which as we have seen, would fully establish his authority, are not necessary to establish it? If this cannot be shown, then let it not be thought incredible that such sanctions are annexed to the law of that Being who reigns over the moral universe. The incredibility of this is further diminished, if we reflect that a system of moral government which includes these sanctions, includes the highest degree of influence to secure right and to prevent wrong moral action, which can be conceived to be essential to a moral government. Suppose what other system of moral government we may, it cannot involve much of the influence to secure right and prevent wrong moral action which this system involves. If any other system would involve decisive proof of the perfect qualifications of the moral governor in respect to knowledge and power, of the excellence of his law as a rule of action, and of his absolute perfection in moral character, so does this. But besides all this, and more than all this, the system now maintained presents motives in natural good and evil which admit of no parallel, and which bind the will to right moral action, not indeed by physical force, but by the most imperious necessity by which it can be bound--the necessity of right moral action to secure perfect happiness, and to avoid perfect misery forever. And more still. In proof that the action required ought to be done, and that its opposite ought not to be done, it reveals through these sanctions, the will of an infinitely perfect being, unveiling his infinite benevolence in its highest approbation of obedience, and its highest disapprobation of disobedience. Thus there is no truth and no evidence of truth, which can be employed to secure right moral action, and which can be supposed to be essential to a perfect moral government, which the system now maintained does not employ, and employ in the most impressive manner. There is no such truth in respect to God, and the creatures of God formed in his image, which is fitted to secure the great end of their being, which is not made known in its full power to impress and control. Pre-eminently by this system is God revealed--God, the depths of whose wisdom none can fathom--God, the thunder of whose power who can understand--God, in the enrapturing glories of his goodness, smiling his approbation of right moral action, and recoiling from wrong moral action in wrathful abhorrence! What majesty and awful love! More cannot be conceived. The universe of truth, of evidence, of motive, is exhausted to give every essential perfection which can be conceived to this system of moral government, and to hind the will of moral beings to secure their own perfection in character and in happiness. Who then shall count it strange, that God should place his moral creation under such an influence? Who knows--who can prove--that this degree of influence is not necessary to the best results in happiness; and therefore demanded by infinite goodness? Who knows--who can prove that the highest blessedness of the moral universe--not to add also, the prevention of the perfect misery of all--does not require this manifestation of God through the medium of legal sanctions, that all may see and know what a friend he is to right moral action, and what an enemy he is to wrong moral action? Who knows--who can prove that the Book, which declares that an infinitely perfect Being employs such an influence for such a purpose, declares a falsehood?

 

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