The GOSPEL TRUTH

A GENETIC HISTORY OF THE

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY

By

FRANK HUGH FOSTER

1907

 THE DEVELOPING SCHOOL

CHAPTER VIII:

Eschatology And Atonement

From the two leaders whom we have just studied, Bellamy and Hopkins, proceeded two streams of theological influence which differed somewhat from each other. Not that there was any strong or divisive difference; for they themselves labored in entire harmony, and both contributed to the forming of many of their colaborers and successors. Still it may be said that there was a "school" of Bellamy, and there was a school of the followers of Hopkins sufficiently marked to give rise to the common name "Hopkinsians." The line proceeding from Bellamy has for its principal names Edwards the Younger, Smalley, Dwight, Taylor, Beecher, and Tyler; and that from Hopkins, Emmons, Woods, and finally Park.

Among the first generation of the pupils of Bellamy the most conspicuous name is the younger Edwards. When he came to Bellamy, it was with a letter of introduction from Hopkins, with whom he had been at Great Barrington for about nine months. He was no "Edwardean" when he arrived at Hopkins, but the instruction of this friend of his father's soon brought him into cordial accord with the teachings of the first Edwards. With Bellamy he remained but three months, when he was licensed to preach (1766). He thus drew from both of these teachers, and might be thought to be a Hopkinsian rather than a follower of Bellamy. But because of his temper and relations to the general movements in Connecticut, he belongs with the latter rather than with the former.

In spite of all the disturbance involved in the Revolutionary War, theological thought in New England continued to move steadily on. The close of the war was to be signalized by the more open appearance of a movement which threatened the very existence of the new divinity, and delivered the mightiest blow against New England Congregationalism which it ever received--Unitarianism. But still earlier there was another movement, of a kindred nature, and itself assuming ultimately a Unitarian form, which called out some of the most important treatises which fall under our view in the whole history of New England--Universalism. And from this attack there resulted, not only a thorough discussion of eschatological questions, but also the general introduction among the New England divines of Bellamy's Grotian theory of the atonement.

The introduction of Universalism into America was performed by Rev. John Murray, who came to this country in 1770. He was a follower of James Relly, of London, who, in a book entitled Union; or A Treatise of the Consanguinity and Affinity between Christ and his Church, propounded the doctrine of salvation en masse in its extremest form. He says:

Christ's righteousness is upon all his seed; by his single act, before they had any capacity of obeying after the similitude of his obedience, or of assenting to what he did or suffered. This manifests such a union to him, such an inclusion of the whole seed in him, as renders his condition theirs in every state which he passes through. Insomuch that his righteousness, with all the blessings and fruits thereof, is theirs, before they have known it, believed it, or ever were conscious of existence. Thus by the obedience of one are many made righteous.

Murray always preached upon the basis of this theory. Hosea Ballou 2d, than whom there could be no better authority, summarizes his teaching as follows:

A few are elected to obtain a knowledge of the truth in this life, and these go into Paradise immediately at death. But the rest, who die in unbelief, depart into darkness, where they will remain under terrible apprehensions of God's wrath until they are enlightened. Their sufferings are neither penal nor disciplinary, but simply the effect of unbelief. Some will believe and be delivered from their darkness in the intermediate state. At the general judgment, such as have not been previously brought into the truth will "come forth to the resurrection of damnation;" and, through ignorance of God's purpose, they will "call on the rocks and mountains to fall on them," etc. Then the judge will make the final separation, dividing the "sheep" or universal human nature, from the "goats" which are the fallen angels, and send the latter away "into everlasting fire."

The effects of Murray's preaching began to be immediately felt in New England. A small community of Universalists was gathered and organized into separate churches. What the influence of the Rellyan mode of thought was upon theologians it is difficult to say. That it achieved some influence is evident from the fact that in 1796 there appeared a posthumous work by Rev. Joseph Huntington, D.D., long the pastor of Coventry, Conn., under the title Calvinism Improved, which is complete Rellyanism, though the disciple is in this case greater than the master. These ideas must have long been in his mind, and it cannot be said in how many others. Huntington founds salvation upon the divine election, and declares that "the elect body is all human nature." But the foundation of election is in the atonement. Christ is strictly a substitute for us. "The true doctrine of the atonement is in very deed this. A direct, true, and proper setting all our guilt to the account of Christ, as our federal head and sponsor, and a like placing his obedience unto death to our account." Hence, as the atonement was made for all men, their guilt is removed by it, and "by a true and proper imputation" its benefits are immediately communicated to the race. Huntington goes so far as to answer expressly the arguments which New England men were beginning to use, founded upon the idea that personal guilt and righteousness cannot, in the nature of things, be transferred. This is possible because property can be transferred, and all "men are God's property, absolutely and wholly so; and of consequence [!] all their doings are equally his property." Through their "union with Christ" the character of men becomes the character of Christ when he is to be punished for them, and then his obedience becomes their obedience, thus giving them salvation. This is the Rellyan idea, and it is often "pressed in phrases strikingly like Relly's.

Against such a movement, which was beginning to draw away their people from evangelical truth, and which was having an influence, more or less certain, among thinkers, the New England school must protest. They did this with one consent; and they would not have been the children of the Puritans if they had not.

The Edwardeans had always shown a decided interest in questions of eschatology. Edwards himself preached some powerful and famous sermons upon this theme, led thereto by the prevailing indifference and spiritual sluggishness of the times, and the disposition to deny the doctrine already manifest in many quarters. He discussed it with great power and vividness. His great positive arguments were brought to the support of the position that eternal punishment is just. This is so because an infinite evil demands an infinite punishment, because of the greatness of man's depravity, because of God's honor, and because of the good results which follow upon punishment. He also went into the refutation of errors, discussing two principal ones--annihilation and final restoration. Annihilation is a relief, whereas future punishment, as represented in the Bible, seems to have no such element. And restoration implies a future probation, as to which there is no Scripture evidence for it, and nothing in the way of a manifest superiority to the present probation to warrant it.

Bellamy also turned to this theme, and contributed an epoch-making discussion of the probation of the heathen, teaching that

all mankind have not only sufficient natural powers but also sufficient outward advantages to know God and perfectly conform to his law, even the heathen themselves; and that the very reason they do not is their want of such a temper as they ought to have, and their voluntary, rooted enmity to God, and love to sin.

The new note of freedom and true ability to repent inherent in all men was here, struck, which was later to sound still more loudly.

Among these earlier writers upon eschatology the first place belongs to Samuel Hopkins, who published in 1783 An Inquiry concerning the Future State of Those Who Die in Their Sins. It was a tract springing out of the discussions of the times, but it did not mention Murray by name, and was throughout of a strictly impersonal character. Only Jeremiah White, a writer of the previous century, whose Salvation for All Men had been recently published, receives direct answer. Hopkins intended to take up every important phase of the subject, thoroughly ground the doctrine in Scripture and reason, and answer every important argument against the eternal punishment of the finally impenitent. He even incorporated a sufficient answer to Murray. But he did not judge the movement inaugurated by this extremist of as great importance as it later seemed to be, and hence passed over it without detailed notice.

The central idea controlling Hopkins' eschatology is his lofty conception of the government of God. It comprises peculiar views of the being governed, man, of the Being governing, and of the character of that government. As to man, Hopkins exalted him to a very high position. Not only did he give great scope to man's natural ability, and emphasize his responsibility, but he viewed him as clothed with the most exalted intellectual powers. He was totally depraved; that is, he was totally turned away from God and engaged in his own pursuits. But, though thus morally fallen, his intellectual powers were unimpaired, and he was capable of piercing by their exertion to the counsels of eternity, and certainly of knowing fully, and with the most absolute clearness and distinctness, his duty toward God and man. As to God, Hopkins' new ideas may be compendiously stated in the single phrase that he viewed him more constantly than others had done as a Governor. Under this conception it was his intention to make his readers feel the infinitely lofty and amiable character of the divine government as the reflection of the divine character, which was summarized in the word "love." Holiness is the loftiest thing in the universe. A God of love, who chooses the well-being of the universe, must choose its holiness first of all. Love of holiness is the same as hatred of sin. God hates it for what it is toward himself, who is the chief Being in the universe; he hates it, as a Governor, for its harmful tendency to his government; he hates it in that he loves holiness, for this hate and love are as inseparable as the two sides of a piece of paper. Thus he punishes it; and his punishment of sin is as amiable as his rewarding of righteousness, for the one motive extending through all his actions is love.

The general course of his argument is simple. In the first section he proves that the Scriptures "teach that the wicked will be punished in the future state." The text is almost continuous quotation. Then he advances to the proof that this punishment will be "endless." His discussion includes a careful treatment of the words employed to express the idea of endlessness, which, if it has not prevented later attempts to limit them in various ways, ought to have done so. But the argument is not petty. It pays suitable attention to the general impression of the Bible. It then passes to the passages which have been supposed to teach another doctrine. Incidentally, among these, 1 Pet. 3:19 is discussed, with the result that the preaching was done by Noah to the men about him at the time of their sin.

The fourth section treats the rational argument. Hopkins was disposed to teach that "reason, without the help of divine revelation, can determine nothing with certainty about future and endless punishment." But this position did not shut out all argument upon it as improper; and he believed that thorough reasoning would do much to establish the doctrine by showing that it was in perfect accord with right reason. His first argument was the one already elaborated by Edwards, that sin was an infinite evil, and so deserving of an infinite--that is, unending--punishment. The magnitude of a sin is measured, he says, by the being against whom it is committed. Now, all sin is ultimately against God, who is the infinite Being. Hence it is an infinite evil. Hopkins adds the thought that the infinite evil of sin is also seen in the evil which it naturally tends to produce, and will produce unless it is prevented.

It tends to dishonor and dethrone the Almighty; to destroy all his happiness, and to ruin his whole interest and kingdom; to introduce the most dreadful confusion and infinite misery, and render the whole universe infinitely worse than nothing, to all eternity . . . Nothing short of an endless punishment can be its proper reward.

And he illustrates the argument thus:

If one who has defamed the character of a worthy personage, being prosecuted, convicted, and condemned, should be punished only by paying a small fine, viz., one penny or shilling, the language of this would be that the character of the person defamed was worth no more, and, therefore, would be so far from answering to the injury, and wiping off the reproach, that it would really fasten the disgrace upon him, and his character would suffer more than if the criminal had not been condemned and punished. [So] a temporary punishment only . . . would be infinitely worse than none.

This argument, with its utter neglect of the second party in the matter, man, is now given up. It is, indeed, in flagrant antagonism to the principle which New England theology was to bring forward, that obligation and ability are commensurate. But, held by Hopkins in all its rigidity, it is easy to see why he would not hear to the various excuses that were offered, as if man were too insignificant or too ignorant to commit an infinite evil. "If a finite being can affront and abuse his Creator," if he can desire to dethrone his Maker and destroy his kingdom, he can commit an infinite evil.

Another striking argument in the same line is derived from the atonement. "One end of the atonement which Christ made for sin was to show what evil there is in sin and its ill desert. But this is every way sufficient to atone for sin which has an infinite ill desert; therefore this declares sin to be an infinite evil, or to deserve infinite or endless punishment." In modern phrase, God will not put forth more energy in the atonement than the occasion demands. He continues: "To deny that there is infinite evil in sin, is, in effect, to deny the divinity of our Saviour." To understand the historical significance of this last sentence, we must remember that Hopkins lived in the shadow of the two great coming controversies, the Unitarian and the Universalist, which he thus recognizes as closely allied.

Hopkins gave fuller expression than his predecessors to the argument that good will arise from the eternal punishment of the wicked. It maintains the divine government, which is a good. It promotes the perfect display of God's character, his displeasure and anger with sin, and thus his righteousness and goodness. Hence it will promote the highest good of the blessed. He expresses himself in the characteristic passage, more candid and powerful than adroit or circumspect:

The smoke of their torment shall ascend up in the sight of the blessed forever and ever, and serve, as a most clear glass, always before their eyes, do give them a constant, bright, and most affecting view of all these. And all this display of the divine character and glory will be in favor of the redeemed, and most entertaining, and give the highest pleasure to all who love God, and raise their happiness to ineffable heights, whose felicity consists summarily in the knowledge and enjoyment of God. This eternal punishment must therefore be unspeakably to their advantage, and will add such immense degrees of glory and happiness to the kingdom of God, as inconceivably to overbalance all they will suffer who shall fall under this righteous judgment, and render it all, in this view and connection, an infinite good.

It was upon this passage that the caricature was issued which represented Hopkins as "entertained" at the sufferings of the lost. Yet the passage reads: "This display of the divine character . . . will be most entertaining;" and: Punishment is "in this view and connection, an infinite good." The passage cannot be said to breathe a spirit of sympathy or tenderness; and yet Hopkins was not without sensibility to the dreadful character of the sufferings of the lost, considered in themselves. His constant thought is that, if sin were not, a happy universe, ultimately without trace of suffering, would be the only one consistent with the perfections of God. But sin having entered by the free choice of man, punishment increases the glory of God.

One final thought was contributed by Hopkins: that the number of the saved will be much greater than that of the lost, "it may be, many thousands to one." Even granting that the most part living in the first six thousand years of the world's history perish, yet there is to come a seventh thousand, the blessed period of the millennium, when so great multitudes will live upon this earth, all of whom will be saved, that the great disparity will be completely wiped out. Upon this thought of the millennium Hopkins expatiates at great length and with delight in the appendix to his System. His eschatology, stern and rugged at it is, ends nevertheless in a prophecy of unutterable glory. Says Channing: "Whilst to the multitude he seemed a hard, dry theologian, feeding upon the thorns of controversy, he was living in a region of imagination, feeding upon visions of a holiness and a happiness which are to make earth all but heaven."

From this digression we must now return to the course of our history. We had noted the arrival of John Murray in America, and the character of the Universalism which he had derived from James Relly, and which he preached. But our digression has not been in vain, for we have seen the materials which were in the hands of those who finally came to the reply to Murray and Relly, which had been gathered together by their predecessors in this field. A few years had necessarily to elapse before this reply was called for. No teacher comes to his full power at once; and the labors of Mr. Murray could not at once produce results sufficient to call for general public notice. In 1779, he organized the first Universalist church in Gloucester, Mass. By the year 1785, Universalists were numerous enough in Massachusetts to justify the calling of a convention. In 1784, Rev. Charles Chauncy, D.D., minister of the First Church, Boston, issued his Salvation of All Men, the first marked evidence that Universalism was beginning to find a place among the Congregational clergy. Hence it was in the year 1785, that the New England divines first published upon the new theories, when there appeared three works: Smalley's Wallingford sermon, "delivered by particular agreement, with special reference to the Murryan controversy;" Dr. Edwards' Three Sermons upon the atonement; and Stephen West's Scripture Doctrine of Atonement. In 1789, Edwards replied to Chauncy, and in 1796 Nathan Strong to Huntington. The object of all these treatises was to refute the Rellyan Universalism which had appeared, and all sought to do it by the same method, by correcting the false premises upon which Relly had based his argument. The result of them was to introduce into New England theology, as already remarked, a new theory of the atonement.

Smalley's reply to Rellyanism was introduced by the following statement of its argument. "God is obliged in justice to save men as far as the merit of Christ extends: but the merit of Christ is sufficient for the salvation of all men; therefore God is obliged in justice to save all." Smalley had been a pupil of Bellamy, who taught that Christ died for all men. Hence he naturally said:

The minor proposition I dare not deny. I question not the sufficiency of the merit of Christ for the salvation of all mankind . . . The only thing therefore which I have to dispute in this argument is the obligatoriness of the Redeemer's merit on the Supreme Being: or, that it is of such a nature as to afford any ground to demand salvation from God as a just debt.

That is to say, he questioned the major premise, which was to question the whole idea that the death of Christ was a satisfaction to justice, as Calvinism had hitherto held. He thereby followed Bellamy farther, and with him made God a governor, and not the offended party, in the matter of sin and forgiveness, as is evident from his whole discussion. He had apparently read Grotius, for he cites an illustration which Grotius gives, the act of self-mutilation by Zaleucus, by which he spared one eye to his son who had broken the law the penalty of which was to lose both eyes. Smalley's contention is, therefore, that justification is an act of free grace, to which God is in no sense obligated in justice, and which he freely performs unto believers alone. His two sermons are in full accord with what other writers were bringing out about the same time upon the atonement, but he was too much restricted by the practical aim of his efforts, the refutation of Murray, to present the new theory in the most comprehensive way or to give to it the best analytical statement.

This special service has, by general consent, been ascribed to Dr. Jonathan Edwards, who delivered at New Haven, also in the year 1785, Three Sermons on the necessity of the atonement and its consistency with free grace. A somewhat fuller account of Edwards' discourses will therefore be required to put the theory in its historical setting.

The first sermon is from the text: "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace" (Eph. 1:11). Forgiveness is here said to be in the exercise of grace, and at the same time in consequence of a redemption by the blood of Christ. How are these two parts of the proposition consistent? This, Edwards says, "has been to me one of the gordian knots" of theology. He seeks to loosen it by proposing three successive questions.

I. "Are we forgiven through the redemption or atonement of Jesus Christ only?" This question he answers in the affirmative. The Scriptures clearly teach it. Then "the necessity of the death and atonement of Christ sufficiently appears by the bare event of his death . . . We cannot suppose . . . that the infinitely wise and good Father would have consented to the death of his only begotten and dearly beloved Son . . . if there had not been the most urgent necessity." With this a posteriori argument, which is Calvin's, he supports an argument otherwise entirely scriptural.

II. Our next inquiry is, what is the reason or ground of this mode of forgiveness? or why is an atonement necessary in order to the pardon of the sinner? I answer, it is necessary on the same ground, and for the same reason, as punishment would have been necessary, if there had been no atonement made. The ground of both is the same. The question then comes to this: Why would it have been necessary, if no atonement had been made, that punishment should be inflicted upon the transgressors of the divine law? This, I suppose, would have been necessary to maintain the authority of the divine law. If that be not maintained, but the law fall into contempt, the contempt will fall equally on the legislator himself; his authority will be despised and his government weakened . . .

"When moral creatures are brought into existence, there must be a moral government . . . This is the dictate of reason from the nature of things. Besides the nature of things, we have in the present instance fact, to assist our reasoning . . . But in order to moral law, there must be a penalty; otherwise it would be mere advice, but no law. In order to support the authority and vigor of this law, the penalty must be inflicted upon the transgressors . . . It is no impeachment of the divine power and wisdom to say that it is impossible for God himself to uphold his moral government over intelligent creatures when once his law hath fallen into contempt. He may, indeed, govern them by irresistible force, as he governs the material world; but he cannot govern them by law, by rewards and punishments . . . For these reasons it appears that it would have been necessary, provided that no atonement had been made, that the penalty of the law should have been inflicted, even in every instance of disobedience: and for the same reasons doubtless was it necessary, that if any sinners were to be pardoned, they should be pardoned only in consequence of an adequate atonement. The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be supported; that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God."

This is the substantial part of the first sermon. Its concluding portion is taken up with the consideration of a number of objections, such as this, that, if God had seen fit to order it so, we might have made atonement for our own sins, etc., all derogating from the strict necessity of Christ's death.

The second sermon proceeds-

III. "Are we, notwithstanding the redemption of Christ, forgiven freely by grace?" After considering several ways of bringing in the word "grace," when the theories upon which forgiveness was explained, like those of Relly and of the older Calvinists, really rendered its application improper, he continues the exposition of his own theory. He begins by defining the terms "justice" and "grace." The word "justice" is used in three distinct senses. "Sometimes it means commutative justice," which "respects property and matters of commerce only and secures to every man his own property." Sometimes it means distributive justice, which "consists in properly rewarding virtue or good conduct, and punishing crimes or vicious conduct. To treat a man justly in this sense is to treat him according to his personal character or conduct." Sometimes it means general or public justice, which "comprehends all moral goodness; and though the word is often used in this sense, it is really an improper use of it. In this sense, whatever is right is said to be just, or an act of justice; and whatever is wrong or improper to be done, is said to be unjust, or an act of injustice. To practise justice in this sense, is to practise agreeably to the dictates of general benevolence, or to seek the glory of God and the good of the universe.

"The term grace comes now to be explained. Grace is ever so opposed to justice that they mutually limit each other. Wherever grace begins, justice ends; and wherever justice begins, grace ends. Grace, as opposed to commutative justice, is gratuitously to relinquish your property, or to forgive a man his debt. And commutative injustice is to demand more of a man than your own property. Grace as opposed to justice in the distributive sense, is to treat a man more favorably or mildly than is correspondent to his personal character, or conduct. To treat him unjustly is to use him with greater severity than is correspondent to his personal character . . . With regard to the third kind of justice . . . as it comprehends all moral goodness, it is not at all opposed to grace; but comprehends that, as well as every other virtue, as truth, faithfulness, meekness, etc . . . And even grace itself, which is favor to the ill-deserving, so far as it is wise and proper to be exercised, makes but a part of this kind of justice.

"We proceed now to apply these explanations to the solution of the difficulty under consideration. The question is this, Is the pardon of the sinner, through the atonement of Christ, an act of justice or of grace? To which I answer, That with respect to commutative justice, it is neither an act of justice nor of grace, because commutative justice is not concerned in the affair. We neither owed money to the deity, nor did Christ pay any in our behalf. His atonement is not a payment of our debt. If it had been, our discharge would have been an act of mere justice, and not of grace . . . With respect to distributive justice, the discharge of the sinner is wholly an act of grace. This kind of justice has respect solely to the personal character and conduct of its object . . . With regard to the case now before us, what if Christ has made an atonement for sin? This atonement constitutes no part of the personal character of the sinner; but his personal character is essentially the same as it would have been if Christ had made no atonement. And as the sinner in pardon is treated not only more favorably, but infinitely more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character, his pardon is wholly an act of infinite grace . . . In the third sense of justice before explained, according to which anything is just which is right and best to be done, the pardon of the sinner is entirely an act of justice."

There are a number of other discussions in this sermon, some of which are marked by great dialectical keenness. We hasten on to the third sermon, which is occupied with "inferences and reflections." Of these it will be necessary to note here only four, and these very briefly.

"The atonement of Christ does not consist in his active or positive obedience," for this "would never support the authority of the law and the dignity of the divine government." Again, in requiring an atonement, "God acts, not from any contracted, selfish motives, but from the most noble benevolence and regard to the public good. It hath often and long since been made a matter of objection to . . . the atonement of Christ that it represents the deity as having regard merely to his own honor and dignity, and not to the good of his creatures, and therefore represents him as deficient in goodness." But this is far from the case. [This is, of course, not an adequate treatment of the point whether God acts as the offended party or as Ruler, but it will be noted that it covers that point.] Still again, the atonement of Christ is not a satisfaction to distributive justice, but only to general justice, or the well-being of the universe. And, finally, God was under no obligation in distributive justice to accept the atonement of Christ, though "the glory of God and the greatest good of the moral system" did require him to accept it, and in this sense obligate him.

This treatment of the subject is hampered by the circumstances which called it forth, so as not to afford a complete view of the atonement, or to present it from its proper starting-point. It is only inferentially that the great difference between it and the old Calvinistic theory is introduced, the change of the view of God from that of "offended party" to "ruler." Nor is the theory of virtue applied as it should be, although God is said to act with a view to the highest good of all. But from this time on, the rectoral theory of the atonement took the place of the satisfaction theory, and as time went on received better statements from successive theologians. The progress of our history will lead us to pass later presentations in review. But we must tarry still a little upon the other original statements of it, noticing next West's.

West presented his views, as was possible in an essay of more than two hundred pages, in a much fuller and more satisfactory form than Edwards had done, but in complete accord with him as to the positions taken. He carries back not merely the atonement, but the creation, to the character of God as its foundation.

A display, or manifestation, of his own true and infinitely holy character was the chief and ultimate end which God had in view in creation. As God is most eminently good, it is evident that the real disposition of his infinite mind doth not appear excepting in works of goodness and where some good is actually done. His true character, therefore, cannot otherwise be manifested then in doing good. The same glorious design which is expressed in creation, will be invariably expressed in preservation, for in strictness of speech, preservation is no more than creation continued. What gave birth to the existence of creatures will direct in the government over them. And should we entertain a thought that God's moral government will not be eternally administered in such a manner as to express to the best advantage his true character, we must at once admit either that he has changed his original scheme, or that the government of so vast and complicated a system is become too unwieldy for its great and original creator, either of which suppositions is atheistical and absurd. The community must have confidence in God; and the confidence of a community in the character of a governor arises in a great measure from the apprehensions they have of his sincere, benevolent regards for the general good. And they can no further confide in his regards to the public good than they believe him to be averse from everything that injures the public. As it is impossible that the love of virtue in any being whatever should exceed his hatred of vice, it is impossible for any one to give evidence of the former when, the object being presented, he neglects expressing the latter in ways becoming his character. As far as God's love of righteousness and hatred of iniquity can be separately viewed and distinguished from each other, the great end of the death of Christ was to exhibit the latter and not the former. The disposition of the divine mind is perfectly uniform and harmonious. There is nothing in God or in the disposition of his mind but benevolence and love. Yet general good operates in a different manner toward different objects, and obtains different epithets according to these severally different operations. Should we, for instance, conceive no different ideas of divine justice from those which we entertain of divine mercy, it is evident we should have no proper and adequate conceptions of either. Or, should we form no different ideas of God's love of virtue and of his hatred of vice, it is manifest that we should view him as being indifferent to virtue and vice. Yet the very different ways in which God's love of virtue and his hatred of vice express themselves in fruits, and the extremely different effects they produce in the subjects on whom they are severally displayed, naturally lead us to view them as in some respects exceedingly different from each other, and that, however obviously they discover in their several operations beautiful harmony and uniformity in the disposition of the divine mind.

Here we see the government founded upon the character of God, and this presented as goodness, love, which consists in regard for the general good. And what is more important, the maintenance of the government of God is no maintenance of this as a mere government, but it is a maintenance of the character through the government, and this for the "public good." In other words, the love of God to his creatures, though not this alone, leads him for their sake not to forgive without the atonement.

The theory of atonement thus introduced received constant study and exposition in subsequent years, to which the progress of our history will bring us again. Leaving it now in the form in which it was first stated, we return for a brief review of its closing stages, to the early Universalist controversy.

The year 1784 saw, as noted above, the publication of Chauncy's Salvation of All Men. This was not Chauncy's first appearance against evangelical theology, for in 1743 he had written against the revivals of that year, and particularly against Edwards' Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God. The doctrine he now advocated was "that the scheme of revelation has the happiness of all mankind lying at bottom, as its great and ultimate end." He teaches future punishment, which he designates as "awful misery;" but, however long it may be, or "however many states some of the individuals of the human species may pass through," it will issue in such a change of mind as shall fit men for salvation, and "the Son of God . . . will not deliver up his trust into the hands of the Father . . . till he has fully discharged his obligations in virtue of it, having finally fixed all men in heaven, when God will be all in all."

The work rests upon what was, doubtless, a well-nigh self-evident proposition to Chauncy--that universal happiness was the designed goal of the universe. Still the argument is carefully exegetical, however defective. On Rom. 5:12 ff., he argues that, as mankind universally is the object of condemnation, "the same mankind must universally be the object of the opposite justification." The discussion of the meaning of the words for "everlasting" in the Greek Testament, ____ and _______, is an extended one. He curiously inverts the argument from Matt. 25:46, robbing it of all power to bear independent witness in the matter. He says:

The precise duration intended by the words . . . must be determined by the nature of the thing spoken of, or other passages of Scripture that explain it. When it is affirmed of the wicked that they shall go away ___ _______ _______, into everlasting punishment, the certain meaning of this word _______, everlasting, is clearly and fully settled by the above proof of the final salvation of all men.

The reply of Edwards was predominantly rational. He thus recognized the essential rationalism underlying the whole of Chauncy's argument. Not that he neglected the exegetical reply; for this was both elaborate and annihilating. In discussing the words ____ and _______, he counts their occurrences in the New Testament, classifies them, subjoins a concordance. He proves their entire correspondence to our English words "eternity" and "eternal," and shows that the presumption with which we come to the subject of future punishment is in favor of their strict use here. He follows Chauncy into all his windings and confutes him everywhere, manifesting all the keenness and delight in dialectics which his father had shown.

But the book was more than merely a successful piece of debate. It furthered essentially the understanding of its theme among the New England divines. The same discriminations as to various kinds of justice which appeared in the sermons on the atonement are applied to this theme. It is to be noted that the principle of all virtue is beginning to modify even the definition of distributive justice; for, while distributive justice respects the "personal character" of the sinner, the nature and amount of a just punishment are determined by the proportion which ought to exist between it and the crime. A punishment is just "when by the pain or natural evil of the punishment it exhibits a just idea of the moral evil or ruinous tendency of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all intelligent beings from the commission of the crime." This is to determine distributive justice by the consideration of the general good, or to convert it into public justice. Thus the relation to the goodness of God of his punishment of men is brought in at this early point; but there is also a special discussion of this relation. In order to answer Chauncy's fundamental assumption, Edwards asks the question "whether the damned deserve any other punishment than that which is conducive to their personal good." If they do not, and do not receive any other, then it is perfectly easy to reconcile their punishment with the divine goodness, for it is nothing but an exercise of the divine goodness toward them. Edwards answers the question affirmatively, because of the words which the Scripture employs to designate this punishment curse," "vengeance," "great evil," etc. which are irreconcilable with Chauncy's idea. But, now, how is future punishment consistent, upon this basis, with the divine goodness? Edwards replies: Pain inflicted in this life, and some punishment in the world to come (which, it will be remembered, Dr. Chauncy did not deny), are evidently for the good of the universe upon the whole. "Why may not endless misery be so too, provided it be just?" Thus Edwards answers the objections by an irrefutable hypothesis. He compels his opponent to prove a universal negative, if he will maintain the irreconcilability of eternal punishment with the divine goodness; viz.: Endless punishment answers no good end. But he does not stop here; he goes on with an argument positively supporting the consistency of punishment with goodness. To make a law which is inconsistent with goodness is just as bad as to execute it. But here is a law threatening eternal punishment. To execute it is no worse than to make it. Both must be consistent with goodness, if either is. But, since sin is in the world, God must punish it. If he were never to punish it, it would seem that he is no enemy to it. Or, if he punish it in a far less degree than it deserves, still it would seem that his displeasure at it is far less than it is and ought to be . . . But will any man say that it is conducive to the good order and happiness of the intellectual system, that God should appear to be no enemy, but rather a friend, to sin?

One more work must be briefly reviewed, and then we may turn away, for a time, from the Universalist controversy. This is Dr. Nathan Strong's reply to Huntington's Calvinism Improved. This is one of the best books of the series. It is, however, in so perfect harmony with the works already examined, in the carefulness of its exegetical discussions, in its emphasis of the new theory of the atonement as the proper answer to Rellyanism, and in the thoroughness with which it pursues the antagonist through all the intricacies of his argument, that we should be only repeating what has already been presented if we indulged in special citations. He repudiates with great force Relly's doctrine of "union." And the divergence of Huntington from evangelical theology is shown by the difference of his doctrine of saving faith.

At this point we may break off the discussion of Universalism for a time. The work of the New England divines did not stop the spread of the movement, for it founded a small number of churches which had for many years a lingering existence, and have perpetuated themselves to the present day. But these powerful collections of argument did arrest the tendency toward Universalistic views of the future among the New England churches, and determined that the course of New England theology should embrace no such divergence from the evangelical theology of the past.

We return, therefore, to the history of the doctrine of the atonement which we broke off with the essay of Stephen West. We had found him presenting more fully than his predecessors the origin of the atonement in the love of God, though leaving something to be desired in respect to the orderly development of this great central thought. His successors remedied this defect with increasing plainness of statement.

Dr. Nathaniel Emmons (1745-1840) expresses the connection between the love of God and the atonement by a more orderly deduction. He says:

All the moral perfections of the Deity are comprised in the pure love of benevolence. God is love. Before the foundation of the world there was no ground for considering love as divided into various and distinct attributes. But after the creation new relations arose; and in consequence of new relations, more obligations were formed, both on the side of the Creator, and on that of his creatures. Before created beings existed, God's love was exercised wholly towards himself. But after moral beings were brought into existence, it was right in the nature of things that he should exercise right affections towards them according to their moral characters. Hence the goodness, the justice, and the mercy of God are founded in the nature of things. That is, so long as God remains the Creator, and men remain his creatures, he is morally obliged to exercise these different and distinct feelings towards them . . . Now, there never was any difficulty in the way of God's doing good to the innocent, nor in the way of his punishing the guilty; but there was a difficulty in sparing and forgiving the wicked . . . This was a difficulty in the divine character, and a still greater difficulty in the divine government; for God had revealed his justice in his moral government . . . How then could grace be displayed consistently with justice? This question God alone was able to solve . . . By inflicting such sufferings upon Christ, when he took the place of a substitute in the room of sinners, God as clearly displayed his hatred of sin, and his inflexible disposition to punish it, as if he had made all mankind personally miserable forever.

Thus again, the government of God is founded upon his character, and ruled in accordance with it. There is still something of the juridical and external in the form of presentation, however, and it needs, perhaps, to be corrected by emphasizing the fact that the government which is here to be maintained is not a government of brute force, but a moral one, a government of moral agents by means of influence. Emmons Says:

It belongs to God not only to exercise a natural government over the natural world, but to exercise a moral government over the moral world. The proper mode of governing moral subjects is by laws, rewards, and punishments.

We may pass on however, for a more satisfactory treatment of this point, to Dr. Edward D. Griffin (1770-1837), whose treatise upon the extent of the atonement emphasized topic, and so had occasion to dwell more at length upon the nature of a moral government. Whatever difference there is, is more of form, however, than of substance. Griffin says:

Considered in relation to its dominion over the mind, a moral government may be called a government of motives; for these are the instruments by which it works. It is a course of acting, not upon the disposition by insensible influence, but upon the reason and conscience of a rational being by manifest motives . . . In a limited sense a moral government is the mere administration of law; but in a more general and perfect sense it includes the whole treatment which God renders to moral agents . . . A moral government wields all the motives in the universe. It comprehends the entire system of instruction intended for creatures. The Bible lies wholly within its bounds. It comprehends the public dispensation both of law and gospel, with the whole compages of precepts, invitations, promises, and threatenings. It comprehends the atonement, and all the covenants made with men, and all the institutions of religion, with the whole train of means and privileges . . . It comprehends a throne of grace, with all the answers to prayer. It comprehends a day of probation, with all the experiments made upon human character . . . It comprehends the day of judgment . . . It comprehends all the sensible communion between the Infinite and finite minds; all the perceptible intercourse between God and his rational offspring; all the treatment of intelligent creatures viewed otherwise than as passive receivers of sovereign impressions.

Caleb Burge (1782-1838), whose Essay on the Scripture Doctrine of Atonement is one of the very best of the New England treatises upon the subject, reproduces these ideas in various forms. He employs certain forms of expression, not common elsewhere, which present with special felicity the substitute which New England theology has to offer for the doctrine that the atonement satisfied the distributive justice of God. Its emphasis upon the individuality of man forced it to the position that, as justice demanded the punishment of the sinner himself, no other arrangement could satisfy exactly this demand. Yet there was something in God himself which must be satisfied by an atonement, which Burge styles his "justice to himself." He says:

Every good being, in order to do justice to his own character, must manifest his goodness. A wise being, in order to do justice to his character, must manifest his wisdom; or, at least, he must not manifest anything which is opposite to wisdom. All must allow that if one being should knowingly give a wrong representation of the character of another, who is wise and good, he would be very unjust. But if a good and wise being should give a wrong representation of his own character (if this were possible) there would be the same injustice done which there would, if the same representation were made by another.

Hence, in order properly to represent his own character, and be just to himself, God must forgive only upon a provided atonement. This is the truth underlying the incorrect statements of the strict satisfaction theory.

We pass on rapidly to Dr. N. W. Taylor (1786-1858). He placed the moral government of God in the forefront of his theology, and two-thirds of his printed lectures are more decidedly the freedom of man in connection with this topic. But they are only the development of what had been taught from the first in New England. This appears in the very form of the definition of a perfect moral government given at the beginning of the treatise. Taylor defines thus: "The influence of the . . . rightful authority of a moral governor on moral beings, designed so to control their action as to secure the great end of action upon their part, through the medium of law." Moral beings are defined as "beings capable of moral action." The points which Griffin had emphasized, form the main staple of Taylor's argument, except that they receive new force from the new theory of the constitution of the mind, which, beginning with Asa Burton, had now in Taylor's hands given American theology a better division of the faculties of the mind, and, by separating the sensibility and the will, had made a reasonable theory of moral action for the first time possible. The "control" spoken of is a control through influence, and this is the influence of authority. The law promulgated requires "benevolence . . . as the best kind of action and as the sum of obedience." Taylor views "benevolence on the part of the moral governor and its manifestation as one essential ground of his authority."

In this fact is involved another. The moral governor who is truly and perfectly benevolent, must feel the highest approbation of right moral action and the highest disapprobation of wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. These particular emotions in view of the true nature and tendency of right and wrong moral action are inseparable from the nature of benevolence in every mind. Again, benevolence, in the specific form of it now stated as the character of the moral governor, must, from the very nature and design of his relation be supremely concerned and absolutely committed to secure so far as he is able, right moral action in every instance, and to prevent wrong moral action in every instance by the influence of his authority.

Even the legal sanctions ratify God's authority by manifesting his benevolence. And so, when men have sinned, their salvation can be given only upon an atonement, since otherwise God would not appear to hate sin, or would disregard the obligations imposed by benevolence to maintain the authority of the law. In the development of this line of thought he is particularly strong. The immutability of God's character is the foundation of the immutability of his law, which is the expression of that character. The immutability of the law is the same as the immutability of its sanctions. Hence, as God is what he is, he must maintain the authority of his law, and hence the principle: the perfect equity or justice of a moral governor can be reconciled with mercy to transgressors only through an atonement. He shuts up the objector to an atonement successively to denying the benevolence of God, or else to maintaining the future exact retribution of this wicked world, or else to admitting an atonement. He does this with so great cogency and force as almost to amount to a new proof of the necessity of the atonement. The necessity lies in the demands of real and comprehensive benevolence.

It is unnecessary to quote from the writings of Charles G. Finney (1792-1875). The same views would be found to be repeated in connection with his more radical and correct opinions upon the freedom of the will. The meaning of a moral government; the character of God as love, which constitutes the divine response to the immediate affirmations of his own intellect as to obligation; love as having respect to the moral system as a whole and demanding a satisfaction to "public justice;" and the perfect adaptation of the divine government and of the atonement to securing the best good of all concerned, are brought out by him in terms largely identical with those employed by his predecessors, but with the added clearness which correcter views as to the nature of the mind and moral agency rendered possible.

Our whole review up to this point has shown us that, while the New England writers emphasized the divine government as the sphere within which the atonement was wrought, they all with increasing clearness founded that government upon an ethical idea, a conception of the character of God as love, which redeems the theory from the charge of artificiality and superficiality, though they did not seek to make the ethical idea prominent, or generally to deduce the whole theory from the ideal basis of it. But even the points already discussed cannot be made as full and clear as they should be, till we have read further. We therefore pass on without delay to the relation of election to the atonement.

The question of the extent of the atonement was prominently brought before the New England writers from the first of their investigations upon the subject. The Universalists had made the proposition that Christ died for all a principal step in their argument. The old theories had avoided their conclusion only by denying that he died for all; but this truth was too plain to admit of denial, in the opinion of the New England thinkers. So, from the first, they taught the doctrine of a general atonement.

Dr. Edwards says nothing in particular upon this point in his three sermons. West, however, proceeds to draw the conclusion which could but follow so soon as the premises of the new theory were adopted. The atonement was sufficient for the whole world, not in the sense that it "superseded all use of punishment in the divine government," but in the sense that it made "such a manifestation of divine displeasure against the wickedness of men as is enough to convince every candid spectator that the disposition of the divine mind is perfectly conformable to the true spirit of God's written law." "The direct end of atonement is answered," he says, "and such a manifestation made of divine righteousness as prepared the way for a consistent exercise of mercy. Now, God would not appear to give up his law even though he pardoned the sinner." West then dwells largely upon the dignity of the person of Christ as exalting the atonement made by him, and contributing to its perfection, and so to its universality.

Emmons is axiomatic and incisive, as usual. The proposition of his sermon upon the necessity of the atonement is: "That the atonement of Christ was necessary entirely on God's account," i. e., not at all upon man's. Hence he argues:

Then it was universal, and sufficient for the pardon and salvation of the non-elect . . . If it has rendered it consistent with the justice of God to exercise pardoning mercy to one sinner, it has rendered it equally consistent with his mercy to exercise pardoning mercy to all sinners. It opens as wide a door of mercy to the one as to the other.

If the only obstacles were upon God's part, once removed they were removed.

The great treatise upon this part of the subject was, however, Griffin's. We shall not fully understand his argument unless we have somewhat clearly in mind the course of New England thought upon the whole subject of the will, for Griffin seeks to find a solution of the difficulties between the maintainers of limited and of general atonement by sharper distinctions upon moral agency. We are therefore compelled partly to anticipate the discussion to which the next chapter is to be devoted. The freedom of the will, as needs scarcely to be recalled, was the great first question which engaged New England theology when Edwards began his contest with the Arminians. His solution, while providing for the divine sovereignty, and an external freedom of the man to do what he willed, did not provide for the freedom of the will itself. This was felt by his contemporary and successor, Samuel Hopkins, who brought forward the idea that freedom was an inalienable attribute of the will as such, and made it to reside, not in Edwards' external freedom, but in the very exercise of volition. Emmons, who was fond of paradoxical forms of statement, emphasized human agency as much as he did divine sovereignty, and often employed much the same terms to describe each. God governs man through motives, and yet when motives have been presented, he acts upon the will, which without his action never could respond to their stimulus. Thus God "produces" our volitions. In fact, all action in the universe is God's. But, on the other hand, by a mysterious connection between man and God, man acts exactly as if God did not act. He is perfectly free, and this in the same sense as God himself is. Under his universal agency, man has a real agency, which must no more be neglected than that of God. With varying success as to the theory of the will, the deepening tendency of the New England school was to view the divine and human operations in the matter of volition as if they were two con-centric spheres. The ultimate question as to the possibility of the communication of independence to man they did not attempt to solve. The fact of natural powers was enough.

Now Griffin approaches the problem very much after the manner of Emmons. His purpose is to reconcile the two schools of thought upon the extent of the atonement, and he says:

One party contemplate men as passive receivers of sanctifying impressions; and their question is, How many did God intend by regenerating influence to make partakers of the benefit of the atonement? The answer is, The elect. And so say we. The other party contemplate men as moral agents; and their question is, How many did God intend to furnish with a means of pardon which they should be under obligations to improve to their everlasting good? The answer is, All who hear the gospel. And so say our brethren . . . The mistake of our brethren, as we view it, has arisen from not keeping these two characters of man distinct [viz., passive subjects and agents]. The two characters are about as distinct as body and soul; and on their marked separation the solution of almost every difficulty in metaphysical theology depends.

This idea is more fully brought out as follows:

None but moral agents bear any relation to law, obligation, guilt, pardon, rewards, or punishments . . . This is what we mean when we say that the atonement was a measure of moral government . . . Now one of the things which essentially belong to a moral agent is, that he must act, and on his action his happiness depends . . . You cannot therefore contemplate a man as needing an atonement, without contemplating him as one, who, if he has opportunity, is to act towards the atonement, and is to enjoy or lose the benefit according as he receives it or rejects it . . . Anything, therefore, which is done for a moral agent is done for his use after the manner in which things are for the use of free moral agents, or creatures governed by motives and choice and bound to act. That is, it is done that he may use it if he pleases, and that he may be under obligation to use it.

The statement of Griffin's fundamental thought here is as follows:

The foundation of the whole divine administration towards the human race lies in this, that men sustain two relations to God. As creatures they are necessarily dependent upon him for holiness, as they are for existence, and as such they passively receive his sanctifying impressions; and they are moral agents. Now the great truth to be proved is, that these two characters of men (passive receivers and moral agents) are altogether distinct and independent of each other. And the proof is found in the single fact, that their moral agency is in no degree impaired or affected by their dependence and passiveness, nor their passiveness and dependence by their moral agency. That is to say, they are none the less dependent (as Arminians would make us believe) for being moral agents; and on the other hand (and this is the main point to be proved), they are none the less moral agents (as Antinomians seem to suppose), that is, are none the less susceptible of personal and complete obligations, for being dependent. For instance, they are none the less bound to believe because faith is "the gift of God," nor to love because love is "the fruit of the Spirit." Their obligations rest upon their capacity to exercise, not on their power to originate; on their being rational, not on their being independent. On the one hand, the action of the Spirit does not abate their freedom. The soul of man is that wonderful substance which is none the less active for being acted upon, none the less free for being controlled. It is a wheel within a wheel, which has complete motion in itself while moved by machinery from without. While made willing, it is itself voluntary, and of course free. On the other hand, the absence of the Spirit does not impair the capacity on which obligation is founded. The completeness of moral agency has no dependence on supernatural impressions, and on nothing but a rational existence combined with knowledge. The bad, equally with the good, are complete moral agents, the one being as much deserving of blame as the other are of praise; otherwise (which forever settles the question), the unsanctified are not to blame and cannot be punished.

The argument is continued:

I have shown you two independent characters on earth. If God acts towards these according to truth, there will be a counterpart of them in the heavens; he himself will sustain two characters . . . altogether independent of each other. As he stands related to the moral agent, he is the Moral Governor; as he stands related to the mere passive receiver, he is the Sovereign Efficient Cause . . . Now the atonement was certainly provided by the Moral Governor, because it was a provision for moral agents. It follows, then, that in making this provision he had no regard to the distinction of elect and non-elect [in distinguishing between which he acts as the Sovereign Efficient Cause]. An atonement made for agents could know nothing of passive regeneration or any decree concerning it.

These ideas represent the highest point attained by the New England writers upon the subject. They all re-echo more or less distinctly the teaching of Griffin. Burge says:

The atonement of Christ is, in a strict and proper sense, for all mankind. Christ tasted death for every man; for the non-elect as much as for the elect. Indeed, election has nothing to do with atonement, any more than it has with creation, resurrection from the dead, or the general judgment.

He adds immediately:

From the necessity and nature of the atonement it is evident that its extent is necessarily universal . . . The death of Christ completely removes them [the obstacles which stood in the way of God's pardoning sinners].

But we hasten to consider the artificial elements of the doctrine which these writers rejected. Among these the principal is the doctrine of imputation, with its associated idea of the strict equivalency of Christ's sufferings to our punishment. Doubtless the prime motive force in this modification of the old theology was the sense of reality and spirit of honesty which were characteristic of the New England thinkers. It is interesting to note the workings of President Edwards' mind upon these topics. His treatise upon original sin we have seen to be the most important of his works as illustrating the operations of his mind and the character of his theology in their relations to conservatism and progress. On the one hand he will have nothing to do with "treating men as" they are not; but, on the other, he cannot avoid a connection with Adam and a guilt for Adam's sin; and so he struggles with theories of identity and with ideas of divine constitution, till he makes us one with Adam in some sense, and yet declares that we are not guilty of Adam's sin by imputation till we are participators in it by "consent." But such efforts in behalf of imputation were in vain. Edwards' successors regarded the idea with more and more distrust, and the Universalist controversy put an end to every effort to retain it. At this time it became an evangelical interest which contended against the theory. Universalism and some forms of orthodoxy maintained that there was no grace in saving men, since the atonement had merited salvation for them, and the merits of Christ were directly imputed to believers. Hence eternal life was bestowed as a thing which had been duly bought by this infinite price. The New England thinkers found this too abhorrent to the gospel. We are saved by grace, they said, and they devoted a large part of those various discourses and treatises, which we have been reviewing in this chapter, to proving that an atonement is consistent with the exercise of grace. Smalley protests against forms of expression which the revered Thomas Hooker, of Hartford, had once employed, as if the sinner could claim forgiveness from God. "Where do we find," he asks, "our infallible Teacher instructing his disciples to make such challenges from the Father, even on his account, of deliverance from all evil and the bestowment of all good, as their just due?" Emmons answers the question from the standpoint of the New England theory of the atonement, as when he says:

Though Christ suffered, the just for the unjust, though he made his soul an offering for sin, and though he suffered most excruciating pains in the garden and on the cross, yet he did not lay God under the least obligation, in point of justice, to pardon and save a single sinner . . . By obeying and suffering in the room of sinners, he only rendered it consistent for God to renew or not renew, to pardon or not to pardon, to reward or not to reward, sinners; but did not lay him under the least obligation, in point of justice, to do either of these things for them.

But he also appeals to our sense of the majesty of God, who "is above being bound by any being in the universe." And, in general, he rests upon the fundamental absurdity of teaching that the character of one man can be transferred to another, since a character consists in acts which, done by one man, cannot be also acts done by another. Burge is perhaps as pointed as any of these writers. He says:

The righteousness of Christ, like that of every other holy being, consists entirely in his actions, feelings, and attributes. Essentially it consists in his love to God and other beings, and is as unalienably his as is any other attribute of his nature. Is it even possible that the actions which Christ performed while here on earth, in which his righteousness in part consists, should be so transferred from him to believers as to become actions which they have performed?

He says trenchantly in reference to the idea that believers receive the righteousness of Christ by faith:

It is confidently believed that neither Scripture nor reason affords any more warrant for the opinion that it is even possible for the believer's faith to receive Christ's faith, or love, than for the opinion that a believer's walking in the highway receives Christ's walking upon the water.

When it is said that "God views and represents them [sinners] as righteous, by virtue of the righteousness of Christ; then the inquiry which arises is, Whether God does not view and represent things precisely as they are?" In all this, which is the style of remark pursued by later New England divines as well, it should be remembered that what the antagonist had in mind was the ignorant Universalist preacher with his Rellyan doctrine of "union." But though the form of answer was thus determined, the New England divines held that the substance of their argument was valid also against the exaggerations of the Old School.

We have thus outlined the course of the doctrine in the New England writers; have shown the determining influence of the doctrine of Edwards as to the nature of virtue, which furnishes the ideal side of the theory; the influence also of increasing light as to the freedom of the will; and the strong effect of the idea of individuality introduced into the school by its founder. The theory underwent no essential change from this point during the progress of the New England school. In the theology of Professor Park it received some enrichment by his steady effort to incorporate whatever of good he found in other writers wherever laboring. Our study of this subject will therefore come to its legitimate conclusion while we are considering the theology of Park, to which time further discussion is deferred.

 

 

 

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