THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT
IN ITS
RELATION TO GOD AND THE UNIVERSE.
By the
REV. THOMAS W. JENKYN, D.
D. Plus Sections 1 thru 6 ON THE ATONEMENT IN ITS RELATION TO
DIVINE MORAL GOVERNMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL
GOVERNMENT. DIVINE moral government is that control which the blessed
God exercises over minds of accountable beings, by reasoning
with them; that is, by exhibiting motives and inducements
addressed to their hopes and fears on the subject of their
DUTY. God governs everything according to its nature. He
manages the sea, and regulates the planets, by physical
force, and the various tribes of animals, by the laws of
instinct. Every one knows that the waves of the sea, the
revolutions of the planets, and the migrations of birds, are
not to be regulated by reasoning with them. But man can be
governed and controlled by reasoning with him; and his
conduct can be regulated by exhibiting to him sufficient
motives and inducements. We keep our oxen to the plough by
physical force, but we keep the ploughman at his work by
moral government, that is, by giving him sufficient motives
and inducements to be so. He is not chained, nor bound, nor
yoked, but acts freely, even while he is bound by
obligations. Physical force can never become an element of moral
government. In proportion as force enters it, it ceases to
be a moral government. The more freedom there is in a
government, the more purely moral it is. Such a freedom is
not the freedom of licentiousness and anarchy, for these
always encroach on the freedom and liberty of some of the
other subjects. It is by reasoning, and presenting motives, that we
govern our own minds, and influence the minds of other men:
and it is by the same means that God governs us, and which
he calls "the cords of a man." If minds become, so debased
and obstinate as to refuse or to dislike such a control in a
community, then coercion will be employed to subdue them.
The slaves at the galleys are governed by coercion, and
criminals are drawn to the place of execution by force; but
this, in a just and wise government, only befalls those who
have voluntarily rejected the moral control of reason and
justice. Man is a reasonable being, and as such, is a member of
the great moral commonwealth of the universe. That
commonwealth supplies him with a law as the rule of his
conduct towards the whole universe. This law surrounds him
with rich and copious exhibitions of reasons, motives, and
allurements, to lead him to the formation of a good
character, and to the choice of a wise course of conduct. It
forces him to nothing, but leaves him perfectly free. In
this government man, as a reasonable being, is free from
everything except from the moral obligation to do good, and
from accountableness to his Ruler if he do wrong. Law must indispensably have the sanctions of rewards and
penalties. Without these a law would be a mere advice, a
recommendation only, and of no authority. The penalties of
the moral law are sufferings and pains. In this inquiry, it
is no work of ours to account for the reasons why sufferings
were annexed as penalties to the moral law, any more than it
is to discover why injury and destruction are, in the
physical laws, the penalties for falling down a precipice,
etc. We can only say, that such is the moral constitution of
which we are members; and such, do providence, conscience,
and the Scriptures, declare it to be. By wrong doing, or sinning, man becomes liable to this
penalty. Nothing but sin will bring us into contact with
sufferings as the penalty of the law. No perfection of God,
no decree of God, no measure or work of God, no malice of
enemies--in short, nothing in the whole universe will bring
us within the reach of the punishments of the law, but
SIN. The sufferings of a sinner, of one who transgresses the
law, are right and good for the ends of the government of
which we are members. The penalty is inflicted, not for the
mere sake of putting the delinquent to pain, nor of
gratifying the private revenge of a ruler, but to secure and
to promote the public ends of good government. These ends
are to prevent others from transgressing; by giving, to all
the subjects, a decided and clear demonstration of the
dignity of the law, and a tangible proof of the evil of
crime. If a member, then, break the rule of the great moral
constitution, it is right that he should suffer, that the
evil of his suffering might restrain others from the evil of
transgressing. As far as sufferings answer these public
ends, they are right and useful; but when they fall short of
these ends, or when, in severity of infliction, they go
beyond these ends, then, they are only natural evils added
to moral ones, without removing them. It is due to the character of the governor, as the public
organ of a commonwealth, and due to the welfare of the
government, that the penalty should be executed on the
offender. It is right and good that the man who injures you
should feel an inconvenience, a pain, a suffering for
it,--not to gratify your spleen and revenge, but to prevent
others from again daring to injure you. You approve of the
penalty when it is executed on others for injuring you; but
if you disapprove of it, when inflicted upon yourself for
injuring others, it is because you are selfish, and feel no
concern for the public good. Sinners have transgressed the law, they have wronged God
they have spoiled his works, and have injured his liege
subjects, and therefore, for the public good, they deserve
to suffer as transgressors. THE PENALTIES OF MORAL GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTERED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC
JUSTICE. Obedience is the first thing, which man, as a member of
government, owes to God. If man give not obedience to the
law, then punishment is due from him, for the ends of good
government. In the classical writers of Greece and Rome, the
"supplicium" or punishment is always represented as being
given, or paid, by the offender, and as what was due, from
him to the government, and not as what was due from the
government to the transgressor. This language expresses the
reality of the case of an offender in Moral government. The
promotion of the public good by his obedience is first due
from him: if he does not promote it in this way, then it is
due from him to promote it, by sustaining the penalty of the
law. The question now occurs, "Upon what principle shall this
penalty be administered?" Private individuals will answer
this according to their own feelings and interests. Some
will say "Let power be employed to inflict a severe
chastisement and intense sufferings for the crime." Others
will say, "Let mercy be exercised to administer the penalty
gently and sparingly." Neither of these principles, alone,
will administer the penalty safely and honorably for the
ends of government. All honest subjects will say, "Let
justice administer it, whatever be the consequences." All
may assent to this, but the difficulty of administering the
penalty with safety is not removed, Another question occurs, "Upon what modification or
principle of justice would you execute the penalty? "Justice
takes many modifications. There is commutative justice,
which gives to another an equivalent for value received.
Divine moral government does not administer the penalty upon
this principle; because it is perfectly inconsistent with an
administration on moral principles, to deal out a
mathematical measurement of punishment for an arithmetical
amount of injury and wrong. For though the punishment of the
sinner will be no greater than deserved, yet all his
sufferings and pains will never be an equivalent, in
commercial or commutative justice, for the honor and the
homage of which God has been wronged. Commercial or
commutative justice cannot therefore be exercised here for
the government is a moral one. No moral quality or action
can, in this government, be recompensed with a commercial
payment. It were absurd to suppose, for instance, a father,
a husband, or a master, governing his family, on the
commercial principle of paying so much, in money or goods,
as equivalent for so much love and obedience received. The execution of the penalty, also on the principle of
distributive justice, is inconsistent with the present
administration of moral government, as it is a state of
probation and trial. Such an execution would render our
present state not a state of trial. If every swearer, or
sabbathbreaker were immediately dealt with according to his
character, men would no longer be in a state of probation to
try whether they would swear and keep the Sabbath or not. If
men would be always seeing the immediate and summary
consequences of sin, they would not be any longer in a state
of being proved, as to what was in their heart, whether they
would keep His commandments or no. They would be walking by
sight, and not by faith. The exercise of what is called vindictive justice in the
administration of the law, ill accords with the present
connection between God and man. There is so much goodness
and mercy, so much clemency and bounty, in our present
circumstances, as to assure us that God has thoughts of
peace and not of evil concerning us. Even the evils and the
inflictions of the present state are not vindictive, but are
evidently under the control and direction of a benevolent
principle. If the divine justice be regarded as commutative, or
distributive, or vindictive, we must suppose that the
execution of the penalty is an affair of indispensable
necessity, and that it must inevitably be inflicted.
Besides, in such a necessary execution, there is also
implied a necessary and inflexible adherence to the strict
letter and form of the law, so that the Public Ruler cannot
inflict less punishment than was threatened, nor confer more
favor than was promised, without violating the
constitution. Then we must recur to our former question--"Upon what
principle shall this penalty of the law be administered?" I
answer, upon the principle of PUBLIC JUSTICE. PUBLIC JUSTICE is that justice which a government
exercises to preserve the public good and defend the public
honor of the whole community. In human governments, the
chief magistrate has a power of suspending penalties, and of
dispensing favors, provided he does not exercise such a
prerogative to the detriment of the public good. Public
justice is related to civil good, as distributive justice is
related to personal good. If the penalty be executed, public
justice provides that it shall be executed only. for the
public ends of government, and not for private revenge. if
the punishment be suspended, public justice provides that
the suspension or remission shall not be detrimental to the
public good; it provides that the ends of government shall
be as fully secured by the suspension as by the execution.
On the principle of distributive justice, Junius Brutus
delivered his two offending sons to the lictors, and said,
"Execute the law upon them." On the principle of public
justice, Zaleucus spared his offending son from blindness,
by consenting to suffer the loss of an eye himself. The ends
of good government were as effectually secured by the public
justice of Zaleucus, as by the distributive justice of
Brutus. The tendency in either administration to produce
salutary impressions on the subjects, is decidedly in favor
of that of public justice. THE SUSPENSION OF THE PENALTY, ON
HONORABLE GROUNDS, CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC
JUSTICE. If the chief magistrate, in suspending a punishment, or
conferring a pardon, act beside the letter of the law, he
cannot be said to be unjust, while his measures subserve the
general design of the law, and answer to the spirit of the
constitution. Suppose one of a gang of robbers to turn king's evidence.
Distributive justice would require that the penalty of death
be inflicted upon him as "particeps criminis," and the
letter of the law would demand his execution. In such a case
the chief magistrate thinks that he will promote the ends of
justice, and secure the public good, better by suspending
the merited punishment than by inflicting it; and,
therefore, so far, no honest subject in the kingdom will
think him guilty of injustice. In civil governments, we are, every day presented with
instances of the suspension of punishment, when it can be
done without injury to the public good. A thief is condemned
to suffer the punishment of death, but this punishment is
suspended, and transportation for life is substituted
instead of it. In either case the end of government is
answered, namely, that he should no longer wrong honest
subjects. The providential government which God exercises over the
affairs of this world, shows that threatenings can be
honorably suspended, when the ends of good government can be
secured by it. The case of Nineveh is in point. The end of
divine government, in the threatenings denounced by Jonah,
was the reformation of the people. This end was secured
without an infliction of the penalty, consequently, no one
but Jonah has ever thought the suspension or remission of
the punishment wrong. That it is a possible case that a
punishment maybe suspended, when the ends of government can
be otherwise secured, is evident from the whole history of
the forbearance and longsuffering of God. The threatened
inflictions are long delayed; many serious warnings are
given of the approach of judgments: when judgments come,
they are not inflicted so severely as was threatened; and
their execution takes place gradually, as if God were
reluctant to inflict them, and as if he were waiting every
moment for a signal. to withhold his hand. This induction
proves that to secure the ends of government, is much
greater in the estimation of God, than to execute a literal
threatening; and this demonstrates that his denunciations
can be honorably withdrawn when their public ends are
secured. It has pleased God to give us a specimen of his
administration of moral government over the universe, in the
theocracy which he exercised over the Israelites. In the
annals of the theocracy, suspensions and remissions of
threatened punishments are facts of very frequent
occurrence. Indeed the whole of this divine polity was a
system of suspensions, founded upon the substitution of
sacrifices, as public expedients and honorable grounds for
the non-infliction of threatenings and penalties. Since God
in this peculiar polity has clearly shown that he can, on
honorable grounds, suspend a threatened judgment, without
being deemed unjust, he has thus exhibited to us the
operation of a principle which is capable of indefinite
application to the whole sway of his moral government, and
which has actually left well-defined and indelible traces of
its operation in the administration of divine
Providence. Even if the arguments from analogy failed us in proving
the justice of suspending a threatening, there is one fact
that in the history of sinners is boldly prominent, and is
presenting itself at every turn: it is the fact that the
original penalty threatened to our first parents has been
actually suspended. Had it been literally executed, there
would have been no human race now existing. The penalty
threatened to Adam was, "in the day thou eatest thereof,
dying thou shalt die." Adam did eat of the forbidden tree;
he was spared, he did not die, his penalty was suspended,
his punishment was remitted. Was such a suspension just? On
what principle can it be justified? We reply that it was
suspended on the principle of public justice, which made
honorable provisions, that the spirit of the divine
constitution should be preserved without adhering to the
letter of it. THE DEATH OF CHRIST AN HONORABLE
GROUND FOR REMITTING PUNISHMENT. I. The atonement of Christ is a distinct and public
recognition of the truth and justice of the sinner's
liableness to the punishment threatened in the law. The apostle Paul, in Col. ii. 14, represents the
influence of the death of Christ as paying a debt or
cancelling a bond. The chirograph, or bond, means the power
of the law to condemn a sinner; that is, our obligation and
liableness to suffer the penalty threatened by the law for
sins. The sinner owes to the public government the suffering
of the punishment. It is this due, this obligation, this
liableness, that is represented by the chirograph. The first part of an honorable payment of a debt, whether
commercial or civil is, freely owning the justice of the
claim, and acknowledging the reality of the obligation. The
whole of the undertaking of Christ proceeds upon this
recognition, that what the law requires is holy, just, and
good. By blotting out the handwriting and cancelling the
bond, he did not mean to imply that its claims were false.
or that its demands were unjust. On the contrary, he nailed
the chirograph to the cross, as having been once a true and
valid indictment. The death of Christ, or the atonement by his death,
supposes the charge against the sinner to be true, and his
liableness to the punishment to be just and right. He came
to seek and to save, that which is "lost," to call, not the
righteous, but "sinners," "children of wrath," "condemned
already." If the atonement did not regard sinners, as
antecedently given over by sin to suffer the penalty of the
law, Christ would not have died to redeem them from under
the condemnation of the law. This public testimony to the
dueness of the punishment honors the divine government in
maintaining and enforcing its claims on the sinner, and
marks sin as an inexcusable wrong, and of unextenuated
guilt. II. The provision of an atonement shows the great concern
of the moral Governor, for the ends of justice, which are to
be secured in his administrations. God is rich in mercy, plenteous in redemption, and ready
to forgive; nevertheless he is concerned for the honor of
his justice. He loves right, and he hates wrong. He loves
order in his government, and is concerned to prevent
disorder. His hatred of disorder and wrong, is commensurate
with his love of himself, and with his concern for the
public good of the universe. In defending his own rights,
the whole of his public character and revealed glory is
concerned. He needs no motive to feel compassion and mercy
towards sinners; nevertheless, a safe medium is necessary
for the honorable expression of that mercy towards them. Sin is a public injury both to God and to the universe.
It is not in the nature of mercy, nor does it become its
character, to forgive such a public wrong without an
expression of its abhorrence to the crime. Such a mercy
would be weak indulgence, a fond and a blind passion. Every
one sees that a family, governed on such a principle, would
soon become the pest of a commonwealth: and so would a
company of servants, or an army of soldiers. Even family
discipline requires that, when you forgive a child, there
ought always to be some expression of displeasure at the
offence. The most powerful expression of mercy's abhorrence of
sin, and of its concern for the ends of public justice, has
been given in the substitution of the Son of God. A father,
for instance, will not be afraid of relaxing the bonds of
good discipline in forgiving a child, when, a mother in
tears and anguish, is the expression of an abhorrence of the
child's offence. God has consulted the ends of public
justice in the exercise of his mercy, and has therefore set
forth the death of his Son as the honorable ground on which
he is just in justifying him that believes. God spared not
his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, as a clear
demonstration of his great concern for his justice, and as a
public expression at what a dear rate he forgives the sin
which his righteous soul abominates. Such a provision for securing the ends of justice, honors
the divine government, because it shows that the reins of
just authority are not at all relaxed. All the subjects will
feel, from the whole of such an arrangement, that the moral
Governor thinks very highly of justice. No friend of the
Mediator can slight the law and the government, and no one,
who slights and disregards the law, will ever be deemed a
friend of the Mediator. III. In the atonement the suffering of death by Jesus
Christ was substituted, by the blessed God, instead of the
suffering of the punishment that was due to the sinner. Jesus Christ suffered for us, the just for the unjust. He
was made a curse for us-and a sin-offering for us. When it
is said that Christ suffered for us, it is not meant that he
suffered the sufferings due to us in law, but that his
sufferings were endured as substituted instead of our
sufferings. An atonement goes on the supposition that the
identical sufferings which were threatened against man, are
suspended, and that other sufferings are substituted instead
of them. This exchange, or commutation of sufferings, in the
expedient for redemption, was intimated in the first promise
made to Adam. Man by transgression had become liable to the
literal sufferings which were threatened in the penalty
annexed to the law. From these sufferings he was to be
delivered by the Seed of the woman. This deliverance was to
be effected, not by power, but by a price of substituted
sufferings, designated the "bruising of the heel," a very
different kind of suffering from that which was threatened
to Adam. This view of the vicarious and substitutionary character
of the sufferings of Christ will give some definiteness and
this phrase is not scriptural, it is not to be treated
contemptuously, as it is not constantly used, with much
sweetness and unction, by many Christians, and in our
spiritual songs. "What are the debts which Jesus Christ has paid for us?"
Some answer the question by saying that Jesus Christ obeyed
the law for us; gave, in our stead, and in our name, that
obedience which we owed to the law, so that the law cannot
now demand perfect obedience of us, because this was given
to it in our stead by Jesus Christ. To understand the theology of such a phrase, let it be
duly considered-- Did Jesus Christ pay our debts in this
sense ? Did he obey the law that we might not obey it? Did
he do what the law required, that we might be discharged
from our duty? Did he love God and love his neighbor, in our
stead, so that we are delivered from the obligation to do
so? I am sure, I wrong my reader by supposing for a moment
that he does not perceive, at once, that in this case,
Christ has paid no debts for us. Paying for us the duty
which we owed to the law, would be redeeming us from God,
and not to God, and would be an axe at the root of all
moral-government. No class of rebels would ever be restored
to their allegiance, by any high officer so obeying the law
in their stead, as to discharge them from all fealty and
homage. It is, therefore, evident, that by Jesus Christ's paying
our debts must be meant, not the debt of duty, but the debt
of penalty. The handwriting, or chirograph, which he
cancelled, was not the bond of obligation to duty and
service, but the bond of liableness to punishment and
sufferings. It will be inquired, "How did Jesus Christ pay our debt
of penalty?" This question is frequently answered, by
saying, that Jesus Christ suffered the identical punishment
to which we were exposed in law. This sentiment is embodied
in a phrase not at all uncommon, that "Jesus Christ suffered
the hell of his people." I shall refer a fuller discussion of the commutation of
sufferings to the chapter on the atonement in its connection
with sin. I shall, now, only remark farther, that the
atonement of Christ cancelled the obligation to punishment,
not by paying the idem in the duty, nor by suffering the
idem in the penalty, but by substituting his own sufferings
instead of the sufferings due to the sinner. IV. The sufferings of the Lord Jesus Christ answer the
same ends as the punishment of the sinner. We have already remarked that an offender is publicly
punished by a wise government, not for the sake of putting
him personally to pain and torture, but for the sake of
deterring others from committing crimes and offenses. It was
upon this principle that an English judge once remarked to a
criminal before him, "You are condemned to be transported,
not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may
not be stolen." The ends of government, in the punishment of offenders
are--to show the goodness and benevolence of the law--to
demonstrate the impartial justice of the governor-to exhibit
the evil consequences of breaking the law,-and to impress
offenders with the hopelessness of escaping the punishment
due to crime. You may be doubting the benevolence of a law that
punishes an offender. But suppose your house robbed, or your
child murdered, you would account that law really
benevolent, which would kindly throw around you the shield
of her sympathy, and would rid the country of such robbers
and murderers. It is true that the murderers themselves
would not regard such a law as good and benevolent, but
every honest man would admire and welcome it. Sinners
generally judge of the laws of God, as criminals judge of
the laws of their country. Public punishments tend to show
that the design of the law is good, and that it watches
kindly over the interests of the poorest subject. By public punishment the magistrate shows that his
justice is impartial and fair. He is above private motives;
his concern is for the public good. The insulted rights of
the, lowest subject shall be vindicated by him: and the
rank, or power, of an illustrious offender shall not thwart
the measures of righteousness. The effect will be that all
will stand in awe of the majesty of unsullied justice. The spectators of a public punishment are likely to be
impressed with the evil of the crime. They perceive that
they who know the interest of the nation best, regard the
deed of the culprit as being injurious and wrong to every
honest subject. They feel that if every one did as the
culprit did, there would be no living in any community. They
will know that by the conduct of the culprit some families
have suffered severely, and that, if he had been spared,
many more would have suffered. They would see that such a
mode of life, however easy and pleasant for the moment, is
sure, eventually, to end in sorrow, infamy, and ruin; and
that such an ignominious end of such a character will be
approved and praised by all honest men everywhere. The other end of government, in executing punishment, is
to convince all offenders of the hopelessness of escaping
the law. The criminal may long hide himself, but eventually
he will be apprehended, and caught in the firm grasp of the
law. Neither his obscurity nor his rank, neither his
entreaties nor his bribes, can shelter him from the
execration of the law and the constitution. The impressions
of this every spectator and every hearer of the execution
will carry with him to his home and to his retirement. If a man transgress a law he must, in a just and firm
government, be punished. Why? Lest others have a bad opinion
of the law and transgress it too. But suppose that this end
of the law can be secured without punishing the
transgressor; suppose that a measure shall be devised by the
governor which shall save the criminal and yet keep men from
having a bad opinion of the law. Why, in such a case, all
would approve of it both on the score of justice, and on the
score of benevolence. For public justice only requires that
men should be kept from having such a bad opinion of the law
as to break it. If this can be done without inflicting what,
in distributive justice, is due to the criminal, public
justice is satisfied because its ends are fully
answered. In the moral government of God, the death of the Lord
Jesus Christ does this. It secures all the ends of the law,
as if the sinner himself had been punished. This view of the
atonement is, I think, what Paul meant when be said, that
"Christ was the end of the law for righteousness;" that is,
that the very end which would have been secured by the
punishment of the sinner himself has been amply and fully
secured by the death of Christ. It is on this account that
the death of Christ is represented in Scripture as an
atonement, a satisfaction, or an equivalent, for suspending
the literal execution of the penalty on the
transgressor. There are two sorts of equivalents, one belonging to
commercial transactions, and the other to moral and civil
affairs. A commercial equivalent is an exchange of one kind
of property for another, as between a buyer and seller, and
which particularly defines the kind and the quantity to be
thus exchanged. A moral or civil equivalent does not regard
kind or quantity, but secures the same ends, and produces
the same effects, as the other moral or civil measure,
instead of which it is substituted, would have produced. Why
in the social circle do you accept of an expression of
sorrow for a fault, instead of inflicting the pain of your
displeasure ? It is because you think such sorrow will
answer the same ends as the infliction of your displeasure.
Why was the death of Zimri and Cozbi, by the zeal of
Phineas, accepted by God as an atonement, instead of
inflicting the threatened death on all the Israelites who
had joined Baalpeor? It was because it answered the same
ends for preventing idolatry as if all the idolaters had
died. Why were the sufferings of our Lord on the cross
substituted, instead of inflicting the curse of the law on
man? It was because that, in the estimation of the moral
Governor of the universe, these sufferings of his Son would
answer the same "end of the law," as would have been secured
by the destruction of the transgressors themselves. The death of Christ secures this end. It magnifies the
law and makes it honorable in the sight of the universe, as
holy, just, and good, both in its commands and in its
threatenings. It is a demonstration of God's justice, as it
shows that he would not exercise even his mercy without an
expedient to honor his justice, though at the cost of the
sufferings of his illustrious Son. It is a testimony to the
evil of sin--that it is regarded by God as an evil, that it
has actually inflicted evils on many, and is likely to
inflict more; that it tends to misery, infamy, and death. It
demonstrates the impossibility of escaping the law: for if
God spared not his own Son as the substitute, "how can we
escape, if we neglect so great salvation?" Thus the death of
Christ tends to deter men from breaking the law and answers
the ends of punishment. The sufferings of Christ not only secure the same ends of
government as the death of the sinner, but they answer them
more fully and abundantly. They better express the
benevolence of the character of God; they better show the,
evil of sin; they supply better motives for holiness; and
they bring a greater accession of happiness to the universe,
for they not only prevent miseries that might have come but
they suspend those which were really due. The sufferings of
a Personage of such grandeur and worth are calculated to
make, on the universe, deeper impressions of the rectitude
of God's government, and of God's displeasure against sin,
than a literal infliction of the penalty on sinful and
degraded creatures. Yea, they answer other and higher ends
than the prevention of sin. The sufferings of millions of
sinners could never have been made a ground and medium for
exercising mercy; could never bring any sinner that was
under the penalty into repentance; and never could save
other sinners: but the sufferings of Christ can do these
things, and do them gloriously. Thus did the blood of Christ
speak BETTER things than the blood of Abel. There are two stupendous facts, in the administration of
moral government, which prove that the death of Christ
answers all these ends. The first is, that though God
declares sin to be an infinite wrong to him, yet he never
asks any sinner to make an atonement for his sin. The reason
of this is, that He himself has found a ransom and has set
forth his own Son as the propitiation for this. The second
is, that God will not treat any man as a sinner, if he will
believe that the death of his Son was a propitiation for
sin. The reason is, that in Christ he is reconciling the
world unto himself without imputing their transgressions
unto them. V. The death of Christ provides that pardon shall be
dispensed to the offender in such a manner, as shall fully
sustain the interests of moral government. Pardon is proclaimed through an atonement which, by its
very provision, supposes that the honor and authority of the
law are not weakened. If God had had no regard for the honor
of his law and government, he would not have provided an
equivalent. He was just, independently of the atonement, but
he provided an atonement that he might be just in justifying
sinful men. The sinner is forgiven on his repentance, which reflects
a disgrace and reproach upon sin. God, indeed, has always
the disposition and the power to forgive, independently of
the state and feelings of the sinner, but the sinner's
discharge from the liableness to the penalty of the law is
not passed, as a judicial act, until he repents of his
transgression. As God has given an expression of his
abhorrence of sin in proclaiming pardon, so has he ordained,
for the ends of government, that the sinner also should give
an expression of his abhorrence of it. This the sinner does
by his repentance. When one comes forth from the ranks of
the revolters, and returns to his allegiance, it is as far
as his influence and example go, a reflection both on the
revolt, and on the revolters. A repenting sinner blames both
himself and others for rebellion against God, and thus
promotes the interest of the divine government. Forgiveness is offered freely and sincerely to all the
offenders, which preserves the divine government from the
charge either of capricious partiality or of arbitrary
severity. God calls upon all men everywhere to repent, and
this is an intimation to all men everywhere that there is
for them forgiveness with God. He exhibits his pardons as in
every way suitable and adequate to the case of the greatest
offender, for he is plenteous in mercy and able to save to
the uttermost, He publicly promises free pardon to every
penitent sinner, and sincerely offers it to every sinner,
with a solemn declaration that "him that cometh he will in
no wise cast out." Hence no offender can despise the government for
partiality, or blame it for undeserved severity. The pardon of the gospel comes from sovereign grace, and
unmerited favor, and this excludes all boasting, claim, and
presumption. Notwithstanding the reconcilableness of God,
and notwithstanding the atonement of Christ, yet no sinner
can claim pardon. Some persons, indeed, have represented
pardon as due from God to the elect; and have said, that it
would be unjust in God not to pardon them. There is nothing
in the holy Scriptures, there is nothing in the nature of
grace itself, to support such a bold and impious sentiment.
Try it yourself. Did you ever feel in prayer that you could
claim the blessings which you asked? Does a happy soul feel
so on his entrance to heaven? Does Gabriel feel that he has
a claim even to his own crown? No: it is all of sovereign
grace. The offender accepts the pardon by believing it, that
is, by faith. The whole of this arrangement excludes
presumption and self-gratulation. The reprieve is not the
prisoner's own, until be accept it; he accepts it merely by
believing it. Would any prisoner think that he deserved the
reprieve because he believed it? Would he demand his
reprieve as a claimant, or would he beg it as a supplicant?
Would he on account of the reprieve presume on the king's
favor and continue to live in rebellion? No the king has
freely, of his own prerogative forgiven him, but it is in a
way, "that he might be feared" and served. The dispensation of pardon still perpetuates and
continues man in a state of probation, and this checks all
inclinations to licentiousness. God pardons, not that he
might be trifled with, but that he might be feared and
served. Man when pardoned is not taken out of a state of
probation and trial. He is still accountable to law, he is
still liable to break that law, he is taught to pray daily
for pardon, he is chastened and afflicted for his sin, and
he will have to appear at the reckoning of the judgement
day. By such an arrangement the honors of the divine
government are safe. The exhibition of pardon has in itself a tendency to
affect the heart, and to restore a rebel to his allegiance.
There is forgiveness with God, not that he might be dreaded,
but that he might be esteemed, revered, and served. There is
no tendency in the dispensation of wrath to make the sinner
relent and return; it hardens more and more. Sinners who
have been beaten with many stripes become harder and harder.
Satan, Cain, and Judas, are now harder than when the storm
began to fall on them. It is mercy that conquers the heart,
and wins the rebel from his revolt. It is mercy "that
restores man to his allegiance,' that God may be served.
Wherever this mercy is prominent in the ministry of the
gospel, thither do guilty criminals flock, as doves to their
windows. After all, it is not mercy to rebellion, but mercy
to rebels; therefore, there is nothing in forgiveness to
connive at revolt, though it smile on the sinner. A LIMITED ATONEMENT INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL GOVERNMENT. By a limited atonement, I understand, an atonement that
consists in suffering the limited amount of punishment due
in law, to a certain number of offenders, the benefits of
which are limited to that number, and to that number only.
Such an atonement is at variance with the declared
principles of divine moral government. It is at variance
with the accountableness of sinners to the law, in their
present state of probation; and it is inconsistent with the
principles of justice on which the divine government is
administered. A limited atonement is established on the principle that
the penalty threatened by the law must, of indispensable
necessity, be executed, executed literally and fully, or
otherwise the justice of the divine government would be
weakened and dishonored. It supposes further, that if the
punishment of the law be not executed on the offender, it
must be executed on the substitute. Then it proceeds to
argue thus,--some offender's are through grace delivered
from the punishment, therefore their punishment must have
been inflicted on their substitute. And again,--some sinners
will themselves forever suffer the punishment of the law in
hell, but it would be unjust to inflict the punishment again
upon them, if Christ, as a substitute, endured it for them;
and THEREFORE the punishment of these sinners was never
sustained by Jesus Christ in his atonement. Sometimes the necessity of the sufferings of Christ as an
atonement is made to arise from the inexorableness of
vindictive justice; and then, vindictive justice is
represented as impossible to be satisfied and appeased,
except by the awful intensity of the sufferings of the
Mediator. Nothing less would propitiate it. Our ears and our
hearts have been pained a thousand times by representations
of the blessed God as if revelling in the agonies of the
cross, and in the blood of his own Son. When "it pleased the
Lord to bruise him," it was not for the undivine
gratification of inflicting pangs and tortures of intense
pain; but "it pleased the Lord" to deliver him up a
sacrifice for our offenses, to substitute his sufferings
instead of ours, as an expedient, for honoring the law and
saving man God still held his Son in undiminished love, and
had infinite pleasure in his vicarious undertaking, and had,
in all the mysterious sufferings of the cross, sincere
good-will towards the salvation of man. If we suppose the
compensative scheme of atonement to consist, not in a
substitution of person only, but also in a substitution of
sufferings, the atonement cannot be represented as
satisfaction to vindictive justice, but it will appear to be
what it really is, an atonement to satisfy the ends of
public justice, in promoting the purposes of mercy. Upon the principle of distributive justice, it is
impossible to account for the atonement of Christ and for
the salvation of man. Some divines constantly affirm that
divine justice required the death of Jesus Christ as a
substitute, and that the death of Christ thus satisfied
divine justice. Is this, indeed, true? To ascertain this, think, What is
justice? Justice is giving to every one his due, or treating
every one according to his character. Now, let us ponder it;
"Was this justice satisfied in the death of Christ? "Justice
is satisfied when it gives to every one his due, or treats
every one according to his character. But, were the
sufferings of an ignominious death really DUE to Christ? Did
he DESERVE the treatment which be received? Is the salvation
which sinners receive through his death really DUE to them?
In short, is either Christ, or the sinner, treated in this
transaction according to character? I conceive that any man looking at this stupendous
scheme, not through the colored medium of a theological
system, will see that Christ received sufferings which he
never deserved, and that the sinner receives blessings which
were never due to his character. Divine justice treats
neither party according to character: for "the Just" who
"did this," and deserved to "live," dies; and "the soul that
sinned," and deserved to die, lives; both cases being
contrary to the principles of distributive justice. The remark is probably ready, that, "this is a peculiar
exercise of justice, as the "just" is substituted for "the
unjust," that the unjust might be saved for his sake." Very
well. Such a measure will be deemed and admired by all as an
expedient of transcendent benevolence and clemency; but the
original question still presses on us; "How is justice
satisfied in it, when neither party has what is due to his
character?" In this critical difficulty, reason and
revelation meet us with the assurance, that though this
expedient of substitution is not distributive justice,
either to Christ or to the sinner, yet it is a measure of
entire justice towards the interests of the community under
divine moral government, because the ends of justice are as
fully secured by the substitution, as if the offender
himself had suffered. It is therefore evident that the
justice which admitted of substitution is not what is called
distributive justice. It is PUBLIC JUSTICE. The exercise of public justice is suitable to the
relations existing between God and man, because it is free,
benevolent, and honorable. Public justice is voluntary and
optional. The standing order of the divine government is not
that God must be just in executing punishment, but that he
might be just in showing clemency. It makes the infliction
of the penalty not indispensable, but admissible and it
makes the suspension of the penalty admissible too, only
when the ends of its infliction can be otherwise honorably
secured. Public Justice is benevolent. It shows that God is on the
side of good; that he had good-will to each subject, and to
all his empire. "Therefore will the Lord wait, that he may
be gracious; and therefore will he be exalted, that he may
have mercy upon you; FOR the Lord is a God of judgment."
Public justice is honorable. By its exercise God humbles
himself without being dishonored; and man is condemned
without being injured, and he is saved without reproach. God
himself regards its exercise for a pleasure, a joy, and a
glory. It is as a just God and a Saviour, that he rests in
his love, and joys over the universe with singing. The hypothesis of a limited atonement is founded upon
commercial views of the justice of God. It supposes that
justice was administered to Christ, the substitute, upon
commutative principles. The hypothesis stands thus: A
certain number of souls was given to Christ to be
saved--certain amount of punishment was due to them for so
many sins--Christ suffered that amount for them, and for
them only; therefore, the benefits resulting from that
suffering is limited to them, and to them only. The supposition of God acting on the principle of
commutative or commercial justice, taking and receiving a
quid pro quo, completely perverts and destroys the moral
dignity of the atonement, and also all its influence as a
medium of saving man with honor to the divine government. It
makes God to exact punctually from Christ the identical
punishment threatened to the sinner, as none other could
have been due, to be inflicted. It makes God to proportion
the sufferings of his Son to the number of sins imputed to
him, as it would have been unjust to have inflicted more or
less than the proportion really due. It represents the
Father of mercies as doling out favors, in proportion to the
number and degree of his Son's sufferings, giving neither
more nor less to any man than the purchased quantum. It
represents the elect as claiming salvation as what is justly
due to them from God, for value which he has received from
their substitute, because it would be unjust to exact the
same debt twice. It represents the salvation of some men as
utterly impossible, because their debt has never been paid.
It exhibits the great and blessed God as mercenary in his
gifts, unwilling to yield a single boon but for value
received in the sufferings of his Son--sufferings which are
represented as inducing, not to say bribing Him to be
propitious and merciful. All these limitations of the
atonement are to be traced to commercial views of divine
justice; and surely such troubled and unwholesome streams
should make us seriously doubt the purity of their source. I
will now introduce a few citations from two of our most
masterly divines, partly to supply specimens of what I mean
by commercial views of the divine administrations; partly to
show that such commercial views naturally produce the
doctrine of limited atonement; and partly to indicate how
much those commercial views have colored a great portion of
systematic theology. The number of citations of this
character, either from these two authors themselves, or from
other theological writers might be indefinitely
increased--but these are sufficient. The first author is Dr. THOMAS GOODWIN, a great master in
the Israel of his day, whose works are marked by deep
research, independent thinking, and evangelical suavity. The
extracts are made from his "DISCOURSE OF CHRIST THE
MEDIATOR," found in the third volume of his works in folio.
Ed. 1692. In b.i. chap. 5, Dr. Goodwin introduces the sinner
as proposing to God for his pardon, "rivers of oil, the
first-born of his body, etc," but all being too low, the
Doctor remarks, "There is no proportion. God would never
have turned away so fair a chapman, if his justice could
afford so cheap a commutation." In b.i. chap. 7, he says of
Christ, "He must pay God in the same coyn we should, and
therefore, must make his soul an offering for sin--and if he
be made sin, he must be made a curse; and which is more than
all this, God himself must be the Executioner, and his own
Son the person who suffers, as no creature could strike
stroke hard enough to make it satisfactory." In b. i. chap.
8, he says, "As his Father recommended the business to him
[Christ] so also he gave special recommendation of
the persons for whom he would have all this done-viz., those
who were given to Christ. Then he observes--"a strange gift
it was, which he must yet pay for, and must cost more than
they were worth; and yet he takes them as a gift and favor
from his father." "So as Mediator (and though a Mediator) he
saves NOT A MAN, but whom his Father gave him, nor puts a
name in more than was in his Father's BILL. You may observe
how careful he was in his account, and how punctual in it.
John xvii. 12. He is exact in his account as appears, in
that he gives a reason for him that was lost, that he was a
son of perdition, and so excuseth it." In b. i. chap. 9, he
represents Isa. xlix. as "the draught of the covenant, or
deed of gift betwixt Christ and his Father for us "--and
then says, "His Father offers (as it were) low at first, and
mentioneth but Israel only as his portion. Then as he
[Christ] is thinking them too small an inheritance,
too small a Purchase for such a price,"--"God therefore
answers him again, and enlargeth and stretcheth his covenant
further with him." In the next chapter he says, that "Christ
laid down a price worth all the grace and glory we shall
have." The next author is DR. JOHN OWEN, the Lebanon of English
theology. The great extent of his learning, his accurate
sagacity in searching the workings of the heart, and the
prominence which he has given to the person of Christ, have
recommended his works to such acceptance and circulation, as
to give their own hue and character to much of the theology
of his country. But the principle of a commercial atonement,
of paying quid pro quo, is interwoven with his whole system
of divinity, as Phidias's name in the shield. Take a
specimen, or two, from his 'Death of Death,' etc., "God
spared not his own Son, but gave him up to death for us
all--that he made him to be sin for us--that he put all the
sins of all the elect into that cup which he was to drink
of; that the wrath and flood which they feared did fall upon
Jesus Christ "--"so all the wrath that should have fallen
upon them, fell on Christ, etc."--"He charged upon him, and
imputed to him all the sins of all the elect, and proceeded
against him accordingly. He stood as our surety, really
charged with the whole debt, and was to pay the utmost
farthing." "The Lord Christ (if I may so say) was sued by
his Father's justice unto an execution, in answer whereunto
he underwent all that was due to sin, etc." "Christ
underwent not only that wrath (taking it passively) which
the elect were [actually] under, but that also which
they should have undergone, had not he borne it for
them." I have quoted enough. An atonement of such a commercial
character as this appears a measure of niggard calculation,
and dribbling mercenariness. It will be a glorious day for
the doctrines of the gospel, and for practical godliness,
when commercial views of the death of Christ shall be
entirely rejected by both christian divines and christian
churches. Thanks be to God! these views are fast
disappearing; as is evident from the fact, that they are
scarcely ever mentioned in the creeds of young ministers at
their ordination.