Can we determine the nature of a perfect Moral Government? A perfect Moral Government defined. --The definition explained and vindicated in the following particulars:

I. Moral Government is an influence on moral beings.

II. Moral Government Implies a moral Governor.

III. Moral Government is designed so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure the great end of action on their part.

IV. The influence of a perfect Moral Government is the influence of authority.

MORAL GOVERNMENT may be said in general terms to be the government of moral beings by the influence of authority. It may be distinguished into different kinds, as it is vested in different administrators, and is administered over different communities. The more prominent of these different kinds of moral government are the government of God over his moral creation, which is above every other--the government of the state or civil government, and the government of the family or parental government.

We may suppose that both parental and civil governments, as manifestly indispensable in some form to man's present well-being, are alike the ordinances of a benevolent Deity, and subservient to the end of that higher system in which men are more directly the subjects of God's moral dominion.

For the purpose however of distinguishing the different kinds of moral government, so far as to aid us in our present inquiry, we may suppose the family and the state each to exist as a distinct and independent community, and to be under a jurisdiction peculiar and appropriate to itself. As members of these particular communities, men would be under a necessity of acting in one manner rather than in another, to secure the highest well-being of the whole. As bound by such a necessity, and capable as moral beings of so acting as to defeat this great end, and to produce the opposite result in misery, they are the fit subjects of moral government, and actually as members of the family and the state, live under such a government.

Our first notion of moral government is obviously derived from that which is parental, and is extended and modified in that conception which we form of the government of the state. Since however, both are marred by undeniable imperfection, we can appeal to neither as a perfect example of moral government. Nor can it be pretended that we have any example of a perfect moral government, which in the present world is fully unfolded to our inspection in all the detail of its administration, and in all the completeness of its issues. The most that can be claimed is, that there is such a government entered upon--one in the actual progress of administration--one which, though not fully achieving its own perfect end, the highest conceivable well-being of all--is yet so distinctly characterized by a strict adherence to the principles of equity, though modified in their application by a gracious economy, as clearly to reveal its absolute perfection.

By a perfect moral government then, is here meant not a moral government which actually secures, but one which in its true nature and tendency is perfectly adapted to secure, and which unperverted would secure the great and true end of such a government, even the highest conceivable well-being of its subjects. We may suppose such a government to exist, and the end which it is designed and fitted to accomplish, to be partially or wholly defeated, solely through perversion by its subjects. Such perversion however, would in no degree obscure, but necessarily imply the absolute perfection of the system. Nor if we suppose that on account of the foreseen perversion of a perfect system, it would be better in relation to actual results to adopt another system, still the adoption of the latter could be justified only on the ground of the foreseen perversion in fact of the former, and would therefore imply its absolute perfection. We may further suppose that an absolutely perfect system of moral government would be adopted by an infinitely perfect Being, notwithstanding he should foresee some degree of actual perversion and counteraction of its tendencies; for it might still be true, that he should also foresee that the actual results of such a system would be far better than those of an imperfect system, even the best possible which he can secure.

Can we then know what are the essential elements of a perfect moral government--those elements which must constitute such a government in the hands of an infinitely perfect Being, the knowledge of which must be of the highest concern to us, as the subjects of such a government? I answer, that there is no subject which mankind generally better understand; none which they are under a more imperious necessity of understanding than moral government in some of its existing forms; none of whose reality they have a more constant and sure conviction; none of whose nature in all essential respects they have a more adequate comprehension. There cannot be an existing state of man, as related to man, there cannot be a social state (and without this man can exist to no important purpose), from which the idea of a moral government and the full conviction of its reality and necessity can be separated. This conviction begins almost with our existence, even so early as when the mother by some look or action first impresses the mind of the child with the necessity of submitting his will to her will. Thus the condition of human infancy places us from the beginning in society, and naturally and necessarily introduces subjection to superior wisdom, power and goodness. From the dawn of the intellect, our parents prescribe things to be done, and forbid things not to be done, approving and disapproving, rewarding and punishing according to our doings. Thus they early assume authority over us, aiming at one comprehensive result in all our doings--that of bringing our will into conformity with theirs.

Now why is this, and who does not know why it is? It is because no family could subsist, much less be prosperous and happy without it. No matter how powerful may be the motives in other forms of exhibition, to promote the harmony and well-being of the domestic circle--no matter how, strong the mutual affections which prevail, nor how wise and good the counsels and advice which are given, it would all be naught, were there no law, no authority, no calling to account, no retribution, that is, no moral government. Why is this? Let the appeal be made to any parent who has the heart of a parent. Why is it, that he governs his children by authority; why assume this prerogative as unquestionable? Is it, that he takes pleasure in so doing for its own sake? Is it, that he loves for its own sake, to restrain their liberty, to cross their inclinations and often to inflict suffering? Or, is it because he knows their incompetence to govern themselves as well as he can govern them--because he knows their ignorance, their passion, their waywardness, and because he knows, that he should be wanting in affection and a due parental oversight and guardianship, if he did not do, what he so surely knows to be for the best? In a word, is it not because he knows the necessity to the well-being of the family, of maintaining, do what else he may, parental authority? What parent, what child, what human being does not understand the nature, the design, and the necessity of moral government? Who does not know all this, as it results from the nature of the human mind, as surely as he knows the necessity of food and of common air, which arises from the nature of the human body?

If we pass from the family to the state, we find the same familiar and well-known thing, having a wider range, and a higher end; though more rigorously maintained in its administration, and more fully developed in its nature and essential characteristics. Born, as most men are under some form of civil government, they learn what it is for some ruling power to exercise authority over many, as the necessary means of a nation's welfare. Here we find for the most part a great variety of statutes and enactments, having respect to the overt doings of men, but all based on one fundamental law; all implying its existence, and its supreme obligation,--the law of subjection to the powers that be. We find a sovereign Will--a Moral Governor--and THE GREAT FACT assumed, conceded, and acted upon--the absolute necessity of authoritative law of a supreme unquestionable right to govern. We find a necessity of it to the existence and well-being of the state yea, to the prevention of utter anarchy and wretchedness which no one in his senses can doubt, dispute or deny. Suppose what else we may, either in respect to him who governs or those who are governed; the authority of law must be recognized and maintained, or all is lost. Whatever sacrifice may be involved--whatever may be lost or gained, this one thing--this indispensable means of the public weal must be maintained. And who does not understand the nature, the design, the necessity of civil government? Who does not know, that at without it human society could not exist--much less attain any tolerable degree of prosperity and enjoyment? What could be done without the fundamental law, claiming submission to authority--and what would this law be without authority sustained by sanctions--without judges, courts, trials, executive officers, sentences passed and executed, and a sovereign will, from which the whole emanates.

I might exhibit the same thing, as it shows itself and its necessity, in lower and feebler forms, in all the relations of life. In our friendships, how much depends on the discharge of certain duties; how are we held under responsibility, and failing here, how are we judged unworthy, and cast away. In neighborhood intercourse, in private circles, in the forms of politeness, and even in street civilities, who does not know, what it is to be responsible to the will of another, who does not know that in these matters there is a law, that a record is kept, that offenders are marked, that there is a tribunal, a judgment and a retribution? Indeed were there two, and only two voluntary beings in the universe, in all respects equals and existing together for their mutual well-being, the will of one in certain respects, would be law to the will of the other, involving the right to enforce it, and with power involving an actual enforcement, by appropriate sanctions. It is the right of one in many cases, to have his will done by another; and, wherever this right exists, especially with power to enforce it, we have an exemplification of the essential characteristics of moral government, whether this right extends to an individual, a family, an empire or a universe.

We all know then, what moral government is, and that men cannot exist in society without it. In that form of it called civil government, the lowest culprit in his prison knows its general nature, its principles, its end, and its absolute necessity to this end, as well as the judge who condemns him. Not one of us, if we could not rely on its protection, would dare to go through the streets of our city. Without moral government, we should no sooner venture into human society than venture into a den of wolves. These things are enough to show how necessary moral government is to man, and how well too the thing itself is understood by man.

But if neither parental nor civil government furnishes a perfect specimen of moral government, how can one know in what its perfection consists; or what such a government would be in the hands of a Being of infinite perfection?

I answer that we are able to trace with entire accuracy the essential imperfections of every human specimen, and thus to determine what is essential to constitute a perfect moral government. Knowing the end of a moral government, what is fitted to defeat it, and to a greater or less extent, what is adapted to that end and necessary to it, we can to this extent decide, what is not and what is, essential to the perfection of such a system. Man may not be qualified to give absolute perfection to such a system, but it does not follow that he cannot conceive of its perfection. Suppose that an absolutely perfect watch has never been made, and never can be by man, does it therefore follow, that it is not easy to conceive of such perfection as within the reach of the power and skill which man does not possess; or that man himself cannot specify the very changes in the materials or the structure, which would give it absolute perfection? What is supposable in such a case, we claim to be true in that under consideration. We are so well acquainted with the subject, that we know wherein the imperfection in the work of man consists, and can trace it to its cause. We know so well, what are the true object and end of a moral government, we know so well that by some things that end must be defeated, and we know so well that other things are perfectly adapted to secure that end; we know so well wherein all human forms of moral government are imperfect, and so well that such deficiencies could not mar a moral government in the hands of an infinitely perfect Being; we know so well what are the principles of moral action, and what are the means most perfectly fitted to influence moral beings--in short, we know so many things, that we can be at no loss to decide what a moral government must be in all essential respects, when administered by a perfect God.

 

I am not saying, that we can tell all that God will or will not do in such an administration, but that we can decide what he will and will not do, in certain important and essential respects. I hope to show you, that there is truth on this subject which man can know, and from which, in its hearings on his immortal interests he cannot escape, and that while there is such a God as Jehovah is clearly revealed, we are not doomed to look out on his ways and his doings as on chaos and darkness, but that, with an effulgence as broad as his own creation, and as clear as the light which is poured over it, he shows an end and a system of means worthy of such an author--a moral creation, comprising beings made in his own image, with tendencies and sure results that will "answer the great idea of him who made it."

I assume, then, what I shall hereafter attempt to prove, and what is properly assumed for the purpose of explanation, that a moral system, or a community of moral beings, as distinguished from any other system not moral, is the best means of the best end, and that a perfect moral government over such a community is the necessary means of accomplishing this end, and is therefore dictated and demanded by perfect benevolence. I now propose to define and explain what I intend by A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT; and to justify the definition.

By a perfect moral government I intend--

THE INFLUENCE OF THE AUTHORITY, OR OF THE RIGHTFUL AUTHORITY OF A MORAL GOVERNOR ON MORAL BEINGS, DESIGNED SO TO CONTROL THEIR ACTION AS TO SECURE THE GREAT END OF ACTION ON THEIR PART, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF LAW.

In explaining and justifying this definition, I propose to consider the several parts of it, more or less extensively, as the case may seem to require.

I. A moral government is an influence on moral beings, or, on beings capable of moral action.

While this will be readily admitted, there are some things involved in it, which demand consideration. One is, that the influence of moral government being an influence on moral beings and designed to control moral action, is as diverse in its nature from the influence of physical causes, as moral action is from a physical effect; or as a moral cause is from a physical cause. It is an influence, which is designed and fitted to give, not the necessity, but merely the certainty of its effect; and which leaves the moral liberty of the subject unimpaired. Hence, it is not essential to this influence that it actually secure the kind of action which it is fitted to secure. A perfect moral government may exist with all its influence, and yet be wholly counteracted in its designed effect on its subjects, since it is obvious that such a government may be maintained over subjects in revolt as well as over subjects who are loyal. Rebellion against government, cannot exist when there is no government. A perfect moral government then, as a government over moral beings, in respect to any cause of action giving the necessity of action, leaves every subject as free to perform the action which it aims to prevent, as to perform that which it aims to secure.

II. A perfect moral government implies a moral governor.

In this respect a moral government differs from a moral system, as a species differs from a genus. A moral system may be conceived to exist either with or without a moral governor. We can conceive of moral beings, who should act under the direct influence of motives, so far as these reach the mind in the perceived nature, tendencies and consequences of action, though there were no influence of a superior being sustaining the relation of a ruler or moral governor. The direct influence of motives, as these are thus apprehended by the mind, and that influence which results from the character and relation of a moral governor, though different, may yet coexist; and either may be supposed to exist without the other. The former without the latter would simply imply a moral system without a moral government. The latter with or without the former, would imply a moral system in that particular form which includes a moral government. The peculiar influence therefore, which arises from the character and relation of a moral governor, whether other influences combine with it or not, is the essential constituting influence of moral government. So far as moral beings act under the peculiar influences of a moral governor, so far and no farther, do they act under the influence of moral government.

III. The influence of a perfect moral government is designed so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure the great end of action on their part.

It will be admitted that this influence is designed to control the action of moral beings in relation to some end which depends on their action in a community of such beings, and which is the best end, and in this sense the great end of such action. What then, is this end? I answer--It is the production of well-being, even the highest well-being of all, and the prevention of misery, even the highest misery of all. A moral being is capable of performing two and only two kinds of moral action, and as a subject of moral government, is under an absolute necessity of performing one or, the other in all action. He cannot, as a moral being, be inactive. His nature and relations necessarily exclude alike inaction and all neutrality of action, or action in which he does not act morally. Again, the nature--the peculiar powers and properties of a moral being--show that he is qualified to perform, what no other being is qualified to perform--that kind of action, which tends to produce the best conceivable end of all action, the highest conceivable well-being of all sentient beings, both of himself and of all others. It is this nature of a moral being, which gives to his existence its peculiar value--its pre-eminent worth, compared with the nature of any other being. It is this, which, as a creature, raises man to companionship with his Creator and with creatures the most exalted, and brings him under obligation to act with them in principle, in purpose and in all subordinate and executive doings, for the accomplishment of the great end of all action here on earth, and amid the scenes of eternity.

Exalted thus by his nature as a moral being, he is by the same nature qualified to act in a manner which tends to defeat the great end of his creation, and to bring on himself and on all other beings, unmingled and perfect misery. And, what adds inconceivable importance to such a being is, that he cannot avoid, as we have said, acting in one or the other of these two modes of acting now specified. Even in every subordinate action, he acts from principle, he acts with or in the form of, a supreme elective preference. These existing together are often called his action; and its tendency as moral action is the tendency of his action in its principle; or rather, the tendency of the action in principle is its true tendency. To neglect to act in that mode which is fitted to secure the great and true end of all action on his part, viz., the highest well-being of all is not only to sacrifice and defeat that end, but it is necessarily to act in that mode, which in its true tendency is fitted to produce the opposite result--the highest misery of all.

Every thing of real significance in the being of a moral agent, viewed in relation to himself and to other beings, every thing virtuous and praiseworthy in the use of his exalted powers, every thing vicious and blamable in the abuse of them, every thing that is dignified and honorable, every thing that is mean and disgraceful, every thing that affords inward peace and triumph, every thing that brings remorse and despair every good and every evil to himself and to others--all, all depends on action. The highest happiness and the highest misery of all, all that blesses and all that curses, life and death, are in the power of action. Such issues, according to the true nature and tendencies of things, depend on the action of moral beings.

Here, then, the design of a perfect moral government is manifest. The design of the pendulum of a clock to control and direct its motion, so as to mark the divisions of time as the true end of the machine, is not more obvious than is the design of a perfect moral government so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure the great end of action on their part, viz., the production of the highest well-being of all, and the prevention of the highest misery of all.

IV. The influence of a perfect moral government is the influence of authority.

By the influence of authority, I mean that influence which results from that right to command, which is founded in competence and disposition to govern in the best manner, and which imposes an obligation to obey. In other words, it is the influence of a right to command which imposes an obligation to obey, as this right results from competence and disposition to give and maintain the best law. Intelligent voluntary beings never act voluntarily without acting from a regard to their own well-being. Instead however, of relying wholly, or even partially on their own wisdom or judgment, in respect to the best mode of action, or the mode in which they ought to act, they may rely partially or even wholly on the decision of superior wisdom and superior goodness. It is true, that the subjects of a moral government may possess such knowledge of the nature and tendency of action on their part, as to know, irrespectively of any decision of the moral governor, that their own highest well-being as well as that of all others can be secured only by conformity to the law of his government. In this way natural good and evil as directly known to result from the nature and tendency of different kinds of action, may concur with the influence of authority to secure their conformity to the law. But in that conformity to law which is secured by the single influence of natural good and evil as motives, there is no recognition of the moral governor's authority. The influence of authority is not the direct influence of natural good and evil reaching the mind through the known nature and tendency of action. It is that influence which results from one's having a right to command by virtue of the superior power, wisdom and goodness, which qualify him to govern in the best manner. So far as this influence reaches moral beings, whether resisted or unresisted by them, they are under the influence of moral government. Where this influence does not exist, there is nothing which can be called moral government.

Of the truth of the present position, the slightest attention to the subject will satisfy us. If we suppose a parent or a civil ruler to be without that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey, we cannot regard him as having authority, or as administering a moral government--or at most only in pretense. Nor can we suppose one to possess this right and exercise it through the medium of law, without admitting the existence of that which is called a moral government. It is then, this influence--the influence that results from the right to command which imposes an obligation to obey, which is an essential element of moral government. This is the influence of authority.

The nature of this influence will be more manifest if we look at the basis or source of the right, viz., the competence and disposition of one to govern in the best manner. These qualifications vest him with the right to govern, as they furnish or constitute the evidence or proof that he will govern in the best manner, or that his law is the best law, and will be sustained as a decisive rule of action to subjects. Such a governor ought to be obeyed. moral obligation is the binding influence of that necessity, which a moral being is under of performing that action which is decisively proved to be the best action, or to be best fitted to the great end of all action on his part, viz., the highest well-being of all, both of others and of himself. Now the competence and disposition of the moral governor to give and maintain the best law, is decisive proof that the law which he gives is the best law, and that the action which he requires is the best fitted to the great end of all action, and as such is the best and necessary means of the best end. These qualifications of the moral governor therefore, as decisive proof that he will govern in the best manner, become a ground of obligation on the part of subjects to obey his law.

It is true that the subject, in submitting to the influence of authority, acts from a desire of the highest well-being of others and of himself, as truly as he would, were he influenced by the knowledge of the nature and tendency of action irrespectively of the influence of authority. The two influences may and often do coexist. Still, they are different influences. If the nature and tendency of action, as directly apprehended by the mind, or learned by experience, may be one kind of evidence, the character of an infinitely perfect lawgiver may be another kind of evidence that the action required is the best kind of action. If evidence from both sources exists, then the highest evidence supposable in the case exists. If, however, we suppose the evidence from the character of the lawgiver only exists, this is sufficient and decisive evidence that the action required by his law is the best action, and ought to be done. That this evidence is peculiarly fitted to impress the human mind, when compared with any other, we may have occasion to show hereafter. Be this as it may, the exclusive competence and disposition of the moral governor to give and maintain the best law being fully evinced, constitute sufficient and decisive proof that the law requires the best kind of action. This fact being established, the necessity of the action required to the great end of all action, viz., the highest well-being of all, is also established. This necessity of the action required, results in the obligation of the agent to perform the action. Without the manifest necessity of the action to the great end of all action, nothing can be conceived to be true of it which can bind the agent to its performance. With the necessity of the action to this end, nothing can be conceived to set aside his obligation to its performance. So far therefore, as there is any thing in respect to the character or the relation of a moral governor, which creates obligation to obedience on the part of subjects, it is the manifestation of his competence and disposition to govern in the best manner, as a proof that he will so govern.

In opposition to the view now maintained, the right to govern is supposed by some to rest on other grounds than competence and disposition to govern in the best manner. Thus, the right, in certain cases, is supposed to rest on some peculiar relation. For example, the right of the parent to govern his children, is supposed to rest simply on the relation of the parent. This is obviously mistaking the evidence of the right for the basis of the right. Every such general doctrine or truth as that now referred to, must be determined by some general principle. The general principle, that parents will govern their children better than others will govern them, is justly inferred from the parental relation, and is therefore, the true basis or ground of the parents' right. This is obvious for if we reverse the principle--if we adopt the principle that others than parents will govern children better than parents, the right to govern them would rest in other hands. Again, it is often maintained that the right of a Creator to govern his creatures, rests simply on his relation as their Creator. The error in this case must be obvious to every one who distinguishes this single relation from the moral character of a Creator. If we suppose him, then, to be a selfish or malignant being, having only the designs of such a being to accomplish by the conduct of his creatures, how could the mere act of creation give him the right to govern? He could not possess even the right to create beings for his own selfish purposes; how then, could submission to the will of such a Creator be the duty of his creatures? It is true that the act of creation may by its effects be supposed to evince the goodness of the Creator, and so become evidence of his qualification to govern in the best manner, and the ground of his rightful authority. But the act of creation may also by its effects be supposed to evince the malignity of the Creator, or to leave his designs and his character in concealment and in doubt. The act of creation does not necessarily involve his goodness. The act of creation therefore, simply considered, cannot be an adequate basis for the right to govern.

To sustain the right of civil jurisdiction, various expedients have been resorted to, all of which confirm the view now maintained. Thus "the divine right of kings" has been a favorite doctrine; and to exhibit and enforce the right to rule, civil rulers have assumed the exalted titles of "sacred majesty," "God's vice-regent," "God's anointed," "God's representative;" have claimed descent from gods, and exacted divine worship, and have pretended to have secret intercourse with some divinity, or to be gods themselves. All this clearly betrays the principle now maintained, as that which in the view of those who govern and of those who are governed, is the true basis of the right to govern.

Some evidently rest the right to govern by law simply on the power to execute its sanctions. This theory obviously places the entire influence of moral government in the influence of natural good and of natural evil, as the one is promised to obedience and the other threatened to disobedience; viewed only as motives to persuade to the one and dissuade from the other. According to this view, might gives right, and the veriest tyrant with power to execute the sanctions of law, combined with the most fell malignity, has a righteous claim for the unqualified submission of his subjects. On this scheme there can be no fixed standard, no permanent and essential elements of right and wrong moral action. All moral distinctions are subverted, and any being having the power, would have the right to fill the universe with misery. This monstrous theory of moral government is the legitimate consequence of the selfishness of this selfish world, looking only at natural good and evil in the form of legal reward and penalty, as the only motives to secure obedience and prevent disobedience to law. No account is made of the essential element of a moral government, the influence and authority. The right to govern, which results from competence and disposition to govern in the best manner--the right which imposes an obligation to obey, is unknown, and obedience and disobedience to a moral governor as having this right, are impossible.

REMARK.

In view of the nature of rightful authority, how desirable it is that men should be placed under this influence.